It is only an adventitious quality of the soul. In the state of
�deliverance�, the soul is devoid of all qualities including
consciousness. Even the materialist Carvaka view says that consciousness
is the result o�- a combination of some circumstances and
material substances. Consciousness, for them, is an epiphenomenon, just
a product of nature produced like the intoxicating property of the drug
when the material elements are transferred into the physical body. It is
said to arise in the same way as the red colour is produced by the
combination of the betel-leaf, nut and lime, or is the result of mixing
white and yeIlow. But Nyaya
Vaisesikas do not deny the existence of the soul. Modern
epiphenomenalism maintains that consciousness is a by-product of the
physical and chemical changes going on in the body. It is like the
residue of a chemical action. It is like the whistle of a passing train.
During his discussion with the Third Ganadhara, Lord Mahavira answers
the objections of the latter. He says that the presumption of Vayubhuti
seems to be that consciousness is produced from the collection
(samudaya) of
bhutas like earth and water.
It is like the intoxication found in the combination of the
ghataki flowers and jaggery,
although it is not traceable in the components separately. If the
combination (samudaya) is
destroyed, the consciousness is destroyed. But, Mahavira points out that
consciousness can never exist in the collection if it is absent in the
individual constituents as oil cannot come out of particles of sand.
But
cetana is the intrinsic
quality of the soul residing in a group of
bhutas, (elements). If it were
only the quality of all the elements taken together, it might also exist
in a dead body. Sometimes, consciousness arises without the working of
the sense organs; and sometimes, in spite of their working, the object
is not apprehended. In the Samayasdra
it is said that the mere presence of the stimuli on the external
environment, and even their coming into contact with the sense-organs,
may not be effective to produce a psychic state like the consciousness.
The presence of a psychic element, like selective attention, determines
the nature of the state. Consciousness, then, has none of the
characteristics that belong to any or all of the collection of knowable
objects. The Jainas do not accept the transcendental consciousness, with
no distinction between the ego and non-ego, of the idealists. According
to Sari-Kara, intelligence and
self are identical.
However, the Jainas accept
with the idealists that consciousness is unique and is not a product of
a concourse of conditions. It is eternal. The Jaina view comes nearer to
the view of consciousness presented by Ramanuja. The
atman is eternal, and its
natural quality of consciousness is also eternal. It is cidrupa and also
caitanya gunaka. The self is
filled with consciousness and has also consciousness for its quality.
Ramanuja tries to distinguish
between the Nyaya Vaisesika view and the Samkara view. Consciousness is
not a non-eternal quality of the self, for, in that ease the self hood
would be unconscious. He also wants to avoid the identity of the self
and consciousness. And the Jainas also say that the self has
consciousness as its essence. Since the time of Leibnitz, consciousness
is admitted to be an accident of the mental representation and not its
necessary, essential attribute. His contention that the inner world is
richer and more concealed was well known to writers of the Upanisads.
However, that consciousness as an aspect of the mental life is a
profound truth, is slowly to be realized.
States of Consciousness
The analysis of the states of consciousness has been an important
problem for philosophers as well as the psychologists. Consciousness has
three aspects-the cognitive, the affective and the conative. They are
modes of consciousness. In perceiving, believing or otherwise
apprehending that such and such a thing exists and has characteristics,
one�s attitude is cognitive. In the affective attitude one is either
pleased or displeased about it. But one is also active about it; tries
to know more about it; tries to alter it in some respect. This attitude
is conative. But Stout says that though these three modes of
consciousness are abstractly and analytically distinct phases in a
concrete psychosis, they are not separable. They do not occur in
isolation from each other. Mind is an organic unity and its activities
have the closest degree of organic interaction. However, in every
psychosis one of the aspects may be predominant. In the pleasure of
pursuit, feeling presupposes conation. Sometimes, feeling is dependent
on certain conative attitudes involved ill. the perceptual process,
Similar reciprocity is found in conation and cognition.
Indian thinkers were aware of the distinction of states in
consciousness. The Jainas recognize three forms of consciousness. They
make a distinction between consciousness as knowing, as feeling and as
ex periencing the fruits of karma (karma phala cetana), and willing.
Conation and feeling are closely allied. As a rule we have first
feeling, next conation and then knowledge. McDougall has emphasized that
feeling is the core of all instinctive activity. in fact, in all
experience there is a core of feeling, while the cognitive and conative
aspects are varying factors. In the
Aitareya Upanisad there is mention of different modes of
experience. Sensation, perception and ideation are different modes of
intellection. It recognizes feeling and volition as the other two forms
of experience. The seers of Upanisads
give a classification of seven mental functions. At the basis is
intellection. The Chandogyoparrisad
emphasizes the primacy of the will. The Buddhists also recognized
such a distinction. We have perception and conception, feeling and
affection, and conation or will. In the Buddhist theory, will is the
most dominant aspect of conscious experience, the basal element of human
life. Radhakrishnan in his Indian
Philosophy suggests that
vijnana, vedana and samskara
roughly correspond to knowledge, feeling and will. Chillers in
his dictionary brings the concept of conation under
samskara. Mrs. Rhys Davids
believes that, although there is no clear distinction between conation
in the psychological sense and will in the ethical sense, still in the
Pithakas there is consistent
discrimination between psychological importance and ethical
implication.s Professor Stout has given up old tripartite classification
of mental states and reverts to the ancient bipartite analysis of mind
bringing the affective and conative elements together under the name of
interest. Radhakrishnan says that, if we discard the separation of
cognition and make it the theoretical aspect of conation, we get to the
Buddhist emphasis on conation as the central fact of mental life.
