Bain says that contiguity and similarity are fundamental bases of the
memory habit and that they acquire powers in general. He says that
writers on mental science have described the law of contiguity by
various names. Hamilton terms it the law of �reintegration�. �We might
also name it the law of association proper, or adhesion, mental
adhesiveness or acquisition�. Bain says that the second fundamental
property of the intellect may be termed consciousness of agreement or of
similarity. It is a great power of mental reproduction, or a means of
recovering past mental states. It was noticed by Aristotle as one of the
links in the succession of our thoughts.
But the external conditions alone are not sufficient. Mere observation
of similarity cannot give rise to recollection. It is not a sufficient
condition, although it is a necessary factor for recollection. The
�internal competency� is also necessary. This refers to the mental
preparedness, or, �the cognitive urge�. In this sense, Hemacandra says
that, though a disposition may have continued for a certain length of
time, it does not operate as a cause of memory unless it is aroused.� In
this respect, we may mention McDougall�s emphasis on the cognitive drive
as a condition of memory. McDougall says, �like all thinking,
remembering is a conative activity. We remember and recollect
effectively in proportion as we have strong motives in doing so. This
truth is too often ignored; we are apt to regard our memory
fantastically as a mysterious automatic machine over which we have no
control.� It is notorious that we remember emotionally exciting events
better than others; which means that the strength of conation, our
interest during any experience, is a main condition of our remembering.
There can be no doubt that an explicit volition, purpose, or intention
to remember greatly favours remembering and recollecting.
But even this internal preparedness in the form of interest or conative
drive is not sufficient unless some psychic impediments are removed. The
fact that our striving to recollect often fails and we get only partial
recollection, that we sometimes forget partially or totally, shows that
some psychic impediments counteract and come in the way of proper
recollection. This is made evident by the study of mental pathology.
McDougall says that conation can determine not only memory but also
forgetting. Just as desire for an object leads us frequently to remember
that object, so aversion to an object (rooted in fear, disgust and
painful experiences connected with it) may prevent the remembering of
it. It may even make it impossible to recollect it by the most genuine
voluntary efforts. McDougall states that thousands of cases of amnesia
of this type occurred among soldiers who suffered the horrors of the
front during the First World War. Freud also attributes failure to
recollect to wishes repressed in the unconscious. In his
Psychopathology of Everyday life,
he cites instances of forgetting in everyday life. Thus, in
order to get effective recollection, it is necessary to remove psychic
impediments like aversion to the object, fear and other painful
experiences associated with it.
Such a removal of psychic impediments was, in a sense, mentioned in
terms of the removal of karrna. Hemacandra says that, in order to
arouse stimulation�s, subsidence and destruction of the obstructive veil
of jnanavaraWya karma would be a necessary condition of
recollection in addition to observation of similar objects and the
conative drive. However, the Jainas mentioned the condition of the
removal of psychic impediments in terms of the metaphysical concept of
karma and the operation of karma. In fact, the Jainas say
that destruction and subsidence of the knowledge-obscuring karma,
jnanavaraniya karrna, is a necessary condition of all cognition.
According to the Nyaya system, while memory has some general conditions,
like the original past presentation (purvanubhava), and its
mental trace, (sarriskara), it has a number of specific causes
which are responsible for retention of the impressions and their recall
in casciousness on future occasions. Several factors, like attention
(pranidhana), association (nibandha), repetition (abhyasa),
and papa and
prrnya, are operative as conditions in producing recollection as
also in retaining an experience. Chatterjee, in his Nyaya
Theory of Knowledge,
mentions twenty-three such causes as given by the Naiyayikas.
The Jainas say that recollection is a valid form of cognition. In fact,
it is a source of knowledge, a pramana, because it is never found
to be discrepant with fact as in the case of successful activity like
search for a thing deposited by oneself. The Vaisesikas and the Advaita
Vedantins also accept recollection as valid cognition. Sometimes, an
objection has been raised to the effect that recollection is not a
source of knowledge, a prarnuya, because it does not cognize the
present datum and so has no objective basis. The Nyaya system does not
admit memory as a separate source of knowledge, because it is only a
reproduction, of past experience in the same form in which it was once
experienced. The Naiyayikas say that it is not a preventative knowledge
(anubhava). It is only the representation of what was once
presented. The object as remembered is different from the object as
presented, since the object as presented before, has ceased to exist.
The Mimanhsakas also do not regard recollection (smrti), as a
pramana, since it gives us knowledge of things only previously
experienced; it does not give any new knowledge, but only a revival of
the same old knowledge. The validity of remembered knowledge depends on
the validity of the previously experienced knowledge.
But the Jainas say that, while memory is conditioned by the revival of
impressions of past experiences, its essence ties in the knowledge of
something as �that� in the past (tadityakara). It is the
knowledge of what was previously experienced as past. Memory is, in the
language of L. T. Hobhouse, assertion of the past as past. That memory
refers to a previously experienced object, or that it is an assertion of
the past, is known by memory itself. The Jainas say that knowledge of
the past given by recollection is valid, like perception, because it
leads to successful activity. They also give the criterion for
establishing the validity of recollection. If recollection were not
valid, inference based on vyapti, the universal relation between
the major term and the middle term, would become invalid. Hemacandra
points out that recollection refers to an object that has once been
experienced, and the reality of the object and not its actually felt
presence is the condition of validity for a cognition. If it is
contended that the object must be felt as present, as in perception, in
order to get valid cognition, we may equally say that perception is also
invalid as it is found to lack the criterion of referring to a fact that
has been experienced in the past. If revelation of the relevant object
be a criterion of validity, it is found to be equally present in the
case of memory.
