As Angel said, perception is a synthetic process, and the combination of
the new and the old is an essential part of the synthesis. This process
of combining was often called, by early psychologists, �apperception�.
This problem will be referred to later. Structural psychologists like
Wound and Titchner analysed perception into sensations. They said that
perceptions combine and fuse together a number of sensory elements as in
the process of forming H20. It is not merely a sum of
sensations. It gives a new psychological product, a creative synthesis,
like the mental chemistry of J. S. Mill. Later, the Gestalt
psychologists gave a new turn to the psychology of perception. They hold
that every perceptual experience is an unanalysed whole; it has a
quality of its own. Thus, we find that perceptual experience is not a
simple unit although it is a whole and unanalysed experience. In the
Pramanamimansa there is a
statement that different stages of perceptual experience are essentially
of the same nature. The Jaina philosophers were concerned with giving a
logical and epistemological analysis of the perceptual experience.
Therefore, they were more interested in giving the conditions and the
stages of knowledge. However, their discussion of the problem has given
a psychological picture of perception in terms of logical analysis. It
is difficult to find the acumen of present-day psychological analysis in
the writings of the ancient philosophers. Moreover, we may remember that
their knowledge and equipment of psychology were very meager. They had
no experimental basis. Their analysis was more on the basis of logic, of
common sense and on insight; and yet, the stages of perception mentioned
by the Jaina philosophers very much correspond to the analysis of
perception given by the traditional psychology and the structuralist
school.
Avagraha -Sensation
Avagraha
is the first stage of sense experience. It may be said to
be analogous to sensation. It is the level of sensation in which
perceptual experience can be analysed. Umasvati defines
avagraha as implicit awareness
of the object of sense. He says that grahana (grasping), alocana
(holding), and avadharana
(pretending), are synonyms of
avagraha. It is indeterminate. The object presented through sense
stimulation is cognized in an undefined and indeterminate way. In this
stage, we are merely aware of the presence of the object without any
associations, without cognizing the specific features, and in fact
without even being aware of its association and name. In the
Avasyaka-Niryukti, avagraha has
been defined as awareness of the sense data. Jinabhadra insists that
avagraha is indeterminate in
its character. He is not prepared to consider that it has reference to
any specific features of the object, because even relative reference is
enough to promote the experience to the stage of
avaya. Then
avaya becomes a higher stage,
and the stage of avaya will not
be necessary or possible once the cognition of specific features is
admitted in the case of avagraha.
It would lead to an endless series, because cognition of the
particular is relative to the state of knowledge, and it would increase
as knowledge increases. It is not possible to ascertain all the
particulars of an object even i n a long time. It is, therefore, more
appropriate to say that avagraha
is mere awareness, mere cognition of an object without the
knowledge of the specific nature of the object nor of its name.
Naudisutra does not define
avagraha. It gives the implications of the definition of
avagraha as given in the
Avasyaka-Niryukti and describes it as cognition of sense-data. It
gives illustrations. It also gives
avagrahanata, upadharanata, sravanata, avalambanata and
medha as its synonyms. But some
Jaina logicians, like Pujyapada Devanandi, Akalanka, Vidyanandi and
Hemacandra, have said that avagraha
is determinate cognition. Pujyapada Devanapdi says that, when the
sense organ comes in contact with an object, there is intuitive
apprehension (darsana). After
that, we get cognition of the object, which is of specific nature. This
is avagraha. For instance, we cognize white colour with our eyes: �it
is white�. In this sense, the intuitive apprehension
(darsana), becomes the first stage of sense experience. It will be
indeterminate. It will be a species of
jiiana. It has already been mentioned in this connection that
dar;;ana cannot be identified
with the primitive and early stages of sense experience. In that case,
we could not have the highest stage of
darsana, like kevala darsana.
Akalaiika defines avagraha
as a determinate cognition of the distinctive nature of the
object. It comes after the intuitive apprehension which is due to the
contact of the sense organs with the object. With the contact of the
sense organs with the object, there arises �intuition of the bare
existence� of the object, sanmatra
darsanarn. This intuitive apprehension develops into the
determinate cognition of the object. That is
avagraha. According to
Hernacandra avugra.ha is a
determinate perception which follows the indeterminate intuition through
the contact of the sense organs with the object. Indeterminate intuitive
experience is darsana. It does
not grasp
the specific
characteristics of the object. This
darsana transforms itself into a determinate cognition, which is
avagraha. But this
avagraha is not a mental construction,a because it depends on the active exercise of the sense organs
like the visual, and also because it cannot be corrected by discursive
thought. Therefore, it is still immediate and direct experience based on
the contact of the sense organs with the object. Similarly, Vidyanandi
and Vadi-devasuri make avagraha
determinate cognition.
However, it would be difficult to make
avagraha determinate cognition
as coming after darsana, which
is indeterminate and due to the contact of the sense organs and the
object, as these logicians have describedIn that case, as we have said
earlier, darsana will become a mere species of jirana and will be reduced to
the level of mere sensation. The higher forms of
darsana, like kevala darsana,
would be meaningless because there would be no higher form of
darsnna. All darsana will be
reduced to the sensational level. But we find that the higher forms of
darsana have been accepted. It would, therefore, be more
appropriate to treat darsana as
a separate type of experience, in the sense of intuitive experience, and
avagraha as the first stage of
jizana. It is really the
sensational stage, where there is mere awareness of the existence,
without the cognition of the specific features, of the object.