In
the Nyayavaisesika theory also
there is a description of the manifestation of the three aspects of
self as knowledge, desire and
volition. We have to know a thing before we feel the want of it. In
order to satisfy the want, we act. Thus, as Hiriyanna says, feeling
mediates between cognition and conation. Thus, the modes of
consciousness have been the problem of philosophers and psychologists.
There is a general agreement regarding the division of consciousness
into three modes, although different philosophers have emphasized
different aspects in the concrete psychosis. Buddhists have emphasized
conation. In the Upanisads all
the aspects have received their due prominence. The primacy of the
intellect is emphasized in the
Chartdogya and Maitreya
Upanisads. In the Chandogya,
again, we get a description of the primacy of the will. But this
has reference to the cosmic will rather than to its psychological
aspect. The Jainas emphasize the close relation between conation and
feeling. The Nyaya theory
describes the function of feeling as a mediating factor between
cognition and conation.
The term self-consciousness is very ambiguous. It may me-u,
consciousness of the self as an object given in introspection. In this
sense. the
self,
the
empirical ego, becomes both an aspect of experience and also an object
of experience. Self-consciousness may mean transcendental and. pure
self-consciousness. It is not an object of knowledge. It is the ultimate
subject presupposed in acts of knowledge. Again, consciousness may mean
the ultimate eternal consciousness, which is a metaphysical concept. It
is also used in the empirical sense as consciousness which is
changing.4+) Some of the earlier philosophers have not made a clear
distinction between the metaphysical and the psychological sense of
consciousness. In the
Upanisads, atrnan
is
described as the basis and the ultimate presupposition in all knowledge.
It is the absolute knower: and bow can the knower itself be known?�-� It
cannot be comprehended by intellect. It is the seer and the l.n.ower.
Yet, the
atman
can
be known by higher intuition. It is knowable as the
pratyagatmanam,
apprehended by
adhyatma yoga
The
Buddhists recognize the distinction between subject and object within
the consciousness. They do not believe in the transcendental
self.
Their view of consciousness is like the stream of consciousness of
William James. Yogacras believe that self is a series of cognition�s or
ideas. There is no self apart from cognition�s. They reveal neither the
self nor the non-self. Some
Nyaya
philosophers, especially the
neo-Naiyayikas,
believed that
self
is
an object of internal perception,
manasa pratyaksa.
The
Vais�esikas
also maintain that, although the
self
is
not an object of perception but of inference, it can be apprehended by
Yogic intuition. The
Sarnkhya
philosophers maintain that consciousness is the essence of
self:
It
is self-luminous.
Self
is
inferred through its reflection in
buddhi. But
Ptanjali accepts the supernormal intuition of the
self
through the power of Loncemtration. The self can know itself through its
reflection in its pure
sattva
and
also when :nixed with
rajas
and
tannins by
supernormal, intuition
(pratibha
jitana). So,
the
pure
self
can
know the empirical
self,
out
the empirical
self
cannot know the pure self. There is the contradiction involved in the
self being both subject and object and the reflection theory does not
much improve the situation. Vacaspati tries to avoid the contradiction
by saying that transcendental
self
is
the subject, and the empirical
self
the
object, of self-apprehension.
According to Prabhakara,
self
is
necessarily known in every act of cognition. Cognition is self-luminous.
It not only manifests itself, but also supports the
atman, much
as
the flame and the wick.
Neither the self nor the object is self-luminous. There
can be consciousness of an object without the consciousness of the self.
In every act of cognition there is a direct and immediate apprehension
of the self. But the self can never be known as object of knowledge. It
is only to be known as a subject. It is revealed by triputa samvit.
The Jainas hold with Prabhakara that cognition is always apprehended by
the self: Cognition reveals itself, the self and its object. Every act
of cognition cognizes itself, the cognizing subject and the cognized
object. But the Jaina denies that consciousness alone is self-luminous.
He regards self as non-luminous. Self is the subject of internal
perception. When I feel that I am happy I have a distinct and immediate
apprehension of the self� as an object of internal perception, just as
pleasure can be perceived though it is without form. �Oh Gautama�, said
Nlahaivira, �the self is prcrtyakser even to you. The soul is cognizable
even to you.� Again, unlike the view of Prabhakara, the Jainas hold that
it is the object of perception and, it is manifested by external and
internal perception. To the question Tow can the subject be an object of
perception?�, the Jaina replies that whatever is experienced is an
object of perception.
William James made a distinction between the empirical self, the me, and
the transcendental self; the I. The self is partly the known and partly
the knower, partly object and partly subject. The empirical ego is the
.self as known, the pure ego is the knower. �It is that which at any
moment is conscious�. Whereas the me is only one of the things which it
is conscious of. But this
thinker is not a passing state. It is something deeper and less mutable.
45 Prof. Ward holds that the
pure self is always immanent in experience, in the sense that experience
without the expedient will be unintelligible. It is also
transcendental,. in the sense that it can never be the object of our
experience. The Jainas were aware that consciousness of self is not
possible by ordinary cognition. Therefore, they said, it is due to
internal perception.
Self-consciousness does not belong to the realm of pure consciousness
which is foundational and without limitation. That is the cetana which
is the essential quality of the soul. But when we descend to the
practical level, the realm of vyavahara, we find the distinction between
subject and object in consciousness. The question whether the self is
perceived by direct experience like the internal perception of the
Jainas, or by the immediate intuition, ( pratibha jiuiua) of the
Vedantins, is raised as a consequence of this distinction. In all this,
the question is answered from the empirical point of view. On this
basis, we may say that there are two aspects of consciousness: (a) pure
and transcendental consciousness, and (b) empirical consciousness. Atman
pure consciousness. Jim is consciousness limited by the organism. Atman
is the subject of consciousness. It is also the object of internal
perception, but only in the sense that it is immanent in consciousness
though not clearly cognized as
object. Jim
is both the subject and the object of consciousness, because it is the
cognizer as well as the cognized.
