But, before we get a sense experience, like sight, certain psychological
impediments hare to be removed. For instance, diversion of attention,
and subjective conditions like prejudice and bias, have to be minimised
if we are to get a correct sense experience. For instance, as I Vulcan
says, for every sense experience we have a mental set which determines a
type of the specific sense experience that we get.- This set
may be inherited or acquired. This psychological factor may be compared
to the
labdhi
of
the
bhavend. Yiya,
which is the expression of the hormic force in the specific form due to
the partial destruction zind subsidence of the knowledge-obscuring
karmas
relating to that sense.
The problem of the contact of the sense organs with the object
of stimulation is an important one in Indian thought. It has a great
psychological significance. Almost all the systems of Indian thought
were aware of this problem and have expressed themselves in one form or
another. The
Nyaya Vaisesika,
the
Sariikhya,
the
Mimamsaka
and
the Vedanta schools of thought believe that all the sense organs get
sensory experience through direct contact of the object of stimulation
with the sense organ. This refers to the physical contact
of the object of stimulation with the sense organ and the sense organs
having such contact are called prapyakari. The sense organs in which
there is no such physical contact with the external stimulation�s are
called aprapya kari. According to the orthodox systems of Indian
philosophy mentioned above, the sense organs are prapyakari because
there is physical contact with the stimulation. In fact, it is
maintained by them that the sense organs move out to the object in the
form of vrtti, or modification, and by taking in their form apprehend
them. The Buddhists believe that the visual sense organ and the auditory
sense organ cognize their objects without coming into direct contact
with them. They are aprapyalrari. For all of them, however, the mind is
aprapyakerri, because it does not come in direct contact with the
object. The Jainas maintain that the visual organ, like the mind, is
apnipyakari, because it does not come in contact with the object. For
instance, we get visual experience of the moon and mountains alike.
According to the Jainas, the eye does not go round to the mountain and
then fix a point to form the vrtti, nor does it go round the stars and
then fix on the moon to get the experience. Such a movement of the eye
round the objects of stimulation is absurd, and it contradicts our
experience. The Jainas say that light and dark ness do not involve the
eye going out �to see light. Moreover, the eye is not an external organ,
bahyendriya.
The
Jainas maintain that it is not true to say that there is a physical
contact either of the nature of anugraha or upaghata for the eye. Seeing
the blazing sun is not upaghata, because the eye is the organ of light (tejasendriycr);
and matter of the same nature does not bring arrugraha and upaghata. But
the eye is not active while seeing the sun after the clouds have gone
because there is deficiency of light. The rays in the eyes are few
compared to the abounding rays of the sun. However, when we see the
blazing sun our eyes do not ache.
The Samkhyayikas object to
maintaining that the eye alone, like the mind, is aprapyakari, and the
other four sense organs are prapyakari. If that were the case, we may as
well argue, they say, that all the sense organs are aprapyakart, because
we, for instance, hear distant sounds and smell the fragrance of a
flower from a distance. But the Jainas say that this objection is not
convincing. They point out that even those sense organs which are
prapyakari do not go out to meet the objects for getting experience; the
objects themselves come in contact with the sense organs and the sense
organs remain where they were. It means that external stimulation�s,
like sound waves, affect the ears and as a result we hear.
The Buddhists say that even the
ear may be called aprapyakari, because we hear from a distance, and as
there is no direct contact of the object with the sense organ. It is
aprapyakari because, in any type of auditory experience there is no
physical contact. For instance, a new-born infant will give the same
type of response to the stimulation of a loud sound or of a pleasant
sound. Even if there is thunder, auditory experience may not be
possible. But the Jainas say this is not a correct explanation, because
in the case of the infant the sense organs are not as yet well adapted
and developed. They have not sufficient capacity for grasping the sound.
The appropriateness of stimulation is one of the conditions of sensory
experience. In the case of hearing, the sound waves are received only
when the sense organ is suitably developed and also when other
conditions are favorable. That is why they go to the appropriate places,
yogya desavasthita. For instance, a low tone is not generally heard, but
if the beloved speaks in a low tone the lover quickly hears. This refers
to the psychological factor of interest which is a condition of specific
sense experience. We may include this in the labdhi of the bhavendriya.
In the case of the auditory sense, the Jainas point out that, although
the ear is a prnpyakari and although some form of physical contact is
necessary for the auditory experience, it is not direct physical contact
with the stimulation as in the case of smell or taste. In the case of
taste specially, the stimulation is directly physical. The particles of
food, for instance, come actually in contact with the tongue. Such
direct phsical contact is called baddha sprsta.z The Jainas say that in
the case of the auditory sense organ the contact is there but it is
indirect. Stimulation like sound waves issuing from the object come in
touch with the organ of hearing and we get the auditory experience.
Modern physiologists describe the
process of audition in these terms. The sound waves are transmitted
through the external auditory meatus to beat against the tympanic
membrane. As a result, the tympanic membrane is caused to vibrate in
harmony with the frequency of sound waves. The movement of the tympanic
membrane in response to sound waves causes the auditory ossicles to move
with it. Under normal conditions, sound waves pass through the external
auditory meatus and strike the ear-drum. This energy is transmitted to
the fluid of the inner ear and the hair cells in the organ of corti are
caused to move and initiate an auditory impulse. There are two theories
concerning the mechanism by which the movement of the hair cells gives
rise to impulses in the auditory nerve: (i) through a microphonic
effect, and (ii) through a chemical mediator. At present, evidence is
not conclusive for either theory.