Sensations, as William James said, are the first things in
consciousness. This does not mean that all our experience is only fusing
and compounding of sensations. Our experience can be analysed into
sensations, and these form the elements of our sensory experience. As
Stout says, sensations are of the nature of immediate experience, like
the experience of cold and warm, a specific tinge of pain, or a
touch located in the body or at the surface of the body. The term
sensation is also extended to cover the visual data, sound, taste, and
smell which may enter into immediate experience. Sensations vary not
only with the variations in the presented objects but also in accordance
with the state of the bodily organs. They are private and immediate
experiences of the individual. Sensations are aboriginal and without
precedent; a mental first cause, uncaused by antecedent mental events
and inexplicable in strictly psychological terms. They are a first
beginning of the knowledge, and the ultimate source upon which all
empirical cognition rests. Further, sensations are simply given rather
than made. They are �impressions� which the mind passively receives.
They constitute, as Lewis says, a content of experience �which we do not
invent and cannot have as we will, but merely find�. During the period
of two hundred years between the publication of Lock�s Essay
and of James�s Principles, two
further characteristics, now largely of antiquarian interest, were
gradually attributed to sensation. Sensations were held to be the simple
elements of which complex ideas are formed, as well as the matter or
crude stuff out of which the associative machinery fashions the
organized and meaningful world of everyday experience.
In this sense we can say that
avagraha
is the stage of sensation. It is the
first stage of experience. It is the given. It does not involve the
stage of darsana, which is
qualitatively different from j�nana. Avagraha
is a species of jnana. Therefore,
we describe avagraha
as the immediate experience. It is sensation.
Stages in
Avagraha
Avagraha has been identified by us with sensation, the immediacy of experience. It
is bare awareness of the existence of the object without any
determination of its specific features. This fact becomes clear if we
remember that avagraha has been
further distinguished into two stages: (i) vyanjanavagraha
and arthavagraha.
Vyanjanavagraha is the earlier stage.
It is a physiological stimulus condition of the sensation, of the
immediate experience. In the Visesavasyaka Bhasya
we get a description of
vyanjanavagraha. There it is said that
what reveals an object, as a lamp reveals a jar, is
vyanjanavagraha. It is only the
relation of the sense organ and the object in the form of sense
stimulation such as sound. In the _Nandisutra,
we get an example of the earthen
pot and drops of water, mallaka
drstanta. It gives a description of the stage of
vyanjanavagraha. A clay pot is
to be filled with water. In the beginning, when a person pours out one
drop of water, it is absorbed and there is no sign of existence of
water. He goes on pouring drops of water and at a certain stage a drop
of water will be visible. Then the water begins to accumulate. We may
call this stage when the water becomes visible the �threshold of
saturation�. The drops of water below the threshold are all absorbed.
Similarly, a person who is asleep receives sound stimulation
successively for sometime. The sound atoms reach the ears. Innumerable
instances have to occur before the ears become full of sound atoms. At a
particular stage, the person becomes conscious of the sound. So far he
was not aware of the sound although the auditory stimulation was pouring
in. We may call this stage of first awareness the threshold of
awareness�. The sensation of sound starts the moment the threshold is
crossed and we become aware of the sound. That is the immediate
experience of sound, arthavagraha.
So far there was no awareness of the sound although the
conditions of stimulation for such awareness were operating below the
threshold. The stimulus was pouring in constantly although no awareness
of sound was possible up to a particular stage. Such a preparatory stage
of sensation presents physiological and stimulus conditions for the
sensational stage. It is indeterminate and undefined. In fact, it is
sometimes contended that it is not consciousness at all. Yasovijaya says
that vyanjanavagraha is
cognition only in name. It is only a condition of
arthavagraha, which is
cognition. However, the presence of consciousness in
vyanjanavagraha may be admitted, although it is not explicit
because of its undeveloped existence.a In this, the awareness is
implicit. It may be referred to as potentiality of awareness. In this
sense vyanjanavagraha is not
totally unconscious, because it is this that develops into
consciousness. It is not possible for man to be clearly aware of all
the contents in his mind even when he is wide awake. Countless points of
consciousness emerge in the course of a single day.
Vyai~janavagraha has been just
described as implicit awareness, the physiological and stimulus
condition of awareness. It gradually develops into awareness and gives
the sensation. It is very often described as �contact awareness�.
However, it would not be appropriate to call this �awareness� although
there is the stimulation flowing in. Awareness gradually emerges later,
through the accumulation of stimulation. It is merely potentiality of
awareness, or implicit awareness. Such a stage of potential
consciousness may be compared to the unconcious experiences described by
Stout. The question of unconscious mental states relates to the
possibility of there being experiences which may be ours but of which we
cannot become aware directly. There are feelings and sensations which do
not enter into the stream of our mental life so as to be open to direct
observation at the time at which they occur. Leibnitz has also spoken of
unconscious mental states, �petites perceptions�. Leibnitz�s doctrine of
�petites perceptions� enables him to understand how things may be in the
mind in an undeveloped way even when we do not seem to be conscious of
it. He agrees with Locke that sensations come first. But the
unconscious mental states and the �petites perceptions� imply the
presence of a certain experience of which we are not directly aware. If
we can know of them at all, as Stout says, we can only do so in the way
in which we can come to know the mental dispositions, or as we come to
know of mental states in the lower animals. In this sense, although we
have compared vyaizjanavagraha
to the unconscious mental states of Stout and Leibnitz, we cannot say
that they are identical. It is true that there is a remote likeness, but
they cannot be similar to each other, because the unconscious mental
states of Stout do not accumulate and gradually emerge into
consciousness. They are there but cannot be directly observed.
