CHAPTER II
MIND IN JAINISM
Morris in
his Six Theories of Mind,
has stated that there have been three stages in the history of
speculation concerning mind: (i) a period in which mind and nature are
vaguely conceived and differentiated; (ii) a period in which they are
regarded as different and sharply opposed; and (iii) a period in which
the effort is to restore, at a more complex level, the relation between
mind and nature which was vaguely conceived in the beginning. Early man
made no distinction between mind and nature, between his personal
experience and the world outside. The lispings of the early philosophers
in the West faced the same problem, and they could not free themselves
from the difficulties of primitive man. There was no opposition between
mind and the world. It was not regarded as a private isolated substance
but as a principle of motion and the order of the world. It lacked
psychological orientation. Anaximenes held that air was the life of the
world just as breath was the life of the body. Heraclitus suggested that
reason guides all things. Empedocles spoke of God as only mind, sacred
and ineffable mind. Anaxagoras said that mind is infinite and self-ruled
and is mixed with nothing. ,Over all mind is the ruler�, he
said, -and over the whole revolving universe mind held sway so that it
caused it to revolve in the beginning.�� These were the groupings of the
early philosophers regarding the principle of the universe, and there
was a marked absence of any clear distinction between mind and the world
of sense. Aristotle writes that, on the one hand, the atomists and the
sophists identified sense and reason, and, on the other, Parmenides and
Democritus made a distinction between thought and sense. The early Greek
philosophers struggled with the problem of mind and its relation to the
physical world.
The problem of mind eludes the grasp of philosophers and psychologists,
because it can be analyzed into both metaphysical and psychological
problems. Metaphysically; it refers to mind as the principle of the
universe standing in relation to the phenomenal world. This is the
cosmic principle which is emphasized by the idealists as the primary
principle. Psychologically, it is the individual mind, the individual�s
system of psychic states in relation to the world of sense. We are,
here, more concerned with the psychological significance of the mind,
although the metaphysical shades do influence the psychological
analysis. The early philosophers could not make a distinction between
the two aspects of the problem. This is evident in the different stages
of the speculation concerning mind.
The Indian thinkers were also groping to grasp the intangible, the
ineffable, and the immaterial. But they could not free themselves easily
from the material. The distinction between mind and matter, the mental
and the physical, was vague and unclear. In the
pre-Upanisadir thought,
the principle of Rta
became the principle of order in the universe. It is the underlying
dynamic force at the basis of the universe. It compels every animate and
inaminate being to follow the law of its existence. �Even the Gods
cannot transgress it.� We see in the conception of
Rta the
development from the physical to the devine. �It is by the force of
Rta that human brains
function.� Man knows by the driving force of the same immanent power
which makes fire to burn and river to flow.� The interpretation of the
famous Rgvedic hymn of
creation �nasadasinno
sadasittadanim� and again of
�Kamastadagre samavartatndhi ntanaso
retah prathamam yadasit. Sato baudhumasati niravindahrdi pratisiya
kavayo martisa� gives a description that for the first time
there arose
kama
which had the primaeval
germ of manas within
it. Similarly the word kratu
is shown to be the antecedent of the word
mauas or
prajita. In Sat.
Bra. 4. 1. 4. 1 there is a statement that when a man wishes,
�may I do that, may I have that,� that is
Kratu, when he attains it,
that is Daksa. The same
term later changed its meaning to
manas and
prajna.
In
the Upatzisads the
importance of the mind and its function was gradually realized, although
it was still in the pre-analytic stage. In
the
Upanisads man was spoken
of as prartatnaya and
matmornaya. We also
hear the utterance of the sages, �I was elsewhere in my mind-T could not
see-I could not hear.� In the
Chsndogyopanisad 7, 3. 1, it is said that, when a man directs
his manas to the study
of the sacred hymns, he studies them; or when to the accomplishing of
work, he accomplishes them. Again in the
Brhadaranyakopanisad . 1. 6,
we read that by the manas
is the man compelled towards his wife and begets from her a
son who is like him. Thus the
Vedic and the
Upanisadic philosophers were trying to find the cosmic
principle which is the root of the universe. But their thought was still
in the pre-analytic stage, or, as Renan calls it, the syncretic stage.
This is perhaps because of the synthetic approach of the Indian
thinkers. Mrs. Rhys Davids mentions that Bergson had asked what would
have happened if the development of thought had started with psychology.
Mrs. Davids answers that in India to some extent it did so happen.
The analysis
of the Jaina theory of mind shows there has been a conflict between the
metaphysical and the psychological approaches to the problem. It is
predominantly a realistic approach. The mind and its states are analysed
on the empirical level. Still, the Jaina ideal is
moksa, freedom of the soul
from the impurities of karma. The purity and the divinity of the soul
are the basic concepts of the Jaina philosophy, and mind has to be
linked with the soul and interpreted in metaphysical terms. The Jaina
approach was also synthetic. The evidence of the conflict can be found
in the description of the various aspects of the mind.
The Jaina theory of the mind, as developed by the Jaina
acaryas, is a theory in
which mind and nature are regarded as different in kind and as sharply
separated and opposed. If the classification of the stages in the
speculation of the concept as presented by Morris can be used, it can be
said to be in the second stage of development, although elements of the
first and the third stages are not altogether absent. Traces of the
primitive speculation were still found. The primitive conceptions of the
mind lingered in the minds of the philosophers. Yet they also tried to
overcome the conflict between mind and nature and establish the intimate
relation between them. An analysis of the Jaina conception of mind will
bear testimony to the view presented here.
The function of mind, which is an inner organ, is knowing and thinking.
Stharrnliga describes
it as sarhkalpcr vyaparavati.
Anuvarfisika gives the
citta vijnana as equivalent of the
manas. �Citta manovijiiarzam iti
paryayah.� Visesa�vasyakabhasya defines
manas in terms of mental
processes.l It is taken in the substantive sense.