Thus, the Jainas believe that the auditory, gustatory, olfactory and
tactual sense organs are prapyakari,
because the contact of the object with the sense organs is due to
upaghata, a gross and subtle
physical contact. The touch of a blanket gives the experience of
roughness, and contact with the sandal paste gives a sense of coolness.
Particles of camphor come in contact with the olfactory sense organs and
we experience a smell. Similarly, soft sounds give a pleasant
experience. But in the case of the eye there is no contact between the
sense organ and the object.
On
the basis of the analysis of perception given in modern science it is
not possible to say that the Jaina view of the
aprapyakari nature of the
visual sense organ is not understandable, because some kind of contact
of the external object with the sense organ is necessary ,even in this
experience. But it should be observed that light is only required to
illuminate the object and not to serve as a medium between the eye and
the object, for the eye can observe the object being itself untouched by
the rays of light illumining the object.
However, the problem of the contact of the sense organ with the abject
was viewed differently by the ancient Indian philosophers. Their problem
was to explain the possibility of cognition to the sense organ. The
Jainas had a realistic approach, and they refused to believe that the
sense organ goes out to meet the object.
C.
D. Broad says that hearing is projective in its epistemological aspect,
and is emanative in its physical aspect. We may say that sight is
ostensibly prpensive and not projective in its epistemological aspect,
but is emanative in its physical aspect. Touch is ostensibly prehensive
in its epistemological aspect, and is non-emanative in its physical
aspect.o
The Jaina analysis of the
prapyakaritva of the sense organ of hearing and the
aprapyakaritva of the sense
organ of sight may be compared to the analysis given by Broad, although
the epistemological and physical aspects of the problem were not clear
to the Jainas in that early stage of knowledge.
Considering the capacity of the sense organs, the Jainas believe that
the capacity of the eyes is greater. The eye perceives things like
mountains, which are at a distance, and things which are very near, like
the parts of the body. But it cannot see the dust in the eyelids. The
capacity is limited, because it cannot see things which are beyond a
particular limit, like the farthest and the nearest. The Vaisesikas say
that it is a defect of the eye. But the Jainas maintain that it is the
nature, the svabhdva, of the
sense organ. The auditory organ is of a similar nature. But in the case
of the ear there is a special power. It grasps sound waves coming from
as far as twelve yojauas
if the wind is favourable and they
are not obstructed. It grasps the sound waves even inside the ear. It is
subtler than the sense organ of smell. It receives sound waves of
various types, but it grasps only those which are relevant, as the bird
picks out milk from a mixture of milk and water-the hamsakstra.
Modern science recognizes that vision is the
most important of all the senses. Blind people learn to depend on other
senses to a remarkable degree. But for the loss of vision there is never
anything like complete compensation. We rely or, vision for protection,
for equilibration, for co-ordination, for creation and pleasure. Next
comes audition. Then we have olfaction and other sense functions.
Audition ranks, perhaps, almost with vision. In the case of man,
olfactory acuity has been allowed to be atrophied. The lower animals are
far more dependent on their acute sense of smell than we are. Actual
survival hinges on the animal�s ability to find food and to avoid
enemies. To some extent this was also the case with primitive man. But
as man advanced, the olfactory sense began to get restricted in its use.
Modern men use the olfactory sense for pleasure. Audition, like vision,
is important for protection, because this sense warns us of danger in
the environment. It also adds to our enjoyment. Therefore, it is
considered as a vital sense.
We may refer to the functions of the senses on the different
animal levels. According to the Jainas there are gradations of animal
life. At the lowest level, there are the one-sensed organisms called
ekendriyas.
They may be earth-bodied,
water-bodied, air-bodied and fire-bodied. This level includes the
vegetable kingdom. Many of the organisms are minute or even microscopic.
They pervade the whole world. They are described as sakala loka
vyapinah. Some of them may be
gross-bodied, and visible. These organisms possess only the sense of
touch. No other sensory discrimination has been developed in them. The
amoebae, the paramecium and other protozoan animals, similarly
coelenterates and even flat-worms, may be included in this list,
although the Jainas have not mentioned any specific animal species in
this category. Modern comparative psychologists are not agreed on the
question of the sensory experience of lower animals. Some maintain that
they have a chemical sense. But some scientists like Stealer think the
reaction of these animals may be due to mechanical stimulation. Even in
food-seeking the sense of touch is predominant. Romances ascribed a
certain amount of discrimination among mechanical stimuli to the
sea-anemones. In the case of planaria maculate, a species of flatworms,
Bardeen has suggested that auricular appendages on the animal�s
Also refer to Physiology of� Man
by
Lanaley and Cheraskin, Chapter-Special Functions.
back near
the head end which are specifically sensitive to the touch, may be
delicate organs capable of stimulation by slight currents in the water
set up by minute organisms that prey on the animal�s food, so that the
primitive reaction when given to food may be really a response to
mechanical stimulation.
In
the next stage are the two-sensed organisms called
dvendriyas. They have the
sense of touch and taste, which is like the chemical sense, although the
chemical sense signifies a combined sense of both touch and taste.