The
Unconscious
Now we come to the idea of the unconscious. The idea of the unconscious
has become very important in modern psychology and has been popularized
by the Freudians. In fact, it has developed in its two aspects-the
metaphysical and the psychological. Plato, in his Charmides, states in
the wake of a Socratic dictum, that knowledge of the self consists in
what one knows and what one does not know. Psychologically, the idea of
the unconscious has developed along with that of the conscious. Montague
speaks of desires and thoughts as being imperceptible. Leibnitz speaks
of unconscious mental states. Kant mentioned the �dark� percepts of
which we are not aware. Hamilton analysed the unconscious into three
degrees of latency. In recent times, psycho-analysis has given a
systematic theory of the unconscious. Freud arrived at the theory of the
unconscious by his study of hysterical patients and analysis of dreams.
Mental life for him has two parts, the conscious, which is the organ of
perception, and the unconscious. The unconscious is ordinarily
inaccessible. It is that which is not conscious. It is the depth which
contains all the dynamically repressed wishes, mainly sexual in nature.
Freud analyses the causation of neurosis and interprets dreams with the
help of the unconscious. Even normal forgetting is explained on these
lines. Harman�s unconscious is a metaphysical principle. It is the
absolute principle, the force which is operative in the inorganic, the
organic and the mental alike. It is the unity of idea and will. It
exists independently of space, time and existence.
The Jaina thinkers were aware of the unconscious, although a clear
scientific formulation was not possible for them in those times owing to
lack of experimental investigations. Nandisutra gives a picture of the
unconscious in the mallaka drstanta, (example of the earthen pot). A man
takes an earthen pot from the potter and pours a drop of water into it.
The water is absorbed. Then he goes on pouring drop after drop
continuously. After some time, when many drops have been absorbed, a
stage will come when the water begins to be visible. This example gives
a clear picture of the vast depth of the unconscious which absorbs all
our wishes and ideas, although the example was meant to explain the
process of avagraha. Buddhist
psychology recognizes the unconscious life. It is called
vidhimutta, while
vidhicitta is the waking
consciousness. The two are divided by a threshold of consciousness,
manodvara. Similarly,
bhavanga subjectively viewed
is subconscious existence, though objectively it is sometimes taken to
mean nirvana. Mrs.
Rhys Davids says that the consciousness is only an intermittent series
of psychic throbs associated with a living organism beating out their
coming-to-know through one brief span of life.
Similarly, the idea of the
unconscious is implicit in the conception of the four states of
consciousness in the various schools of Indian thought. In the
Mancfukyopattisad we get a
description of waking, dreaming, dreamless sleep, and the highest stage,
turlya. In the dreaming and
dreamless states of sleep there is the implicit awareness of the self.
All the orthodox systems of
Indian thought accept this distinction of the levels of consciousness.
This implies the presence of the unconscious state of which we are not
at the moment aware.
In
modern psychology, the idea of the unconscious underwent modifications
at the hands of Jung. Jung used the word unconscious in a wider sense.
He made a distinction between the personal unconscious and the
collective unconscious. The personal unconscious contains repressed
wishes, forgotten memories and all that is learned unconsciously. Deeper
than the personal unconscious is the collective or racial unconscious,
the common groundwork of humanity out of which each individual develops
his personal and unconscious life. The collective unconscious is
inherited in the structure of the organism including the brain structure
which predisposes the individual to think and act as the human race has
thought and acted through countless generations. The collective
unconscious includes the instincts and also the archetypes. Archetypes
are the primordial ways of thinking submerged in the waking life. An
archetype becomes an idea when it is made conscious. The new discoveries
in science and the creative work of scientists arise out of this
treasure-house of primordial images. �J There is nothing to prevent us
from thinking that certain archetypes exist even in animals. They are
grounded in the peculiarities of the living organism itself; therefore,
they are direct expressions of life whose nature cannot be further
explained.
The doctrine of karma
presented by Indian thinkers and systematically worked out by the Jainas
may be aptly compared to the collective or racial unconscious of Jung,
more specially of the archetypes of the collective unconscious, although
the karma theory has a
metaphysical flavour. The Jainas have given a more elaborate and
scientific theory of kartria.
The law of karma is the
ultimate determinant of various courses of life bath physical and
mental. In fact, our physical stature and our birth in particular social
surroundings is the result of the
karma we have accumulated. The
kannic matter goes on accumulating with the deeds we do. The
innate faculty of the soul is obscured by the particles of
karma as the luminous light of
the sun is obscured by the veil of clouds or by fog. This obscuration is
beginningless although it has an end. The
karma that binds us is both
physical and psychical in nature. The physical karma
is material in nature, while the psychical
karma comprises those psychic
effects and states which are produced in the soul owing to the influx of
the physical karma. Karmic
atoms are classified into eight types.
Ji7anavarniya karma obscures
true cognitive faculties. Darsana
rvarwiya karma obscures the intuitive faculty.
Monaniya karma deludes us.
Similarly, specific types of karma
determine our age, our physique, the states, and even the power
and activity of life. The force of
karma works implicitly and makes us what we are in both body and
mind. Thus, it was suggested, the operation of
karma can be compared to the
operation of the collective or racial unconscious. The collective
unconscious stands for the objective psyche. In his more recent essays,
Jung writes: �The contents of archetypal character are manifestations of
a process in the collective unconscious. Hence, they do not refer to
anything that is or has been conscious, but to something essentially
unconscious�. Elsewhere, Jung writes that the personal layer
ends at the earliest memories of infancy, but the collective layer
comprises the pre-infantile period that is the residue of ancestral
life. It contains the archetypes of very ancient images. He says that it
is possible to find the karmic
factor in the archetypes of the unconscious. �The
karma aspect is essential to
the deeper understanding of the nature of an archetype�. It
is sometimes suggested that the comparison between the operation of
karma and that of the
collective unconscious is inadequate. There is no question of common
inheritance except in the physical make up. Each individual has his
peculiar karma prakrti, which
cannot be derived from common inheritance. It may, however, be pointed
out that the archetypes do refer to the common heritage that each
individual shares with his community.
