PREFACE
A study of
Jainism in terms of Western thought is much needed to day. With
over-specialization in the empirical sciences and in philosophy, we are
apt to lose the wood in the trees. In this age of �analysis� it is
necessary to re-assess the place of a synthetic approach to the
fundamental problems of philosophy and psychology.
The present
publication is essentially the same as the thesis submitted by me for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Karnatak University, Dharwar.
It is an attempt to interpret the problems of Jaina psychology in terms
of Western thought. I am aware that it is not possible to compare the
ancient Indian thought with the concepts of modern psychology. However,
it would be sufficient if I could succeed in pointing out some possible
similarities between ways of thinking out problems by ancient Indian
Philosophers including the Bainas and thinkers of the West.
I am
grateful to the Karnatak University for getting the work published. I
acknowledge my indebtedness to the eminent scholars. A. Moore of the
University of Hawaii, A. N. Upadhye of Rajaram College, Kolhapur and
Principal A. Menezes, Professor of English, Karnatak University, who
have suggested ways of improving the work. Principal Menezes went
through the entire manuscript with an eye to language and diction. It is
not possible to mention the names of all the persons who have been of
help to me in the completion of the work. However, mention must be made
of my colleague Shri A. M. Jalihal and my friends Shri S. K. Mutalik and
Shri B. B. Hungund who have read the proofs. I also thank the Sarada
Press, Mangalore, for their cooperation.
Vijayadasami,
19th October, 1961.
T.
G. KALGHATGI.
The
Karnatak University, Dharwar is grateful to the University imission, New
Delhi, for the 50% financial assistance towards the of this thesis under
the scheme of publications of Approved Research wrote Theses
(Humanities).
INTRODUCTION
The aim of
this treatise is to present some problems of Jaina psychology with
reference to ancient Indian and Western thought including Western
psychological thought, specially of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
Jainism is a
realistic philosophy. As a religion it is a polemic against the
authority of the Vedas and the pseudo-spiritualism of the elaborate
sacrificial system of worship. Jainism is an old religion which
prevailed even before Parsva and Vardhamana, the last two tirthankaras.
The Yajurveda mentions
Rsabha, Ajita and Aristanemi as tirthankaras. The
Bhagavata Purana endorses
the view that Rsabha was the founder of Jainism. Jainism reflects the
cosmology and anthropology of a much older pre-Aryan upper class of
North-Eastern India. Jacobi has traced Jainism to early primitive
currents of metaphysical speculation. But the Jaina metaphysics,
epistemology and psychology have arisen as a result of the interaction
of the �orthodox� ways of Indian thought. The Jaina system of thought
arose out of the need to re-assert the Jaina faith against the academic
invasions of Hindu thought. Elements of the Hindu and Buddhist theories
have been incorporated in the Jaina theory of knowledge. As an example
of such interaction we may mention the Jaina theory of
pratyaksa as a source of
knowledge. The original Jaina theory of
pratyaksa as a direct
source of knowledge of the soul and
paroksa as knowledge due
to the sense organs were modified in the light of the prevailing views
of other systems of Indian thought. However, in this treatise we are not
directly concerned with the problems of the antiquity of Jainism and the
chronological order of the Jaina epistemological and psychological
theories.
The Indian
mind is synthetic. It is the synthetic view that has made our philosophy
embrace all branches of knowledge into one comprehensive view. In recent
times, the sciences have become independent and they have freed
themselves from the bonds of philosophy. But in ancient India, as also
in the ancient West, philosophy included all the sciences. For instance,
there was no special science of psychology. It was a philosophy of the
mind. The term psychology, belongs to our �new world�. Even half a
century ago it was a philosophy of the mind or it was at least a mental
physiology. Contemporary psychology, especially the British and the
American psychology, may be considered as a science detached from the
prevailing philosophical systems. But, as Murphy shows, German
psychology was and still is related to philosophy, and changes in
psychology can be traced to developments in philosophy.
In the Jaina
thought, as also in the ancient Indian thought the problems of
epistemology and the problems of psychology were indistinguishable.
Epistemology was the basis for the psychological analysis of mental
states and events. Many problems of psychology were unintelligible
without consideration of the basic metaphysical problems. Psychology was
possible only under the shadow of metaphysics. And the Jaina psychology,
if it may be called psychology, may be considered to be academic and
rational psychology. It did not use the method of experiment. It relied
on introspection and the insight of seers and to some extent on the
observation of the behavior of others. The insight of the ancient sages
of India gave them a vivid picture of the reality in its various colours.
It is the insight and the vision of the Jaina sages that built the
superstructure of the mental philosophy of experience for the Jainas.
They did not base their conclusions on experimental investigations. This
was because the Jaina, as also the Indian mind generally, was not
interested in the analysis of the things of the world. Experimental
investigation had little meaning for them.