Again, it has been objected that it would be difficult to understand how
an object which is deficient can be a generating condition of
recollection. But the Jainas say that this objection is also not valid.
Cognition reveals its object when it is brought into being by the
requisite condition of the operation of the sense organs and mind and
the destruction and subsidence of the knowledge-obscuring karmas,
just as light which comes into being on the operation of its own
conditions reveals objects, like the jar, though not generated by those
conditions. Similarly, if recollection is said to be invalid, one must
give up inference also, since inference is not possible without
recollection of the necessary concomitance.
Some Vaisesika writers also contend that smrti (recollection), is
a valid source of knowledge. They recognize both smrti and
preventative cognition
(smrtyanubhava),
as a form of valid knowledge. Smrti
arises out of impressions of past experience, and it is the knowledge of
the individual object �as that�, as something previously experienced,
like �that bathing hat� and �that city of Banners�.
Vallabhacarya also maintains that
smrti
is
a separate
pramana,
because it gives true knowledge of certain facts. Although it depends on
previous experiences, it cannot be said to be sincerely a repetition of
some previous experience. It is something more. It gives the experience
of the past experience as past. Awareness of its being past is not a
part of previous experience; and memory gives us the knowledge of this
new element.
Among
the Western philosophers, Russell, Hobllouse and others recognize memory
as a primary source of knowledge. Memory gives us direct knowledge of
the past. Russell says that immediate knowledge by memory is the source
of all other knowledge concerning the past; without it, there would be
no knowledge of the past by inference, since we should never know that
there was anything past to be inferred. He says that memory resembles
perception in point of immediacy and differs from it mainly in its being
referred to the past. Hobhouse shows that memory is neither retention of
past experience nor a mere image of past experience, but an assertion of
it as past on the basis of such retention and images. Eking also thinks
that the view of memory as a direct experience is clearly true if we
have any knowledge of the past at all. If we know the past, it is the
past we know and not the present ideas of the past. It is a mistake to
suppose, as the Naiydyikas did, that we are directly aware of the past,
that the past must be, so to speak, bodily present to our mind or occupy
the same position as present objects of perception.
Thus smrtti,
or
recollection, is considered by the Jainas as valid cognition and a
separate source of knowledge. In fact, even inference involves memory,
because it cannot take place without the recollection of the universal
relation between the major term and the middle term.
The validity of recollection as cognition is an
epistemological problem, although it has a psychological significance.
Recall is a revival of past experience. It has past experience as its
basis. But we must remember that perception is one kind of mental event,
while recall is a different kind of mental event. It is cognitive in
nature and an independent source, of knowledge. Drever says that a
percept is an event and memory of it a new event. The Jairla analysis of
recollection is mainly epistemological, although it expresses the
psychological factors
involved in the fact of recollection. The Jainas were
primarily concerned with the analysis of recollection as a prarnarta.
The psychological factors involved in recollection were only
incidentally referred to. In fact, all Indian thought gives mainly a
metaphysical and epistemological analysis of the problems of knowledge,
although psychological factors are incidentally mentioned.
Recognition (Pratyabhijna)
Recollection (smrti), does not give us a complete picture of
memory unless recognition as a factor operates. Complete memory involves
retention, recall and recognition. We may, however, say that retention
is a condition of memory, and recall and recognition are not so much
conditions of memory. They are forms of expressing the cognition
experienced in the past. Remembering may take different forms. The
effects of past learning may manifest themselves through the activities
of recall or of recognition and they manifest themselves by making it
easier to relearn the original experience. Corresponding to these forms
of remembering there are different procedures in which memory may be
employed as a test for the continued retention of the effects of
learning. These are the methods of recall, recognition and relearning.
We are not concerned with relearning because it is not a valid source of
knowledne as such.
Recognition was defined as the remembering of something that was
presented to the senses. For instance, as Woolworth mentions, we
recognize a friend by his visible appearance or by the sound of his
voice. His dog may recognize him by the sense of smell. The other senses
may sometimes provide cues for recognizing an object already experienced
in the past. �Cues or signs are used in recognition as they are used in
perception. In fact, recognition is a kind of perception.� McDougall
makes a distinction between implicit and explicit recognition. The
former is primitive and the latter develops out of it. The dog that runs
away at the sight of a man who threw a stone at it, is showing only
implicit recognition. The dog does not think �this is the man who threw
the stone�. For us, the utterance of the proper name of the object is an
important part of� recognition. The similarity of the effect on us is an
essential ground of recognition. �The capacity for recognition, and so
of all remembering, is at bottom of the fundamental function which James
calls �conception� and which perhaps is better called �knowing��.