However, Jung developed the concept of the collective
unconscious on the psychological plane with reference to the
psycho-analytical study of the interpretation of dreams and fantasy.
From this side, the archteypes are
fundamental patterns of symbol formation. Had he developed the
archetypes of the collective unconscious, he would have reached the
doctrine of karma,
the store-house of the physical and
psychical effects of the past. He Would have realized that the force of
the unconscious is the force of
karma
which determines the
future course of life.
The metaphysical state of the unconscious has been an equally
important problem for the philosophers. In the development of Indian
thought three distinct views can be stated: (i) there is no entity such
as consciousness. The unconscious alone exists. This is the view
presented by the materialists. This view is associated with the Carvaka
view. (ii) Consciousness alone exists. There is nothing like the
unconscious. This view is expressed by the monistic idealists of the
Vedanta. The Vedantist believes that there is nothing but consciousness,
or the
cit,
which wrongly superimposes unconsciousness upon itself by making an
object of itself The unconscious is created by the process of
self-objectification. The appearance of the pure consciousness is due to
its reflection in its limiting adjuncts. The pure cit wrongly identifies
itself with the varying forms of the limiting adjuncts, as the moon in
the water appears shaking because of the water shaking.
Similarly, the all-pervading
cit
may be limited by
manas, buddhi
and
ahamkara,
as
the
akasa
which, though unbounded, is spoken of as bound according as it takes the
form of a jug or a cloud. The unconscious is only the self-limitation of
the limitless. Again, some Vedantists maintain that the unconscious is
due to the limitation of consciousness through the nescience of
avidya,
and
discriminative knowledge removes this veil of the unconscious, as the
son of Kunti was known as the son of Radha and was believed to belong to
a low caste because he was brought up in such a family.s
However, the Vedantin accepts that from the practical point of view,
things exist outside our consciousness and there exists a realm of
unconscious in our midst. But it is due to the fact that our
consciousness has not yet attained its highest stage of possibility. But
when the range of consciousness is so widened as to include the realm of
the subconscious and the unconscious, then it becomes identical with the
universal consciousness in which there is nothing except itself. Thus
the unconscious is only the receding and vanishing point of
consciousness which alone exists as a permanent reality. This is the
picture of the monists.
The duelists maintain that consciousness and the unconscious
exist side by side and independently. This is the view of the
Sarhkhya
and
the
Yoga
philosophy.
Purusa
is
conscious and
prakrti
is
unconscious. They meet to create experience. The
purusa
is
reflected in the
buddhi
which is
unconscious, just as a face is reflected in a mirror. Vijnanabhiksu
maintains that the reflection is mutual, because the
buddhi
is
reflected back in the purusa. The unconscious
buddhi
seems to be conscious owing to its proximity to the conscious purusa.
But the Jaina philosophers have shove some of the defects of this
theory. Acarya Hemacandra has said of the Sarnkhya Yoga doctrine that in
it consciousness does not know objects, the
buddhi
is
unconscious and what else would be more self contradictory than this ?
Vidyanandi says that, the purusa being of the nature of non knowledge,
how could Kapila be the instructor of truth even like one in deep sleep?
The prakrti is also unconscious and like a jar it cannot fulfill the
function of instruction. The Jaina admits with the Vedantin the
possibility of pure consciousness at least in the final state of
emancipation. because consciousness is the very essence of the soul.
Even in the stage of bondage there is not a single moment in which the
self
ceases to be conscious. Bondage is the limitation of consciousness by
means of the veil of karma and what comes through the channel of the
senses. Karma is the unconscious principle which veils right knowledge
and right intuition. Ignorance and delusion are not, then, innate but
are produced through the influx of karma. The senses are rather
handicaps than instruments of knowledge. In omniscience, the self and
its consciousness are released from its barriers and the
self
attains omniscience. However, the Jainas do not believe that the
limitation to consciousness is illusory. It is a fact in the empirical
world.
In Western thought, Hartmann gave
importance to the unconscious. He said that the human mind is determined
by the �unconscious in love�, �unconscious in feeling� and the
�unconscious in character and morality�. For him, the unconscious is the
absolute principle active in all things, the force which is operative in
the inorganic, organic and mental alike yet not revealed in
consciousness. It is the unity of unconscious representations and will,
the idea and the will. The unconscious exists independently of space,
time and individual existence, timeless before the being of the world.
For us, it is the unconscious in itself; it is the superconscious.
Note on Pasyatta
The ancient Jaina literature describes upayoga and along with
it, also mentions pasyatta. Prajnapanasutra recognizes a peculiar mental
force called pasatraya, which is rendered as pasattya in Sanskrit. There
is a description which states that both upayoga and pcrsarraya can be
sakara and anakara. It means that
jrancl
and
darsana belong to both pasyatta and upayoga. Pasyatta originally
corresponded to drs and now connotes prolonged vision� with reference to
determinate knowledge; and clear vision with reference to intuition.