PLAN OF THE WORK
This treatise is analytic and interpretative. It is not possible to
compare the problems of Jaina psychology with the present problems in
psychology, because psychology in the present day has become an
objective and a concrete science using experimental methods for
investigation. In the modern age, increase in knowledge has meant
increase in specialization. The specialized developments of the problems
of modern psychology cannot be easily compared with the ancient
psychological problems that the Jaina and the other Indian thought
presented. We can only show that some problems in Western psychology
have developed on similar lines to those presented in the Jaina
philosophy. The problems of modern psychology have developed in a more
exact and measurable direction. This cannot be said of the ancient Jaina
thought. However, the basic problems were the same and the approach was
similar. In this sense, some theories of psychology have been mentioned
here by way of comparison. The object is to show a few possible similar
developments in the field of psychological investigations in the Jaina,
ancient Indian and Western thought.
This work begins with the study of the
self in Jaina philosophy.
Discovery of the self
was the main problem of Indian philosophy. The effort of Indian
philosophy has been to know the
self and make the knowledge effective in human life.
The first chapter, therefore, discusses the problem of the soul in Jaina
thought. The idea of the soul has occupied an important position in
Indian thought. Jainism makes a dichotomous division of the categories
into jiva and
ajiva. Jainism considers
the soul from the noumenal point of view,
niscaya naya, and the
phenomenal point of view, the
vyavahara naya. The psychological implications of the nature
of the soul have been discussed in this chapter.
The second chapter deals with the Jaina theory of mind in all its
aspects. Jainas make a distinction between the two phases of the mind as
(i) the material phase (dravya
manas) and the mental phase
(bhava manas). The first
phase refers to the structural aspect, and the second refers to the
mental and functional aspects. The Jainas make mind a quasi-sense organ.
Similarly, it is aprapyakari,
as it does not come into physical contact with the object.
These problems have been fully discussed with special reference to
Indian and Western thought.
The main problems in the third chapter are the interpretation of
upayoga, jnana and
darsana. Upayoga is the
essential characteristic of the soul. It is interpreted here as the
horme of the modern
psychologists. Cetana,
or consciousness, is the psychic background of all experiences.
Jnaua and
darsana are the
manifestations of upayoga
in the light of the psychic background of
cetana. Other problems
concerning consciousness, like the states of consciousness and
self-consciousness, have also been analysed. The Jainas, as other Indian
philosophers, were aware of the unconscious in its psychological and
metaphysical aspects. In the end, a note on
pasyatta, interpreted as
mneme, is also added.
In
the fourth chapter we come to the analysis of sense organs and sense
qualities. The Jainas have given a detailed description of the nature
and function of the sense organs. They have accepted five sense organs.
They do not recognize motor organs of experience. They make a
distinction between the structural aspect
(dravyendriya), and the
psychic aspect (bhavendriya).
The visual sense organ is
aprapyakari, as it does
not come into physical contact with the object. The other four sense
organs are prapyakari,
because of the physical contact with the object for cognition.
Similarly, the psychological analysis of the sense qualities, as
presented by the Jainas, is given in this chapter.
The fifth chapter deals with the problem of empirical experience. It is
the problem of perception. The Jaina analysis of perception is complex
and elaborate. It has a great psychological significance. The Jainas
mention four stages of perception: (i)
avagraha, the stage of
sensation, (ii) Mil, the stage of integration of sense impressions,
(iii) avaya,
perceptual judgment, and (iv)
dharana, retention. These problems have been discussed in the
light of the analysis of perception.
In
the sixth chapter we come to the problem of other sources of empirical
experience. Retention (dharana),
recollection (smrti),
and recognition (pratyabhijna)
are factors involved in memory. This chapter gives the
analysis of retention as the condition of memory, and recollection and
recognition as forms of expressing memory. Similarly, the psychological
implications of inference (anumarra)
as a source of knowledge have also been analysed.
In
the seventh chapter the problem of supernormal perception is discussed.
The Jainas believe that sense experience is not sufficient to give the
experience of reality. They accept the possibility of direct experience
without the instrumentality of the sense organs and the mind. They
called this pratyaksa.
This is the supernormal perception. All schools of Indian thought,
except the Carvaka,
accept the possibility of supernormal experience. The Jainas have given
three levels of supernormal perception: (i)
avadhi, (ii) manahparyaya
and (iii) kevala,
although avadhi may not
be called supernormal experience.
Avadhi may be compared to clairvoyance, and
manahparyaya may be
likened to telepathic cognition. The two forms of supernormal experience
have been analysed with reference to the investigations of modern
psychical research. For the kevala
there is no comparison. It is the state of omniscience.
Chapter
eight gives the description of the fourteen stages of the struggle for
the realization of the self.
They are called
gunasthanas in Jainism. The transcendental
self is to be realised.