Comparative psychologists maintain that rudimentary animals, specially
the water-dwelling animals, have smell and taste combined. They call it
the chemical sense; for, in the aquatic animals smell and taste are
actually the same. Lloyd Morgan has proposed the term �talaesthetic
taste� for the chemical sense of aquatic animals. But it is said that
touch gives mechanical stimulation and is present in all animals. The
Jainas say that touch is the basic sense. They describe in detail
animals possessing the two senses. They give examples of animal species
possessing the two senses. For instance, the conch,
candauaka, kapardaka, jelukhi, golaka,
and puttaraka, belong
to this class. These are the molluscan species. Among comparative
psychologists there is general agreement regarding the presence of the
chemical sense in the molluscan. animals. Nagel regarded the horn of the
marine snails as their most sensitive region. Pieron found that there
are three modes of chemical excitability in these animals: (i) an aerial
distance excitability on all parts of the body with predominance of the
mouth, the anterior edge of the foot, and the siphon; (ii) a contact
sensibility in both air and water in the horns in the mouth; and (iii) a
delicate distance sensibility in water located in the regions of the
mouth, the horns, the anterior edge of the foot and the osphradial
region.
Three-sensed organisms possess a sense of touch, taste and smell. Many
examples have been quoted. The ants have three senses.. The four-sensed
organisms possess the sense of touch, smell, taste
and
sight. The bhramara (the bee)
has four senses. Many of these belong to the species of insects. But
comparative psychologists are not agreed on the place of the sense of
sight in insects. The homing of the bees and their recognition of their
nest-mates were the two interesting problems which psychologists were
faced with. Some scientists thought that vision is the guiding factor in
these cases. However, Be the thought that they were not guided by sight.
He said there was some unknown force which guided them to their hives.
Many scientists believe that smell plays an important part in this case.
Modern scientists have observed that even simple animals like the
amoebae give reaction to light stimulation. Schaeffer reports a curious
fact that the amoebae
can �sense� a beam of light 20 microns to 120 microns distant moving
towards it. Many jellyfish react to light. Romanes says that they
possess a visual sense; but there is no positive evidence. Some of the
molluscan species possess eyes of some degree of development, although
their reaction to light is very slow. The crustacean are provided with a
peculiar visual organ, the compound eye; and the chief function of this
eye seems to be that of responding to shadows and movements. As we go
higher up in the animal scale, we find that the structure of the eye
becomes more complex, and the compound eye gives rise to the simple eye
with cones and rods. The vertebrates, like fish
(Matsuya),
crocodile
(niakara),
and man are five-sensed organisms.
Those possessing the five senses are divided into two groups: (i) those
possessing mind and intelligence; these are called
sarhjninah;
(ii) those who do not possess mind
and intelligence, asarhjiainah.
It is not possible to say
whether the Jainas showed a qualitative distinction between sense and
reason. However, they maintained that among the five sensed animals only
some of them are samjititls.
Human
beings belong to this class. They possess specific
mental states like memory, imagination and intellection.. The
asahijnins
do
not possess such mental qualities. A further psychological analysis of
this group is made by the Jainas. They say that the
saujnins
are
further divided into those which are incomplete and those which are
complete. Incomplete species are those in which the sense capacities do
not work freely and are deficient in expression. Such deficiency may be
due to a defect of structure in the sense organ or in the mental
capacity to grasp the sense experience. This, in brief, is the
classification of animals having sense organs. Going higher in the scale
of life, there are those beings who are not fettered with the sense
organs. They are called
anindrivas.
They get pure and unalloyed experience, because sense experience,
according to the Jainas, is experience at a lower level. It is not
direct experience of the soul. It comes through the sense organs, which
are a limitation. Beings without sense organs come nearer to the
realization of the highest experience. Some of them are complete in
mental equipment and capacity. They are perfect beings. They are
siddhas.
Thus, from the psychological analysis of the development of animal life
we go to the metaphysical nature of the soul found in the disembodied
being. The embodiment of the soul is a hindrance to the attainment of
pure experience. Pure experience is possible by removing the barrier of
the senses. The present stage of psychology cannot explain such a
phenomenon as super-sensible experience, although it is possible to
approach this problem through studies in para-psychology and
extra-sensory experience. Research in this direction is both possible
and necessary. This problem will be referred to in a later chapter in
which extra-sensory perception will be discussed.
Sense qualities
Sense organs are instruments by means of which sense
experience is possible. The senses are capacities of experience, and the
sensible qualities which exist outside are objects of experience. For
instance, the common element between the eye and the object is colour,
and the common element in the case of hearing is sound. They are
stimulation�s. The Jainas have given a psychological analysis of the
sense qualities emerging from the experience of the various senses. As
Radhakrishnan says, a good deal of psychological analysis is discernible
in the division of sense qualities. According to the Jainas, the visual
sense quality of colour is classed into five types: black
(krsna),
blue (nila), yellow
(pita),
white
(sukla),
and pink (
pedant).a
Young supposed that there exist three distinct sets of nerve fibers, one
set sensitive to red, one to green and the third to violet. This theory
has been expounded by Helmholtz. There are three primary colour
excitations, and the mixture of these three gives different colour
experiences. All fibbers are responsive, in some way, to all waves,_
though the red fibbers are excited by the long waves: Green fibres
respond to those of medium length. Violet fibres are maximally
stimulated by short waves. All colour experience results from these
three simultaneous excitations based on the relative strength of the
components in the stimulus of light. This is the Trichromatic theory.