Distinguishing between
upayoga
and
pasyatta,
the
commentator Malayagiri says that
sakara upayoga
consists of five classes of knowledge
mati, sruta, avadhi, manah-paryaya
and
kevala jnana,
and
also three types of wrong cognition:
kumati, kusracta
and
avadhi-ajnancr;
while
sakara pasyatta
consists of six classes because
mati-jnana
and
mati-ajnana,
are
not included in them. Similarly,
anakara Upayoga is darsana. It
has
four types:
caksudarsana
(visual),
acaks. edarsarta
(intuition which is due to the mind and other sense organs except the
eyes),
avadhi darsana
and
kevaladarsana. Anakara pas
ether,
on the other hand, consists only of
three classes, because
crackups darsana, which is
devoid of clear vision, cannot possess
pasyattjj. Pas, atta
thus means prolonged vision or clear
vision. However, the clear meaning is not stated, although their
sub-divisions are mentioned. The distinction between
upcryoger
and
pasta
and their sub-divisions cannot be
dismissed as mere fancy of the ancient philosophers. We have analysed
upayoga
as horme, the psychic force in life.
Similarly, it would be possible to say that the ancient Jaina
philosophers were aware of the psychic force which holds our experience
and which later becomes, the basis for new experience. Mneme
is the first general property of the mind. It is the power of the mind
by which the past is retained. Ross says that it is the general truth of
living organisms that all life processes leave behind the modification
of structure, both in the individual and the racial sense. In our mental
structure are conserved the after-effects of all our individual
experiences and probably many of the experiences of our ancestors also.
The same idea is incorporated in the theory of Anamnesis in Plato�s
Dialogues Meno.
Knowledge is attained by the recollection in one�s life
of realities and truths seen and known by the soul before its
incarnation, But Mneme is not to be identified with memory, although
memory is possible through the anemic force, which is wider than memory.
Memory is mneme raising to the level of awareness. �When I recognize my
friend in the street I do not say that I remember his face; but again my
recognition is possible in virtue of past experience in which my friend
has figured, and it is therefore a manifestation of mneme�. It is
possible that lower animals have the power of rename. In the lower
animals also it operates both in the individual and the racial sense.
Birds build their nests after the racial pattern and they cross the sea
at particular places.
From the analysis of mneme given above, it appears that similar ideas,
though in a more simple manner, must have influenced the Jaina
philosophers to point out the presence of
pasyatta as distinct from
upayoga, which is the life
force for conscious experience. In the divisions of pas� yatta
given by Malayagiri, it is mentioned that
pasyatta has no
mati jnana and
mati ajnana as its forms.
Mati-jnana is direct sense
experience which arises from the contact of the sense organs with an
object, although knowledge due to mind is also included in
mati-jnana. Hence,
pasyatta would not include the
formation of direct sense experience, although other forms of experience
are included. Therefore, it would not be inappropriate to say that
pasyatts is the power of the
mind by which we retain our experiences and which becomes the basis for
more experiences. However, we should not forget the fact that the
ancient Jaina philosophers, as all other ancient Indian philosophers,
were not clearly aware of the psycho logical significance of the
problem. Theirs was insight and philosophic speculation.
CHAPTER IV
THE SENSE ORGANS AND THE SENSES
The soul gets embodied through the accumulation of
karma. Then starts the wheel
of samsara The embodied soul
comes into contact with the objects of the world and tries to grasp the
nature of things through the specialized sources of the body. They are
the sense organs. The Jaina thinkers, like other ancient philosophers of
India, recognized two varieties of comprehension-sensory and
extra-sensory. Sensory comprehension is conditioned by the senses and
the mind, whereas extra-sensory comprehension occurs directly in the
pure consciousness. Sensory comprehension is possible through the sense
organs. The sense organs are very often considered as windows through
which the soul cognizes the external world. In
Ganadharavada we get a
description of the process of cognition as coming out through the
senses, as Devadatta looks through the five windows of his palace.�
Pancastikayasara describes the
function of the sense in a similar way. The sense organs are denoted by
the word indriya, and
indriya refers to the
instrumental nature of the source of knowledge. There are two ways in
which the word indriya can be
looked at. hrdriya is referred
to as the capacity of experience: it is
paramaisvarya upabhoga samartha.
It is also referred to as that through which experience is
possible: idvate iti indriyam.
The Jaina philosophers called such cognition
paroksa jnana (indirect
knowledge), because it comes through the sense organs, which are
different from the soul. Later, it began to be called
samvyavahnrai prat yaksa.
The Jainas considered that the
indriyas are impediments to
the attainment of pure consciousness and also to the purification of the
soul. Indriyas are the source
through which karma can flow
in, and the source of empirical cognition. In the
Upanisads, the nature and
function of the sense organs have been described. The
Atrnan was first alone. He
knew, He was self-conscious. Then he became embodied. The sense organs
became instruments through which experience is possible. Regarding the
number of sense organs, Prajapati is said to have described sixteen
parts of the body. In the Prasna
Upanisad the parts are enumerated. The
iudriyas are considered as
one. The Swetasvatara Ulanisad
also gives such a classification. The distinction between the sense
organs, jiianendriyas, and motor
organs, karrnendriyas, was made later. The name of indriya for an organ
of sense was first mentioned in the Kausitaki Upanisad. In the Persona
Upanishad the ten indriyas were subordinated to the mana as the central
organ. In the Maitri Upanisad, the jiianendriyas are described as the
five reins; the motor organs (karmerldriyas), are the horses; manas is
the driver; prakrti is the whip;
F
the vocal organ, the
prehensive organ, the locomotive organ, tile evacuative organ and the
generative organ are the five karmendriyas.
The Buddhists recognize six
varieties of consciousness, visual, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and
purely mental. Then there are six asrayas, the repositories of the
functions of the senses. They are the visual, auditory, olfactory,
gustatory and tactual organs, and also the mind. The five sense organs
are made up of the five elements.
