This
leads to the conclusion. But according to the modern Naiyayikas, liege
or the middle term cannot be the operative cause of inference. It cannot
lead to the conclusion except through the knowledge of vyapti. Hence,
they say that the knowledge of vyapti should be taken as a special
ground (karana), of inference. Vyapti does directly lead to the
conclusion. It has for its function the synthetic view of the middle
term as related to the major term, on the one hand, and of the minor
term, on the other. This is liriga paramarsa. In this, the middle
term is considered thrice. Hence, it is maintained by the modern
Naiyayikas that, while knowledge of the vyapti is a special cause of
inference, linga paramarsa is the immediate cause of the
conclusion. Some modern Naiyayikas, in fact, say that linga paramarsa is
the operative cause of the conclusion. Bradley�s analysis of inference
presents a similar picture. The premises, or the data, and the process
of inference consist in joining them into a whole by ideal construction.
However, as Chatterjee points out, liriga paramarsa is not an essential
condition of all inference although it may make an inference most cogent
and convincing. In the case of inference for oneself, we do not require
more than the major and the minor premise to arrive at the conclusion.
There is a natural transition of thought from the premises to the
conclusion. In the case of inference for others, we have to state the
identity of the middle term occurring in the two premises and exhibited
in the third premise which relates the same middle term to the minor and
major terms.
Thus, it is generally agreed that inference is a mental process, and the
validity of inference is based on psychological and logical grounds. The
validity of inference depends on the knowledge of the universal relation
between the major and the middle term. It is also based on the
perception of the relation between the middle term and the minor.
Perception of the minor term as related to the middle term, and the
recollection of the universal relation between the major and the middle
term, lead to the conclusion of the relation between the minor term and
the major. This is the picture of the psychological ground of inference
as presented by the Jainas and other Indian philosophers. VIcDougall
showed that all deductive reasoning involves appreciative synthesis,
although it is merely association. It is a process of �mediate
apperception�. In fact, he says, all types of reasoning are processes of
�mediate apperception�. They all make use of the �middle term�, and this
use oi the middle term is the sole and essential feature of reasoning,
in which it differs from other mental processes.
Structure of the Syllogism
All systems
of Indian philosophy agree in holding that the syllogism represents the
typical form of expressing inference for others. However, logicians are
not agreed as to the number of propositions constituted in a syllogism.
Propositions are called avayavas. Some logicians say that there are ten
propositions in a syllogism. For instance, according to the old
Naiyayikas and also according to some Jaina logicians like Bhadrabhahu,
a syllogism consists of ten propositions. But Vatsyayana states that all
the ten members of syllogism are not logically necessary, although they
may express the psychological process of inference. Logicians generally
agree that a syllogism has five members. Gautama mentioned five members
of the syllogism: (i) pratijnd the first statement, or an
assertion of what is to be proved, for instance, �the hill is fiery�, is
pratijiza. It sets forth the thesis of enquiry. The suggestion
presented controls the process of inference from the very start; (ii)
hetu, states the presence of the middle term. It gives the ground
(sadhana), or the means of truth. For instance, it states dhurnat,
�because of smoke�; (iii) udaharana states the universal
relation between the major and the middle term and gives examples in
support of its contention. It is a combination of the deductive and
inductive processes. It may be compared to Aristotle�s major premise
with the establishment of the universal proposition by means of
examples. It presents an inductive process in stating examples. Dr. Seal
writes that the third member of the syllogism combines and harmonizes
Mill�s view of the major premise as a brief memorandum of like instances
already observed with the Aristotelian view of it as universal
proposition and a formal ground of induction; (iv) upanaya, the
application of a universal proposition with its examples to the subject
for the minor term of the inference. It may be called the minor premise
of the syllogism. This may be affirmative or negative; (v) nigamana,
the conclusion; it states, �therefore the hill is on fire�. What is
provisionally presented in the pratijna is finally accepted in
the conclusion. The Samkhya and Vaisesika systems accept
the five membered syllogism. But the Mimamsakas and the Vedantins do not
accept the five membered syllogism. According to them, a syllogism does
not require more than three members to carry conviction. The two
essential conditions of valid inference are the vyapti and the
paksa dharmata, the presence of the middle term and the minor term.
Therefore, they contend, the three propositions would be sufficient to
give full force to the syllogistic inference. The three propositions may
be the first three like pratijna, hetu and udaharana, or
they may be the last three, like uddharana, upauaya and
nigamana. The Buddhists go further than the Mimarnsakas and reduce
the syllogism to two propositions only. This is analogous to the
enthymeme in Western logic.
Among the Jaina logicians, Bhadrabahu seems to be in favour of ten
membered syllogisms, as we have mentioned earlier. In his Anasyaka
Niryukti he describes the ten propositions constituting a syllogism.
They are constituted by the pratijiid, hetu and their vibhakti
and vipaksa. Similarly, nka;iksa and akanksa pratisedha
are the constituent propositions in such a syllogism. Radhakrishnan
says that Bhadrabahu here adopts the double method of proof. When an
argument is put forward, for instance, to prove the nor.-eternity of
sound, the counterproposition is asserted and denied by means of the
statement. How ever, Bhadrabahu says that the number of propositions in
a syllogism depends on the caliber of the person to whom it is
addressed. Accordingly, it may be a ten-membered syllogism or a five-membered
syllogism. Neither of these alternatives need be rejected. �We reject
neither�. In the Pramanamimamsa, Hemacandra describes the nature
of the five propositions constituting a syllogism. Bhadrabahu�s
contention that the extent of the constituent propositions depends on
the ability of the persons to whom it is addressed, has great
psychological importance. It implies that the inference is limited by
the capacity of the individual�s understanding of the argument
presented. Siddhasena Divakara mentions five members in a syllogism.