We
may take the analogy of the psychological investigations of the Western
psychologists in their attempt to measure the intensity of felt
sensation. Weber carried on experiments in the direction of measuring
the felt difference in the intensity of the sensation. He found that in
comparing objects and observing the distinction between them, �we
perceive not the difference between the objects but the ratio of this
difference to the magnitude of the object compared�. If we are comparing
by touch two weights, the one of thirty and other of twenty-nine and a
half ounces, the difference is not more easily perceived than that
between weights of thirty and twenty-nine drachmas. Similar observations
can be made about the sense of sight. The difference in the intensity of
light is discernible when the ratio of the original stimulus to the
increased stimulus is 100:101. Weber said that, in addition, not the
absolute difference between the vibration of two tones but the relative
difference compared with the number of vibrations of the tones, is
discriminated. The original stimulus, whatever its absolute intensity
may be, must be increased by a certain constant fraction of its own
amount, before any unlikeness in the sensation is discernible, before
�the threshold of discernment� is passed. The constant fraction is
different for different kinds of sensation. The basis of the stimulus
consists in the fact that the awareness of sense experience is possible
after �the threshold of awareness is reached�. This is possible when the
stimulus units are accumulated and produce the awareness after the
particular stage. Mallaka drstanta gives a picture of such a mental process, although
quantitative measurement and the experimental basis were not possible.
Arthavagraha
As
soon as a person becomes conscious, the stage of
vyaiajanavagra/ia is over and
it transforms itself into arthavagraha.
This may be called the stage of sensation proper. It is awareness
of the object. In the Nandisutra,
there is a statement that, in this stage, we are aware of the
sound as �this is sound� or �colour� or �touch�, but not exactly cognize
the nature of the sound, colour or touch. But in the
Visesavasyalcabhasya, this kind
of determinate awareness, as �this is sound� is denied in the stage of
sensation. It is merely awareness of the occurrence of the cognition,
because it lasts only for one moment. It is, therefore, indeterminate
and indefinite. It does not reach the stage of cognition of specific
content. In the Visesavasyakabhasya,
there is a discussion of an opinion of the Jaina thinkers who
define arthsvagraha with reference to the development of personality. It
is said that the awareness of a new-born infant is confined to cognition
of the general nature only. But, as i t gradually grows, it gets
sufficient experience and acquaintance with the object, and cognizes
specific features of the object even in one instant. This view is
criticized in the Visesava.syakabhasya on the ground that it will lead to an
indefinite series of cognitions and that cognition would vary with the
extent of the individual�s knowledge.
On
the basis of such a distinction regarding the two stages of
avagraha, it is stated that
vyanjanavagraha lasts for
indefinite moments, gradually proceeding towards the level of
consciousness. The physio
logical and stimulus conditions of awareness in the form of sensation
continue to accumulate for a number of moments till the threshold of
awareness is reached. But once the stage of awareness in the form of
sensation is reached, it lasts only for an instant, which is an
indivisible point of time and is infinitesimal.
We
have seen that Western psychologists, like Stout, describe sensations as
something of the nature of immediately experienced warm or cold, a
specific tinge of pain, touch located in or at the surface of the body,
rather than anything outside. Psychologists have extended the term to
cover the visual data, the sounds and the smells that may enter into
immediate experience. Stout further says that all recognition of
sensation as of a certain kind, and all apprehension of it as continuing
to be of the same nature or as changing in nature at different moments,
involves a reference beyond this experience. For, sensation is immediate
experience and nothing more. At any one moment there is no other
immediate experience except just the experience itself at the moment.
Sensations are genuine and factual, while mental constructs are spurious
and artificial. Sensations are new, uncontaminated and untouched by
those mental processes which render ideas suspect. They are not
structured by perception, dimmed and blurred through detention, abridged
through forgetting or artificially arranged as a result of fortuitous
associations. From Hume to Russell, modern empiricism has tended to
regard the inchoate beginnings of knowledge in unformed sensation as
more authentic than the cognitive refinement which recent inquiry
provides.
The Jainas have raised another problem regarding the subdivision of the
stages in avagraha, sensational
experience. This is based on the problem of contact of the sense organs
with the object, the prapyakaritva
and aprapyakaritva. This
problem has been discussed in the last chapter. According to the Jainas,
the visual sense organ is aprapyakari,
because there is no contact of the sense organ with the object.
Other sense organs are prapyakari.
Vyaiijanavagraha, it is maintained, is essentially concerned with
the contact of the sense organs with the stimulus coming from the
object, gradually giving rise to awareness of the object. In this sense,
according to the Jainas, there are four types
of vyaiajanavagraha there being
no vyanjanavagraha for the
sense of sight. The visual sense organ is incompetent to establish
direct contact with objects of the external world through the
stimulation. But, arthavagraha is awareness itself. It is of six types - due to the
five sense organs and due to the mind which is a quasi-sense organ.