But Herring and Franklin have objected to this theory. They maintain
that yellow and white are as primary as the three colour qualities
mentioned by Helmholtz. Herring supposed that the primaries are to be
arranged in pairs. There are three complex substances, one mediating
white-black, another red-green, and the third responsible for
yellow-blue. The white-black material is more plentifully supplied and
is more readily excited than others. When activated, it gives purely
achromatic brilliance and can be depressed in direction by black only
through light adaptation and contrast. The other two substances behave
differently, having their activity either depressed or augmented. The
red-green substance yields red when �torn down� by light, and green when
built up. In the yellow-blue substance, depression produces blue,
whereas augmentation results in yellow. The LaddFranklin theory
represents, in a sense, a compromise between the Trichromatic
combination for mixture and the tetra-chromatic combination in its
existence. It points out that there are five primary colour qualities.
In fact,
Newton presented his celebrated triangle for explaining the natural
phenomenon of the spectrum and the scope of the sense of sight. The
triangle places green at the apex, red and violet at the lower points,
gray in the centre, and purple at the mid-base. The figure is given in
Table III. Instead of this triangle, Wound proposed a circle. Titchner
gives us a pyramid in which every possible chromatic or achromatic
variation finds its due place. Whatever may be the difference between
the views of the Jainas and of modern scientists, it may be said to the
credit of the Jainas that they were aware that the five sense qualities
are responsible for giving the variation in colour experience. Modern
scientists like Ladd and Franklin, and even Newton, have mentioned five
primary qualities. According to the Ladd-Franklin theory, there is a
white-black whole and a yellow-blue whole; similarly, it mentions the
red-green whole. The Jainas did not mention red-green as a specific
sense quality.
TABLE III
Newton�s
Triangle of Spectrum
GREEN
GREY
FED
PURPLE VIOLET
Regarding sense qualities like touch, taste and smell, the
Jainas give a detailed analysis of the different types of sense
qualities. Touch is of eight kinds, like hot
(usna) and cold
(sita); rough
(ruksa) and smooth
(srzigdha); soft
(komala) and hard
(kathora); light
(laghu) and heavy
(guru). Modern scientists have
realized that skin has the potentiality of yielding a greater diversity
of sensations, because the skin proves to be responsive to a wide range
of stimuli, like mechanical, thermal, electrical and chemical.
Mechanical stimulation gives rise to sensation. of touch, contact and
pressure. Thermal stimulation produces the sense experience of warm and
cold in various degrees. Chemical stimuli have been worked to give rise
to pain. Chemicals and drugs have been of much interest for their
quality of reducing pain. Electrical stimulation of the skin
seems capable of arousing all systems
of sensibility. Kinaesthetic and organic sensibilities of various types
including hunger and organic pain belong to the sense of touch.o The
Jainas say that there are five types of taste: pungent
(tiktu),
bitter
(katu),
acid
(umla),
sweet
(nzadhura)
and astringent
(kasaya).
Some scientists have
accepted salt, sweet, bitter and sour as the primary taste qualities.
However, there is no complete agreement on this point. In the Western
thought, at the end of the sixteenth century, there were n.ine basic
taste qualities, like sweet, sour, sharp, pungent, harsh, fatty, bitter,
insipid and salty. By the middle of
TABLE IV
Henning�s Taste-tetrahedron
the eighteenth century, some of them were
gradually dropped, because it was found that they were merely mixtures
of different taste qualities. Later, four qualities were accepted as
primary. Henning�s �taste-tetrahedron� presents the relation between the
four primary taste qualities: saline, sweet, sour and bitter. Various
other taste qualities arise out of the inter-action of the primary
qualities. However, Henning views taste as one, and not four senses.
Henning�s tetrahedron is shown in Table IV.
The Jainas classified smell in only two types, as good,
(sugandha)
and
bad
(durgandha).
No
further distinction has been made,
In the eighteenth century, in Europe, an
odour system was devised. Henning has given a scheme of odour prism
which is shown in Table V. The Crocker Henderson system posits four
fundamental odours, like fragrant, acid, burnt, and caprylic. All these
classifications are partly based on experimental investigation and
partly on rational insight. But there are difficulties in the grouping
of odours, because, as Woodworth points out, in, the analysis of
Henning�s classification some odour qualities are not purely odour. They
are mixed up with taste qualities. Zwaardemaker classified the smell
qualities as ethereal (as in
TABLE V
Henning�s Smell Prism
FOWL
SPICY
EESINOUS
fruit), aromatic (as in spice), fragrant (as
in flowers), ambrosial (as in musk), alliaceous (as in onion),
ampyreumatic (as in tar), hircine (as in cheese), repulsive (as in
laudanum), and nauseous (as in decaying flesh). This is a very
elaborate, even clumsy, classification. It does not mention the primary
sense qualities alone. The Jainas gave an analysis of the odour
qualities, and in fact of all sense qualities, on the basis of rational
insight. They thought it safer to analyse the smell sense qualities into
two major categories, as good and bad.
The traditional exposition of the seven fundamental sounds (svara)
mixing in various ways to form melodies of various types, has been
accepted by the Jainas. The seven sounds are: sadja, rsabha, gandhara,
madhyama, paiacama, dhaivata, and nisadha. In the Western sound system,
we get the following: Do, re, me, fa,
sol, la, and si. In all, there are twenty-seven main kinds which
can be combined in innumerable
TABLE VI
1. Sparsa�Touch�8
kinds (1) Usna (hot); (2) Sita (cold); (3) Ruksa (rough);
(4) Snigdha (smooth); (5) Kornala (soft); (G) Kathora (hard�,;
(7) haghu (light); (8) Guru (heavy).
