The Jaina holds with prabhakara that cognition is
always apprahended by the self. Cognitio reeas itsef, the self and it s object.
Every act of cognition coginizses itself, the cognizig subject and the cognized
object. But the Jaina denies that consciousnee alosne is self- luminous. He
regards self is the subject of interna perception. Whe I feel that I am happy
have a distinct and immediate apprehension of the self as an obeject of
internal perception, just as pkeasure can be perceive though it is without form.
“Oh Fautama” said Mahavira,”the self is pratyaksa
even to you The soul is cognizeabel even to you.46 again unlike the view of
prabhakara. The Jainas hold that it is the object of perception ad it is
maifested by external and internal perception. To the question “how can the
subject be an object of erception?” the Jaina replies that whatever is
experienced is an object of perception
William James made a distinction between the
empirical self, the me, and the transcedental self, the I. The self is party
the known and partly the knower, partly object and partly subject. The
empirical ego is the self as knowm, the pure ego is the knower. It is that
which at any moment is conscuous.” Whereas the me is ony one of the thig which
it is conscious of. But this thinker is not a passint state. It is something
deeper and less mutable.49 prof. Ward
holds that tha pure self is always immaent in experience, in the sense that
experience, without the experient will be uninteligible. It is also
transcedental, in the sese that it can never be the object of our
experece.50 The Jainas were aware
that consciousness of self is not possible by ordiary cognition Therefore, they
said it is due to internal perception.
Self- consciouses does not belong to the
ream of pure cosciousewss which is foungational ad withou limitaiton. That is
the cetaa which is the esssential
quality of the soul. But whe we descend to the practical leve, te realm of vyavahara, we find the distinction
between subject ad object in consciousness. The question whether the self is
perceived by direct experiece likes the iternal perception of the Jainas. , or
by the immediate untuition, (pratibha
jnana) of the Cedantins is raise das a consequece of this distction. In all
this, the question is answered from the empirical pointof view on this basis,
we any say that there are two aspects of consciousness: a) emprirical
consciousness. Atma is pure consiousneess. Jiva is consciousness limited by the
organism. Atma is the subject of conscounees. It is also te object of interna
perception. But only in sense that it is immanent in conscousness though ot
clearly cognised as object. Jiva is both the subject and the object of
cosciousness, because it is the cognizer as well as the cognized.
iv. The Agama theroy of knowledge is very old and probabalu orginated in the
premahavirea period . the jana pravada formed
a part of the purvasrut which formed a par of the ancient literature.
Jinabhadra in his Visesavasykabhasya, quotes
a purva Gatha on nana. There seems to have been no diffecence of opioon between
the fooowers of parsvea and mahavira rearding the diision of kowledge. Both of
them accept the five fold distinction of kowledge. The agamas have also
preseted the five dividions of knowledge.
Knowledge is iherent I the soul, but owing
to perversity of attitude arisig out of the veil of Karman , we may get wrong
knowedge, ajana. Knowledge is perfect
when the veil of Karman is totally reoved. It is imperfect evetn when there is
partial subsidence or destruction of Karman. The soul ca get perfect knoledge
directly whe the veio of Karma is remoed,. That is pratyaksa jana. But empriical knowledge experience of this world,
is possible with the help of the sense orgas indirectly. Such knowledge was
acalled paroksajnana. Matinahana(sense experience), aremanahaparayaya (telepathy), and Kevalajanana (omniscience), were
called pratykasa. But later, in ordet to brig the Jaina theory
of knowledge in line with the throies of other systems of Indian thought, they
modidied their conception of pratyaksa and paroksa Jnana. In the anuyougadvara
sutra, we we fing a hage in terminology. Matiand sruta began to be alled
pratyaksa as they wer possibel through the operation of the sense organs.
Jinabhadra als the two samyavahaara
pratyaksa. Alongside of Jnana, we
have direct itutition of the object it is darsana. Darsana has similar
subdiisions. The genra cassification of knowledge and intuition mentioning
their perersities is shown in table I. The subsidence ad destruction of the
veil of karman is a necessary condition of knowdege and intuition. Wrong
knowledge is characterise as samasay (doubt) viparayaya
(perversity,) and anadhayavasaya
(wrog knowledge caused erence.) Owing to the lack of discrimination between the
rea and the unral, the lack of discraination between the real and the unrea the
soul with wrong knowledge, ike the lunati, knows thig accordig to its ow whims.