Nyayakosa defines
manas in the sense of the
inner organ which controls the mental functions. It is
difficult to define mind.
If at all it is to be defined, it is always in terms of its own
processes. Even the psychologists of the present day find it difficult
to give a definition of mind without reference to the mental processes.
Older psychologists meant by mind something that expresses its nature,
powers and functions in the modes of individual experiences and of
bodily activity. McDougall also says that we are bound to postulate that
�something�; and �I do not think�, he writes, ,,that we can
find a better word to denote something than the old fashioned word
mind.�il McDougall defines mind as an organized system of mental and
purposive forces. Wundt says that mind is a pre-scientific concept. It
covers the whole field of internal experience.l
The old metaphysical problem whether mind and soul are
distinct or identical, faced the early philosophers. Aristotle, in
hiss
De Anima,
says that Democritus regarded mind as identical with the soul for the
fineness of its particles. Anaxagoras is less exact. He speaks of mind
as the cause of goodness or order, and, therefore, different from the
soul. Mind, alone of things is simple, unmixed and pure. Elsewhere. he
identifies it with soul, where he attributes it to all animals great and
small, high or low. Titus Lucretius Carus says that mind and soul are
kept together in close union and make up a single nature. It is the head
so to speak, and it reigns paramount in the whole body. The Jaina
thinkers asserted the distinction between soul and mind.
Mahavira
was
asked by Gautama whether mind was different from the soul. -Oh Gautama�,
said Mahavira, -mind is not the soul, as speech, like mind, is different
from the soul, although non-living substances have no mind.�
The
Jaina thinkers did not merely postulate the existence of mind without
any evidence. They found the evidence in the experiences of the world.
They also give the empirical proof for the operation of the mind. The
contact of the sense organ with the soul alone does not give cognition
in the relevant experiences, because there is the absence of manas.
Something else is necessary for the cognition, and that is the mind.
Again, the mind has the functional connotation which speaks for its
nature: �Just as speech signifies the function of speaking, fire
expresses the function of burning and the light shows the light.�
Orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy postulate the existence
of mind as an internal sense organ. On the evidence of cognition the
contact of the soul with the sense organ is not sufficient. We must
posit the existence of a
manas,
some additional condition which brings them together. For instance, a
man may not hear a sound or see an object when the mind is pre-occupied,
when the mind is elsewhere, as we read in the
Upanisads.
There is also the positive evidence in the facts of memory and of
experiences like pleasure and pain. As mind is not tangible, the proof
of mind has always to be indirect, and not direct. McDougall infers the
structure of the mind from its functions. He writes that we have to
build up our description of the mind by gathering all possible facts of
human experience and behaviour, and by inferring
from these the nature and
structure of mind. He thus makes a distinction between the facts of
mental activities and the facts �,
mental structure. It is comparable to the structure and the
functions of the mechanical toy; and one who wishes to ascertain the
nature of the machinery within it, can only watch its movements under
various conditions. There is nothing scientifically wrong in such a
procedure. Even the psychologists of our time have adopted a similar
procedure. The structure of the molecules, for instance, was inferred on
the basis of the observation of their behaviour. Recent comparative
psychologists have also tried to find evidence of mind in animal
behaviour. Miss Washburn says that there is no objective proof for the
presence of mind. Evidence from behaviour has been suggested.
Variability of behaviour is said to be a criterion. But this criterion
was not found to be satisfactory, because from our own experience we see
that very often variability is due to the physiological condition. There
is nothing in the mental process to account for the variability. Romans
and other psychologists have suggested that the criterion is based on
the variation of behaviour as a result of previous individual
experience. Miss Washburn writes, �the fact is that the proof for the
existence of mind can be derived from animal learning by experience only
if learning is rapid.� But this evidence is not very satisfactory.
Yerkes and Lukas try to find structural evidence for the presence of
mind. The similarity of the structure can be taken as evidence for the
presence of mind. Lukas suggested morphological, physiological and
teleological criteria for the presence of mind. Yerkes mentions six
criteria, like the general form of the organs, the nervous system, the
neural organization and specialization in the nervous system. Mind
functions in various ways. Descartes said that mind is a substance which
thinks. Although it is called a thing which thinks, it is an attribute
of the soul. It is a thing �which doubts, understands, affirms, denies,
wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels.� Nyaya
Bhasya, in Indian thought,
describes the activities of the mind as �remembrance, inference, verbal
cognition., doubt, intuition, pratyaksa, dream, imagination, (uha) as
also perception of pleasure and pain and the rest�. They are indicative
of the existence of the manas. The operation of the mind is necessary in
every act of perception. This is shown by the fact that even when there
is the contact of the sense organs with the respective object, there is
no simultaneity of perception of all these objects. This is due to the
fact that there is no such contact of the manas with other objects. Mind
is characterized by mental processes like doubting, imagining, dreaming
and expecting. It is also characterized by pleasure and pain and
desires. These are the distinguishing marks of mind.
Nandisutra describes mind
as that which grasps everything (sarvarthagrahanam
manah). In
Tattvarthadhigamasutra, we are told that cognition of what is stated
on authority, like in scriptures is the object of mind,
srutamanindriyasya. In
Maitri Upanisad, mind is
described in its reflective aspect as source of all mental
modifications. He sees by mind, by mind alone he hears, and by mind too,
he experiences all that we call desire, will and belief, resolution,
irresolution. All this is but mind itself. In modern psychology also,
Wundt says that mind will be the subject �to which we attribute all the
separate facts of internal experience.� Mind, in the popular thought, is
not simply a subject in the logical sense, but a substance in real
being, and the various activities of the mind are its expressions or
notions. But this
involves, he says, some metaphysical presuppositions. For him, mind is a
logical concept of internal experience.