2.
Rasa--Taste-5 kinds:
(1) Tikta (pungent);
(2� Amla (acid); (3) Katu (bitter); (4) Madlcura (sweet); (5)
Kasaya (astringent).
3. Varna�Colour�5
kinds: (1) Krs�a (black); (2) Nila (blue); (3) Pita (yellow); (4)
Sukla (white); (5) Padma (pink).
4.
Gandha-Smell-2 kinds: (1) Sugandha (sweet smelling); (2)
Durgandha (bad-
smelling).
5.
Sabda-Sound-7 kinds: (1) Sadja; (2) K,sabha; (4) Madhyama; (S)
Pancama; (G) Dlaatvata; (7) Nisadha; i.e. the: Do, re, me, ,;a,
sol, la, si.
These are 27 which can
be combined in various ways.
Note:
In rational beings, mind also assists the senses in bringing
knowledge to the soul.
ways. There
are two varieties of combination of tones: difference tones and
summation tones. The difference tones were discovered by the celebrated
Italian violinist, Tartini. Summation tones were discovered after the
Helmholtz researches, in 1856 A.D.
A difference tone has a pitch determined by the difference
between the frequencies of the two other tones. The pitch of the
summation tones results from the addition of frequencies. The study of
the combination of tones and beats has led to research in auditory
harmony. In the case of sound researches, Spearman says that a
distinction has been drawn between noise and tone.43
A detailed classification of the Jaina view of sense qualities is shown
in Table VI.
Thus, the analysis of sense qualities given by the ancient Jainas has
not been arbitrary. It has a great psychological significance, although
it has no basis in scientific and experimental research. However, it can
be said with confidence that the Jaina analysis of sense qualities shows
a good deal of psychological significance, and has shown very deep and
clear rational insight. The conclusions drawn by these philosophers may
not be adequate and not agree with the modern views of scientists who
have worked out the same problems through experimental research in
laboratories. It may be noted that there is not either much agreement
among modern scientists as to the detailed analysis of sense qualities
like colour, sound, smell and taste, although there is a fair agreement
on the fundamentals. The same measure of agreement can be found in the
views of the Jaina philosophers. In fact, the views presented by the
Jaina philosophers on the problem of sense qualities very much agree
with the views of other Indian philosophers of ancient times. We find
this in a description of sense qualities given by the Naiyayikas. It is
needless to say that the psychological significance of the analysis of
sense qualities given by the Jainas purely through rational insight and
not on the basis of experimental research, cannot be ignored.
CHAPTER V
THE JAINA
THEORY OF SENSE PERCEPTION
The Jainas have made a significant contribution to the theory of sense
perception. In order to understand the Jaina theory of sense perception
it is necessary to study their epistemology.
The Jaina attitude is empirical and realistic. The Upanisadic
philosophers found the immutable
reality behind the world of experience. Goutama, the Buddha,
denounced everything as fleeting and full of sorrow. Mahavira stood on
commonsense and experience and found no contradiction between permanence
and change. The Jaina philosophy is based on logic and experience.
Moksa is the ultimate aim of
life. It is realized by the three-fold path of right intuition, right
knowledge and right conduct.� Right knowledge is one of the major
problems of Jaina philosophy. It is necessary to understand the Jaina
theory of knowledge and experience for the proper understanding of Jaina
thought. The Jaina epistemology is very complex and developed gradually
in response to the demands of time.
The Agarrta theory of
knowledge is very old and probably originated in the pre-Mahavira
period. Jnana pravada formed a
part of the Purvasruta which
formed a part of the ancient literature. Jinabhadra, in his
Visesavasyakabhasya, quotes a
pirva gatha on
jnaua. There seems to have
been no difference of opinion between the followers of ParSva and
Mahavira regarding the division of knowledge. Both of them accept the
five-fold distinction of knowledge. The
Agamas have also presented the
five divisions of knowledge.
Knowledge is inherent in the soul, but owing to perversity. of attitude
arising out of the veil of karma,
we may get wrong knowledge,
ajiTa;ta. Knowledge is perfect when the veil of
karma is totally removed. It
is imperfect even when there is partial subsidence or destruction of
karma. The soul can get
perfect knowledge directly when the veil of
karma is removed. That is
pratyaksa jnana. But empirical
knowledge, experience of this world, is possible with the help of the
sense organs indirectly. Such knowledge was called
paroksa jnana. Matijrcana
(sense experience), and srutajnana
(knowledge due to verbal communication), are
paroksa jitana; while
avadhi (extra-sensory
perception), muraahparvaya
(telepathy), and kevala jn�ana
(omniscience), were called pratyalcsa.
But
[Please this
table see file name �wide table page no. 13,57,73�]
later, in order to bring the Jaina theory of knowledge in line with the
theories of other systems of Indian thought, they modified their
conception of
pratyaksa
and
paroksa j0na.
In
the
Anuyogadva�ra Sictra,
we
find a change in terminology.
Mati
and
sruta
began to be called
pratyaksa
as
they were possible through the operation of the sense organs. Jinabhadra
calls the two
samvyavalzara prat,vaksa.e
Alongside of
jnana,
we
have direct intuition of the object. It is
darsana. Darsana
has
similar subdivisions. In the same way, wrong knowledge is also possible
in those cases where the veil of
karma
is
not removed and where there is perversity of attitude. Thus, we have
mati-ajrcana, srcata-ajn�ana,
and
avadhi-ajnana.