Thus, according to the Jainas, the visual sensation does not require
accumulation of the sense stimulus coming from the object. It would�mean
thcre is no mental state below the �threshold of awareness�.
But it would be difficult to justify the view regarding the visual sense
in the light of modern science. It may be said that even in the case of
the visual sense organ, the light rays have to pass through the lens of
the eyes and reach the retina. In this sense, there is contact between
the sense organ, the eye, and its object, which is illuminated by light.
This problem has been discussed in the last chapter. It would, however,
not be inappropriate to say that, even in the case of the sense of
sight, the physiological and the stimulus conditions are required.
Vyailjanavagraha is a necessary
stage of arthnvagraha. All
sensations emerge from the accumulation of the stimulation up to the
stage of �threshold of awareness�. �Sensation is aroused by the messages
which are transmitted through the nerves from the sense organ to the
brain; and this is the description of the nature of the sensory message
and the way in which it can be recorded and analysed�. If the message
from the sense organs is crowded closely, the sensation is intense; and
if the message is separated by long intervals, the sensation is feeble.
Sensations have an upper and a lower limit. They are �thresholds�. If
the stimuli are not sufficient and fall below the threshold, they do not
evoke sense experience. They are called sub-liminal stimuli. The sub-liminal
stimuli may accumulate and produce the experience. Western psychologists
say that sensations have a latency period. This is the time taken by
bodily tissues, physiological factors, before they produce their effect.
For instance, it takes a certain length of time to arouse a sense organ
and to excite the nerve fibres that lead to the brain. The brain
connections, the motor nerves and also the muscles take time.
Arthavagraha,
then, is the real sensational stage, the immediacy of
experience, while vyanjanayagraha
is a latency stage and the stimulus condition which gradually
gives rise to the awareness. However,
arthavagraha is also indefinite and not determinate. According to
Jinabhadra the consciousness of a person just awakened from sleep and
hearing the sound does not take the form �this is sound�; because �this
is sound� is determinate and discursive and requires more than one
moment for developing. But, the
arthavagraha is awareness of the sound, and it is instantaneous.
The cognition �this is sound� is possible at a later stage, called
avaya.
Iha
Cognition of objects in empirical experience is not
complete with mere awareness at the sensational stage. In fact, pure
sensations are not possible. As Stout says, we have hardly any pure
sensations, absolutely devoid of meaning, either original or acquired,
except perhaps in the case of children. Therefore, though sensations are
not selfsubsistent, they do involve mental factors. They have derivative
meaning. All recognition of a sensation as of certain kind involves a
reference beyond immediate experience. �Its identity in nature or
difference in nature in relation to the past or possible future
experiences can only be an object of thought transcending the immediacy
of sense. Sensations transcend the immediacy of experience also because
they are inseparably connected with thought. They have reference to
external objects. They mean something beyond themselves. For instance, a
sensation of red refers to something red or to something which appears
red. Thus, absolutely pure sensation is not possible. It is only an
abstraction. It always involves some element of meaning or association
which makes the experience concrete. Sensations have always a derivative
meaning. In this sense, our empirical experience will not be complete
with avagraha. Avagraha is not
self-subsistent. It involves meaning and has reference to object.
Arthavagraha, mere awareness of sensation, lasts only for one
instant, and it immediately transforms itself into more specific
cognition. It brings in iha, a factor involving meaning. The next stage
in experience, then, is iha. In
avagraha, there is mere awareness of the object. In iha, the nature
of the object is cognized. In avagraha,
a person simply hears a sound. In
iha, he cognizes the nature of
the sound also. In Tattvarthasutra Bhasya, we get a description of the factors of
experience. Sensation cognizes only a part of the object, while
iha strives to cognize specific
features. It strives for cognition of the nature of the object. The
process of iha continues for a
certain period of time, although it never exceeds one
rnuhatrta. Naudisutra gives
five synonyms of iha: abhogayata,
margauatn, gavesanata and
vimarsa. Umasvati gives synonyms of
ihd as
uha, tarka, vi cararra and
jijnasa. Pujyapada Devanandi defines
iha as striving for understanding the specific character of the
object which has been cognized by
crvagraha. Jinabhadra says that it is inquiry for the distinctive
features of the object. Akala?ika defines
iha similarly. Hemacandra says
that iha strives for the
cognition of the specific details of the object apprehended by
sensation. Vyaiajanavagraha
is the potential condition of awareness.
Arthavagraha is the dawning of awareness.
Iha is the tendency towards cognizing the specific features of the
object. Ihi-t has been very
often translated as �speculation�. But it would be more appropriate to
use the phrase �associative integration�. However, it would be difficult
to find out an appropriate phrase for
�iha�, because the synonyms, like
cinta and
virnarsa, mentioned in
Nar.disutra and, like
pariksu and
vicarana, mentioned by Umasvati lead to attribute discursive
thinking at this early stage of perceptual cognition. What Umasvati and
Nandisutra
meant by using such terms with the
content of discursive thinking as synonyms of iha, it is difficult to
know. We may only say that iha is the first mental
association which gives content and coherence to the immediacy of
experience in the sensational stage. Mere awareness of the sensation is
followed by the cognition of specific features of the object. It is a
striving of the mind towards coherence and integration of the sense
impressions. In this stage, we get the nature of the object, although it
is still in. the semi-conceptual stage. Thus, iha is a stage in the
formation of perceptual experience. It brings in associative integration
of sensory elements experienced in the stage of sensation. It is very
often said that perceptual experience involves factors like association
and selection of the sense data. Perception involves implicit
comparison, assimilation, discrimination and integration. It involves
association. We perceive a red rose. In this experience, we get the
experience of the sensation of red. Other characteristics are associated
and integrated and then we perceive the object, the red flower. At
least, that is what the earlier psychologists, especially the
Associationists, believed. In fact, the Associationists believed that
all complex experience can be looked upon as reproduction and
association of elementary sensations.