Perersity of attitude veils the faculty of perception and knowledg, becomes
vitated. It becomes ajana.55
Pramana
Pratyaksa paroksa
Samvyavaharika paraarthika samaraa pratyabhijna
rarka auumana agama
Sakala vikala
Indriya Anindriya
nibandhana
nibandhana kevala
Avagraa Iha Avaya
Dharaba Avadhi Manahpryaya
TABLE I (B)
Jana
Avadhi
Maahaprayaya kevala Mati sruta
Jnana Ajnana Jnana Ajnana Jnana Ajana
(vibhagavadhi)
(kumati)
(kusruta)
Note: this is
based on the analysis give by s.o. Ghoshal I his edition of the Dravyasamraha
Prtyksa: we may now consider sense perception or pratyakasa jnana, as the nandisutra4-5
calls it . it is knowledge obtained through the operation of the sese
organs and the manuas. Heachandra
describes in the pramanaminasa that pratyaksa is that which is immediate,
clear and unambiguous. He analyses the various defiitions of pratyaksa of other schools and shows
that they are not adequate. The Naiyayika defination of perception as unerring
cognition which is produced by the ssnese object cotact is ot adequate. How
can the sensse object contact and the like, he asks, which is not of the nature
of cognition, function as efficient
instrument for the determination the object? The Buddhists have given a
definition of perceptual cognition as that which is free from conceptual
construction and is ot erroneous. But hemacandra says that this defination is
irrational since it has no bearing on practical ctivit. It has no pragmatic
value. Jaimini defines perception as that which is engendered in the mind of a
person upon the actual contact of the sense organ with the object. This
definition is also too wide, snce it overlaps such cognition, as doubt; and
illusions also occur as a result of sense contact. The older exponents of the
Samkhya School define perceptual cognition to be modification of the sense
orgas such as the organ of hearig. But sense ograngs are devoid of
consciousness, theresore, their modifications cannot be conscious. If on the
other hand it is assumed to derive its conscient chracter from its association
with a concious principle like the self, then the status of the organ of
knowledge should be accorded to the self. Therefore, Hemacandra said perceptual
cognition is immediate and lucid.56
In
plato’s dialogue Theaetetus, Socreated said that, ‘if knowedge and perception
are the same, it leads to an impossibility, because a ma who has come to know a
thig and still remembers it does not know it, since he does not see it and that
would be a monstrous conclusion.57 In
the Nandisutra a distinction is made
between indriyapratyaksa and anindeiya pratyakass. Indriya pratyaksa
is cognition which is immediate ad direct ad arises out of the operation of the
five sese organs. There are therefore five types of sense perception- the isul
, auditory, tactual, olfactory ad gustatory. The experiece that does not need
the sense orgas and is immediate ay be caled extra-sesory perception. It isalso
pratyaksa, becaust it is immediate ad
direct it is of three types avdhi, aah-
paryaya ad kevalpratyaksa. The old Jaina thinkers thought that knowledge
born with the help of the five seses as well as the manas maybe called matijanaa. But in indriya-pratyaksa they included kowledge bor of the five sese
organs as the mid is ot for thej exactly a sese organ. It is a quasi-sssese
organ, Uasavati defines matijanana as
knowledge caused by the senses and mind, since mind is a quasi sense no indriya.58 The commentator Siddhasenaganin mentions three types of mati: (i)
knowledge born of the sense organs, (ii) knowledgeborn of the mind , and (iii) knowledge due to the jointactivity of
the sense organs and mid.59 However, from the Bhasya of the Tattvarthasutra wefind that Matijnana
can be distingushed into different types , as (i) knowledge due to sense
organs, like sense perception; (ii) knowledge due to the mind oly, like cinta; (iii) knowledge due to the jount
actiity of the mind and the senses. Memory and recognition can be included in
Matijnana. Senses perception (indeiya-pratyaksa),
as a species of Mati jnana is of fice types based on the nature and function of
tice sese organs.60 The five senses
possess the capacity of sense experience becausse the cogition of the
stimulation must be conditioned by the reevant instruments. The Jaia analysis
of sense perception has a great psychologial significance, alsothoug perception
was a loical ad metaphysical problem for the Jainas as for other Indian
philosophers in fact, even in the wesst, phuilosophers were first busy with the
logical and the metaphysial analysis of the problem of perception, but with the
advancement of psychology as a science may have realized that perception is
more a problem for psychology. Bertarand Rusel says that, the problem of
perception has trubled philosoohers from a very early date . My ow beief is
that the problem is scientific, ot philosophical or rather no onger philosohical’ 61
The contact of the sense organs with the
object is a condition of perception as metioned by the Naiyayikas 62.’ Although, according to the Jaias, such a
contact is not necessary I the case of visual experience. Hemachadra said that
objects and ight are not conditios of experience., because of lack of
concomitance between te two .63 But it is not denied that they are remote
conditions, like time and space , which subseve the subsicence and destruction
of the knowedge obscuring Karmas. They are indirectly useful to the visual