Abhidhanarajendra
mentions that the word
manas has a functional significance, because it describes the
functions of the mind like thinking, imagining and expecting. And from
this functional significance of the mind the structure of the mind is
inferred. The Jaina thinkers make a distinction between two phases of
the mind: dravya manas and bhava
manas (Manah dvividharic dravya manah
bhava manah ca). In the
Visesavasyalcabhasya, we
get a description of the two phases of the manas. The material mind,
which may be called the mental structure, is composed of infinite, fine
and coherent particles of matter meant for the function of mind-dravyatah
dravya manah. It is
further described as a collection of fine particles which are meant for
exciting thought processes due to the yoga arising out of the contact of
the jiva with the body. In Gommatasnra:
Jiva-kanda also there is a
description of the material mind as produced in the heart from the
coming together of mind molecules like a full blown lotus with eight
petals.
The material composition of the mind was not uncommon in the
philosophies of the East and West alike. In the
Brhadaranyakopanisad,
mind was looked upon as material.
Upanisadic
philosophers supposed that mind for its formation depends on
alimentation�. it is supposed to be manufactured out of the food that we
take
(Annamayam
manah hi somya manah).
Food takes three different forms: the heaviest becomes excrement, the
medium quality becomes flesh, and the subtlest part becomes mind, just
as the churning of curds gives the subtlest which is butter. Later, in
the days of
Bhagavadgita,
the
three temperaments
rajas, tames
and
sattva
were recognized, and they were due to different kinds of food. This may
be compared to the modern theory of temperament as depending on the
secretion of glands. Therefore, pure food was desirable. The quality of
food influenced the quality of mind. In
Chandogyopanisad,
it
is said that when food is pure, the whole nature becomes pure, memory
becomes firm ...... In the
Nyaya
theory it is contended that mind, being an additional sense organ, need
not be structurally different from the other sense organs. An atom of
earth, water or air can, without any logical inconsistency, be credited
with the function of mind. Similarly, it cannot be distinguished from
akasa. There has been a controversy between the
Naiyayikas
and
the Mirnamsakas
about the material size of the mind. The
Naiyayikas
believed that mind is atomic in size. Otherwise there would be
simultaneous cognition of different things. The impossibility of
cognition was referred to in the
Brhadaranyakopanisad,
�my
mind was elsewhere, I could not see...� as quoted earlier. But the
Mimarhsakas
hold that mind is unlimited in size. The
Veddntins
believe that mind is a created substance devoid of any parts and it must
be of medium size,
(madhyama
parimana).
According to
Sa�mkhya Yoga,
in
the process of evolution, owing to disturbance in the balance of the
gunas, buddhi, ahamkara
and
manas
are
gradually evolved. They are
jada
in
nature. Hiriyanna says that, according to this view, the functions that
we describe as mental are really mechanical processes of the physical
organism, wluch assume a psychical character only when illuminated by
the spirit. In the
Vedanta
also the
antahkarana is
looked upon as
bhautika,
composed of five elements wherein
tejas
predominates. Such a description of the non-sentient
(jada)
aspect of mind is endorsed by the modern theories of mind
based on the study of the evolution of behaviour from the primordial
amoeba. �The fundamental feature of behaviour is irritability and
conductivity, with the specialization of structures sensitive to the
different forms of energy in nature.� There arises the nervous system
which not only
conducts the impulses but also integrates them. Thus,
behaviour arises on the basis of �structural modifications which are
based on the various types of energy tranformation.�
In
Western thought also there were philosophers who conceived of mind as
material. Lucretius Carus has said that the nature of mind and also of
the soul is bodily. �We perceive that our mind in our body suffers
together with the body and feels in unison with it.� Mind is exceedingly
fine and is formed of exceedingly minute bodies-also exceedingly round,
because, after death, life and mind vanish and weight does not change,
just as the flavour of wine vanishes without affecting the quality of
wine.
The Jaina philosophers maintained that the
bhava manas is the result
of the activities of the dravya
manas. processes like thinking, and the
bhava manas. it is
expressed in mental is also described as
jiva. It is the thinking
self.
Such a description of mind as
dravya manas and bhava
manas, the structural and the psychical aspect, can be
compared to the description of mind given by some modern philosophers.
C. D. Broad, in his Mind and its
Place in Nature presents a similar view. It is a modification
of the instrumental theory according to which mind is a substance that
is existentially independent of the body. For Broad, mind is composed of
two factors neither of which is and for itself has the property of mind,
but which when combined exhibits mental properties. The factors are the
bodily and the psychic factors. It is comparable to a chemical compound
like NaCl and H20 in which the individual components lose
their individual identity when combined. Therefore, �mentality is
likewise an emergent property composed of living body possessed of (i)
the nervous system and something else and (ii) the psychic factor, which
possesses some feeling like mental.� The bodily factor is described as
�the living brain and the nervous system.� About the psychic factor,
Broad seems to be vague. Neither mental characteristics nor mental
events seem to belong to it. It is likely to be sentience only. However,
the psychic factor must be capable of persisting for a period at least
after the death of the body; and it must be capable, when separated from
the body, of carrying �traces� of experience which happen to the mind of
which it was formerly a constituent. In other words, it must comprise
the anemic mass�. Broad�s view comes nearer to the
Buddhist
vinnana rather to the
Jaina view of bhava manas.
Of all the psychic factors in the Buddhist view,
vinnancr has a more
permanent nature. In the Digha
Nikaya it is mentioned that after death the body is
dissolved, mind ceases, but
vinnana, the coefficient of the desire to enjoy, clings to
produce its effects in some other embryo waking elsewhere. With this
difference of the psychic factor, the Jaina distinction between the
dravya manas and the
bhava manas corresponds
with Broad�s theory of the composition of mind. In speaking of the
mental structure, McDougall has likened it to the structure of a
machine. However, McDougall also warns us that it should not be taken in
the sense of a material structure or arrangement of parts. He likens it
more to the composition of a poem or of music. �The structure of the
mind is a conceptual system that we have to build up by inference from
the data of the two orders, facts of behavior and the facts of
introspection.� The same can be said of the composition of the
manas.