The Jainas thought that, as
iha
is
striving for determinate and specific cognition, it is
possible to confuse it with doubt,
(sarhsaya).
But, iha is not to be confused with doubt, although it
does involve an element of striving for finding the specific nature of
the object. Jinabhadra says that the mental state which refers to many
conflicting alternatives where it is difficult to make choice, is the
state of doubt. It is a state which is really nescience,
(ajnana).
But
Tha
is
the mental state in which there is striving for the
ascertainment of truth. It leads to the acceptance of the true and the
avoidance of the untrue.� Siddhasena Divakara also draws the same line
of distinction between
iha
and
samsaya.
For
instance, on receiving a sense impression of sound, there arises a doubt
whether the sound comes from a conch or a horn. The mind is driven to
consider the specific points of agreement and difference. It is
perceived as sweet and agreeable. This quality is attributed to the
sound of the conch and not of the horn. This associative integration,
and the striving for cognition of the specific nature of the object, is
iha.
According to this interpretation, it appears that doubt is the beginning
of
iha.
It
arises just before
iha
takes form. In the
Pramanamimamsa,
it
is said that doubt crops up in the interval between sensation
(avagraha),
and
associative integration
(iha),
even when the object is a matter of habitual perception.
But the existence of the state of doubt is not easily detected owing to
the rapidity of succession of mental events. But
with the introduction of
doubt as a stage in the process of perceptual experience before
Ma, the associative integration becomes more difficult to
understand from the psychological point of view. This has been very
often responsible for terming iha as
speculation. However, we may say that the doubt which intervenes
between sensation and !h1i,
which we have called associative integration, is more a logical
expediency than a psychological fact. The Jaina logicians are concerned
with finding a logical sequence and consistency in the problem of the
theory of the knowledge, rather than in psychological analysis. It is
difficult to maintain that iha,
in the sense of speculation, is a stage which culminates from doubt or
from the comparison of various alternative presentations. In this sense,
doubt (samsaya) and speculation
(iha) involve an element of
discursive thinking which is not possible at this early stage of
perceptual experience. It would be more appropriate to say that iha is
the associative factor. It integrates impressions to form a concrete
psychosis. In the language of the structural psychologists like Wouldn�t
and Titchner, such a process of association and integration is a
necessary element in perceptual experience, which is a complex
experience.
Avaya
From the stage of associative integration
(iha), we come to the stage of
interpretation. Sensations are interpreted and a meaning assigned to the
sensation. That would be perception. Sensation is the first impression
of something the meaning of which is not cognized. Perception is the
interpretation of the sensation, in which the meaning is known. William
James says it is �knowledge about�. This involves perceptual judgment.
When we perceive a red rose, our perception involves the cognition,
�this is red rose�. The Jainas said that this stage of perceptual
judgment is avaya, although it
is still in the non-verbal stage.
Avaya follows in the wake of
iha, associative integration. In this stage, we reach a
determinate experience. The striving for a cognition of the specific
nature of the object results in the definite perception of the object.
Avasyakaniryukti defines
avaya as determinate cognition.
In the Sarvarthasiddhi we get a
description of avaya as
cognition of the true nature of the object through cognition of its
particular characteristics. so
Umasvati says that upagama, upanoda,
apavyadha, apeta and apagata
are synonyms of avaya.
They mean determinate cognition.
Nandisutra gives avartanata,
pratyavartanata, buddhi, vijnana as synonyms.
Tattvarthasutra Bhasya
describes avaya
as the stage of ascertainment of right
and exclusion of wrong. For instance, on hearing a sound, a person
determines that this sound must be of a conch and not of a horn, since
it is sweet and not harsh. Harshness is the quality of the sound of a
horn. This type of ascertainment of the existing specific feature of the
object is called avaya. It is perceptual judgment. It is expressed in
the form of a judgment, as �this is a sound of a conch�, or �this is a
red rose.�
Some Jaina logicians say that
avaya
has
only a negative function. In this stage of experience there is merely
the exclusion of non-existing qualities. They ascribe cognition of the
existing quality to a later stage of experience called
dharana.
Jinabhadra says that such a view is not correct. He says that, whether a
cognition merely does the negative function of excluding the
non-existing qualities, or also does the determination of the existing
characteristics, or whether it does both, it is still
avaya
(perceptual judgment). Umasvati seems to hold the view mentioned by
Jinabhadra. Pujayapada says that
crvUya
cognizes the specific features of the object. Therefore, it is
determinate cognition. Akalanka holds a similar view. Vadi-Deva
describes
avcrya
as
a determination of specific features of the object cognized in the stage
of 7115.85
Hemacandra holds a similar view. He says that
avaya
is
the final determination of the specific nature of the object cognized by
iha. Avaya
has
been described in this treatise as perceptual judgment.