However, Das Gupta says that, regarding inference, the Jainas hold that
it is not necessary to have five propositions in a syllogism. It is only
the first two propositions that actually enter into the inferential
process. (vide Prarneya kamalarrurrtanda, pp. 108-109.). When we
make an inference, we do not proceed through the five propositions. A
syllogism consisting of five propositions is rather for explaining a
matter to a child than for representing the actual state of the mind in
making an inference.
Aristotle�s
syllogism is a purely formal and deductive form of inference. We have
seen that, in Indian thought, a distinction between deductive and
inductive inference is not made. An inference in Indian thought is both
formally and materially true. Aristotle�s syllogism begins with the
major premise, and then it proceeds to apply the universal proposition
to a particular case. According to the Jainas and also in all Indian
thought, we first get the pratijna or the proposition to be
proved. From the psychological point of view, we do not, in fact,
proceed in Aristotle�s way. We do not begin with the universal
proposition and then apply the universal proposition to a particular
case, unless it is to be a deliberate form of reasoning formally
presented. It would be psychologically correct to say that we first
begin by stating what is to be proved, and then find reasons to prove
it. Aristotle�s syllogism has more of a logical than a psychological
status. W. E Johnson says that it is commonly supposed that premises are
propositions first presented in thought, and that the transition from
these to the thought of the conclusion is the last step in the process.
�But, in fact, the reverse is usually the case, that is to say, we first
entertain in thought the proposition that is technically called the
conclusion and then proceed to seek for other propositions which would
justify us in asserting it. A conclusion may, on the one hand, first
present itself to us as potentially assertable, in which case the mental
process of inference consists in transforming what was potentially
assertable into a proposition actually asserted�.
CHAPTER VII
SUPERNORMAL PERCEPTION
Introduction
The nature of empirical experience was discussed in the last chapter. It
was, by the earlier philosophers, called paroksa. Later
philosophers, trying to adjust the original views with the prevailing
concepts of pratyaksa and paroksa called it
samvyavahara pratyaksa and made it arise from the contact of the
sense organs and the manas. But the empirical way of knowing may,
at the most, give us knowledge of the things of the world through the
instrumentality of the sense organs and mind. As such, according to the
Jainas, it is not a direct experience. It does not give us knowledge of
reality. The Jainas believe that the soul is pure and perfect, and
omniscient. But through the obscuration of the soul by the karma,
the knowledge that the soul has is obscured and vitiated. Once the veil
of karma is removed, the soul knows directly. That is
pratyaksa. The knowledge acquired through the sense organs and the
manas is knowledge obtained indirectly by means of external
sources. The Jainas, therefore, said that such experience is paroksa,
or what they later called samvyavahara pratyaksa We have,
however, the possibility of getting direct and immediate experience
without the instrumentality of the sense organs and the manas.
The soul directly cognizes as it is freed from the veil of karma.
This is pratyaksa. It may be called supernormal perception.
Modern psychical research recognizes some such phenomenon and calls it
extra-sensory perception.
The problem of supernormal experience is not new. Indian philosophers
were aware of supernormal perception. Many of them made a distinction
between lacckika pratyaksa, empirical perception, and alaukika
pratyak.sa, supernormal perception. All schools of Indian philosophy
except the Carvakas and the Mimamsakas believe in supernormal
perception. The Carvakas do not accept any other source of know ledge
than sense perception. The Smarhsakas also deny the possibility of
supernormal perception, because, according to them, the past, the
future, the distant and the subtle can be known only by the injunctions
of the Vedas. Supernormal perception is not governed by the general laws
of perception. It transcends the categories of time, space and
causality. The facts of empirical experience cannot explain the nature
of supernormal perception. However, the Indian treatment of supernormal
perception is more descriptive than explanatory. It is not based on
experimental analysis. The Indian philosophers arrived at the conception
of supernormal perception through speculation and the higher intuition:
Very often, the whole theory of the gradation of supernormal perception
is built on the basis of the transcendental experience of the seers. The
Nyaya Vaisesika, the Samkhya Yoga, the Vedanta, the Buddhist and the
Jaina schools of thought believe in supernormal perception, although
they have given different descriptions of the experience. According to
the Nyaya Vaisesika schools, perception is distinguished into
laukika and
alaukika. On the basis of
the philosophy of the prakyti
and the purusa,
the Sarhkhya philosophers maintain that supernormal perception can
cognize past and future objects, which are really existent as
respectively sub-latent and potential. Patanjali thinks that ordinary
mental functions can be arrested by constant practice of meditation and
concentration. Samadhi is
the consummation of the long and arduous process of inhibition of
the bodily functions, concentration and meditation. The Vedantists
accept Patanjali�s view regarding supernormal perception.