The Jaina philosophers, however, were aware of both the elements in the
mental life of animals, although they were groping to find the relation
between the two aspects of the mind. The analysis of the psychic factor
and the idea of prana
as �bodily power� has led some philosophers like Zimmer to believe that
the Jaina categories represent a comparatively primitive archaic
analysis and description of human nature, many of the details of which
underlie and remain incorporated in the later classic Indian view.
Zimmer is suggesting that the analysis of the psyche that prevailed in
the classic period in the synthesis of the six systems was originally
not a Brahmin contribution, but non-Aryan, having come through
Sarnkhya Yoga. Its
categories are pre-figured in the Jaina view. Although the roots of the
Jaina view may be primitive, the conception as developed by the Jainas
presents a view of the composition of the mind which is comparable to
the modern theories as already referred to. However, the
dravya manas and the
bhava manas are not two
distinct parts, but two aspects distinguishable only by analysis. They
treated manas as one
activity with different aspects. The Jainas have refuted the Buddhist
theory of mind as a collection of
khandas. The Buddhist conception of mind is well described in
the Sariryukta Niknya, Vol. II p.
194, �that which is called intelligence arises as a thing and
ceases as another�. It is a �series of flash points, cinema films,
thaumatrope figures welded into an apparent phenomenal unit.�� The
Jainas say that the Buddhist theory goes against belief in the other
world. Mind for the Jainas is a whole and not a collection, nor even a
compound of dravya and
bhava manas. Stout
says that the unity of the individual mind is the unity of the complex
whole which is indivisible inasmuch as its partial ingredients have not
an independent existence of their own. The unity of such a mind is
beyond comparison.
Each jiva has its own
mind, although the general nature of mind is one:
�manana laksanatvena say
vamanasamekatvat�, because the essential nature of mind is
the expression of the mental states. In the
Sthananga we read,
�ege jivanam match�. In
this way and according to the situation, the Gods, men, and
assures have each his own
mind. In the Tattvarthasutra,
the classification of the souls, five-sensed organisms with
minds, is mentioned; sanjninah
samanaskah. In the five-sensed organisms only some possess
minds. Comparative psychologists like Kohler and Alverdes have shown
that mind in. the developed form is possible in the case of higher
animals having insight.
Naiyayikas also believe that each organism possesses a mind
and sensitive organs in order that it may be in a position to cognize
the objects and to experience pleasure and pain in accordance with past
karma. Each
self has one mind,
because a single mind of atomic magnitude cannot be shared by all. This
mind in each self can
function only inside the organism with which the
self is connected.
If there were one common mind
for all, there would be simultaneity of cognition. A similar argument
was presented by the Jaina thinkers in favour of the
jiva being
bhavamanarupa. If the
jiva were
sarvagata, there would be
cognition of everything by everyone.
Their arguments were more metaphysical and epistemological than
psychological. But modern psychology has tried to analyse the same
problem from the psychological point of view. McDougall writes, �It
seems probable that mind has the same nature wherever and whenever it
exists or manifests itself, whether in animals, men or superhuman
beings, whether in the new-born infant, the fool or the wise man. On the
other hand, the structure of the mind seems to be peculiar to each
individual�; not only is it different in the various species of animals
(if they have minds) and in man; but the structure of the mind of one
man is different from that of every other man; and, in any one man at
each stage of his career or life-history, it is not quite the same as at
any other stage.
The ancient Indian philosophers were faced with problems concerning the
instrumental nature of the mind. It was generally believed that, like
other sense organs, mind was also a sense organ, and the instrument of
the soul. In the Upanisads we find references to the mind as one
of the organs along with the other sense and motor organs, (
jnanendriyas and karrnendriyas). Prasna Upanisad mentions
manas as a central organ. Reference to the manas as the
driver of the ten organs in the Maitri Upanisad may also be
noted. Orthodox Hindu philosophy accepts mind as the internal organ.
There were some philosophers who made buddhi, ahatizkara, and
manas together to constitute the internal organ antalzkarana.
But Jayanta believes that mind is an internal organ. Similarly,
Vidyanandi maintains that buddhi and ahamkara cannot be
regarded as sense organs. The Nyaya haisesika philosophers
regarded mind as the internal organ. But Gautama did not include it in
the list of the sense organs; Kanada is also silent. Vatsyayana includes
manas under the senses. He calls it the inner sense by which we
apprehend the inner states of feelings, desires and cognition�s. The
self perceives the inner states by the instrument of the manas.
Vatsyayana believes that mind is as good a sense organ as the eye
and the like, though there are certain differences. But the Jainas
believed that the mind is a no-indriya in the sense that it is
different from the five sense organs. Its sense contents and functions
are not entirely identical with those of indriyas. The prefix No
here does not mean not, but is at times rendered as issued.
It is a quasi-sense organ. Still they accept the instrumental
function of the mind. In the Gommatasara: Jivakanda, we get a
description of mind as the no-indriya. It is through the mind
that mental knowledge and mental activity arise. But in the case of the
mind there is no external manifestation as in the case of the other
sense organs. The function of mind is assimilative.
- Pramanamimamsa
describes mind as the thing which grasps everything. In the vrtti
of the same it is said, �manonindriyamiti no indriyamiti ca ucyate.�
In the Tattvarthasutra, the function of mind, which is
anindriya, is described as the sruta cognition. The second
function is the mati and its modifications.
It is called the organ of
apprehension of all objects because all sense experiences are
apprehended by the mind. The Jainas accepted the instrumental nature
(karanatva) of the mind. But it is said that the karana is of
two types-bahya karana
and antahkarana, and even the dravyamanas is described as
the antahkarana, the internal organ. Being the internal organ, it
is different from the other sense organs.
However, such a description of mind need not be interpreted in the sense
that, according to the Jaina view, mind is not a sense organ; in fact,
it is more than a sense organ. Its function is not specific like that of
the other sense organs. It is
sarvarthagrahanam, as it is stated in the
Pramanamimamsa.