The way to self-realization is long and difficult. It is a struggle for
emancipation and for the attainment of perfection. In the fourteenth
stage one reaches the consummation of self-realization. This is the
stage of kaivalya, or
rirarijarra. The
struggle for perfection in the fourteen stages is psychologically
important, although empirical psychology will not be able to explain the
significance of these stages.
CHAPTER I
THE JAINA THEORY OF THE SOUL
The problem
of the soul has been a perennial problem in religion and speculative
philosophy. Primitive man had made a distinction between body and soul.
The burial of the dead- with their belongings and even the mummification
of the Egyptians are based on such a distinction between body and
spirit. The philosophical concept of the soul has developed from such
primitive distinctions.
In
modern psychology, the idea of the soul is no longer important. In its
place has come the notion of self
or �the centre of interest.� The word �soul� is ambiguous.
Sometimes it stands for mind, sometimes for self and sometimes
for both. The English word points to an entity as the cause or vehicle
of physical or psychical activities of the individual person. The soul
is a spiritual substance. In Indian thought the word
atrnan has undergone
various changes. It is little used in the
Vedas. It primarily meant
breath. In the Upanisads
another word, prana,
is used for breath, and atman
stands for the. innermost part of man. Man was
atmavat. For the
Upanisadic seers, the soul was a presupposition for all experiences.
Indian philosophies, with the exception of
Mayavada of Samkara and
Ksanikavada of the
Buddhists, fundamentally agree about the nature of the soul as a
permanent, eternal and imperishable substance. But the primitive Aryans
believed that the life of man is continued after death in a shadowy
existence in some subtle bodily form. This is not the soul of the later
philosophers. Jacobi calls it the psyche.� This is the development of
the primitivenotion of life after death lingering in some form. It is
found even to-day in the practice of
sraddha. The psyche is
frequently spoken of as purusa
and of the size of the thumb
(arzgusta-mdtra). At the
time of death it departs from the body. In the oldest
Upanisads the psyche is
described as constituted by the
pranas, psycho-physical factors. Still, these factors were
not regarded as principles of personality.
The idea of the soul has occupied an important position in Jaina
philosophy. Jainism aims at the liberation of the soul from the cycle of
birth and death. The saving of the soul is the Christian ideal. In the
Apology, Plato makes Socrates say that his mission was to get men to
care for their souls and to make them as good as they can be.
Jainism is
dualistic. There is a dichotomous division of categories. All things are
divided into living and non-living, souls and non-souls. In the first
verse of the Dravyasamgraha,
we read, �The ancient among the great Jainas have described
the dravyas as
jiva and
ajiva.� Jim is a
category, and jiva
personalised becomes atman.
Jainism believes in the plurality of souls. Souls are
substances distinct from matter. Souls influence one another. But they
are quite distinct from one another and not connected in any higher
unity. They may be called spiritual monads. Jainism emphasizes the
diversity of souls. Amongst the Muslim theologians, Nazam and his school
maintained that the soul is a spiritual substance.
Jainism considers the soul from two points of view: the noumenal
(niscaya naya) and the
phenomenal (vyavahara naya).
The
Dravyanuyogatarkaya of Bhoja describes the distinction as
mentioned in the Vise,
savasykabhasya by saying that the
niscaya narrates the real
things and the vyavhara
narrates things in a popular way. In the
Samayasara,
Kundakundacarya points out that the practical standpoint is essential
for the exposition of the inner reality of things, as a non-Aryan is
never capable of understanding without the non-Aryan tongue.
The existence of the soul is a presupposition in the Jaina philosophy.
Proofs are not necessary. If there are any proofs, we can say that all
the pramanas can
establish the existence of the soul. �Oh Gautama, the soul is
pratyaksa�, said Mahavira,
�for that in which your knowledge consists is itself soul.� What is
pratyaksa need not be
proved like the pleasure and pain of the body. It is
pratyaksa owing to the
aham pratyaksa, the
realization of the �I�, which is associated with the functions
pertaining to all the three tenses. William James and James Ward present
self-consciousness in this form. Ward talks of the �internal perception�
or self-consciousness. The last order of knowledge of the duality of
subject and object is an indispensable condition of all actual
experience however simple. It is, therefore, first in order of
existence. It is the subject of experience that we call the pure ego or
self. William James
says, �For, this central part of the
self is felt. It is
something by which we also have direct sensible consciousness in which
it is present, as in the whole life-time of such moments.-
Thus, one who ignores the self-evidence of the soul is like one
who says that sound is inaudible and the moon is devoid of the moon. The
existence of the soul can be inferred from the behaviour of others.