In
the West, modern scientists have begun to take more interest in such
perception, although they call it paranormal, and not supernormal
perception. It is also often called extra-sensory perception. The
Society �for Psychical Research has carried out investigations on this
problem. It is now recognized that cognition�s independent of the senses
are possible. Such phenomena as clairvoyance, telepathy and the like
have been recorded to prove the possibility of the occurrence of
extra-sensory perception. But such psychical research is entirely
modern.� It was founded in 1882. Myers and Henry Sidgwick were the
nucleus of research in this field. William Barest, the physicist, was
also a member of the Society. Many eminent philosophers and
psychologists took keen interest in the investigation of extra-sensory
perception. Prof. Bergen, C. D. Broad, L. P. Jacks, H. H. Price and R.
H. Thouless are among the supporters of this type of investigation.
However, interest in the study of extra-sensory perception may be said
to be very old. The first recorded psychical research in the West was
carried out under instructions from King Crocuses in the sixth century
B.C. Wanting to test the powers of the Oracles, he sent embassies with
instructions to ask what the King was doing at that time. But it was
only in the 19th century that systematic study of this problem was
started with the establishment of the Society for Psychical Research,
The aim of the Society is to approach these various problems without
prejudice or prepossession of any kind and in the spirit of exact and
unimpassioned inquiry.
Going back to the Indian philosophers of the past, we find that there
has been a general recognition of the fact that normal perception
through sense organs and mind is not all. In the Nyaya Philosophy,
specially beginning with Gatigesa,
the distinction between normal and supernormal perception has been
recognized. However, in alaukika pratyaksa
the objects are not actually present
to the senses, but are conveyed to it through an extraordinary medium.
There is, in this, a special sense object contact, alaukika
sannikarsa. There are three types
of supernormal perception , (i) Samantha laksanu,
in which we perceive the generality
in the individual members of a class, for instance, we perceive the
universal poutiness in the perception of individual pots. (ii) Janna
laksana, in which we perceive an
object which is in contact with the senses, through previous knowledge
of itself, for example, when we see a piece of sandalwood there is also
a perception of fragrance. This may be compared to what Stout, Ward and
Wundt call �complication�. But it would be difficult to call such forms
of perception supernormal.� In fact, some psychologists would say it is
a kind of implicit inference, although Stout, Ward and Wundt would think
of it as a form of perception. However, such perception does not involve
anything supernormal. (iii) yogaja pratyaksa,
intuitive apprehension of objects,
past, future and distant, through some supernormal powers generated in
the mind by spiritual concentration. For those who have attained
spiritual perfection such perception is constant and spontaneous. In the
case of others who are yet to reach perfection, it requires
concentration or dhyana,
as a condition. Chatterjee says that
we may mention, as cases in point, the theological ideas of eternity and
omniscience or intuition in the philosophy of Spinoza and Schelling.
Yogaja pratvaksa has a
great bearing on the phenomena of extra-sensory perception like
Clairvoyance, Telepathy and Pre-cognition. However, yogaja
pratyksa may be called
supernormal perception. Jayanta describes the nature of yogic
perception. The yogi can perceive a past, future, distant or subtle
object. He can perceive even Jayanta Bhatta says that
a yogi perceives all
objects in a single intuition.
Similarly, Bhasaryaina defines yogic perception as direct and immediate
apprehension of objects which are distant or past, future or subtle.?,
Prasastapada divides yogic perception into two types, (i)
yukta pratyaksa, in which we get
perception in ecstasy, and (ii) viyukta pratyaksa,
which implies perception of those who
have fallen off from ecstasy. Bhasarvajna also makes a similar
distinction. Those who are in a state of ecstasy can perceive their own
selves, the selves of others, akasa,
time, atoms and manas.
Those who have fallen off from
ecstasy can perceive subtle, hidden or remote things through the contact
of the self, (manas),
and senseorgans, with the object by means of a peculiar power due to
meditation. Similarly, Neo-Naiyayikas make a two-fold
distinction, between yukta pratyaksa and vyanjana pratyaksa.
In the latter case, the individual getting the perception is still
endeavoring to attain union with the supreme being. Prasastapada
mentions arsa jnana as a kind of yogic perception. It is an
intuitive apprehension of all objects, past, present and future, and
also of dharma owing to the contact of manas with the
self and a peculiar power, dharma, born of austerities. It is
sometimes said that arsalnaha
and yogic perception are different, because arsa-jnarra is
produced by the practice of austerities, while yogic perception is
produced by meditation. However, both are supersensuous in nature. But
the Mimamsakas and the Jainas do not accept the possibility of yogic�
perception because it cannot be either sensuous or nonsensuous. It
cannot be sensuous, as it is not produced by contact of the sense organs
and the rnanas. Sense organs cannot come into contact with the
past, the future and the distant object. Nor can yogic perception be
produced by the mind alone, as the mind, without the help of the
senseorgans, is capable of producing only mental states like pleasure
and pain. It is not also possible to maintain that the external sense
organs can apprehend objects, without coming into contact through the
powers of medicine, incantation and the practice of austerities, because
the senses are limited in their sphere. They cannot transcend their
natural limitations even when they attain the highest degree of
perfection by intense meditation. Therefore, the Mimarisaks say, yogic
perception cannot be sensuous, as sensuous knowledge cannot apprehend
past, future and distant objects. Similarly, if yogic perception can
perceive what was apprehended in the past, it would be mere recall or a
form of memory. But if it cognizes more than what was perceived in the
past, it is illusory, as it apprehends something which has no real
existence. If yogic perception were perceptual in character, it could
not transgress the general conditions of perception, as it must be
produced by the contact of the sense organs with the object.