organs, like collyrium. Perception of a particular object is I fact, according
to the Jainas, due to the destruction and subsidence of the relevat
knowledge-obsucurig Karmas, Jnanavaraniya Karma. This implies a psychological
factor. An appropriate physica condition in the destruction and subsideseof
knowledge-obcuring Karama is a necessary factor I the perceptual experience. It
also depends on the competencey of the apprpriate psychica factor. The psychic
factor of selective attention is needed before we get the sense experiece. This
is possible when all psychic impediments are partially or wholly removed
through the destruction ad susidece of knowledge- aoscuring Karma. 64 such a psychic factor may be desribed as a
metal set which is ecessary for the perceptual experiece. Emphasis on the menta
factor in perception has been mentioned in Upaisads also in westen thought
Aristotle was clearly aware that perception is not possibe merely throught the
sense organs.65 For him, perception cnsists in beigng moved ad affected sense
perception does not arise from the senses themseves, as orgas of sense
perception are potentially and not actually.loke writes that whatever
alteations are made in the body,if they reach not the mind; whatever
impressions are mad in theoutwrd part, if they are not taken notice of within,
there is no perception. For we may burn our body with no other effect thatn it
does a billetunless the motion be countinued to the brain; and there the sese
of hurt or idea of pain be produced in the mind, wherein consits actual
perception. 66 in modern psycholoty
prof. Woodworth gives a formula ‘W-S-O-W’ for explaining the facinatiing
problem of how an individual perceives an objective fact. At any given miment a
man is set for the present situation. He might be listenting to a low hum just
as smooth tone. But if he tries to make out what the sund can be he is more
likelty to perceeive it as the hum of an aeropane.67
According to the Jainas, sense perception
can be analysed into four stages as (i) avagraha,
68 (ii)iha (iii) avaya and (iv)
dharaa These stages of sense
experience arise through the operation of the sense organs and the mind. The
earlier forms like Avagraha, develop into the susequent forms, ad al of them
partake of the same esssetial nature.69
Avagraha refers to the first simple ad primitive stage of experience
this may be said to be merey the stage of sensation. Next omes iha In this
stage there is a metal elemet, and it refers to the integratie factors of the
mind. In the third stage, we get a cear and decisie cognition of the oject.
This is Avaya It implies the presence of the inferental element in perception.
Darana is retention of what is already experieced I the perceptual cogition. In
fact it is ot actually a stage of perceptual experience.
Psychologists point out that perception is
not a simple process not is it merey the sese-datum. It onsists in the
organization and interpretation of senstaions. It is ‘knowledge about, and not
merely ‘knowledgeof acquaitance’, as william James said perception involves
certain psychilogical caftors like association discrimination, intergration
assimilation and racognition perception also inoves iference. We pereie a
tabe,ad when we perceive the object as a table we recognize it and we get a
defined picute of the object. AsAgell said perception is a synthetic process,
and the combination of the new and the od is an essential part of the
synthesis. This process of combiig was often caled, by early psychlogists,
‘appercepchologists ike wudt and Titchner analysed perception into sunsations.
They said that perceptions combine and fuse together a number of sensory
elements as in the process of forming H20. It is ot merely a sum of sensations.
It gies a neq psychlogial product, a creative synthesis, ike the mental
chemistry of J.S.Mill. later , the Gestalt psychlogists gave a neq turn to the
psychlogu of perception. They hold that every perceptual experiecnce is an
unaalysesd whole: it has a quality of its own. The Jaias were cocerned with
giving logial ad epistemological analysis of the perceptual experince. There fore,
they were more interested in giving the conditions and the stages of kowledge.
Their anaysis was more on the basis of logic of common sense and on insight;and
yet the stages of peception metuoned b the Jainaphilosophers very much
correspond to the analysis of perception given by the traditional psychlogy and
the strcturalist shclool.
Acagraha senstion: Avarraha is the first
stage of sense experience. It may be said
to be analogous to sensation . it is the level of sensation in which
perceptual experience can be analysed. Umasavti
defines avagraha as implicit awarencess of the object of sense. He says
that grahaa (grasping)alocaa (holdig,) avadharana (prehending),
are synonyms of avagraha.70 It is
indeterminate. The onject presentaed through sense stimulation is cognized in
an undefined and indeterminatae way. In this stage, we ae meraely aware of te
presence of the onject without any association, without cognizing the specific
features, and in fact iwthout even being aware of its association and name.71 In the Avasyaka-
Niryukti Avagraha has been dedied as awarenesss of te sese data.72
Jinabhadra insists that Avagraha is indeternmintae I its characte. He is not
prepard t consider that it has refeence to nay specific features of the object,
because eve realitve reference is eough to promote experience to the stage of
Avaya.