The
general classification of knowledge and intuition mentioning their
perversities, is shown in Table VII. This classification shows that the
Jairlas believed that the subsidence and destruction of the veil of
karma
is
a necessary condition of knowledge and intuition. Wrong knowledge is
characterized as
samsaya
(doubt),
viparyaya
(perversity), and
anadhyava.saya
(wrong knowledge caused by carelessness and indifference). Owing to the
lack of discrimination between thereal and the unreal, the soul with
wrong knowledge, like the lunatic, knows things according to its own
whims. Perversity of attitude veils the faculty of perception and
knowledge, and knowledge becomes vitiated. It becomes
ajilana.s
Pratyaksa
We may now consider sense perception or
pratyaksa jnana,
as
the
Nandisutra
calls it. It is knowledge obtained through the operation of the sense
organs and the
manas.
It
was called
paroksa by
Umasvati. Jinabdhara called it
sarirvyavahara pratyaksa.
It
is also called
indriya pratyaksa.-I
In the
Nandisutra,
a
distinction is made within
pratyaksa,
between perception
(indriya
prcrtyaksa),
and
perception not due to the sense organs
(unindriya
prat yaksa).s
Hemacandra describes in the
PramanamFmaritsa
that
pratyaksa
is
that which is immediate, clear and unambiguous. He analyses the various
definitions
of
pratyaksa of
other schools and shows that they are not adequate. The Naiyayika
definition of perception as unerring cognition which is produced by the
sense object contact is not adequate. How can the sense object contact
and the like, he asks, which is not of the nature of cognition, function
as efficient instrument for the determination of the object? The
Buddhists have given a definition of perceptual cognition as that which
is free from conceptual construction and is not erroneous.
But Hemacandra
says that this definition is irrational since it has no bearing on
practical activity, It has no pragmatic value. Jaimini defines
perception as that which is engendered in the mind of a person upon the
actual contact of the sense organ with the object. This definition is
also too wide, since it overlaps such cognition, as doubt and illusions
also occur as a result of sense contact. The older exponents of the
Samkhya school define perceptual cognition to be modification of the
sense organs such as the organ of hearing. But sense organs are devoid
of consciousness; therefore, their modifications cannot be conscious.
If, on the other hand, it is assumed to derive its conscient character
from its association with a conscious principle like the self; then the
status of the organ of knowledge should be accorded to the self:
T1-erefore, Hemacandra said, perceptual cognition is immediate and
lucid.9
It
is not possible that sense perception, which is based upon the
stimulation present to the senses, is incapable of knowing the
cognitions that preceded and that follow. Even in the case of cognitions
arising out of the data present to the senses, the cognitions would be
only subjective. It would not be possible to determine their validity or
invalidity to the satisfaction of an outsider. It would be difficult to
establish objective validity; hence sense perception is one of the
sources of knowledge, and not the only source as the Carvakas would
maintain.
In
Plato�s dialogue, Theaetetus,
Socrates examines the doctrine that knowledge is through perception.
This is the position of the common notion that knowledge of the external
world comes to us through the senses. Socrates points out that the view
of Theaetetus is identical with the doctrine of Heraeleitus that all
things are in motion, and the Protagerean dictum,
homo mensura. Socrates in the
end shows that the position adopted by Theaetetus is not acceptable
because it leads to an impossibility. Socrates said that, if knowledge
and perception are the same, it leads to an impossibility, because a man
who has come to know a thing and still remembers it does not know it,
since he does not see it, and that would be a monstrous conclusion.Io
Pratyaksa is
defined in the
Pramanamirnamsa as that which is immediate and lucid. These
characteristics are applicable to both perceptual and non-perceptual
experience, experience through operation of the sense organs and
experience without the help of sense organs. We have seen that in the
Nandisutra a distinction is
made between pratyaksa as that
which is due to the sense organs, and that which does not need the
mediation of the sense organs. They are called
indriya pratyaksa and
unindriya pratyaksa,
respectively. Indriya pratyaksa is
cognition which is immediate and direct and arises out of the
operation of the five sense organs. There are, therefore, five types
of sense perception-the visual,
auditory, tactual, olfactory and gustatory. The experience that does not
need the sense organs and is immediate may be called extra-sensory
perception.. It is also
pratyaksa, because it is
immediate and direct. This was called real
(pratyaksa),
by the followers of
Agama
literature. It is of three types,
avadhi, manah paryaya
and
kevala pratyaksa.
In this chapter, discussion will be
restricted to the sense experience,
mdriva pratyaksa.
It is also called, as was seen
earlier, sarirvyavahara
pratyaksa. Emperical knowledge
may be called sarimyavahara
prcrtyaksha. It is of two
kinds, mati
and
sruta. Matijitana
is a species of
Samvyavahara pratyak,scr. MatijUina
is defined as knowledge due to
the sense organs and mind.
Irtdriya pratyaksa may,
therefore, be regarded as a form of
matijnana.
This may be called sense perception.
Sense perception may be regarded as
rnatij~Ona,
as it is concerned with the contact
of the sense organs with the object. Sense perception of this type may
be compared with the definition of
pratyaksa
given by Gautama, the founder of
Nyaya philosophy, already referred to. Gautama defines
pratyaksa
as knowledge which arises out of the
contact of sense organs with its object, inexpressible in words,
unerring and well-defined.]�- Gangesa says that this does not include
intuitive perception, which is also direct and without mediation of the
senses.l The Jainas called the type of perception defined by Gautama a
form of matijnana.