Similarly, the soul exists because, �it is my word, O Gautama!�
The jiva is described from the noumenal and phenomenal points of
view. From the noumenal point of view, the soul is described in the pure
form. The phenomenal describes the empirical qualities of the soul. From
the pure point of view, it is not associated with body or any physical
or mental qualities. Mahavira points out to the third Ganadhara that the
soul is different from the body and its senses; just as Devadatta
recollects an object perceived through the five windows of the palace,
which is different from the palace and the five windows, so also a
person recollecting an object perceived through the five senses of the
body is different from the senses and the body.
The Buddhist impermanence of the soul is also refuted. Buddhists had
said that there was no self
except the khandas.
Kundakundacarya points out that from the noumenal point of
view the soul and the body are not one, although in worldly practice the
soul having a beautiful body is called beautiful and fair like the
beautiful body of the living
arhatg In the
Chandogyopanisad, in the dialogue between Yajnyavalkya and
Janaka, the idea of the self
is progressively brought out by showing that it is not
physical nor a dream-state.
From the noumenal point of view, the soul is pure and perfect.
It is pure consciousness. From the real point of view, the soul is
unbound, untouched and not other than itself. The soul is one and not
composite. In the Sthananga
we get a description of the soul as one
(ege atta). The
commentator describes it as
ekavidhah atmanah.9 In
Samayasara,
Kundakupdacarya describes the absolute oneness of the soul �on the
strength of my self-realization.� This does not mean that the
self is one in the
Vedantic sense of cosmic self.
It does not contradict the plurality of souls in Jainism. It
only emphasizes the essential identity of souls.
Jivas in all their
individual characteristics are essentially the same. If the soul were
one, then, �O Gautama! there would not be
sukha, duhkha, bandha,
moksaetc.�
Individual souls are different like the
kumbhasll
The nature of jiva has
been well described by Nemicalidra in his
Dravyasariigraha. He
describes the soul both from the noumenal and phenomenal points of view.
He says that jiva is
characterised by upayoga,
is formless and is an agent. It has the same extent as its body. It
is the enjoyer of the fruits of
karma. It exists in
samsara. It is siddha
and has a characteristic of upward motion. We get a similar
description in the
Pancastikayasara of Kundakundacarya. Jiva
is formless. It is characterised by
upayoga. It is attached
to karma. It is the
Lord, the agent and the enjoyer of the fruits of
karma. It pervades bodies
large or small. It has a tendency to go upward to the end being freed
from the impuities of Kama. Thattvarthaura characteristic.
Every
jiva possesses an infinite number of qualities. Glasenapp, )
octriree of Karma in Jaina Philosophy, mentions eight important
characteristics:
1. The faculty of omniscience (kevala
jhana).
2. The faculty of absolute undifferentiated cognition
(kevala darsalza).
3. Superiority over joy and grief.
4. Possession of belief in complete religious truth (samyaktva),
and irreproachable moral conduct
(caritra).
5. Possession of eternal life (alcsayasthiti).
6. Complete formlessness (amurtatva).
7. Unrestricted energy (viryatva).
8. Complete equality in rank with other
jivas.
The first characteristic of the soul is upayoga. The
word is difficult to define. It is the source of experience. The
cognitive, and affective aspects spring from it. It is a differential of
the living organism. Umasvati says that upayoga is the essential
character the soul. Upayoga has conative prominence. It may be
called horme in the sense that McDougall has used the term. It is
a vital or urge to action. P. T. Nunn has stated that horme is
the activity that differentiates the living animal from dead matter. It
is like Schopenhauer�s �will to live�, and Bergson�s elan vital.
Jnana and darsana are manifestations of
upayoga.
Citta
or cetana as a characteristic of the soul is
important in Indian philosophy. In the Dravyasamgraha, jiva is
described as possessing cetana from the noumenal point of view.
Cetana is a sort of inclination which arises from upayoga.
This inclination branches directions � jnana and darsana. Darsana
may be said to be undifferentiated knowledge. Jnana is cognition
defined. The jiva has infinite jnana and darsana.
But certain classes of karma, like jnanavaraniya and
darsanavaraniya karma, tend to obscure and confuse the nature of the
jiva. From the phenomenal point of view, darsana and
jnana tend to manifest themselves in eight kinds of jnana and
is of darsana.
The possession of upayoga raises the question whether the jiva
possesses upayoga and is yet different from it, or whether it
is identical with it. The Nyaya theory does not recognize the
identity of quality and its possessor. Jainism asserts that only from
the phenomenal point of view they are separable. In Pancastikuyasara
we read �Only in common parlance do we distinguish darsana
and jnana. But in reality there is no separation.� The soul is
inseparable from upayoga. Horme is an essential characteristic of
the living organism. It is manifested in the fundamental property
experienced in the incessant adjustments and adventures that make up the
tissue of life and which may be called drive or felt tendency towards an
end. Animal life is not merely permeated by physical and chemical
processes; it is more than that. Even the simplest animal is autonomous.