The question regarding the nature of recognition was discussed by the
Nyaya thinkers. Chatterjee mentions a distinction in the meaning of
recognition. It can be understood in two senses. In a wide sense,
recognition means understanding the nature of a thing. In this sense it
is an ordinary mode of perception. It may be referred to as savikalpa
pratyksa. In a narrower sense, recognition means knowing a thing as
that which was known before. Pratyabhijfia is recognition in this
sense. According to Naiyayikas pratyabhiji is conscious reference
of past and present cognition of the same object. I see a jar and I
recognize it as something perceived before. Thus I say, �this is the
same jar that I saw.�
It
has been maintained by some that recognition is a confusion of two
cognition�s, perception and recollection. The Buddhists think that
recognition is a mechanical compound of preventative and representative
mental states. It is not a single psychosis because it cannot be
perceptual in the absence of a sense object contact. Similarly, they say
it cannot be a saaska�ra, for there is a sense of thinness
in the state of recognition. The Naiyayikas contend that it is a kind of
qualified perception giving us knowledge of the present object as
qualified by the experience of the past. We see an object and we
recognize it as having been seen on a previous occasion. The Mimamsakas
and the Vedanta�s support this view. But the Jainas argue that the state
of recognition is a simple psychosis. It is synthetic in nature and it
is different from perception and recollection.
The Jainas give prominence to recognition as an important form of
cognition. Hemacandra describes recognition (pratyabhijna), as
synthetic judgment born of perception and recollection. Perceptual
experience and recollection work together to produce recognition. They
are both combined to form a synthetic judgment born of perception and
recollection. They are, therefore, conditions of recognition.
Recognition as a synthetic judgment is expressed as �this is that jar�,
and �this is that cloth�. These are cases of identity. We also get
recognition as synthetic judgment which expresses similarity in the form
of judgment, as �the cow is like the gavaya.� In this sense, the
Jainas make upamana, a form of recognition, and they do not give
upamana the independent status of pramarca. We may also
get the synthetic judgment of recognition expressed in the judgment of
difference. We recognize that the buffalo is different from the cow.
Thus, recognition is a concrete psychosis. It is synthetic in nature,
expressed in synthetic judgment, like the judgment of identity, the
judgment of similarity, and judgment of difference. Perception is the
direct and immediate cognition of the object when the object is present
to the senses. Recollection is the reproduction, �ideal revival�, of
what was experienced in the past. It is the emergence of the mental
trace to the level of consciousness. When perception and recollection
are combined in a particular form to produce synthetic experience
expressed in a synthetic judgment, we get recognition. When we get a
description like, �know him to be Caitra who is shaggy all over the
body, who has protruding teeth, who is dwarfish and who has broad eyes
and a snub nose�, we make out Caitra when we see him next. Similarly, a
man from the North happens to describe a camel as �a cursed animal with
long crooked neck and with ugly limbs, addicted to feeding on hard sharp
bramble�. A man from the south who heard this description happens to see
a thing of such description, he then recognizes the animal as a camel in
the form of a synthetic judgment, �the object in front is a came. The
Jainas have emphasized the synthetic nature of recognition as an act of
cognition. However, it is a concrete psychosis in which the present and
the past, perception and recollection are synthesized. In this sense,
recognition is different from recollection, although recognition
involves recollection as a factor. In. recognition, the object is
present before us; in recollection, what is recollected is not present
to our senses.
A
psychological analysis of recognition shows that recognition is a fusion
of a percept with an image. Recognition accepts or rejects the object
recalled in memory. We cognize when we react to present experience as
familiar. The sight of a face, the sound of a note, the smell of a rose,
all these may be experienced as being familiar. But we recall a word by
speaking it, or we recall past activities after an interval. Hunter
makes a distinction between recall and recollection. Recollection
involves personal aspects in the memory. Recognition has been described
as a mental state which may be definite or indefinite. We may get
indefinite recognition in which we only get a feeling of familiarity
without getting a definite picture of that experience. Recognition will
be definite when it refers to the place and time of the experience. In
such _recognition we get, as Titchner said, a revival of the cognition
of an object once experienced, associated with a group of other ideas
and tinged with a feeling of familiarity. Thus, in recognition, the
perception of an object and the recall of the percept are synthesized to
produce a concrete psychosis of recognition. The Jainas described such a
concrete psychosis as recognition, or pratyabhijna. However,
Stout says that recognition in its more primitive form does not require
discrimination of the universal from the particular, but only a confused
or implicit awareness in which the universal is not separately
apprehended as a distinct object of thought. In recognition, there is
only a rudimentary judgment of recognition inasmuch as the universal
nature of the particular is confusedly apprehended. Yet, there is no
judgment in which the subject and the predicate are
mutually sundered from each other. We are not here concerned with the
problem of apprehending the distinction between the universal and the
particular in perceptual judgment. However, it may not be out of place
to say that the Jainas have made recognition a non-verbal form of
cognition, in which explicit expression of a judgment in the form of a
proposition containing subject and predicate is not possible, although
recognition is a form of experience in which we are aware of the
similarity or difference of the object which was experienced in the
past. In this, we are to understand the description of recognition given
in the
Pramanarnimarhsa
as a synthetic judgment, like the judgment of similarity,
identity and distinction, although not explicitly expressed in language.
But the
content of recognition and the content of recollection are different,
because recollection only cognizes what has been known before and refers
to its content as �that�. Recognition establishes the identity of the
past datum with the present one.