The Jainas also do not accept the possibility of yogic perception as
presented by the Nyaya Vaisesika Schools. The Jainas say that sense
organs are limited in their sphere and cannot be freed from their
inherent limitations. Even the sense organs of the yogis cannot
apprehend supersensible objects like atoms. The peculiar power of
dharma born of meditation cannot be of any use to the sense organs
in directly apprehending supersensible objects. Dharma can
neither increase the capacity of the sense-organs, nor can it merely
assist the sense organs in their function of apprehending supersensible
objects. Sense organs in themselves cannot apprehend supersensible
objects.
The Nyaya Vaisesika _ Schools _ maintain that the manas
can get simultaneous cognition of objects past, future and distant with
the help of dharma born of yoga. But the Jainas say that
the manas, which is regarded as atomic in nature, Cain never
enter into relation with all the objects of the world simultaneously.
But it is contended that, if the mind of a yogi can apprehend objects
not simultaneously but successively, yogic perception would not be
different from ordinary perception. Therefore, the Jainas
say,
yogic perception in the sense presented by the Nyaya Vaisesika is not
possible. Perception of all the objects of the world can never be
produced by the external sense organs or by the mind even though aided
by the peculiar power of dharma born of meditation. The Jainas
contend that it is the self which is responsible for such
cognition. The self apprehends all the objects of the world
independently of the sense organs and the mind when the veil of karma
is progressively removed.
The Jaina View of
Supernormal Perception
The Jaina account of supernormal perception, is based on the
Jaina metaphysics of the soul. In its pure state, the soul is perfect,
simple
and
unalloyed. It is pure consciousness. But when it gets embodied, it moves
in the wheel of samsara and experiences the things of the world
and its pleasures and pains. The sense organs are the windows through
which the soul gets empirical experience. They are the instruments by
which empirical experience is possible. But when the veil of karma
is removed, the soul gets pure experience. The Jainas believe that
the soul is inherently capable of perceiving all things with all their
characteristics. But this capacity is obstructed by the karmas
which obscure real knowledge. Because of such obstruction by the
knowledge-obscuring and other kaznnas, it gets only an imperfect
knowledge of the objects of the world. The nature and extent of the
knowledge the soul gets will depend on the nature and extent of the
obscuring veil. But the knowledge of the soul is never totally
obstructed by the veil, even
as
the light of the sun or the moon is never totally
obstructed even by the darkest clouds. There is always some glimpse of
the external world however imperfect it may be. Complete destruction of
the veil of karma gives perfect knowledge and omniscience.
On this basis, the Jainas divide pratyczksa into two
kinds, (i) samvyavahara pratyaksa, empirical perception which was
originally called paroksa, and (ii) pdramarthika pratyaksa,
transcendental perception. Empirical perception is what we get in
every day experience. It is of
three kinds; it may arise
(i) from the sense organs, (ii) from the mind, which is a quasi-sense
organ, or (iii) from the sense organs and the mind. But as for
transcendental perception, the
self gets this experience without the help of the sense
organs and the mind. It gets the experience directly when the veil of
the karma obscuring
the knowledge is removed. This is a form of supernormal perception. It
was called pratyasa,
because it is the direct experience of the
soul without the
instrumentality of the sense organs and the mind. It is of two kinds: (i)
imperfect, incomplete, or vikala,
and (ii) perfect, complete,
or sakala. Vikala, is
divided into two types, (i)
avadhi (clairvoyance) and (ii)
manahparyaya (telepathy).
Perfect transcendental perception is omniscience. It
is
kevala. This is the stage
of supernormal perception. It
is the perfect knowledge of
all the objects of the world through the complete destruction of the
relevant obscuring karmas.
It is like the divine omniscience presented by the Nyaya Vaisesika
schools-and--by Patatijali. -But the Janis do not-believe
in
the existence of God. For
them, the soul itself is
perfect and divine and each
individual soul an attain perfection and omniscience by completely
destroying the karmic
matter which is an obstacle to the perfect knowledge. When the veil of
karma is destroyed,
the soul realizes its omniscience.-, According to the Jainas, the soul
is inherently capable of cognizing all things together with all their
characteristics irrespective of spatial or temporal distinctions. It is
only because of the karmic
veil that this capacity is obscured. But it is possible that the
veil of karma may not
all be destroyed although the relevant knowledge-obscuring
karma may be removed.
Such annihilation of karma
may be by degrees According to the degree of annihilation of
karma, the degree of
supernormal perception also varies. Omniscience occurs when there is
complete. destruction of the obscuring veil. But when there
are differences in the destruction of these veils the two varieties of
supernormal perception, avadhi
and manalrparya,va,
occur. However, the Jainas believe that
supernormal perception in the
form of avadhi, manahparyaya
and kevala
are not dependent on the instrumentality of the sense organs and the
manas. Only normal
perception needs the help of the sense organs and the
manuals? .The sense
organs have no function in the case of supernormal perception. It may
also be said that, even in the case of empirical perception like
mati and
sruta, the role of the
sense organs is subordinate,
because the-sense organs serve to eliminate the veil of
karma which obscures the
knowledge of the _object. However, they have their own function, because
in the absence of these, empirical perception would not be possible.