Another problem that the Jaina thinkers faced along with other
Indian philosophers was the
prapyakaritva of the mind. This problem is peculiar to Indian
philosophers. It refers to the capacity
of the sense organ to come
in actual contact with the object of experience. According to the
Nyaya philosophers mind is
prapyakari, because
cognition is possible when the mind comes in contact with the object
through the sense organs. The speed of the
manas in contacting the
object is greater than the speed of any other sense organ. But the
Jainas believe that the manas is
aprapyakari. It does not directly come in contact with the
objects. They strongly object to those who argue that it is
prapyakari. If, they say,
the mind were prapyakari,
then the mind would go out of its place and meet the objects, like
the idol of Jina on the
Mount Meru, both during
the waking and the sleeping state. But this is not so; otherwise there
would be confusion of experiences. While thinking of fire, we should
experience burning. When we think of poison, we should experience
poisoning. Similarly, when we think
of sandalwood, we should
experience coolness.s Even the
dravya manas, although it is made of fine particles
of the matter, cannot get
cognition, because it is unconscious
(acetana). Moreover, it is
an internal organ unlike the other sense organs. Those who believe that
the mind is prapyakari
may give dream experience as evidence: the mind goes out of its place to
the Jirralaya on the
Mount Mercc
in the dream. But such
experiences are also false because they do not correspond to the facts
of experience. They are like the illusion of a moving circle when a
burning stick is moved fast (alaycakrabhrama).
After waking up, we find that our experience in the dream was
false. The argument for the
prapyakaritva of the mind on the basis
of undifferentiated
unanalyzed cognition is also not acceptable.g This problem has a great
psychological significance, although it is found even in primitive
times. It is intimately connected with the problem of the process of
perception.
Ancient philosophers could not free themselves from the animistic ideas
in spite of the fact
that they had advanced in the direction of conceiving the immaterial as
distinct from the material. The Jaina view expresses the naturalistic
approach to the analysis of mental states. Still, the metaphysical
approach was not absent. The Jainas were trying- to see the problem from
a more analytic and empirical point of view. They centered their
discussions on the various facts of experience; as in the waking and the
dream state, in order to find evidence for the aprapyakri nature
of the mind.
One more problem remains, and that is the problem of the relation
between body and mind. This has been a perennial problem for
philosophers and psychologists of the East and the West. The problem has
a metaphysical and a psychological side. There have been philosophers
who have made attempts to solve this problem. Whether it refers to
individual minds and bodies, or to the general relation of the finite
mind with matter, there are various possible solutions to the problem.
Materialists say that only the body is real, and the mind or the mental
is only the product and dependent upon it. The idealists lay emphasis on
the primacy of the mind. The material is unreal, or it is manifestation
of the mental. There are other solutions, as of those who say that both
are unreal, or two aspects of some higher reality. The realists, on the
other hand, emphasize the reality of both matter and mind. Similarly,
there are many divergences, specially when referring to the relation
between the finite mind and the finite body. The relation between the
finite body and the finite mind may be: (a) a complete dependence, as
when mind is regarded as the secretion of the brain or a sort of
epiphenomenon, a product, a process and similarly by-product of physical
processes; (b) that of parallelism, the two series, mental and bodily,
corresponding step by step, element for element to each other; (c) that
of reciprocity or interaction, the mental processes being the condition
of the bodily, and the bodily of the mental. The Jaina philosophers
discussed the metaphysical aspect of the problem. They were, at the same
time, not unaware of the psychological side of the question. Still, the
distinction between the metaphysical and the psychological was not
clearly drawn. Mahavira points out to the Ganadhara Vayubhuti that it is
not correct to maintain that consciousness is produced by the collection
of the bhutas, material elements like earth and water, as
intoxication is produced by the mixture of the ghataki flower and
jaggery, although it is not found in their constituents separately. On
the contrary, cetana is the quality of the soul. It is different
from the bodily aspect. In this we find the refutation of the layout
view. Similar arguments are found in Sutrakrtriiga. In
Paircastikayasara, Kundakundacarya discusses the problem from the
side of the effect of karma on the jiva. On account of the
rise, annihilation and suppression of karma, jiva has five bhavas. The
five physical characteristics of karma like udaya, ksaya
etc., determine the corresponding psychic characteristics called bhavas.
The last parinamic bhava is not causally connected with samsaa
or moksa. It is a niskriya bhava. Being affected by the
changes in the karmic material, jiva experiences certain emotional
states. But whatever emotional states appear in the consciousness are
due to the causal agency of jiva. The extrinsic cause is he physical
matter, and the proximate cause is the jiva. Karma is a of two types,
dravya karma and bhava karma. Peculiar combinations of paramount
(atoms), form the material karma. A change in the material karma may
being about a similar change in the psychic states. This conscious
change has a predominately affective tone. This is bhava karma. Thus it
is really parallelistic. There are two distinct causal agencies, as
nimitta karta or efficient cause and upadana karta or substantial cause.
Jiva is the substantial cause of psychic changes. Its action is
immediate. Bhava is psychic he change; and I can be brought about by a
psychic change only. Karmic matte is the substantial cause of the
physical changes; these are the two series which correspond to each
other. Karmic matte brings about its own changes. Jiva, through its own
impure ways of thought the at are conditioned by karmic matte, brings
about its own thought changes. These two processes form independent
series. This seems to suggest ape psycho-physical parallelism. But the
parallelism is not merely the temporal correspondence of the two series.