The validity of recognition and the nature of recognition as
separate source of knowledge, a
pramana,
has been an important problem in Indian thought. It was
very often contended by some schools of Indian thought, tike the
Buddhists and the Naiyayikas, that recognition is not an independent
source of knowledge, a
pramana.
The
Buddhists say that there is nothing like recognition as a separate
source of knowledge, as anything different from cognitive acts like
recollection, indicated by the word �that�, and perception, indicated by
�this�. The Naiyayikas say that recognition is a kind of qualified
perception in which the present object is qualified by the distinct
recollection. of our past experience of it. But the Jainas say that such
an objection is not valid, because the object that is known by
recognition cannot be comprehended by recollection and perception alone.
The province of recognition is the substance which stands out as the
identity in and through its antecedent and consequent modes. This
identity cannot be the content of recollection, which cognizes only what
has been experienced before. But we are aware of the identity of the
object experienced in the past with that which is presented to our
present consciousness. This identity cannot be cognized only by
perception, which is limited to the cognition of the present datum.
The Naiyayikas maintained, as we have seen, that recognition
is nothing but a species of perception. The Samkhya theory also brought
pratyabhijna
under perception. The eternal
buddhi
under goes modification by virtue of which it becomes connected with the
different kind of cognition involved in recognition. Similarly, the
Mimamsakas and the Advaita Vedantins also hold that recognition is a
kind of
perception. Recognition is that kind of perception in which the object
is determined by the name by which it is called, as �this is Devadatta�;
for, according to Advaita Vedantin,
pratyabhijna is a
perception of the nirvikalpa
type since there is in it no predication of anything about
the perceived object, but an assertion of its identity amidst changing
conditions. Samkara agrees with the Naiyayikas and the Mimarfasakas in
holding that recognition is a perceptual cognition produced by the
peripheral stimulation and the subconscious impressions co-operating
together. Kumarila agrees with the Naiyayikas in regarding recognition
as a preventative cognition, since it is present where there is activity
of the senses and is absent where there is no activity of the senses. We
cannot treat recognition, he says, as non-perceptual only, because it is
preceded by an act of recollection. In recognition also there is a
contact of the sense organs with the object, and wherever there is such
contact there is perceptual cognition. But the Jainas say that such a
view cannot be accepted, because the province of perception is limited
to what is actually present and given to the senses. Hence, the identity
of the past and the present datum cannot lie within the scope of
perception.
It
has been urged that a sense organ, with the help of recollection, does
give rise to perception of such identity; and recognition is only a
species of perception. But Hemacandra says that this is impossible,
because a sense organ cannot go beyond the sphere of the present datum.
It is also not true to say that the senses will be able to comprehend
identity when associated with recollection, just as the organ of vision
acquires additional potency when associated with collyrium. The
additional efficiency that might be acquired by a sense organ is never
found to overstep its proper jurisdiction. Therefore, recognition is not
a form of perception. Nor is it mere recollection. It is not even formed
by the mere combination of perception and recollection. It is a
synthetic judgment which expresses something more than the mere
combination. Therefore, recognition is an independent source of
knowledge, a pramana.
Hemacandra says that it cannot be said to be lacking in validity, since
the lack of discrepancy, which is the criterion of validity, is present
in it. On the metaphysical plane, if the identity of the
self and the like as
determined by the evidence of recognition were to lack objective
reality, the logical justification of bondage and emancipation as states
of the same ethico-religious aspirant- would become impossible. The
sense of identity will have a lease of life only if we accept
recognition as a valid source of knowledge.
This is the picture of the validity of recognition as a source of
knowledge. It is mainly an epistemological problem, although it has
great psychological significance. Recollection (smrti), and recognition
(pratyabhijna), have
been described as forms of memory. Memory expresses itself, as we have
seen, in recollection and recognition. We have also seen that
recognition is a synthetic judgment in which the identity of the present
datum with that which was experienced in the past is expressed, although
it is still a non-verbal form of cognition. As it is a synthesis of
recollection and perception, it would be difficult to maintain that it
is an independent form of cognition, a concrete psychosis. Recognition
is a form expressing memory. It is sometimes described as a factor
involved in memory. And memory is ideal revival. It is mainly
reproductive in nature and does not involve transformation of what was
revived in accordance with the present conditions. In this sense, it is
not possible to say that recognition is an independent form of
cognition, although it may be called a psychosis which is synthesized by
recollection and perception. However, the Jainas maintain that
recognition is not a species of perception nor of recollection. This
view is also true because recognition is not just perception nor
recollection. It is a synthesis. The synthesis gives the additional
quality judgment of the identity of the present datum with that which
was experienced in the past. It may also express similarity and
difference. However, this problem is more epistemological than
psychological.
Thus, recollection (smrti), and recognition
(pratyabhijna), have been
considered by the Jainas as valid forms of cognition and sources of
knowledge. Retention is a condition of recollection as much as it is a
condition of perception. The tendency to endure is a prominent factor in
retention; and the absence of lapse is itself a tendency to endure.