Bhutabali, in his Mahabandha,
sees the instrumental role of the
manas in the
naanah paryaya jnana. But
this view need not be taken as representative. Akalanka_
_in-templates, in this case, manas as Atman. In this
sense, the Jnaina view of supernormal perception is different from, the
, crlaulcilca pratvaksa of the Naiyayikas. The forms of
alaukika pratyksa are produced by supernormal contact,
alaukika-sannikarsa. In this, there is a special type of
contact with the sense object. But the Jainas do not accept such a
special type of sense object contact. The sense organs are limited in
sphere. They do not have the capacity of coming into contact with
supersensible objects. The sense organs have no function in the case of
supernormal perception, as they cannot cognize the past, future and
distant objects. Therefore, empirical perception signifies direct and
immediate apprehension of gross objects produced by the contact of
the organs with the objects determined in time and space and by
merit (punya) and demerit (pdpa). Supernormal perception
is direct and immediate cognition of all objects past, future and
distant. Recent psychical research shows that those who are endowed with
supernormal powers grasp the secret thoughts of other individuals
without using their sense organs. They also perceive events more or less
remote in space and time. In-supernormal perception,
Trans-spatial and Trans-temporal. relations are apprehended.
There is an �elsewhere� in which the order of things would be different.
We do not come across the �elsewhere� by means of empirical experience,
because, in this, we become aware of the external world by means of
bodily sense organs which have been specially developed to reveal it and
nothing else. We may understand this when we realize that our organs of
sense perception are narrowly specialized to serve biological and
practical ends, and that our normal consciousness is also largely
specialized.
We
have seen that the Jainas say that supernormal perception is really
pratyaksa, or direct apprehension obtained by the soul when all the
impediments are removed. Supernormal perception has been classified as (i)
avadhi, (ii) marrahparyayci, and (iii) kevala. The
distinction between vikala and sakala pratyaksa has also
been mentioned. The three forms of supernormal perception mentioned by
the Jainas may appear, Tight appoints out. . to-be-
dogmatic. However, it may be noted that the vital source of the Jaina
theory of knowledge lies in this conception. If the soul has the
capacity to know, it must know independently of any external conditions.
Distance, spatial or temporal, is not a hindrance to the soul.?
C.
D. Broad says that forms of supernormal cognition may be classified as
follows: We may divide them into (i) supernormal cognitions of
contemporary events or of contemporary states of mind, and (ii) super
normal cognitions of past or future events or past or future things or
persons. Under the first heading, we can include clairvoyance and
telepathy. In the second type, we may include supernormal cognition of
past events, for instance, knowledge of the past as claimed by Miss
Moberley in her book An Adventure,
and supernormal precognition, knowledge of the future, as is
claimed by Dunne in his book, An
Experiment with Time. The analysis here will be restricted to
the study of clairvoyance and telepathy with reference to
avadhi and
mauahparyaya. Then a brief
survey of omniscience, or kevala
jiana, as the Jainas have presented it, will be given. Other
forms of extra-sensory perception like mediumship, automatic writing and
poltergeists have been of interest to modern psychical research. Flew
analyses the forms of extra-sensory perception into spontaneous
phenomena, psychical and mental, and mediumship, physical and mental.
However, these forms of extra-sensory perception do not come within the
purview of this discussion.
Avadhi
Avadhi jnana is
a form of supernormal perception. It is
pratyaksa, or direct
perception, because the soul gets direct apprehension of the object
without the help. of the sense organs and the mind. In this,
we apprehend objects which are beyond the reach of the sense organs and
the mind. In this, we apprechend objects which are beyond the reach of
the sense organs. However, in
avadhi we perceive only such things as have form and shape
This can be compared with clairvoyance, which modern psychical research
calls a form of extra-sensory perception. Things without form, like the
soul and dharma, cannot
be perceived by avadhi.
Clairvoyance of this type differs with different individuals
according to their capacity, developed by them through their merit.
Owing to the varying degree of destruction and subsidence of the
karmic veil, the
individual can perceive supersensible objects in different degrees. The
highest type of avadhi
can perceive all objects having form. The Jainas interpret the capacity
of perception in avadhi jnana
in terms of -space and time. They have developed a
technique of mathematical calculation of the subtleties of time and
space. Regarding space, cmadhi
jnana can extend over a space occupied by innumerable
pradesas of the size of
the universe. With reference to time, it can perceive through
innumerable points of time both past and future.
Avadhi can perceive all
modes of all things. But it cognizes only a part of the modes of things
according to the degree of intensity of perception. The lowest type of
avadhi can perceive an
object occupying a very small fraction of space, e. g., the
angula. Regarding capacity
in terms of time, the lowest type of
avadhi can last only a
short time, a second. It cannot extend beyond a second. Similarly, it
cannot know all the modes of objects.� It can only cognize a part of the
modes. Thus, avadhi,
which may be compared to clairvoyance, differs with different
individuals according to the capacity of the persons perceiving. The
capacity is, in turn, determined by the relative merit acquired by the
persons.
Modern psychical research has provided many examples of such persons.
Experimental investigation has been carried out in this field. For
instance, Prof. Rhine and his colleagues at Duke University carried out
experiments with a pack of zener cards and arrived at astonishing
results. Perception beyond an opaque wall, precognition and
fore-knowledge have been of great interest to para-psychology. Even Kant
was greatly interested in ostensible clairvoyance, by Swedenborg, with
reference to Queen Lovisa in 1761 and his clairvoyant cognition of the
Stockholm fire. Dreams which foretell events may also be included-in
such forms of perception. The Society for Psychical Research has
collected many such instances. For instance, the Hon. J. O. _ Connor,
about ten days before the Titanic
sailed, saw in a dream that the ship floating in the sea,
keel upwards, and her passengers and crew swimming around. In another
case, a lady dreamt that her uncle had fallen from horseback and died.