It is transcended by the doctrine of the nimitta karta. As in the
Cartesian view, their thinking and unthinking are distinct, yet the two
are related by the peculiar concept of causal relation. The unthinking
may be the nimitta karta of the other, and the converse also may be
true. However, the who causal channels are independent. The Samkhya
thinkers raised objections against such a view. If the karmic matte
affects its own change and if jiva brings about his own changes, why
should he enjoy the fruits of karma for which he is not responsible; and
why should the two independent series affect each other? But
Kundakundacarya answers that the world space is filled with material
bodies, some imperceptible and some perceptible. These constitute the
karma. These are he karma varganas. They are physical molecules of a
particular constitution which give them the tendency to be attracted by
the jiva. This is also known as the karma prayoga pudgala. Jivas and
karma varganas coexist. But by the mere fact of contiguity, jiva and
karmic matter are brought together as the casket filled with black
collyrium powder becomes black by mere contact. The relation of this
bhavamanarupa jiva to the body is described on the analogy of the
mixture of milk and water: kstraniravat. Similarly, just as the
lotushued ruby placed in a cup of milk imparts its lutre o the milk, the
jiva residing in the body imparts its lustre o intelligence to the body.
Radhakrishnan says that the Jainas accept the dualism of body and mind.
They accept the view of parallelism with all its limitations. And to the
question why jiva should suffer the fruits of karma for which it is not
responsible, � a sort of pre-established harmony� is usgested. But the
Jainas do not speak merely in terms of pre-established harmony. Their
theory transcends parallelism and postulates a more intimate connection
between body and mind.
Some modern psychologists like Jodi would limit the extent of
parallelism. Mind is correlated with body, but only under certain
conditions, where there is a certain complexity of organic structure, a
central nervous system. Some others like Spencer, hoffdin and Paulson
make the parallelism universal. The Jainas have given a modified
parallelism with reference o psychic activity as determined by the
karmic matter.
The analysis of the Jina concept of mind so far shows that the Jainas
were clearly aware of the distinction between mind and body.
Metaphysically, they gave the dichotomous division as jiva and ajiva.
They presented a sort of psycho-physical parallelism concerning
individual minds and bodies. Yet, they were not unaware of the
interaction between the mental and the bodily. The empirical approach
showed them that there is such mutual influence. The idea of the
nimitta-karta was introduced for the solution of the problem. The notion
of the structure of the mind (dravya-manas), and the functional aspect
of mind (bhava-manas), shows that they were aware o the significance of
interaction. A clear and consistent formulation would have been possible
if the metaphysical and the psychological analyses were clearly
distinguished. The Jaina theory was an attempt at the integration of the
metaphysical dichotomy of jiva and ajiva and the establishment of the
interaction of the individual mind and body.
CHAPTER III
THE JAINA THEORY OF UPAYOGA
The Jaina philosophers talked of
Upayoga as the fundamental characteristic of life.
Upayoga is the defining
characteristic of the soul. Upayoga
is that by which a function is served:
Upayujyate anena iti upayogah.
It is also described as that by which a subject is grasped.
In the
Gommatasara: Jivakanda, Upayoga is described as the drive
which leads to the apprehension of objects.
It is the source of the
psychical aspect of experience. All the three aspects-cognitive,
conative and affective, spring from it. It gives rise to the experience
of objects, and the experience expresses itself in forms of
jnana and
darsana. Upayoga is of
two types: anakara,
formless, and sakara,
possessed of form. Anakara
upayoga is formless, indeterminate cognition.
Sakara upayoga is
determinate cognition, a defined form of experience. It would not be out
of place to point out that Upayoga
is not the resultant of consciousness as it is sometimes
maintained. This was one of the earlier attempts to translate
upayoga. Nor is it a sort
of inclination arising from consciousness. It is the conative drive
which gives rise to experience. It is, in fact, the source of all
experience. The Jaina philosophers were aware of the driving force of
experience, the force by which experience is possible. This may be
likened to the �horme� of the modern psychologists.
The biological studies of the lower animals from the amoeba onwards show
that all animals are centers of energy in constant dynamical relation
with the world, yet confronting it in their own characteristic way. A
name was needed to express this fundamental property of life, the drive
or a felt tendency towards a particular end. Some psychologists called
it conation� or the conative process. But this drive may not always be
conscious.
There is the presence of an internal drive in such processes. ,,To
this drive or urge, whether it occurs in the conscious life of men and
the higher animals we propose to give a single name-horme�. This
activity of the mind is a fundamental property of life. It has various
other names, like the will to live,
elan vital, the life urge
and the libido� Horme under one form or another has been the fundamental
postulate of Lamarck, Butler, Bergson and Bernard Shaw. McDougall took
great pains to present the hormic theory of psychology as against the
mechanistic interpretation of life and mind.
The hormic force determines experience and behaviour. We get conscious
experience because of this drive. The conscious experience takes the
form of perception and understanding. Horme operates even in the
unconscious behaviour of lower animals. In the plants and animals we see
it operate in the preservation of organic balance. In our own physical
and mental life we find examples of horme below the conscious level. We
circulate our blood, we breathe and we digest our food, and all these
are the expressions of the hormic energy. It operates at all levels both
in the individual and the racial sense. But the horme expressed and
presented by the Jaina philosophers could not be developed and analysed
in terms of the modern psychology, because their analysis of
upayoga was purely an
epistemological problem tempered with metaphysical speculation. They
were aware of the fact that there is a purposive force which actuates
and determines experience. This is clear from the distinction between
jnana and
darsana as two forms of
upayoga.
Jnana and
Darsana
As
already painted out, the Jainas make a distinction between
anakara and
snskna upayoga. They say
that anakara upayoga
(indeterminate cognition) is
darsana; and sakara
upayoga is jitana. Sakara upayoga is specific cognition and
cognize the specific qualities of the objects. The
anakara upayoga is
indeterminate and undistinguished. It is general cognition. It may be
called the knowledge of acquaintance, in the language of William James.
The distinction between the indeterminate and the defined cognition,
(the sakara and
anskara upayoga), has been
a great problem in the Jaina theory of cognition. It is an ancient
problem which has its roots in the early distinction between the two
types of karma, jnanavaraniya
and darsanavaraniya.
The Agamas
make a clear distinction between
jnana and darsana.