Retention is also a condition of recollection, because the mental trace
retained in the mind makes recollection possible when it is aroused and
revived. Modern psychologists make retention, recollection and
recognition factors involved in memory. We have seen, as Hunter points
out, that recollection and recognition are forms of expressing memory,
because memory is not a thing containing parts but the mental activity
itself, although �faculty� psychologists made compartments of the mind
and memory a faculty of the mind. Even Hume says that an impression
makes its appearance in two ways: either it retains a considerable
degree of vivacity in its new appearance or it loses that vivacity and
becomes an idea. The faculty by which we repeat our impressions
retaining the original vivacity is called memory. But modern
psychologists do not treat memory as a faculty or a thing but as an
activity. We may better talk of remembering rather than memory.
However, remembering may take different forms. It may express itself
through the activity of recall or recognition. In this sense, we may
think of recall and recognition as separate and valid forms of memory
rather than conditions or factors involved in memory. Srnrti and
pratyabhijira would then
be the two valid cognition�s. However, such an analysis would be more
epistemological than psychological.
Inference (Anumana)
We
now come to another source of knowledge
(pramana), which is
inference (anumana).
The Jainas have mentioned uha, inductive reasoning, and
sabda, scriptural
authority, as separate pramanas.
But these two are not relevant to our discussion, because
they have a more logical than psychological significance. Inference, or
anumana, is generally
recognized by all the Indian systems except the Carvaka as a pramana.
Inference and reasoning are expressions of thinking as an activity of
the human mind. Modern psychologists have begun to take greater interest
in the study of the psychology of thinking. Physiological and
psychological analysis of the mechanism of thinking have been carried
out by psychologists, especially the Behaviorists and the Gestalt
psychologists. William James recognizes that thinking of some sort
always goes on. But, as Vinacke points out, the fact of thinking
presents two sets of phenomena, (i) the psychological process and (ii)
the neural process. The early philosophers in the West gave prominence
to thinking as a special and differentiating quality of man. Man was
called homo sapiens.
Aristotle said that man is a rational animal. The highest form of mental
life is reasoning, which utilizes material from sense and imagination,
but goes beyond them into the realm of pure ideas. Aristotle worked out
a logical system of reasoning which is called traditional logic, Early
Greek philosophers gave theories about reasoning as about other mental
states, from logical systematization based on introspection rather than
from empirical evidence in the modern sense.
A
similar attitude was present in early Indian thought. The Indian
philosophers were concerned with building a logical structure of
reasoning and incidentally with the epistemic conditions of reasoning,
rather than the psychological analysis of reasoning. The theory of
knowledge and the analysis of the epistemic conditions of reasoning had
for them a pragmatic value. For the Jainas, as for many other Indian
philosophers, the ultimate aim was
moksa. The realization of
moksa is possible by right knowledge as also by right intuition and
right conduct. It was, therefore, necessary for them to study the
conditions and limitations of knowledge. The Jaina emphasis on the
logical and epistemological problems of reasoning expresses the spirit
of Indian thought. This study has to be restricted to the nature and
conditions of inference as a process of thought. The psychological
factors will be referred to, as also the psychological significance of
the nature and conditions of inference. This has been included in the
discussion because reasoning is a source of knowledge and the analysis
of empirical experience would not be complete without understanding the
nature and conditions of inference as a source of knowledge.
The Jainas
have recognized inference (anumana), as a source of knowledge,
(pramana). Most of the Indian schools of thought, with the exception
of Carvaka, have given prominence to inference as a source of knowledge.
The Carvakas are materialists. They contend that perception is the only
pramana. As perception cannot establish a universal proposition,
nor can tell us anything about the past and future, perception cannot
give us knowledge of vyapti, which is the universal relation
between the major and the middle term and the basis of inference.
Therefore, the Carvakas say that inference is not a valid source of
knowledge as it has no sound logical basis.� But the Buddhists have
objected to this contention of the Carvakas. The Buddhists say that the
Carvaka refutation of inference is itself a process of reasoning.
Similarly, it is by inference that the Carvakas came to know that their
views were different and that the other sources of knowledge were not
valid. Hemacandra also says that the Carvakas have to depend on other
sources of knowledge, like inference, for the validity of their
contention. Since perception will not be able to cognize things in the
past and future, even with regard to specific direct cognition, the
Carvakas will not be in a position to determine the validity or
invalidity of cognition to the satisfaction of others. Perception is
subjective and so will not be able to establish the objective validity
of inference. It was seen earlier that in Plato�s
Dialogue, Thecrtetus,
Socrates examines the doctrine of knowledge through perception and shows
that such a doctrine leads to the impossibility of knowledge. In the
Pramanamimansa, Hemacandra says that the validity even of perception
can be established only on the evidence of its unfailing correspondence
with fact. Hence it follows that Carvaka must have recourse to a
different source of knowledge like inference. The Buddhists have
accepted inference as the other source of knowledge. In fact, the
Buddhists make all non-perceptual cognition necessarily of the nature of
inference.
The meaning of inference has been a difficult problem in Indian thought,
though there has been general agreement on the essential nature of
inference. The Jainas say that inference is mediate know ledge. It is
knowledge obtained through some other knowledge. Hemacandra says that
inference is the knowledge of the major term on the strength of the
knowledge of the middle term. The Jainas hold that
anumana is the process of
knowing an unperceived object through the perception of a sign and the
recollection of its invariable concomitance with that object. It is
called anumana because
it is the organ of subsequent (anu)
cognition (mana).