In the Jaina
Agamas, mati jiratra
is also known as
abhinibodhikay�nana.
But the term
rnatijnana
seems to be older than
abhinibodhika-jYana,
as
matijt:ana
is associated with the
karma
theory which is very old. The old
Jaina thinkers thought that knowledge born with the help of the five
senses as well as the manas
may be called
matijrlana.
But in
indriya pratyaksa
they included
knowledge born of the five sense organs, as the mind is not for them
exactly a sense organ. It is a quasi-sense organ.
In Jaina literature various synonyms for
matijnana
have been mentioned.
Tattvarthasutra
mentions
mcrti, smrti
(recollection), cinta (thought), and
abhinibodha
(perceptual cognition), as synonyms. Bhadrabahu mentions iha associative
integration,
apoha, vimarsa, margana, gavesanU, sarirj�ra
and
smrti
as
synonyms?
Nandisutra
follows Badrabhu. The mention
of
all these synonyms does not mean that
they identified the various forms of cognition mentioned in the synonyms
as sense perception, because Bhadrabahu and Umasvati, for instance,
would not in the least have meant that
smrti
is identical with sense
perception; nor cinta
identical with matijizana.
However, what they meant was that, in empirical experience, we find
matijnana and such experience
as recollection and thought. In this sense,
matijizana may be said to
include sense experience due to the operation of the five senses and
experience through the manas,
as the Jaina philosophers following the
Agamic literature maintained.
In the PramanamFmarirsa,
empirical perception is described as perception due to the ~ senses and
mind. In the commentary of the same stanza it is said that the phrase
�due to the sense and mind�, (indriya
manonimittam), has both collective and distributive meaning. But
matijnana, in the sense of
experience due to the five sense organs, is a form of
pratyaksa. It is
indriya pratyaksa. Umasvati
also includes experience due to the mind in
matijhana. He defines
matijMna as knowledge caused
by the senses and mind, since mind is a quasi-sense,
no-indriya. The commentator
Siddhasenaganin mentions three types of
mati: (i) knowledge born of
the sense organs, (ii) knowledge born of the mind, and (iii) knowledge
due to the joint activity of the sense organs and mind. However, from
the Bhasya of the
Tattvarthasutra we find that
matijiaarra can be
distinguished into four types, as (i) knowledge due to sense organs,
like sense perception; (ii) knowledge due to the mind only, like
cinta; (iii) knowledge due to
the joint activity of the mind and the senses. Memory and recognition
can be included in matijhana.
Akalanka says that memory, recognition and discursive thought are cases
of matijitana so long as they
are not associated with language. As soon as they are associated with
words they become srutaynana,
although very few philosophers have supported Akalanka in this respect.
However, if matijnana were to
include cognition due to the joint activity of the sense organs and the
mind, memory and recognition may well be included in
matijiiana. In the fourth
stage of matijiana, cognitions
without the help of the sense organs and the mind are included. For
instance, the vague and primitive awareness of the plant life and the
instinctive awareness of the lower organisms which have not yet
developed sense organs, may be said to be cognition of this type. These
are direct forms of awareness. Sense perception
(indriya-pratyaksa), as a
species of matijnana is of
five types based on the nature and function of the five sense organs.
The five senses possess the capacity of sense experience because the
cognition of the stimulation must be conditioned by the relevant
instruments. The sense is the mark which denotes that cognition of the
object has been generated by the self. We get a similar description of
sense perception in the Nyaya Sutra.
The five types of sense perception are based on the special
characteristics of knowledge, (buddhi
laksana), visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactual. The
senses consist of elements endowed with a special quality, and so they
are able to perceive the respective objects and not themselves. For
instance, the eye sees the external object and not itself. In sense
perception, it was seen in the last chapter, the sense of touch is
fundamental. Similarly, the sense of sight is vital for human life.
Price says that the experiences of seeing and touching are primary,
other modes of sense experiences, like hearing and smelling, are only
auxiliary. �If we possessed them but did not possess either sight or
touch we should have no belief about the material world at all, and
should lack even the very conception of it�. It was also seen in the
last chapter that, according to the Jainas, the sense of sight is of a
fundamentally different nature, in that the other sense organs are based
on the contact of the sense organs with the object, while the sense of
sight does not need any contact with the object.
The nature of sense perception will now be analysed. The task here is to
give a psychological analysis of the experience, if possible. It may
aptly be said that the Jaina analysis of sense perception has a great
psychological significance, although perception was a logical and
metaphysical problem for the Jainas as for other Indian philosophers. In
fact, even in the West, philosophers were first busy with the logical
and the metaphysical analysis of the problem of perception, but with the
advancement of psychology as a sceience, philosophers have realized that
perception is more prohlcm far psychology. Pretend Russell says that,
�the problem of perception has troubled philosophers from a very early
date. My owl belief is that the problem is scientific, not
philosophical, or, rather, no longer philosophical�.