The soul is simple and without parts. It is formless. As the soul is
immaterial it has no form. This quality has been mentioned in other
systems also. The Jaina thinkers were against the Buddhist idea of the
soul as a cluster of khandas. Buddhists do not refer to the
permanent soul. It is a composite of mental states called kharrdas.
�In modern Western thought�, Hume says, �when I enter most
intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble upon some
particular perception or other of heat or cold, light or shade, love or
hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself any time without
perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.� Hoffding
stated that the ego has been looked for in vain as something absolutely
simple. The nature of the ego is manifested in the combination of
sensation, ideas and feelings. But Herbart maintains that the soul is a
simple being not only without parts but also without qualitative
multiplicity. Modern psychology has emphasized substantiality,
simplicity, persistence and consciousness as the attributes of the soul.
Descartes has said, �-I am the thing that thinks, that is to say who
doubts, who affirms . . . who loves, who hates and feels...,� this and
he designates this thing as substance.
Hamilton advocated the four characteristics with the greatest
explicitness. Other prominent names are those of Porter, Calkins, Angell
and Aveling.
From the
phenomenal point of view, jiva is also described as possessing
four pranas. They are sense (indriya), energy (bala),
life (ayu), and respiration. (ana). Pancastikayasara gives
the same description. The idea of prana is found in Indian and
Western thought. In the Old Testament (Genesis: Book I) we
read, �The Lord God breathed into the nostril the breath of life and man
became a living soul.� In the primitive minds we find the conception
that the wind gave men life. When it ceases to blow, men die. In the
Navaho legend there is a description of the life force according to
which we see the trace of the wind in the skin at the tips of fingers.
Pranas refer to
psycho-physical factors of the organism. The
jiva assumes the bodily
powers when it takes new forms in each new birth. Whatever thing
manifests in the four pranas
lives and is jiva.
The four pranas
are manifest in ten forms. The
indriya expresses itself
in five senses. Bala
may refer to the mind, the body and speech.
Ayu and
ana are one each. These
pranas in all their
details need not be present in all organisms, because there are
organisms with less than five sense organs. But there must be the four
main characteristics. The most perfectly developed souls have all the
ten prinks and the
lowest have only four. This has a great biological and psychological
significance. Comparative psychology points out that in the
psycho-physical development of the various animal species at the lower
level, the chemical sense which is affected by chemical reaction is the
only sense function; and it later becomes the separate sense of taste
and smell. Experimental investigations carried by Riley and Forel point
out that the chemical sense is used by insects like moths even for
mating. Forel has given a topo-chemical theory for explaining the
behaviour of bees. As we go higher in the scale of life, the chemical
sense plays little part. In birds, sight and smell are well developed.
In mammals, we find a higher degree of qualitative discrimination of
smell. As we go higher still; we get the variability of adaptation which
may be called intelligence.
In
the Brahmanas and the
oldest Upanisads there
is a description of the psyche as consisting of five
pranas. They are regarded
as factors of the physico-psychological life. Occasionally, more than
five pranas are
mentioned. But still the idea of a permanent
self had not shaped
itself. In the third adhyaya
of the
Brhadaranyakopanisad Yajnyavalkya was asked to explain what
happens to a person after the body has been dissolved, and the parts of
the psyche has been remitted to the fire and wind. He avoids the
discussion and suggests that karma
remains after death. This was a step forward towards the
formation of the permanent self.
Brhadaranyakopanisad also contains a discussion about the
constituent parts of the soul. Eight instead of five have been
suggested. Vijnana and
retah are mentioned.
This vijnanarraayapurusa
comes nearer to the conception of the soul, although personal
immortality is not emphasized. In Jainism also, the idea of a permanent
soul possessing pranas
must have developed on the same lines.
From the phenomenal point of view, the soul is the Lord
(prabhu), the doer
(karta), enjoyer
(bhokta), limited to his
body (dehamatra), still
incorporeal, and it is ordinarily found with karma. As a potter
considers himself as a maker and enjoyer of the clay pot, so, from the
practical point of view, the mundane soul is said to be the doer of
things like constructing houses and the enjoyer of sense objects. As the
soul produces impure thought-activities and as a consequence, the
material karmas, it also enjoys thoughts with the help of the material
karmas. Thus, jiva enjoys its thought-created activity. However, from
the noumenal point of view, jiva is the doer of
suddha bhavas or pure
thought (karmas); and from the phenomenal point of view, it is the doer
of pudgala karmas or karmic matter. The distinction between the formal
cause (nimitta), and material cause (upadana), has been introduced for
the description of the soul. The Jainas say that the soul is the
efficient cause of the material karmas. The jiva possesses
consciousness, and consciousness manifests itself in the form of various
mental states. These mental states are responsible for activities which
produce material karmas. It is, therefore, asserted that jiva is the
agent of thought-karmas indirectly of the karmic matter. The
Pancastikayasara describes
the atman as the agent of its own
bhavas. But it is not the agent of pudgala karmas. Jainism
emphasizes the activity of the jiva as against the
Samkhya view of the
passive udasina purusa. As a consequence of activity, the jiva
experiences happiness and misery. But Nemicandra says that it is only
from the phenomenal point of view. From the noumenal point of view, jiva
has consciousness and it enjoyes eternal bliss. In the Dravyasamgraha we
read, �Niccayanayado cedana bhavam
khu adassa�. The joys and sorrows that jiva experiences are
the fruits of dravyakarma. But Buddhism believes that the agent never
enjoys the fruits of karma. James Ward giving the general
characterization of the varied contents of the empirical
self�, says that the
self has first of all (a)
a unique interest and (b) a certain inwardness, further it is (c) an
individual that (d) persists (e) is active, and finally it knows itself.