The knowledge of the major term which is of the nature of
authentic cognition of a real fact and which arises from a middle term
either observed or expressly stated, is called inference. It is really
cognition which takes place subsequent to the apprehension of the middle
term and the recollection of the necessary relation of the major term
and the middle term. In the Jaina
Tarkabhasa, a definition of inference as given in the
Pramanamimansa is
mentioned. The Nyaya system has worked out an elaborate system of
inference. It is primarily a study of inference. Vatsyayana, in his
exposition of the process of reasoning described by Gautama, asserts
that the process of reasoning is extremely subtle, hard to understand
and only to be understood by one of much learning and ability. Keith
says that the admission of such a nature is important, because it shows
how difficult were the first steps of understanding the process of
reasoning. Anumana,
literally, means knowledge which follows from some other knowledge. It
is knowledge of an object due to the previous knowledge of some sign,
linga. The previous
knowledge is the knowledge of the sign which shows the universal
relation between the major and the middle term.
Anumdrra has been defined
by the Naiyayikas as knowledge of an object not by direct perception but
by means of the knowledge of a
liriga, or sign, which expresses the relation between the
major and the middle term. Bhasarvajna defines inference as a means of
knowing a thing beyond the range of senses through its inseparable
connection with another thing which lies within the range of senses.
Gangesa defines inference as knowledge which is produced by some other
knowledge. The object of inference is the knowledge of some fact which
follows from the knowledge of some other fact. By means of
anarmarra we want to know
that which may not be perceived but which is indicated by previous
perception. For instance, anumana
leads to the knowledge of a hill having on the basis of the
perception of the smoke on the hill.�
All
systems of Indian thought, except the Carvaka, believe that inference is
a process of arriving at truth not by direct observation but by means of
knowledge of the vydpti, the universal relation between two things. The
Buddhists believe that inference consists in perception of that which is
known to be universally connected with another thing. Such a connection
is either due to the principle of causality or to the principle of
identity. According to the Vaisesikas, inference is knowledge derived
from the perception of a liriga, or sign, which is uniformly
connected with something else, such as cause, effect, co-effect and
correlative term. The Sdmkhya, Yoga, Mimamsa and Vedanta systems
define anumana as knowledge of one term of a relation which is
not perceived through the knowledge of the term, but which is explicitly
understood as related to the first term. In this sense, inference is a
process of thought in which from something known we arrive at something
unknown.
In Western thought, Miss Stebbing distinguishes inference from
suggestion and recollection. However, it is difficult to distinguish
precisely between those experiences in which inference is not involved
and those in which it is. Psychologists do not agree as to where the
line should be drawn. It is not, however, legitimate to distinguish, she
says, between two kinds of inference as psychological inference and
logical inference. All inference is psychological, for inference is a
mental process; but its validity depends on conditions that are logical.
Inference, then, may be defined as a mental process in which a thinker
passes from the apprehension of something given- datum-- to the
apprehension of something related to the datum in a certain way. The
datum may be a sense datum, a complex perceptual situation, or a
proposition. The datum of an inference can always be expressed in a
proposition. Hence, inference may be said to be a mental process in
which a thinker passes from one or more propositions to some other
propositions connected with the former in a certain way. Western
philosophers and physchologists are not agreed as to the essential marks
of reasoning. On the one hand, there are philosophers who regard reason
as quasi-divine and a spiritual function, while the materialists and
some modern philosophers like Strong, Santayana and Russell have thought
of reasoning as merely a complex process of associative reproduction
essentially determined by the physicochemical process in the brain
proceeding according to the purely mechanistic laws of habit. From the
point of view of psychology, McDougall says that the essence of all
reasoning is that a judgment and a new belief are determined by beliefs
already established in the mind. If the old beliefs are true and the
reasoning process correct, the new
belief is true and
becomes an effective guide to action. In this he includes inductive
reasoning also. In the most striking cases, the new belief is derived
from a complex chain of processes front a previously established belief
: as when the astronomer Adams arrived at the belief that a hitherto
unseen planet would be seen at a certain position in the heavens if a
sufficiently powerful telescope were directed to that spot. Some modern
psychologists have tried to reduce the whole thinking process to neural
activity. They have made it implicit talking. But this problem is not
relevant to our purpose.
Inference has been distinguished from perception. It cannot be
identified with perception, although both are equally valid sources of
empirical knowledge. Perception is independent of any previous
knowledge, while inference depends on previous perception. It is
sometimes defined by the Naiyayikas as knowledge which is preceded by
perception. It is based on the perception of the relation between the
middle and the major term as subsisting in the minor term. Secondly,
perception is due to the contact of the sense organs with an
object. Hence, perception is limited to the cognition of the
present. But in inference it is possible to get knowledge of the past
and future in addition to the knowledge of the present. Perception,
therefore, is direct immediate knowledge, while inference is mediate
knowledge. Hemacandra says that perceptual cognition arises out of the
datum present to the senses. It is incapable of taking cognizance of
what has preceded and what is to follow. Therefore, it cannot discern a
characteristic capable of determining the validity or invalidity of the
individual cognition�s occurring before and after. Similarly, it is not
possible by means of perception to have acquaintance with what passes in
other people�s minds. Udyotakara mentions this point when he makes a
distinction between perception and inference. Perception is confined to
objects of the present time and within the reach of the senses, while
inference relates to past, present and future. Perception and
experimental observation do involve an element of inference in that the
perceived element is interpreted. Samkara says that where perception is
available inference has no place. Buddhists made another distinction
between perception and inference. For them, perception gives, though
inexpressible in words, the peculiar character,
(svalaksana) of the
momentary object, while inference deals with ideal generality
(samanya laksana). But the
Naiyayikas do not accept this distinction. For the Naiyayikas,
perception gives us knowledge of the individual in its concrete detail
as well as its generality, while in inference we deal with generality
only in an abstract form. For instance, we have, on the one hand, before
us fire which we perceive; on the other hand, we infer the existence of
fire past, present and future as generally connected with smoke.