She also dreamt he was brought home in a wagon. �There in my dream the
wagon came to the door. And two men, well-known to me, helped to carry
�the body upstairs. I saw the man carrying the body with difficulty, and
his left hand hanging down and striking against the bannisters, as the
men mounted the stairs�. Later, the dream recurred thrice, with all the
details unchanged. This was followed by her uncle�s death in exactly the
same situation as she had dreamt, and he was carried home in the same
way with his left hand hanging and striking against the bannisters as
the men mounted the stairs. In our country, we get many
instances of dreams and such forms of perception is necessary.
To turn to ancient., Indian - thought, Prasastapada
and Jayant Bhatta say that, though yogis can perceive all objects past,
future and distant, even ~ ordinary persons like us are not entirely
devoid of such perception. Some men have the power of perceiving the
future. On rare occasions, we get a flash of intuition, as for instance,
when a girl perceives in her heart of hearts that her brother will come
to-morrow.- These may be included under the form of
avadhi perception.
However, they cannot be called supernormal perception. They are
extra-sensory or para-normal perception, yet not abnormal mental
phenomena. The Jainas also do not make
avadhi a
form of supernormal perception in
this sense, because, according to them, beings living in hell, and even
the lower organisms, are capable of possessing avadhi,
although, in general it may be
included in the supernormal perception. Modern psychical research is
also aware of the possibility of such a form of perception in the higher
vertebrates. In
the commentary on verse V of Dravvasgdigraha,
Ghoshal says that avadhi
jnana is psychic knowledge which
is directly acquired by the soul without the instrumentality of the mind
and the senses. He cites knowledge in a hypnotic state as an instance of
avadhi. But it would
not be correct to compare avadhi
to knowledge in a hypnotic state,
although the description of avadhi
as direct cognition without the help
of the sense organs and the mind would be correct. The hypnotic state is
a state of hyper-suggestion and an abnormal mental state. In this sense,
avadhi cannot be
called a state of hyper-suggestion and it would not be proper to reduce
avadhi
to an abnormal mental state.
The Jainas have given a detailed analysis of
avadhi
and of beings who possess
avadhi.
According to the Jainas, heavenly beings and beings in
hell possess
avadhi
naturally. They are endowed with it from birth. It
is bhava pratyaya
in them, possibly because they do not possess bodily
sense organs like human beings. In the case of human beings as well as
five-sensed lower organisms,
avadhi is
possible owing to the destruction and subsidence of the
relevant veil of
karma.
It
is acquired by merit. Therefore, it is called
enapraty aTa.2.
Thus, human beings and the lower organisms have to
acquire
avadhi
by
effort, while the beings residing in heaven and hell get it naturally.
Visesavasyakabhasya
gives a detailed description of
avadhi
from fourteen
points
of
view and its varieties with reference to temporal and spatial
extension.?
Panc astiknyasara,
divides
avadhi
into three types with reference to spatial extension,
desavadhi, paramavadhi
and
sarvavadhi.
All three are conditioned by psychic qualities, but
desavadhi
is also conditioned by birth in the case of heavenly
beings and beings in hell.
Desavadhi
is a very limited faculty of perceiving things beyond
sense perception.
Paramavadhi is a
higher form of perception which is not confined to a limited space and
time. But
sarvavadhi
is
the perfect faculty which perceives all things.
Desavadhi_ is
divided into two types,
gunapratyaya
and
bhavapratyaya,
with their subdivisions.
Nandisutra
gives six varieties- of
avadhi,
which are possible in the ease of homeless ascetics. It
also mentions subdivisions
[Please see the Table in file name �Page No.
135 is Table�]
of these. A
table of classification of avadhi
according to the
Nandisutra is given Tin table No. VIII. The first
variety, for instance, is
arrugarni avadhi. It is clairvoyance, which continues to
exist even if a person moves
elsewhere. Ananugami avadhi
is the opposite of this.
Vardhamaua avadhi is that which increases in extensity and
extends in scope and durability as time passes.
Hiyamana is opposed to
this. Avasthita is a
steady form of avadhi
which neither increases nor decreases in scope or durability. The sixth
form of avadhi is anavasthitha. It
sometimes increases and sometimes decreases in intensity.
Such classifications of avadhi
with their subdivisions have a psychological significance. It
is possible that clairvoyant cognition may differ in different
individuals in respect of intensity and durability of experience and the
extent of the objects perceived by the individual. There are instances
in which some persons get occasional flashes of perception, as in the
case of a girl who got the intuition that her brother would come. In
some other cases, clairvoyance is more or less steady, and it recurs
very often. The Society for Psychical Research has collected many
instances of such perceptions. The scope of clairvoyant cognition with
reference to the objects cognized varies with the sensitiveness and
extent of contact of the subliminal consciousness. Different persons can
perceive different objects with different degrees of clarity according
to their capacities. The Jainas have said that the lowest type of
avadhi can perceive
objects occupying a very small fraction of space like the
angula. The highest, type
of avadhi can perceive
all objects having form. However,
avadhi cannot perceive all the modes of all things.