But the process of entanglement in activity and enjoyment is
beginningless. It gets entangled in the sarimsara and embodied through
the operation of karmas. The soul gets various forms due to the
materially caused conditions (upadhic),
and it is involved in the cycle of birth and death. It is
subjected to the forces of karmas which express themselves first through
the feelings and emotions and secondly in the chains of very subtle
kinds of matter, invisible to the eye and the ordinary instruments of
science. When the soul is embodied, it is affected by the
environment-physical, social and spiritual, in different ways. Thus, we
get the various types of soul existence. The soul embodies itself and
identifies itself with the various functions of the bodily and social
environment. William James distinguishes between the
self as known or the
me, the empirical ego as
it is sometimes called, and the
self as knower or the I, pure ego. The constituents of the
me may be divided into
three classes: the material me,
the social me
and the spiritual me.
The body is the innermost part of the material me. Then come the
clothes, our home, and property. They become parts of our empirical ego
with different degrees of intimacy. A man�s social
me is the recognition that
he gets from his fellowmen. A man has as many
selves as there are
individuals and groups who recognize him. The spiritual
me also belongs to the
empirical me. It
consists of the �entire collection of consciousness, my psychic
faculties and disposition. taken concretely.� But the pure
self, the
self as the knower, is
very different from the empirical self. It is the thinker, that which
thinks. This is permanent, what the philosophers call the soul or the
transcendental ego.g James Ward also makes a distinction between the
self known or the
empirical ego, and the pure self.
For him, the empirical ego is extremely complex. It is the
presented self. The
earliest element is the presented self, the bodily or the somatic
consciousness. But they never have the same inwardness as �the sense of
embodiment.� We also find a certain measure of individual permanence and
inwardness that belongs to the
self. We may call this �the sensitive and the appetitive
self.� With the
development of ideation there arises what we call the inner zone, having
still greater unity and permanence. This is the imaging and desiring
self. At the level of
intellection, we come to the concept that every intelligent person is a
person having character and history and his aim in life through social
interaction. This gives conscience, a social product as Adam Smith has
said. At this stage a contrast between the thinker and the object of
thought is clearly formed. This is the thinking and willing
self. At this stage, even
the inner ideation and desire become outer, no longer strictly
self. The duality of
subject and object is the last order of knowledge and is the
indispensable condition of all actual experience. It is the subject of
experience that we call pure ego or
self.
The Jaina thinkers made a distinction between the states of the soul as
bahiratrnan, antaratman
and paramatman. Bahiratman
consists in the identification of the
self with body and
external belongings. It is the bodily
self. In this we say, �I
am the body, I am lean etc.� This identification is due to ignorance.
The same soul is in the
karmavastha and is characterized by
suddha caitanya and bliss.
It is free from all sense of otherness. It has discriminative knowledge.
This conscious self is antaratman
in the samyagdrsti
gunasthana. The pure and perfect
self which is free from
the impurities of karma
is the paramatman.
It is characterized by perfect cognition and knowledge. It is freed
and is a siddha. This
paramatmarc is jnanamaya
and is pure consciousness, It cannot be known by the senses. It has
no indriyas and no
manas. From the noumenal
point of view, these are the attributes of the
soul. The Jaina approach to
the problem is metaphysical. It contains elements of psychological
investigation; but the language is the language of metaphysics. Modern
psychologists, especially the rational psychologists, stopped at
psychological analysis and explained the process of realizing the pure
nature of the self
from the empirical stage to the stage of pure ego. But the
transcendental self is
not the subject of psychology. William James has said that states of
consciousness are all that psychology needs to do her work with.
�Metaphysics or theology may prove the existence of the soul; but for
psychology the hypothesis of such a substantial principle of unity is
superfluous.�
Jainism
refers to the size of the soul. Although souls are not of any definite
size, they contract and expand according to the size of the body in
which they are incorporated for the time being. The soul is capable of
adjusting its size to the physical body, as the lamp placed in a large
or small room illuminates the whole space of the room.