Types of Inference
Indian logic does not make a distinction between deductive and inductive
inference as separate forms of inference. Rather, an inference is a
combined deductive and inductive process. Similarly, the distinction
between immediate and mediate inference is also not found. All
inferences are in the form of categorical syllogisms; and they have both
formal and material validity. A distinction between deductive and
inductive inference is psychologically inadequate. Vinacke points out
that it has become conventional to recognize two broad areas in logic:
formal logic, which is called deduction; and scientific method, which is
called induction. �It is now commonly recognized, however, that these
distinctions break down in the actual process of reasoning, although
deductive inference is often the only observable process in formal
syllogistic situations. If syllogisms are extended into everyday life so
that their origins can be traced, inductive processes occur�. Dewey has
endeavored to rid logic of such distinctions as deductive and inductive
inference, because both kinds of esquire are fundamental in science and
such a distinction is possible through intellectual analysis. Even the
division of inference into immediate and mediate is not psychologically
sound. The process of inference is always uniform and one. It is the
process of thought in which from something which is already known we
arrive at something relating to something new which is not present to
the senses. In this sense, immediate inference is only a brief
expression of the process of inference. The main function of mediate
inference is to communicate systematically one�s own reasoning to others
with a view to convincing them or rather with a view to creating similar
beliefs in others. For the sake of our own knowledge and conviction it
is not necessary to establish an elaborate system of reasoning in the
form of syllogism. In this sense, the division of inference into
immediate and mediate has no psychological significance, although it may
have logical importance and validity.
In this sense also, it may be said that a distinction has been
drawn, in Indian thought, between inference as inference for oneself
(svartha anumana) and
inference for others (parartha
anumana). Almost all Indian systems have made such a
distinction. In the Pramanamimamsa
inference has been similarly distinguished. Inference for
others is described as syllogistic in nature. Inference for oneself is
subjective and �is calculated to remove personal misconception�, while
syllogistic
inference �is capable of removing the misconception� of another person.
Subjective inference is also based on the knowledge of the relation of
the major with the middle term. Still, it needs to be expressed in
elaborate syllogistic form. The Naiyayikas made three classifications of
inference: (i) svartha anumana and parartha anumana; (ii)
purvavat, sesavt and samanyato drstam; and (iii)
kevalanvayi, kevala vyatireki and anvaya vyatireki. Keith
points out that the distinction in inference as svartha and
parartha was wholly unknown to Gautama and Kanada but was accepted
by the
Syncretist School. The classification of inference into svartha
and parartha is a psychological classification which has in view
the purpose which the inference serves. With reference to the purpose,
all inferences are either meant for acquiring some new knowledge for
oneself or for the demonstration of a known truth to others. In the
svartha inference, a man seeks to reach a conclusion for himself. In
parartha inference, the aim is to demonstrate the truth of the
conclusion to others. The conclusion is justified with the help of the
middle term. For instance, in the parartha anumama a man, having
inferred the existence of fire on a hill, lays it down as a thesis and
proves it for others. The other two classifications mentioned by the
Naiyayikas have rather logical significance than psychological value.
Regarding the distinction between the svartha and parartha
anumana, it may be pointed out that inference for oneself is
notional (jnanatmaka), as Dharmottara stated. Inference for
others is verbal (S�abddtmaka). Keith points out that the Nyaya
view of the distinction shows that, in inference as communicated by the
syllogism, that is parartha inference, the hearer must perform
the necessary mental operation which the teacher has already preformed
and which he now helps by syllogistic exposition the hearer to perform
for himself. Therefore, it can be said that the svartha inference
deals with the process of inference and the parartha inference is
the formal expression in syllogistic form. The first is characterized as
artha_ rupatva, as Sivaditya showed, the other as
sabdarupatva.
Vinacke points out that, if deduction is regarded as a method
by which already existing generalizations are used, it is found that
deductive situations are widely encountered in everyday life. They are
not always evident as such. They often occur in a disguised and
incomplete form. He says that, in general, two aspects of the problem
may be distinguished. On the one hand, there are conditions under which
the individual argues with other people; on the other, there are more or
less public
arguments to which the individual is exposed. In the first situation, we
are obliged to make assertions, develop arguments and state conclusions
with a view to communicating and demonstrating them to others. In the
second type of situations, we find ourselves reading in the newspapers
or magazines arguments presented implicitly or explicitly in deductive
form. In all such situations the rules of logic are valuable grounds for
valid arguments. Although this distinction between the two deductive
situations presented by Vinacke does not exactly correspond to the
svartha and parartha anumana, the analysis of the first
situation corresponds to Parartha anumana. Parartha anumana
expresses itself in elaborate argument in syllogistic form.