The psychic phenomenon called �French sensitiveness�, sometimes called
as �psychometry�, may be
included as a form of although
in psychometry the mind and the sense organs do play their part. There
may be physical contact with the object. However, physical contact
serves only as an occasion to create a �a psychical rapport�. The role
of the object coming in contact with the hand of the person would seem
to be rather to canalize the sensitive faculty and concentrate it in the
right direction, though we have no information as to how it happens. Dr.
Osley gives many instances in
which persons having this capacity have given detailed descriptions of
the past or the future by merely touching the hand or even by touching a
paper written by the person. He gives an experience which he had. An
event in his �life, an accident, was foretold twice. The man who
described the future accident gave a vivid picture of the accident, of
the man, a baker, bleeding and things strewn about. The accident
occurred exactly as it was predicted. Tyrrell cites many such instances.
Dr. Osley says that, if we are to take the language of the permanently
metagnomic subjects literally, one might think...... that they perceive
realities as if by a paranormal optical sense outside time and space.
They grasp from an ultra-material plane and see things as they would
occur. - There seems to be one major difference between the description
of perception given .by Dr. Osley and the nature of
avadhi. We have seen that
avadhi does not make
use of the sense organs and the mind. But Osley describes the phenomenon
as perception of realities �as if by a paranormal optical sense outside
space and time.� This is not very clear. However, the optical sense
outside time and space need not refer to the functions of the physical
sense organs. Moreover, Dr. Osley says that the perception is as if by a
paranormal optical sense. C. D. Broad admits that clairvoyance is
non-sensuous perception. He interprets an experiment with red cards in
the following terms: �We shall have to suppose that the clairvoyant has,
from infancy, been continuously though unconsciously apprehending
directly all those objects which he has also been cognizing indirectly
through sight and touch. Then we can suppose that an association would
be set up between, e.g. the conscious experience of seeing an object as
red and the unconscious experience of directly apprehending it as having
that intrinsic characteristic which makes it selectively reflect
red-stimulating light-waves. Suppose that, on some future occasion, such
an object, though no longer visible, is still being directly but
unconsciously apprehended by the clairvoyant. He will still apprehend it
as having that intrinsic characteristic, whatever it may be, which has
now become associated in his mind with the visual appearance of redness.
Consequently, the idea of it as a red-looking object will arise
automatically in his mind, and he will announce that the unseen object
is red�. Whatever may be the explanation of clairvoyant cognition, it
cannot be denied that such experiences are facts. Eminent philosophers
like Sidgwick, Price and Broad have admitted the existence of such
clairvoyant experiences.
Mana hparyaya
Now we come to the next form of supernormal perception, called by the
Jainas manahparyaya.
The Jaina concept of manahparyaya
is based on their doctrine of mind. We have seen that mind,
according to Jainas, is a particular material substance composed of a
specific form of
varganus, or group of
atoms, It is composed of an infinite number-of atoms called
manovarganas. There are
fine atoms. The finer atoms form the
karma. Next in fineness
come the manovarganns.
They occupy less space. The other groups of atoms form the subtle
and the gross body. The modes of the mind are different states emerging
into acts of thought. Every state of our mind is a particular mode of
mind. As our states of thought change, the mind also changes. Every mode
of thought is reflected in the mind substance. Direct experience of such
modes of mind substance working in other individual minds is called
manahparyaya. Avasyakaniryukti
gives a brief description of the nature of
manahparyaya knowledge.
Manhparyaya cognizes
objects thought of by the minds of other people. In the
Visesavasyakabhasya, we
get a description of the
manahparyaya jnana. A person possessing
manahparyaya directly
cognizes the mental states of others without the instrumentality of the
sense organs and the mind.s We have seen that Bhutabali admits the
instrumentality of manas
in this experience, but his view is not generally accepted.
In Western
thought, such a form of cognition was called �thought transference.�
But, as Tyrrell says, since the name gives a wrong suggestion that
something was being transferred through the space, it is not adequate.
Myers coined the phrase �telepathy� for describing such experiences.
Tyrrell gives many instances of telepathic cognition. He also mentions
instances of collective telepathy which he calls collective telepathic
calculations. In Apparitions,
published by the Society for Psychical Research, many
interesting examples of telepathic cognition are recorded. It is not
possible to go through the many instances of telepathy which Western
scientists have recognized.
Coming back to the Jaina view, we find that
manahparyaya, telepathic
experience, is not easy to get and is not common. A certain physical and
mental discipline is a condition for getting their power of intuition.
In the Avasykaniryukti
we read that manahparyaya is
possible only for human beings of character, especially for
homeless ascetics. Human beings acquire this capacity through merit and
by the practice of mental and moral discipline, In the
Nandisutra there is a
detailed description of the conditions of the possibility of
manahparyaya in the case
of human beings. Manahparyaya
is possible only in this
karmabhumi, this world of
activity, this empirical world. Even the gods are not competent to
possess manahparyaya.
Only gifted human beings with a definite span of life can acquire
this faculty. Some conditions have to be fulfilled and some discipline
has to be undergone by human beings for acquiring
manahparyaya. The
conditions for the possession of manahparyaya
are: (i) the human beings in the
karmabhumi must have
fully developed sense organs and a fully developed personality. They
must be paryapta; (ii)
they must possess the right attitude, (samyagdrsti).
As a consequence, they must be free
from passion; (iii) they must be self-controlled and they must be
possessed of rddhi,
extraordinary powers.
Thus, telepathic cognition is not possible for all beings.