Avuyu
may be compared to the apperception involved in perceptual experience.
Perception is a complex experience. The older psychologists analysed
perception as involving apperception. Apper ception is assimilation of
new experiences to old. It is involved in all distinct perceptions, and
usually in all attentive perceptions. When we hear the footsteps of
someone coming up the stairs, we are only aware through the sense organ
of hearing of a sound of a certain type. But that sound is of a
particular person who is coming up the stairs, is interpretation based
on our previous experience. We then get the experience that we hear the
footsteps of a person coming up the stairs. In this stage, what is
fragmentary in our experience is supplemented and expanded, and fitted
into a system to form a completed picture.
Dharnna
(Retention)
Now we come to the stage of retention,
dharana,
in
perceptual experience.
Nandisutra
defines retention as the act of retaining a perceptual judgment for a
number of instants or innumerable instants. It gives
sthnpana
and
pratistha
as
synonyms of
dharana.g6
Umasvati
defines dharana as final determination of the object,
retention of the cognition thus formed, and recognition of the object on
future occasions. According to Umasvati, retention develops through
three stages: (i) the nature of the object is finally cognized; (ii) the
cognition so formed is retained; and (iii) the object is recognized on
future occasions. Avasyakaniryukti
defines dharana as
retention.,�, Jinabhadra says that retention is
the absence of the lapse of perceptual cognition. Like Umasvati, he also
mentions three stages: (i) the absence of the lapse of perceptual
judgment; (ii) the formation of the mental trace; and (iii) the
recollection of the cognition on future occasions. In this description,
the absence of the lapse, aviccuti,
(mental trace), vasana,
and recollection (smrti), are
three stages included in the conception of
dhararra. Pujyapada Devanandi
defines dharatra as the
condition of the absence of forgetting, in future, of that which has
been cognized by avaya.
Akalanka says that it is absence of forgetting what has been cognized by
perceptual judgment. But some logicians like Vadideva do not accept
dharana as a condition of
recall in future. Dharana is a
stage of perceptual cognition and cannot last up to the moment of
recall. They say it is only establishing perception for a certain length
of time.
Thus, we find that some logicians make
dharana mere retention of perceptual experience, while some
others would make it also a condition of recall of that experience at a
future time. Those who deny that it is a condition of recall say flat it
cannot be a cause of recall although it is a remote condition of recall,
because recall does require retention of an experience. Vridideva says
that the recollection of an experience is due to a special capacity of
the soul, which may be called
saraskara. Hemacandra entirely agrees with Vadideva�s
interpretation, although he tries to reconcile the two views. He says
that retention is also a condition of recall. Hemacandra says that the
condition is only the causal stuff capable of effecting recollection of
past experience. It is only a mental trace,
scrrizskara. It is the
continued existence of a cognition for a definite or indefinite length
of time. He further says that the mental trace, or
samskara, is a species of
cognition, and not different as the Vaisesikas have stated. If it were
not cognition, it would not produce recollection, which is cognitive in
nature. Hemacandra reconciles his view of retention as the condition of
recall with the view of retention as the absence of the lapse mentioned
in Yisesavasyakabhasya. He says
that retention is the absence of the lapse of perception. But it is
included in the perceptual judgment (avaya).
That is why it has not been separately mentioned by him.
Avaya, when it continues for
some length of time, may be called retention in the sense of absence of
the lapse of experience. It may also be said that absence of the lapse
is also a condition of recall in the sense in which he defines
dharana. Mere perception
without the absence of the lapse cannot give rise to recollection.
Perceptual judgments which are not attended by the reflective mental
stage are almost on the level of unattended perception, like a person
touching grass in hurried motion. And such perceptions are not capable
of giving rise to recollection.
Hemacandra�s description of avaya and his analysis of
dharana come nearer to the
psychological analysis of perception, specially of the Structuralist
school. Perception is a concrete experience in which sensations are
organized and interpreted. Meaning is assigned to sensations. Without
the factor of meaning or interpretation of the impressions, perception
would be impossible. Hemacandra�s example of the person touching grass
in hurried motion shows that �selective interest� is a necessary
condition of perceptual judgment. Such experiences would be on the
fringe of consciousness, and they would enter into the focus of
consciousness only if forced by factors like nearness or selective
interest. Retention is an important condition of perception. In fact, as
Stout says, retentiveness is in some form an indispensable condition of
mental development. Mental development would be impossible unless
previous experience left behind its persistent after-effects to
influence the mental state in the course of subsequent experience. These
after-effects are called traces or dispositions. Hemacandra called them
samskara. They are the latent
conditions of subsequent experience. However, Hemacandra makes them
special capacities of the soul. Mental traces or dispositions brinS us
to the problem of memory.
However, the analysis of perceptual experience shows that the concrete
psychosis involves the accumulation of sense stimuli to produce a
cumulative effect. It gradually gives rise to awareness, that is, the
physiological and stimulus condition of sense awareness. That is
vyaimjanavagraha.
It gives rise to awareness of the object. It is a
sensation. It is arthavagraha.