Nemicandra describes it
as the phenomenal characteristic of the soul. From the noumenal point of
view it is said to exist in innumerable
pradesas. In respect of
the elasticity of the soul, Jainism differs from the other schools of
Indian thought. As Jacobi says, the Jainas have a tenet of the size of
the soul which is not shared by other philosophers. Some philosophers
like the Vaisesikas,
Democritus and the atomists, thought of the soul as atomic. Some others
talked of the omnipresence of the soul. Jacobi says that the original
Vaisesika was not clear
on this point. Some Samkhya
writers preferred the soul to be infinitely small, while
Isvara Krsna and later
writers characterized it as all-pervading. The spatial view of the
habitation of the soul had occupied the minds of the
Upanisadic philosophers.
Upanisadic psychology
agrees with the Aristotelian in localizing the soul in the heart. It was
later thought that it was in the brain. Yogic and
tantric books recognized
the cerebro-chemical processes, and consciousness was traced to the
brain. In the Taittirpyopanisad
(l. 6. 1. 2) we read that the soul in the heart moves by a
passage through the bones of the palate, right up to the skull, where
the hairs are made to part. The soul in the heart is called
manomaya. In �the
Kausitaki Upanisad the
soul is described as the master of all bodily functions. The senses
depend on the soul as �relatives on the rich�. The
self is immanent in the
whole body, and is hidden in it. This passage leads to the view, like
the Jaina view, that the soul fills the body. Different other accounts
are given in the Upanisads.
In the Brhadaratzyaka
the self is
described as small as a grain of rice or barley. In the
Kathopanisad we find that
the soul is of the size of the thumb. It dwells in the centre of the
heart. In the Chandogya,
it is said to be of the measure of the span between the head and the
chin. William James traces the feeling of
self to the cephalic
movements. He says that the self
of selves
when carefully examined is found to consist mainly in the collection of
these peculiar motions in the head or between the head and the heart.
Desecrates maintains that the seat of the soul is the pineal gland.
Fichte holds that the soul is a space filling principle. Lotze says that
the soul must be located somewhere in the matrix of the arterial brain
events. These accounts tend to make us believe that the soul is
something material which occupies space. It is sometimes pointed out
that the idea of the spatial attributes of the soul constitutes a
contradiction. If the soul has no form it cannot occupy space, even the
infinite pradesas; and
if it is immaterial, it
cannot have form. However, this contradiction is due to the difficulties
of expressing the immaterial
in terms of the
material. This has been the perennial problem of philosophy,
because the immaterial
has no vocabulary of its own. The Greeks had the same difficulty. Plato
had to resort to allegories and myths_ for expressing the
immaterial. In Jainism,
although the description of the soul is not metaphorical, it is just an
attempt to come nearerest to
immaterialism. It may be that the difficulty is due to the
complexity of substance in Jainism. Jainism gives the cross division of
substances as spiritual and non-spiritual, and again as corporeal and
non-corporeal. Non-spiritual is
ajiva. In the non-spiritual, we get the non-corporeal
substance like dharma
and adharma; and there
is the corporeal which is called
pudgala. From the phenomenal point of view,
jiva comes under the
spiritual but corporeal. The corporeal need not necessarily be material.
The classification is as follows :
Substance
|
Spiritual
non-spiritual
|
| |
Corporeal
corporeal non-corporeal
|
| |
Jiva
matter 1. akasa
2. dharma
3. kala
If this division is accepted, there need be
no contradiction. Again, when size is attributed to the soul, it is
possible that it refers to the sphere or extent of the influence that is
intended. In the Pancastikayasara we read that just as a lotus
hued ruby, when placed in a cup of milk, imparts its lustre to the milk,
the soul imparts its luster to the whole body.
Jiva
is
characterized by upward motion. Nemicaridra describes the pure
soul as possessing urdhvagati. In the Pancastikayasara it
is said, when the soul is freed from all impurities it moves upward to
the end of loka. For Plato, the soul was, above all, the source
of motion. It is only the self that moves. In the Phcrdrus,
Socrates says in his second speech, �The soul is immortal, for that
which is ever in motion is immortal.� The
self
never ceases to move and it is the fountain and the beginning of motion
to all that moves. The movement of the soul in samsara is due to
its association with karma; but by nature it has the upward
motion which it adopts when it is free from karma. But it has to
stop at the top of the universe beyond which no movement is possible in
pure space which is devoid of the medium for motion. The Jaina
conception of the soul as possessing urdhvagati is more an
ethical expediency than a metaphysical principle or a psychological
fact.
All these attributes belong to the nature of every soul and
they are clearly seen if the jivas are pure and free. However,
most of the jivas are not pure and free. They are contaminated by
some foreign elements which veil their purity and perfection. The
foreign element is karma, very fine matter, imperceptible to the
senses, and which enters into the soul and causes great changes. The
souls are then involved in the wheel of samsara. They become
samsarins.