Kundakundacarya makes a distinction between the two, both
from the empirical and the transcendental point of view. He says that
the atman, its
knowledge ( jnana), and
intuition (darsana)-all
these are identical, and they reveal the
self as well as the
non-self
However, he does not make a
clear distinction between the sakara upayoga and the anakara
upayoga on that basis. Acarya Virasena, in his commentary called
Dhavalii on Satlchandagama of �uspadanta, says, What
comprehends an external object of the nature of the
universal-cum-particular is jnana, and comprehension of the
self of the same nature is darsana.�
They are both valid
cognition�s, and it is also maintained that jnana comprehends the
reality in its complex and universal-cum-particular nature. It is not
correct to say that jnana comprehends the particular and
darsana apprehends the general only. Virasena says that the only
difference between them is that jnana knows the external reality
and darsana intuits the internal self. Darsana is arztarrnukha,
introvert; while jnana is bahirmukha, extrovert. Brahmadeva
in his Vrtti on Dravyasamgraha of Nemicandra gather
says that darsana intuits the universal characteristic.]
But in his commentary on gsthZi 44, he distinguishes two
views, one from the point of view of logic and the other from the point
of view of the Scriptures. Logic will give us the conception of
darsana as intuition of the universal as for instance sat.
all According to the Scriptures, the awareness of one�s self
which shows the striving for knowledge, and the subsequent
determinate knowledge is jnana. The selfsame consciousness is
called darsana as well as jnana with reference to the
object of cognition. It is called darsana when it is engaged in
intuiting the self and jirancr when engaged in knowing the
nonself. Other great thinkers, like Pujyapada, Samantabhadra,
Akalatika and Vidyanandi accept the determinate and the indeterminate
nature of jnana and darsana respectively. Darsana
need not be taken to be identical with indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpa
pratyaksa), as it is sometimes maintained. It need not be taken as
�pure sensation of the existence of objects.l If it were to be
identified with sensation, it would be a rudimentary stage of
cognition; it would be the first stage of cognition. In that case, we
can accept the highest type of darsana like avadhi and
kevala. The Jainas accept the possibility of the perfect
darsana, kevala darsana. We may call darsana intuition, as
against jnana which may be called intellective cognition.
The temporal relation between jnana and darsana is another
problem which the Jaina philosophers faced. Acarya Jinabhadra mentions
three positions: (i) they occur simultaneously, (ii) there are alternate
occurrences, and (iii) they are identical. This problem arises with
reference to the perfect being. The Jainas are agreed that in the case
of the imperfect jivas there is no simultaneity of occurrence of
jnana and darsana. An imperfect being in the mundane
existence cannot experience jnana and darsana at the same
time. There is no agreement among philosophers. Philosophers following
the angelic literature maintain that there is simultaneous
occurrence of jnana and darsana even in the case of the
kevalin, because Jnana and darsana are both conscious
experiences, and as such cannot occur at the same moment of experience
even in the case of the kevalin much less in the case of the
beings in the mundane existence, the samsarins. In the
Visesavasyakabhasya we get a similar view. Here Jinabhadra says that
it is not true to say that when the veil of karma is removed the
omniscient soul gets the two experiences simultaneously, because both of
them are essentially conscious experiences. Umasvati maintains that in
the case of the mundane souls jitana and darsana as
conscious mental states manifesting themselves in mati, sruta and
avadhi occur one after the other and not simultaneously. But in
the case of the omniscient, where there is �pure knowledge� and �pure
intuition�, there is simultaneous occurrence of the two experiences.
Kundakundacarya is also of the same opinion. In the case of
the kevalira the two experiences occur simultaneously even as the
light and the heat of the sun.] - Pujyapada Devanandi gives a
similar view. Akalanka and Vidyanandi support the simultaneous
occurrence of jnana and darsana in the kevalin. If
they were to occur successively, his omniscience would only be a
contingent occurrence.l There are some philosophers who do not make any
difference between j0na and darsana at the highest level.
They advocate the identity between the two. Haribhadra mentions that the
�old Acaryas� held the non-difference of the jnana and darsana.
As pointed out by Tatia, it is difficult to determine who the old
tycaryas� referred to were.� Siddhasena Divakara points out
that we can distinguish between jnana darsana up to the point of
manahparyaya-jnana, but at the level of the kevala jnana
there is no difference between jnana and darsana in the
case of the omniscient. If the omniscient soul knows all in an instant,
he should continue to know for ever, other wise he does not know at all.
He also says that darsana is jnana of external objects untouched
by or unalienable to the sense organs. But the cognition does not
cognize past and future events by means of a linga. Yasovijaya
sums up the discussion on this problem with the remark that philosophers
looked at the problem from different points of view. Therefore, none of
the three positions is untenable. Those who maintained simultaneous
occurrence looked at it from the empirical point of view. Jinabhadra
resorted to the dusutra,
analytic point of view, while Siddhasena looked at it from the
samgraha, or synthetic
point of view.
Apart from the logical and epistemological implications of this problem
it has a great psychological significance. The experience of the
kevalin is not possible
for us to know. However, it is necessary to analyse the experience in
its psychological aspect. The discussion. of the simultaneity and the
successive occurrence of jnana
and darsana
in the case of the kevalin
throws light on the fundamental nature of experience in the
jnana and the
darsana aspect. Experience
is concrete, it expresses itself in the analytical and synthetic aspect.
Immediate experience is a factor in the concrete psychosis. We also get
the analytic experience which is aided by intellective factors.
Jnana and
darsana have been very
often talked of as knowledge about, and knowledge of acquaintance. But
knowledge of acquaintance is not a proper phrase for
darsana, because knowledge
of acquaintance is a single form of cognition. It is analogous to
sensation. But darsana is
not to be identified with the primitive and the original form of
cognition. It is higher, and yet simple. It may be referred to as
intuitive experience which apprehends reality directly in a moment of
experience. For instance, we very often get the solution of a
mathematical problem in a flash. Parraudin, a Swiss hunter, conceived
the idea that the huge blocks of rocks had been transported by glacial
action. He got this as a sudden flash of insight. It was later proved by
more plodding scientists. There has been a good deal of discussion
regarding the knowledge of acquaintance or �simple apprehension� in
modern psychology. L. T. Hobhouse recognizes �simple apprehension�.