But, following the tradition of
the Upcrni, sadic thought as in the Prasna and Maitri, the Sarhkhya
philosophers mentioned the organs and manas, which are instruments of
the soul for experience and activity. They have mentioned five sense
organs, five motor organs, and manas. Sometimes, thirteen
organs are mentioned, including ahamkara and buddhi. In that case, mind,
nhamkara, and buddhi are the internal organs, called antahkarana, and
the other ten are the external organs. The sense organs are not the
products of gross matter but of ahariakara. Aharhkara is psycho-physical
in nature. The functions of the sense organs are sensory in nature. They
are concerned with getting experience. They are, therefore, called
jnanendriyas. The function of the motor organs is bodily activity. They
are, therefore, called karmemdriyas. The functions of the two can be
compared to the afferent and efferent nervous systems. In the evolution.
of life from aharikara, the manas, the sense organs and the motor organs
are developed out of the preponderance of sattva. The �Tanmatrns� are
due to tamas. Rajas is the force which gives impetus to sattva and tamas.
But Vijnanabhiksu says that mind alone is due to sattva, while the sense
organs and the motor organs have evolved out of Rajas. The internal
organs are described as the main gate-keepers, while external sense
organs are the subordinate gate-keepers.
Sarhkara accepts the view that there are eleven organs (indriyas):
five sense organs (jnanendriyas), five motor organs (karmendriyas), and
one internal organ (antahkarana). The antahkaraya assumes different
forms according to the diverse functions it takes. For instance, the
function of manas is doubt, the function of buddhi is determination.
Ahamkara is ego consciousness, and citta is concerned with recollection.
The five sense organs are made of elements like earth, water, air, fire
and akasa. The sattvic part is predominant in the jnanendriyas. The
rajas part predominates
in
the karmendriyas. The internal organs are made up of the sattvic part
and the five elements combined.
The Jainas have accepted the five
sense organs alone, although the mind is considered as a quasi-sense
organ, a no-indriya. The motor organs are recognized as instruments of
experience and behaviour. The Jainas argue that, if motor organs were to
be recognized as bidriyas only because they are instruments of special
types of physical function, then the number of indriyas would have to be
extended indefinitely. The Jainas treat as indriyas only
those which are the conditions of specific cognition. Zimmer says that,
according to the Jainas, the life monads enjoying the highest states of
being, hzaman or divine, are possessed of five sense faculties as well
as of a thinking faculty (manas), and the span of life (ayus), physical
strength (kaya bala), power of speech(vaca bala), and the power of
respiration (svasochvasa bala). In the Samkhya Yoga and the Vedanta
systems, five faculties of action (karmendriyas), are added to the five
sense faculties. The karwendriya are analogous to the Jaina idea of bala.
�Apparently, the Jaina categories represent a comparatively primitive
archaic analysis and description of human nature, many of the details of
which underlie and remain incorporated in the later classic Indian
view�.
The Nyaya system has similar arguments against the recognition
of motor organs as indriyas. Jayanta maintains that if the tongue, hands
and feet etc., are regarded as indriyas, many other organs should also
be admitted as such. The function of swallowing food is discharged by
the throat. The breast performs the function of embracing. The shoulders
carry burden. All these should, then, be recognized as organs or
indriyas.,
Again,
the function of one sense organ cannot be discharged by another. For
instance, visual cognition is not possible without eyes. But that is not
the case with motor organs. A person grasps things with his hands, but
can also walk a little with his hands. If the different parts of the
body doing different functions are included among motor organs, the
throat, the breast and the shoulders would all be motor organs. The
Jainas made the same point. In fact, the Jainas say that all motor
organs can be included in the tactual sense organ.
Even in the West, the problem of classification of the sense
organs has been very old. It very often depends on the view taken of the
sensations originating in the skin and the internal organs of the body.
Traditionally, there are five special senses: vision, -audition, smell,
taste, and touch or feeling. Aristotle mentioned the five senses,
although he expressed
some doubt about touch as a single sense. Current popular
usage is in the Aristotelian tradition. However, at different times,
specially of recent years, the list has been expanded. The �extra�
senses have come out of the sense of feeling by the process of
sub-division. Boring, listing the sense qualities of feeling, includes
pressure and other factors in the sense of feeling.
In the history of
classification of the senses, there have been in general three logically
distinct approaches. They may be grouped together (i) qualitatively, on
the basis of observational similarity: (ii) stimulus-wise, with respect
to the object or forms of physical energy that logically set them off;
and (iii) anatomically, in accordance with the system of sense organs.
Gelded says that the anatomical basis seems to provide the best
organizational principle. For instance, we could talk of the sense of
green and the sense of grey, but since we know that the production of
these qualities is the work of a single anatomical unit, the eye, we are
accustomed to group the two classes of sense experiences together as
visual.
Modern physiology maintains that all movement is due to the activity of
the muscles. Muscles are made of bundles of contractile fibers by which
movements are effected. There are three types of muscles: (i) skeletal
muscles, (ii) smooth muscles, and (iii) cardiac muscles. Cardiac muscles
are controlled by the nervous system, and are located in the heart.
Skeletal muscles have a much wider distribution. They are attached to
the bones of the skeleton, making bodily movement possible. Smooth
muscles are found in many of the internal organs, as in the stomach
walls and in the iris of the eye. Reflex and voluntary movements are
possible because of muscles. In man, muscles are controlled by the
nervous system. The nervous system consists of a mechanism for
perceiving change in the environment, and another for reacting to the
environment.l Thus, all physiological functions are possible owing to
the stimulation of the afferent nervous system which reacts through
efferent nerves by using the muscles and tendons in its activity. In
this sense, it could well be said that all physical functions may arise
out of the sense of touch. In invertebrate animals like the protozoa,
the chemical sense seems to be the only sense for all experience and
activity. Scientists are not agreed on the question whether these
animals show reactions owing to the chemical sense or to the mechanical
stimulation. Schaeffer thinks that it is due to mechanical stimulation.