Only human beings can acquire it. It is conditioned by a strict physical
and mental discipline. The person possessing it must necessarily be a
hermit, or homeless ascetic. His character must be of a high type. The
discipline and the occult powers attainable by the yogis mentioned in
the Patanjali Yoga are analogous to the qualifications of human beings
possessing
manahparyuva.
But
Siddhasena Divakara says that lower organisms possessing two or more
sense organs are also found to strive by means of attraction or
repulsion; therefore, they are possessed of mind. It would, hence, be
proper to extend the scope of
manahparyaya
to such lower organisms. It would be improper to
postulate
manahparyaya
as
a separate category of knowledge. In this connection, we may refer to
modern psychical research in telepathy described by Rhine says that it
is possible to find instances of the possibility of such perceptions in
the case of lower animals, especially the higher vertebrates. Several
experiments have been carried out in this connection and several
instances have been quoted. But the traditional Jaina view does not
accept the possibility of
manahparyaya
in the case of the lower animals. It restricts the scope
of such cognition to human beings.
Objects of Cognition in
Manahparyaya
Although there is among the Jainas, general agreement on the
nature of
manahparyaya,
the
Jaina philosophers are not agreed regarding the objects of the cognition
possible in this experience. Various views have been presented.
Jinabhadra states that one who possesses
manahparyaya
perceives the states of mind of others directly. But
external objects thought of by the minds of others are only indirectly
cognized through inference. Hemacandra, commenting on the statement of
Jinabhadra, says that a man may think of a material object as well as of
a non-material object. But it is impossible to perceive a non-material
object directly except by one who is omniscient. Therefore, one who is
possessed of
manahparyaya,
telepathic cognition, knows external objects thought of by others only
indirectly, by means of inference. The function of telepathy is
restricted to perceiving mental states, like thoughts and ideas, of
others. External objects are the content of these mental
states. They are not
possible to be cognized directly in
manahparyayti. They are
known indirectly by inference, as they are associated through the media
of states of the mind, although such knowledge is not of the type of
ordinary inference. Hemacandra also supports this view of restricting
telepathy to cognition of mental states of others. He says that
cognition of external objects thought of by others is indirect, as it is
by necessary implication from the perception of thoughts which are not
possible without objects. On the other hand, Unlasvati says that
manahparyaya cognizes
states of mind and material objects thought of by the minds of others.
The mind undergoes a process of change while thinking, and the object
content of this process is intuited by
marrahparyaya. One who is
possessed of manahparyaya
knows only a fractional part of the objects of clairvoyance. He
knows a greater number of the states of the material objects that form
the content of the invisible process of the mind. Thus, according to
Umasvati, the scope of telepathy is larger, because it includes
cognition of external objects thought of by others in addition to mental
states. But Siddhasena Divakara seems to interpret this statement of
Umasvati in the light of the view presented by Jinabhadra. He says that
objects are cognized indirectly through inference. However, this does
not seem to be the proper interpretation of Umasvati, because we have
seen that objects forming the content of the mind are directly cognized.
The statement of Umasvati lends itself to this interpretation. We now
come to a third view regarding the object of
manahparyaya. This view is
presented by Pujypada Devanandi. He says that external objects are also
intuited by manahparyaya.
Manahparyaya is a form of
pratyaksa in the
traditional sense of the term. It is independent of the instrumentality
of the sense organs and the mind. It does not involve inference, which
depends on the sense organs such as eyes and also on the information of
others.s According to his view, manahparyaya
has wider scope, as it cognizes external objects directly. We
may say it includes avadhi,
or clairvoyance, also. There is
agreement as to the nature of
manahparyaya as
pratyaksa, but regarding
intuition of external objects there has been a difference of opinion. We
have seen that Jinabhadra does not accept the possibility of direct
cognition of external objects in
manahparyaya. He introduces inference for explaining this
kind of cognition. Pujyapada Devanandi has widened the scope of
manahparyaya by including
direct perception of external objects also. Akalanka says that states of
the mind are only the media through which external objects are intuited.
Umasvati accepted the direct perception of external objects thought of
by others in manahparyaya.
The question of the scope of manahparyaya is not psychologically
significant. Those who accept telepathy as a form of
supernormal� experience do not make such a distinction. Telepathy is
primarily concerned with cognition of the thoughts of others. It was,
therefore, called �thought transference�. In this, the mental states of
others are intuited. But the objects forming the content of the mental
states are not excluded from the scope of telepathic cognition, although
it is not explicitly mentioned. However, it would also be possible to
maintain that cognition of objects forming the content of the mental
states may be included in the field of clairvoyant experience, because
clairvoyance cognizes objects which are beyond spatial and temporal
relations.
Classification of
Manahparyaya
Sthananga recognizes two varieties
of manahparyaya as rjumati and vipulamati. Umasvati makes a similar
distinction. He says that rjumati is less pure and it sometimes falters.
Vipulamati is purer and more lasting. It lasts up to the rise of
omniscience. We also get such an account in Paneastikayasara. Rjumati
gives a direct intuition of the thoughts of others, while in vipulamati
the process of knowing the ideas of others is manifested in an irregular
way. Pujyapada Devanandi describes the nature of manahparyaya as
intuition of the objects of the activities of the sense organs. He says
that vipulamati knows less objects than rjumati, but whatever it knows
it knows perfectly and vividly; vipulamati is more penetrating and more
lucid than rjurnati.