James talks of the �knowledge of acquaintance�. Hobhouse says that
thought relations never constitute a content of immediate experience.
�The consciousness in which we are directly or immediately aware of the
content present to us a state which I venture to call apprehension, is a
primitive underived act of knowledge�. Prof. Stout speaks of immediate
experience in similar language. Simple apprehension is the term which
seems most suitable for the presence of an object to consciousness
without indicating any more special relation in which the mind may stand
to this object. Bertrand Russell also, in spite of the frequent use of
the phrase ,knowledge by acquaintance�, means by it the same
kind of experience as Hobhouse and Prof. Stout meant by �simple
apprehension�. It is better called �acquaintance� and not �knowledge
based on acquaintance�. We shall say that �we have acquaintance with
anything of which we are directly aware, without intermediacy of any
process of inference,� or any knowledge of truth�. However, the term
darsana cannot be
translated in terms of any of these, as acquaintance or simple
apprehension; they signify underived knowledge. The terms refer to
simple, direct and primitive experience. Stout says that it gives the
bare presence of the object to consciousness. If so,
darsana would quite differ
from such a form of simple apprehension.
Darsana has various
degrees. It admits of perfect experience which is direct and unerring,
kevula darsana. Thus,
it would not be appropriate to identify
darsana with such a simple
and primitive form of knowledge as mentioned by Hobhouse, Russell and
Stout. It is best to call it intuitive experience�.
Jnana is experience which
presents the analytic features of objects. It is not a state of
perception, because perception is a stage of experience. It is a stage
of jnana as well as
darsana; we find that mati
jnana and mati-darsana
are two species of cognition. Sensation and perception belong
to both forms of cognition, jnana
and darsana.
In
the Dravyasamgraha,
Nemicandra says that soul in its pure form has the quality of
consciousness. Brahmadeva, in his commentary writes that from the
ultimate point of view, jiva
is distinguished by its quality of consciousness.
It is the most direct and
nearest reality of which any one who has introspected is most
immediately aware.
Consciousness has been the most important point of discussion for
philosophers, psychologists as well as scientists. Attempts have been
made to salve the problem from various angles. In the
Aitareya Aranyaka, an
effort is made to understand the different stages of the development of
consciousness in the universe. In the evolution of herbs, trees and all
that is animal, the atman
is gradually developing. In the herbs, only sap is seen; in the
animated beings, citta
is seen; in man, there is gradual development of
atman, for he is now
endowed with prajria.
Similarly, in the Chandogyopanisad,
Prajapati describes the progressive identification
of atman with body
consciousness. The physico-psychological method is adopted in the
Taittiriyu. Finally, the
atman as
jnanamaya and
anandamaya is emphasized.
The Jaina classification of the
jivas places the problem of the evolution of consciousness on
a scientific basis. Jivas
have been classified into one, two, three, four and five-sensed,
according to the number of the sense organs possessed by them.
Jivas possessing the five
senses are divided into those having mind and those without mind. It is
now realized that the. rise of consciousness is late in the evolution of
life, from physical evolution to the evolution of life, mind and
consciousness. However, it is difficult to say whether the ancient
philosophers were aware of the evolution of life and consciousness in
the sense understood to-day. Still, it would not be inappropriate to say
that they were aware of the relatively later growth of mind and
consciousness.
Cetana
From the speculative side, cetana
as a fundamental quality of the soul is pure consciousness, a
kind of flame without smoke. This consciousness is eternal, although it
gets manifested in the course of the evolutionary process of life in the
empirical sense. This empirical consciousness arises from the contact of
the sense organs with the objects. Thus,
cetana in its pure form
gets embodied with the atman
and comes into contact with the empirical life, with the
sense organs and objects. It manifests itself in the form of
jnana and
darsana. Jnana and
darsana are, therefore,
aspects of cetana and
cetana is the
spring-board from which they arise. It is like the flood of light in
which objects are illuminated. It is the psychic background and the
psychic halo of cognition in its two aspects,
jnana and
darsana. Cetana,
therefore, is the light of consciousness that the soul possesses and
through this light the cognition of objects arises.
Now, the problem arises-how to relate concepts like
upayoga, cetana, jnana and
darsana. Upayoga has
been described as of two types,
jnana and darsana. We
have described upayoga
as horme, the psychic force which is driving life and
consciousness with a purpose. The purpose may be conscious or
unconscious. On the conscious side,
upayoga expresses itself
into jnana and
darsana. This expression
is possible in the light of cetana.
If cetana
were not there, then upayoga
would be purely an unconscious drive expressing itself in
physiological activities like breathing and blood circulation. But we
feel that even these activities are sometimes objects of our marginal
consciousness. In any case, there is the psychic overtone of the
physiological activities in our lives. This overtone is the light of
consciousness, or the light of
cetana which is a permanent quality of the soul. In the
background of this light the psychic drive or
upayoga expresses itself
into cognition, as the light of the lamp enables a man to see the
objects. This irresistible force of life makes us cognize objects. Thus
upayoga is force. It is
the fundamental characteristic of the soul.
Cetana is the background
of light. It is the fundamental quality of the soul. Cognition like
jnana and
darsana are expressions of
the force of upayoga in
the background light of cetana.
The Jaina view of the consciousness as the quality of the soul differs
from the Nyaya-Vaisesika
view. Nyaya-Vaisesika
philosophers believe that consciousness is a mechanical and
adventitious quality produced by the contact of the various factors
inhering in a substance separate from itself. The
atman in itself is
unconscious, jada.
According to Kanada, consciousness is produced in a jar through its
connection with fire,
agnighatasamyogaja is
rohitadigpaavat�. Consciousness conceived to be a product
depending upon a suitable concourse of circumstances.