Metalnikov believes that the discrimination is a chemical one. The same
problem continues to vex scientists in the case of animals like the
coelenterates, flat worms, annelids, molluscs even up to the insect
level. Thus, we find that in the case of the lower animals, especially
the invertebrates, the sense of touch appears to be predominant and to
be the source of all experience and activity.
The Jaina philosophers, as pointed out earlier, showed that all motor
organs can be reduced to experiences due to the sense of touch. However,
this does not mean that the ancient Jaina philosophers scientifically
annalysed the physiological processes of motor responses. Knowledge of
physiology had not developed to the stage required for such analysis.
But their insight showed them that all bodily functions including those
of speech, excretion and reproduction, are reducible to muscular
movement due to the nervous stimulation and response.
It
is for this reason that the senses were regarded as mutually identical
when looked at from the standpoint of unity of substance. They had all
of them fundamental identity. All of them involved neural responses. But
this identity is not absolute. They were regarded as numerically
different from another point of view. Their specific functions were
different. This attitude is due to the catholic outlook of the Jainas,
which made them ready to accept all correct points of view, however they
differed from their own. This is due to the
anekanta vada of the Jainas.
If the sense organs were identical, then the organ of touch would
experience taste and the rest also. In that case, the other organs would
be superfluous. Further, the perfection of, or partial injury to, one
organ would similarly affect the other sense organs. Similarly, if the
difference between the sense organs were absolute, they could not
possibly cooperate in giving a synthetic judgment, like �I see what I
touch�. For instance, we very often get an experience like,
�I see the ice is cold�.
But we cannot attribute to the ancient Jaina philosophers experimental
acumen in the physiological and psychological analysis of the nature of
sense organs. This analysis was more from the metaphysical point of
view. The Jainas accepted the identity and also the diversity of the
sense organs because of their logical outlook. Their non-absolutist
anekanta attitude to the
problems of life gave them insight to find the truth in the different
views presented. Thus, the analysis of the sense organs presented by the
Jaina philosophers was more a result of philosophic insight that, of
scientific analysis. However, it cannot be denied that the analysis
comes nearer to the description of the senses and their distinctions
given by the modern physiologists, although the Jainas were not aware of
the experimental and analytic basis required for such a description.
The Jaina analysis of the
structure and functions of the sense organs is unique and deserves study
with reference to the problems of modern physiology. It is not possible
for us to go into the details of the analysis of the sense organs in the
light of the discoveries of modern physiology, as it would be outside
the scope of the present work. However, a brief survey of such
comparative analysis is necessary.
The senses are called
indriyas
because they have been produced by
indra,
which means
karma.
They are the manifestations of namakarma, which is the karma which
determines the nature and composition of our organism. The
nama-karma
determines what body we shall get, whether a human body or the body of a
lower animal. Similarly, the physiological defects of individuals are
due to this
karma.
The
nature and functions of the sense organs are determined by the nama
karma.
The
sense organs serve as organs of perception of objects for a soul which
is polluted with karma. The soul in a state of such pollution would not
be able to get the direct knowledge due to its own nature and pure
consciousness, for it is clouded by the knowledge-obscuringjnanavarayya-and
intuition-obscuring-darsanavaraniya karma. In such an embodied state of
the soul, experience and knowledge are possible only through the
instrumentality of sense organs. Therefore, sense organs are the means
through which empirical knowledge is possible.
According to the Jainas there are five sense organs like the
tactual, the gustatory, the olfactory, the visual, and the auditory.
Each of these has its own characteristic capacity of experiencing touch,
taste, smell, colour, and sound. Each of these organs is structurally of
two parts, the physical and the psychical. The physical part of the
sense orgait is called
dravyendriya.
The
psychical part is called bhavendriya. The physical part of the sense
organs is caused by the rise of the corresponding
nama-karma.
The
psychical part of the sense organs is caused by the destruction and
subsidence of the knowledge-obscuring karma,
jhanavaraiziya karma.
Each of these two parts is again sub-divided in two parts as:
dravyen, driya
is
divided into (i) nivmtti and (ii)
upalcarana.
Nivrtti is the organ itself and upakarana is the protective physical
cover like the eye-lid in the case of the eye. Each of these two, again,
is sub-divided in two parts: atitarriga and balziraga-internal and
external. The internal part (antaranga), is very often talked of as soul
its if. It is to be identified with the psychic element which is
necessary for any experience. It permeates the whole sense organ.
Bahiranga (the external sense part), is the material which is permeated
by the psychic element. In the case of upakarana, the protective cover
like the eye-lid is the
bahiranga.
The
matter immediately surrounding the eye may be identified with the
antaranga of the physical part of the sense organ,
although it is possible
to say that in all cases the
antararga refers to the psychic element present in the sense
organs and necessary for sense experience. However, it would be more
appropriate to speak of the antaranga
of the material sense organ in terms of the material only; and,
in that sense, it would be apter to say that the
antaranga of the
dravyendriya refers to the
matter that is inside the sense organ and is permeated by the psychic
element. For instance, we compare this to the cornea of the eye. In
fact, we may also include the vitreous humour in the eye.
The bhavendriya, the psychic
part of the sense organ, is also divided into two parts:
(i) labdhi, and
(ii) upayoga. Labdhi is the
manifestation of the specific sense experience due to the destruction
and subsidence of the knowledge-obscuring
karma. In fact, it may be said
to refer to the removal of the psychic impediments which have to be
eliminated if sense experience is to be possible. These impediments are
not physical. like insufficiency of light in the case of vision, but
psychic, in the case of the sense experience itself.