The samsari jivas are classified on the basis of
various principles, like the status and the number of sense organs
possessed by them. They are the sthavara jivas, immovable souls.
This is the vegetable kingdom. Sir J. C. Bose has pointed out that the
vegetable world has capacity for experience. They are one sensed
organisms. Earth, water, fire and plants are such jivas. They
possess the sense of touch. This view is peculiar to Jainism. Trasa
jivas (moving souls) have two to five senses. Worms, oysters,
conches etc., possess taste and touch. Ants, bugs and lice have three
senses-taste, touch and smell. Mosquitoes, bees and flies possess four
senses-taste, touch, smell and sight. And birds, beasts and men have all
the five senses. Again, five sensed organisms may possess mind. They are
called samanaska. They may be bereft of mind
(amanaska).
In
Gommatasara : Jivakanda, we get a detailed classification of samsari
jivas. This classification is shown in Table I.
Comparative psychology points out that there have been various stages in
the development of animal life. The first simple animals, the protozoa,
are possessed of one sense. In fact, till we reach the insect species we
find that the chemical sense predominates. Positive, negative and food
reactions are mainly due to the chemical sense. As we go up the animal
scale, we find sensory discrimination in qualitative distinctions. Even
the other senses get discriminated and developed as we proceed in the
development of animal life. Similarly, the distinction between the jivas,
as paryapta and aparyapta, has great psychological significance.
Gommatasara thus illustrates the paryapta, developed, �as the things
like the room, jars, and clothes are full or empty, so the jivas should
be understood to be complete or incomplete.
� Jiva becomes paryapta with
the absorption of karmic matter for building up its body, sense,
respiration and manas. One-sensed organisms become complete with the
possession of food, drink, body, sense, and respiration. Similarly, the
possession of these attributes makes the first four-sensed organisms
paryapta or complete. For five sensed organisms all the six are
necessary. In the absence of these the jivas are incomplete. Comparative
psychology has shown that sensory discrimination has been a gradual
process. Miss Washburn points out that ability to distinguish between
the different sensory experiences depends on several factors, like the
nature of the sense organs and the ability to make varied reaction
movements.
On the basis of these investigations, three different classes of senses,
like the chemical sense, hearing and sight, have been mentioned. The
chemical sense is manifested in the combined senses of taste and touch.
As sensory discrimination becomes more complex, the mental life of the
animal becomes more developed and pronounced.
These characteristics of the soul are mentioned from the practical point
of view. Defilement of the soul takes place when the karma pours into
the soul. This is called asrava. The soul then begins to experience
mundane and emotional experiences like the passions. The karma which
comes into contact is retained. The soul is eternally infected with
matter. Every moment it is getting new matter. In the normal course of
things, it has no end. But the deliverance of the soul from the wheel of
samsara is possible by voluntary means. By the process of sarizvara the
soul can stop the influx of karma; by nirjara it can eliminate the karma
already glued to the soul. Then all obstacles are removed and the soul
becomes pure and perfect, free from the wheel of samsara. Being free,
with its upward motion the jiva attains the liberation or moksa.
[Please
this table see file name �wide table page no. 13,57,73�]
In the last
lines of the Gommatasara: Jiva
kanda, it is said that the liberated soul remains pure and
free.
Pure and perfect souls live in eternal bliss. But they do not
lose their identity as the
Vedantin would emphasize. In the eighth
khanda of the
Chandogyopanisad, it is
said that when a man depart hence his speech is merged in mind, his mind
in breath, his breath in fire, which in the highest being is
sat. Now, that which is
the subtle essence has its self.
It is the self,
�and thou, Oh Svetaketu, art that.� In the eleventh
khanda also, we read that
when the body withers and dies and the living
self leaves it, the
living self dies not.
Jacobi says that here we come nearer to the concept of the soul. It
differs from the Jaina concept in that the soul here does not possess a
permanent personality. for in
mukti the jiva
is merged in Brahman
and its individuality is lost. For the Jaina, McTaggart�s analogy of
the �college of selves� would appear to be apter, although what type of
spiritual unity there is in moksa.
Jainism cannot say. McTaggart speaks of the unity of the
absolute as that of a society. All the selves are perfect, and �if an
opponent should remind me�, he writes, �of the notorious imperfections
of all the lives of all of us, I should point out that every
self is in reality
eternal and that its true qualities are only seen in so far as it is
considered as eternal.� Sub
specie eterrritatis it is progressing towards perfection as
yet unattained. The neverceasing struggle of the soul is an important
tenet in Jainism. The universe is not, then, an amusing pantomime of
infallible marionettes, but a fight for perfection, in which �something
is eternally gained for the universe by the success.� The Jaina outlook
is melioristic.