Thus, avagraha is a stage of
sensation. It is a stage of immediate experience in which we are merely
aware of the object of stimulation without knowing anything more of the
object. Avagraha, on the whole,
is a stage of sensation. But, avagraha
is not without the thought element. There can be no pure
sensation. Sensations always have a derivative meaning for retentiveness
and association operate from the very beginning of life. A sense
impression or image has meaning in so far as it refers to something
other than itself, in so far as it enables us to think of the object. In
experiencing a sensation, an object is brought before the mind. The
sensation of yellow carries with it the thought of something yellow.
This leads us to the next stage called iha. It is associative
integration. In this stage of integrati~e experience, we do not get the
full experience of the object in the form of cognition of the
determinate nature of the object in its fullness. In this we do not form
a judgment. In the stage of avaya,
we get the perceptual judgment. In this stage, sense impressions
are interpreted, and meaning is attached to the experience. We get
perceptual judgment in the form: �this is a red rose�. The implicit
presence of the thought element in sensation gets expression and a
concrete experience is formed. According to the Jainas, the perceptual
experience which they sometimes call
avagraha in general, needs to be retained. Otherwise, it would
not be complete. Retentiveness is, in some form, an indispenesable
condition of mental development. Our subsequent experience depends on
the capacity to retain the perceptual cognition. This capacity of
retention differs with different individuals. A completed perceptual
experience would be possible with all the four stages co-operating. This
is the concrete psychosis called perception. As it was pointed out
earlier, it is sometimes referred to as
avagraha. Iha, avaya and
dharana have already been shown
to be cases of avagraha. But
such identification of the other processes with
avagraha was not universally
accepted. Jinabhadra says that they are cases of
avagraha only by courtesy,
repacarena.
The Jainas have given an exhaustive description of the four stages of
avagraha, perceptual
experience, so far discussed. Each of them is of six types, as they
arise from the five sense organs and the mind. Again,
vya-ijunavagraha
is of four types only. Thus there would be twenty-eight forms of
perceptual cognition. Each of the twenty-eight forms, again, is of
twelve types according to the nature of the object they can have.
Therefore, the Jainas have mentioned that there are three-hundred and
thirty-six types of sense experience,
mati jnana or
abhinibodhika-jnarra. This elaborate classification has no
psychological significance, although it has logical and mathematical
interest. The Jaina logicians were fond of fabulous mathematical
calculations. This is found in their elaborate classification of
karma as given in the
Gorrtmatasara: Karma Kanda.
Glasenapp in his Doctrine of Karma in
Jainisna, has given a detailed analysis of this division. The
same tendency must have inspired the Jaina logicians to give such an
elaborate classification of avagraha.
CHAVIER VI
OTHER SOURCES OF
EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
It
was seen in the last chapter that the concept of
dharana has occupied the
attention of the Jaina logicians and that they are not entirely agreed
on its function. Dharana has
been considered as a condition
of recollection. The psychological analysis of memory shows that
retention is a condition of memory, and recollection and recognition are
the forms in which memory expresses itself. We are, therefore, concerned
here with analysing the concept of memory. We shall study retention,
recollection, and recognition as factors involved in memory.
Retention
The Jaina philosophers are not agreed on the function of
dharana, retention.
Nandisirtra has mentioned three
stages of dharana. Umasvati has
also accepted the three stages. They make
dharana a condition of
recollection, although some logicians, like Vadi-Deva, do not accept
this. It was mentioned in the last chapter that Hemaeandra reconciles
the two views regarding the function of retention. He makes it both a
factor in perceptual cognition and a condition of recall. This raises
the problem of the analysis of memory and the function of retention in
memory.
Psychological analysis of memory is representative. It is the process of
remembering objects of past experience. Perception, on the other hand,
is a preventative experience-the interpretation of sense impressions
produced by external stimuli. Sometimes, the word memory is used as
synonymous with retentiveness in general. But Stout says that this
application of the term is inconvenient. Retention is a factor involved
in memory. It is, as was stated, a condition of memory. �Memory is ideal
revival, so far as ideal revival is merely reproductive and does not
involve transformation of what is revived in accordance with present
conditions.�� Hume has said that, when an impression has been present
with the mind, it again makes its appearance as an idea; and this it may
do in two different ways. In its new appearance it retains a
considerable degree of its first vivacity. This he calls memory.
Retention is a condition of memory. In retention, the past experience is
retained in the form of mental traces or mental dispositions, (sanskaras).
In physiological terms, it leaves a structural modification in the brain
owing to the plasticity of the brain. However, retention is more mental.
It is a sanskara which is more cognitive in nature, as Hemacandra
stated. The brain cannot be the repository of past experience, as Mill
and William James have said. Bain says that the faculty called memory is
�almost exclusively found in the retentive power although sometimes
aided by similarity.� Thus, retention implies the power of preserving in
the form of mental dispositions, past perception.
In
this sense, the Jaina philosophers called dharana a condition of
recollection. Hemacandra mentions it as a condition of memory. In this
sense also we can interpret the description of the three stages of
retention given in the Nandi. sutra and the Tattvartha. sutra Bhasya.