Conditions of
Inference
The aim of inference is to attain some new knowledge of a thing on the
basis of whatever has been already known. It arises out of the necessity
to know something more, as also out of doubt and anxiety regarding the
thing to be known. Where perception is available, inference is not
necessary, because we need not reflect much to know objects present to
our senses. Inference is not possible regarding either things unknown or
things definitely known. It functions only with regard to things that
are doubtful. Doubt is a condition of inference. It implies not only
absence of certain knowledge about something, but also a positive desire
or will to know it. Modern Naiyayikas do not accept this view, because,
they say, there may be inference even when there is no doubt and in the
presence of certainty. Similarly, there may be inference even when there
is no will to infer. The inference aims at proving that which is yet
unproved, as there is a desire to prove the object. At the same time, as
Hemacandra says, it is incapable of being contradictory. Therefore, it
is generally accepted by all schools that a logical discourse does not
come into play in regard to matters which are unknown or definitely
established. That a state of doubt is a motive of inference is very
often recognized in psychology and philosophy. Doubt sets us thinking
and gives rise to efforts towards the solution of a problem. The Jaina
philosophers, in fact all Indian philosophers, have stated that desire
to know is an additional factor for inference. So, too, Miss Stebbing
shows that doubt is a psychological condition of inference.
Inference consists in establishing the relation between the major and
the minor term. Knowledge of such a relation depends on the knowledge of
the vyapti, universal relation between the major and the middle term.
Knowledge of the major term, which is of the nature of authentic
cognition of a real fact and which arises out of the middle term either
observed or expressly stated, is in fact called inference. It is a
cognition which takes place subsequent to the apprehension of the middle
term (linga grahana) and the recollection of the vyapti. Regarding the
vyapti Das Gupta points out that the Jainas, like the Buddhists, prefer
antarvyapti (e. g., relation between smoke and fire) to bahirvyapti
(relation between the place containing smoke and the place containing
fire). The Buddhists showed that vyapti may be based on essential
identity, causality, tadatmya and tadutpatti. Experience cannot be the
sure ground of vyapti. But the Vedantins make it the result of inductive
generalizations based on simple enumeration. The Naiyayikas agree with
the Vedantins in showing that vyapti is established on the basis of
uncontradicted experience.
Just as inference depends on the knowledge of the vyapti, it also
depends on the knowledge of the relation between the middle and the
minor term. This is often called paksa dharmata. In inference, the minor
term becomes related to the major through its relation to the middle
term. Chatterjee points out that, while the validity of the inference
depends on vyapti, the possibility of inference depends on the relation
of the minor with the middle term which is also called paksata. Vypti is
the logical ground of inference, while paksata is the psychological
ground of inference. Kesava Misra explains the process of inference as
follows: In the first stage the operation leads to the perception of
invariable connection between the major and the middle term. This is
arrived at from frequent observations of the occurrence of the two in
the past.
For instance, smoke is observed on a hill. We then remember the relation
which perception has established between smoke and fire. This gives rise
to reflection in the form that there is on the hill smoke, which is
always accompanied by fire. Then we arrive at the inference that there
is fire on the hill. Keith points out that this value of the conception
of inference as a mental process is enforced in minute detail by the
Nyaya school. From another point of view, stress is laid on the fact
that the subject, the minor term, must be something regarding which
there is a desire to establish something else. This desire may be for
one�s own satisfaction or for that of others. Bosanquet also considers
such a mental activity of inferring as the decisive feature of
inference.
The
conditions of inference have been discussed by modern Western logicians.
Russell seems to think that the psychological element of our knowledge
of the propositions and their relations, is not a necessary condition of
inference. Validity of inference mostly depends on the logical condition
of the implication between propositions. We infer one proposition from
another in virtue of a relation between two propositions �whether we
perceive it or not�. The mind, in fact, is as purely receptive in
inference as commonsense supposes it to be in perception. of sensible
objects. But W. E. Johnson and Miss Stebbing have recognized both the
psychological and the logical conditions of inference. The logical
conditions consist in the relation between the propositions. They are
called � the constitutive conditions�. The psychological conditions have
been called �the epistemic conditions� of inference. They refer to the
relation of the propositions to what the thinker may happen to know.
Earlier in the chapter, Johnson says that inference is a mental process
which, as such, has to be contrasted with implication. The connection
between the mental act of inference and the relation of implication is
analogous to that between assertion and proposition. Miss Stebbing also
shows that inference involves both the constitutive and the epistemic
conditions. The epistemic conditions relate to what the thinker who is
inferring knows.
The question
regarding the special cause of inference (karana) that brings about the
conclusion in inference, has been discussed by Indian logicians.
According to the Buddhists, the Jainas and some Naiyayikas, it is the
knowledge of the liriga, the middle term, that leads to the conclusion.
The middle term known as such is to be taken as the karaha or operative
cause of inference. R. S. Woolworth says that reasoning very often
depends on the use of the middle term. The Mimansakas and the Vedantins
believe that the knowledge of vyapti is a cause of inference. According
to them, the knowledge of the universal relation between the major and
the minor term is received in our mind when we see the liriga or the
middle term as related to the paksa or the minor term.