(Upayoga is the psychic force
determining the specific sense experience coming out of the contact of
the specific sense organ with the object of stimulation. It is the force
of horme operating in all psychic life and especially operating in a
specific way in the determination of the sense experience. The word
horme has been used earlier as the psychic force which determines our
experience and behaviour. This force operates in a specific sense
experience, like sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. Although
upayoga is the common force
necessary for all these experiences, it gives rise to different
experiences in the different senses, because it gets specific
expressions from the physiological and psychic conditions differently
presented. A general table of the distinction of the structure of the
sense organs is given in table . It is based on the analysis of the
structure of the sense organs as given by the Jainas. The details of the
structure are worked out on the basis of the description given by
Umasvati in Tattvarthasutra
Chapter II.
Thus, the Jainas make a distinction between the physical structure and
the psychic element involved in the sense organs. The physical part is
the organ itself, It is the physiological instrument through which the
individual receives the sense impressions. The outer part of the
structure is the protective organ. It also facilitates the reception of
the external stimulation. The internal part of the structure refers to
the sensory nerves and the humours as in the case of the eye.
It is the
antaranga. Nivrtti is the internal physiological composition
of the sense organ. Upayoga is
the hormic force which is responsible for the sense experience.
Labdhi is the manifestation of
the horme in order to produce a specific sense experience under suitable
psychic and physiological conditions.
The Jainas have given a detailed analysis of the structure of the
different sense organs. For instance, the internal part of the sense of
hearing is like the kadarnba
flower or like a ball of flesh, mamsa gola-kara. The internal eye is of
the size of a grain of corn, dhanya
masurakara. The sense organ of smell is like a flower, mukta
kusuma candra. The organ of
taste is like the edge of a knife. The sense of touch is of various
forms. Similar descriptions can be given regarding the
upakarana or protective cover
of the organ. For instance, the external part of the organ of taste
consists of a collection of clear particles of matter,
svecchatara pudgala samuha.
The spread-outness of the sense organs is another problem mentioned by
the Jainas. The eye is the smallest. The organ of hearing is also small,
but it is bigger than the eye. Sometimes it expands when it hears loud
sounds. The organ of smell occupies the largest space. However, it is
limited in extent. If it were unlimited in extent, experience of smell
would be possible even when the object
touches any
part of the body. But this is not the fact. The organ of taste has
greater extent, although it is still limited, angula mita. However, the
sense organ of touch is unlimited in extent. It pervades the whole body.
It is sarira vyapaka. Thus the sense of touch is considered by the
Jainas as primary in one more sense. It is possible in any part of the
body.
Modern psychologists point out that the sense organ of touch is really
unlimited in extent, because it gives rise to various sense experiences
like pressure, temperature and organic pain. In fact, even the internal
parts of the organism give us experiences which are reducible to the
experience due to tactile stimulation. Organic pains like stomach-ache
are, in fact, species of the experience of touch. In this sense, all
sense experiences can be reduced to the tactile sense experience. The
Jainas can be said to be justified in giving primacy to the sense of
touch.
The Jaina description of the different parts of the organs may well be
compared to the description of the sense organs given by modern
physiologists, although the latter have given an accurate and detailed
analysis of the structure of sense organs based on experimental
investigations. We may, however, note that experimental investigation
was
[Please this
table see file name �wide table page no. 13,57,73�]
not possible
in those days. Modern physiologists say that the vision is far more
complex than any other sense organ.. We may take the example of the
anatomy of the human eye for comparison. Fig. shows the comparative
picture of the anatomy of the human eye according to the modern
physiological and the Jaina view. The outer layer
[Eye Photo]
DRAVYENDRIYA
BAHIRANGA
ANTARANGA
Upakarana
includes protective cover. Includes aqueous humour and
Includes
eyelids and sclerotic coat. choroid coat.
Nivrtti of Dravyerzdriya is compared
to the matter that surrounds the internal part. Iris may be included in
this.
Shows the
physiological internal composition of the sense organ. It includes
retina, vitreous humour and lens.
of
the
material sense organ of the eye consists of a tough resistant material
which is termed sclera. This material gives substance to the eye-ball.
The most forward part of the
sclera is transparent. It is called cornea. It is a tough resistant
material which permits the passage of light rays and protects the eye.
The eye-lids and the sclera may
together be compared to the outer protective cover of the structure of
the dravyendriya. It
is the
upakarana
of the eye. In fact,
eyelids are the outer part and the cornea is the inner part. On the
inside of the back is the retina which is most important. It is a system
of highly specialized nerve cells. The cells are receptors sensitive to
light. The
image is focussed upon. this layer. The retina consists of two types of
nerve cells, rods and cones. Then we have the lens, which is
transparent, consisting of a semi-solid substance enveloped by a thin
capsule. .Just in front of the leans is the thin muscular layer of the
iris. It has an opening at the center through which the light rays may
pass. This circular aperture is the pupil of the eye. The lens, the iris
and the pupil can be compared to the
nivrtti,
specially to the external part of the
nivrtti.
The
retina and the vitreous humour may be compared to the internal part of
the nivrtti.
Similarly, the aqueous humour between the cornea and the
lens may also be included in this.
The physiologists do not account for the psychic part of the
sense organ which has been called
bhavendriya.
It
refers to the psychic factors which are necessary conditions for the
sense organs giving the sense experience. The basic psychological factor
required for the sense experience of the specific sense organ is the
psychic force, the horn, which has been called the
upayoga.
This force is operating in all experience and behaviour and is
responsible for the specific sense experience.