The three stages describe stages in the development of memory. The
first, perceptual experience, should continue to remain in the mind in
some form. Without this, recollection would not be possible. Retention
is also a condition of recall. The absence of lapse of experience is
necessary for the revival of the experience at a later stage. In the
analysis of dharana in the second stage, the cognition formed by avaya
is retained. This later leads to recognition. Jinabhadra describes the
three stages of dharana as (i) the absence of lapse of perception, (ii)
the formation of a mental trace, and (iii) the recollection of the
cognition on future occasions. Hemacandra points out that perceptual
judgment, when protracted for some time, would become retention; and
that is the absence of the lapse of perception. But the absence of the
lapse of perception is also a condition of recall, because without the
absence of the lapse there would be no mental trace and there would be
no recollection. Retention, then, is not memory itself although it is a
necessary condition of memory, because recollection would not be
possible without retention. Formation of a mental trace is an important
factor in retention. We have seen that Hemacandra showed that, in a
sense, retention can be described as a mental trace, a samskara. It is a
continued existence of a cognition for a definite or indefinite length
of time. He says that the mental trace, or samskara, is cognitive in
character. It is a species of cognition. The mental trace, or sarhskara,
may be compared to the mental disposition of the modern psychologists.
Some of these give a physiological picture of the mental disposition.
They say that past experiences are retained in the form of physiological
dispositions. They are not mental traces or mental dispositions. They
are only structural modifications of the brain. They are unconscious
cerebration�s. In this sense, retention would become merely
physiological in nature. It would be merely a neural habit. But this
view is not adequate. Past experiences are retained in five form of
mental dispositions, although physiological traces may also be there.
Mere physiological disposition cannot take the place of mental
disposition. Mellone says that they exist in the form of psychological
(mental) dispositions, and not merely in the form of physiological
dispositions. Stout also maintains that past experiences are retained in
the form of mental dispositions which constitute the mental structure.
We have seen that 1-Iemacandra has made the mental trace, or
sanskara, of the nature of
cognition and not different from cognition as some philosophers, like
the Vaisesikas, suppose. If it were not cognition it would not produce
recollection, which is cognitive in nature, nor would it be an attribute
of the self.
Retention,
then, can be described as the mental trace, or
sanskara by which experiences cognized in a definite form by
avsya are retained in the mind
and they do not lapse. Such retention of past experiences will form a
condition of the recall of the experience on a future occasion. Hunter
writes, �retaining is a necessary condition for remembering, for without
it there would be nothing to remember. Forgetting and retaining are
related, for if there is failure to retain then there must be
forgetting.�
Recollection
The second factor in memory is recollection. Very often, recollection is
considered to be a condition of memory, but it would be more appropriate
to say that recollection is a form in which memory expresses itself.
There is a distinction between recall and recollection. Hunter makes
this distinction very clear. For instance, if we remember a poem learnt
earlier, it would be recall. But, sometimes, in recalling the poem we
remember our personal experiences in learning it. We also remember the
page on which the poem was printed and the room in which we learned the
poem. That would be recollection. However, such a distinction is not
necessary for our discussion. We may take the word recollection in a
broad sense as including recall. We may sometimes term it as recall.
Recollection may be termed as reproduction of past experiences. It is
the ideal revival of past cognitions which have been retained in the
form of mental dispositions. It is the revival of the original
experience. It is ideal revival, as Stout says, so far as it is merely
reproductive. Retention alone is not, therefore, a sufficient condition
of memory. Experiences retained have to be recalled before they become
memory. Every psychic process leaves behind some engram complexes which
are conserved in the mental structure of the individual and bring about
changes in it. The conserved elements are not the mere mass, but are
organized wholes through cohesion, as Drever writes. Such cohesion
brings about force and facilitates recall. Perceptual experiences are
retained in the form of mental dispositions. This is also Spearman�s Law
of Retention. Thus, retention is a necessary condition of recall.
However, it is not itself recall and should not be identified with
recall. We have seen that in the Pramanamimarnsa also there is a
description of retention as a condition of recall.
Hemacandra describes the process of recollection. According to him, it
is smrti. It arises from the stimulation of mental dispositions,
vasana, which may be considered
to be equivalent to samskara.
Perception, once experienced continues to remain in the mind in the form
of an unconscious mental trace, or an unconscious mental disposition.
This is a latent condition of memory. But when they are stimulated, they
come to the surface of consciousness and we recall the experiences which
we once cognized and which femained so far in the form of mental traces.
Therefore, Hemacandra says that the stimulation of the mental trace
gives rise to recollection. The emergence of the latent mental trace by
stimulation then, constitutes a necessary condition of recall. Unless
the stimulation is present, recall is not possible.
According to the Naiyayikas, smrti is a form of qualified perception and
has reference to the direct presentation of some object, although it
involves an element of representation. In memory, there is a revival of
past experience in the form of ideas and images, in the same order in
which they were actually experienced by us and were retained by the
soul.
The emergence of the mental trace to the conscious level is, as seen,
due to its stimulation. This stimulation is determined by different
conditions. The conditions for the emergence of the mental trace to the
conscious level may be classed into two types: (i) external conditions,
and (ii) internal conditions. The external conditions refer to
environmental factors. Observation of similar objects, for instance, is
an external condition necessary to arouse the mental trace to the level
of conscious state. Mohanlal Mehta, in his
Jaina Ps vchology, has
mentioned that external conditions necessary for the fact of recalling
may be classed into three types, which represent the three laws of
association: the law of contiguity, the law of similarity, and the law
of contrast.� The recollection of an object experienced in the past
refers to the object as �that�, �that jar�, �that cloth�. Perception
always refers to the present datum, while recollection has a reference
to the content as it existed in the past.