Conditions of Perception
Sense organs are a condition of sense perception. are the instruments by
which we get sensory experience. The senses are the marks of the
self, and they afford proof of
the existence of the self. The
senses are instruments like the carpenter�s axe, by which experience is
obtained by the sslf. The contact of the sense organs with the object is
a condition of perception as mentioned by the Naiyayikas, although,
according to the Jainas, such a contact is not necessary in the case of
visual experience. According to the Nyaya definition, perception
involves defferent factors, viz., (i) sense organs, (ii) their objects,
(iii) the contact of the sense organs with the object, and (iv) the
cognition produced by them. It is sometimes maintained that the
description given by the Jainas of sense experience as cognition due to
the senses and the mind is inadequate. Visual perception, for instance,
has the additional condition of the presence of light. But it has been
pointed out by Hemacandra that objects and light are not conditions of
experience, because of lack of concomitance between the two. But it is
not denied that they are remote conditions, like time and space, which
subserve the subsidence and destruction of the knowledge-obscuring
karrnas. They are indirectly
useful to the visual organs, like collyrium. The inadequacy of the view
that the object and light are conditions of perception can be seen from
the fact that illusive perception of water takes place in a mirage. Cats
and owls perceive in the dark, where the stimulation of light is
absent.g This is meant to show that the Nyaya emphasis on the object as
a condition of perception is not acceptable. Perception of a particular
object is, in fact, according to the Jainas, due to the destruction and
subsidence of the relevant knowledge-obscuring karrnas,
jihnavaraniya karma. This
implies a psychological factor. An appropriate psychical condition in
the destruction and subsidence of knowledge-obscuring karma is a
necessary factor in the perceptual experience. It also depends on the
competency of the appropriate psychical factor. For instance, even when
the object is present we may not see it when our attention is elsewhere
engaged. In the Samayasara we read that the presence of stimuli in the
external environment and even their coming into contact with the sense
organs may not be effective to produce the relevant experience. For
instance, we may not see an unpleasant visual foam, even though the
stimulation may reach the eyes. The psychic factor of selective
attention is needed before we get the sense experience. This is possible
when all psychic impediments are partially or wholly removed through the
destruction and subsidence of knowledge-obscuring karma. We have
described such a psychic factor as a mental set which is necessary for
the perceptual experience. Emphasis on the mental factor in perception
has been mentioned in the Ilpanisads
also. This was referred to in the earlier chapter. We here have
the dictum that when the mind is elsewhere we do not see. �I was absent
in mind, I did not hear�. In Western thought, Aristotle was clearly
aware that perception is not possible merely through the sense organs.
For him, perception consists in being moved and affected. Sense
perception does not arise from the senses themselves, as organs of sense
perception are potentiality and not actuality. Lock writes that,
whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind;
whatever impressions are made in the outward part, if they are not taken
notice of within, there is no perception. For we may burn our body with
no other effect than it does a billet unless the motion be continued to
the brain; and there the sense of hurt or idea of pain be produced in
the mind, wherein consists actual perception. In modern psychology,
Prof. Woodworth gives a formula �W-S-O-R-W� for explaining the
fascinating problem of how an individual perceives an objective fact. At
any given moment
a man is set
for the present situation. He might be listening to a low hum just as a
smooth tone. But if he tries to make out what the sound can be, he is
more likely to perceive it as the hum of an aeroplane.
Thus we find that the analysis of perceptual experience shows that the
sense organs and the contact of the sense organs with the stimulation�s
of objects are no doubt conditions of perception. But that alone is not
sufficient. A psychological condition is necessary for the experience.
This psychological factor consists, negatively, in the removal of the
psychic impediments to perception. This may be likened to the subsidence
and destruction of the knowledge-obscuring
karmas of the Jainas. On the
positive side, the psychic condition is selective attention and the
�mental set�.
Stages of Sense Perception
According to the Jainas, sense perception can be analysed into four
stages as (i) Avagraha, (ii) Ihu,
(iii) Avaya, and (iv) Dharana.
These stages of sense
experience arise through the operation of the sense organs and the mind.
In the PramanamJmarizsa we get
a description of the four
stages of sense experience,
salrivyavahara pratyaksa. The four stages mentioned above have
been usually described as the four subdivisions of sense experience. In
the Narrdi Sutra, they are
mentioned as four types, caturvidha.
But it would be more appropriate to say that they are the four
stages of sense experience,
because, psychologically analysed, they express the four stages of
perceptual cognition, although perception, in our view, is a concrete
psychosis. The correctness of this interpretation can be seen from the
fact that in the commentary on sutra
of the Pramanamirnarrisa
it is stated that the earlier form, like
avagraha, develops into the
subsequent forms, and all of them partake of the same essential nature.
Thus, in the Jaina thought, four stages of
matijnana, as mentioned above,
have been described. Avczgraha refers to the first simple and primitive
stage of experience. This may be said to be merely the stage of
sensation. Next comes iha. In this stage there is a mental element, and
it refers to the integrative factors of the mind. In the third stage, we
get a clear and decisive cognition of the object. This is
avaya. It implies the presence
of the inferential element in perception.
Dharanii is retention of what
is already experienced in the perceptual cognition. In fact, it is not
actually a stage of perceptual experience although it is included in
perceptual experience.
Psychologists point out that perception is not a simple process nor is
it merely the sense-datum. It consists in the organization and
interpretation of sensations. It is �knowledge about� and not merely
�knowledge of acquaintance�, as William James said. Perception involves
certain psychological factors like association, discrimination,
integration, assimilation and recognition. Perception also involves
inference. We perceive a table, and when we perceive the object as a
table we recognize it and we get a defined picture of the object.