Sestions, as william James said are the
first thigs is cnsciuousness. This does ot mean that all our experiecce is ony
fucig and compundig of sendstions our experienced can be analysed into
senstation, and these form the eemets of our sensory experience. As stout says,
sssenstations are of the nature of immediate experience, like the expeiece of
cold ad warm, a specfiic tinge of pain, or a touch located in the body or at
the suface of the body. The term sensation is also extended to cover the isual
data sound taste, and smell which may enter into immediate experience.
Sensations vary not only with the variations in the presented object but also
in accordance with the state of the individual.73 During the period of two hundred years between the oublication
of locke’sEssay and of James’s principles, two further characteistic, now
largely of atiquarian interest were gradualy attibuted ot sensation. Sensations
were held to be the siple elemets of which complex ideas ar formd as wel as the
matter curude stuff out of which the associative machinery fashions the
ouranoized and meaningful world of everda experience.74
Avagraha
has been furthe rdistingushed into twp stages: I) vyanjanavagraha and ii) arthavagrha.75 Vyajanaagraha is the earlier stage. It is a physiocogial
stimulus conditon of the sensation of the immediate experience. In the Visesavasyaka Bhasya we ger a
desceiption of Vyanjavagraha. There it is said that what reeals an object , as
a lamb reveals a jar, is Vyajaaagraha. It is oly the relation of the sense
ogran and the onject in the for of sense stimulation such as sound.76 in the Nandisutra,we
get an exmple of the earthe pot and frops of warte malaka-drastanata. It gies
a description of the stage of Vyanjaaargaha aclay pot is to be filled with
water. In the brgnning when a person purss out onedrop of water . it is
absorbed and there is not sifn of existece of water. He goes on puring drops of
water and at a certain stage a drop of water will beviisble. Then the water
begins to accumulate . we ay call this
stage whe the waterbecomes avisisble the ‘threshoud of saturation. The drops of
water below the treshoud are all abosrbed. Similarly, a person who is asleetp
receives sund stimulation successively for some time. The sound atoms reach
stimulation sucessively for some time.the sound atoms reach the ears.
Innumerable instances have to occur before the ears become full of sund atms.
At a partifular stage the person becomes coscius of the sound. So far he was
not aware the sound although the auditory stimulation was pouring in . We may
acall this stage of first awareness’ the threshold of awareness.’ The sensation
of sound starts the moment the tresho is crossed and we become aware of the
sound. That is the immediate experence of sound,arthavagraha. So far there was awareness. Of sound although the
coditions of stimulatio sor such awareness were operating beow the
threshold.77 The stimulus was pouring
in constantly although no awareness of sound was possible up to a praticualr
stage. Such a preparatory stage of sesation presents physilological ad stimulus
conditions ofr the senasationa stage.it is indeterminate and undefined. Vyajanavarraha has been just described as
implicti awareness the physiological and sutmulus conditionof awareness. It
gradully deelops into awareess ad gives the sentstion. It gradually deelops
into awareness and gie the senstion. It is ery often described a scntact
awareness’ alothough there is the stimulation flowing in Awreess gradually
emerges later’ through the accumulation of stimulation. It is merely
potentiality of awareness, or implicit awareness.
As soon as a person becmes conscious, the
stage of Vyanjanavagraha is over, and
it transrofm itself into arthavagrha. This may be cale dthe stage of sestaio
proper . it is aware ness of the object in the Nandisutra there is stanement that, in this stage, we are aware of
the sound as ‘this is sound or coour’ or touch’ but not exactly cognize the
nature of the sound colour or touch’, but not exactly cgnze the ature of the
sound, colour or touch.78 but in the visesavasyakabhasya’ this kind of
determinate awareness as this is sound’s is denied in the stage of sensation.
It is merelyawareness of the occurrence of the cognition becauee it lastas oly
for one moment.79 It is,therefore
indeterinate and indefinite. It does not reach the stage of cogition of
specific content.
On the basis such a distinction regardig
the two stages of Avargaha it is stated that yanjanavagaraha lastas for
indefinaite mimens gradully proceeding towards the lie of consciounness.80 The physiological and stimulus onditions of
awareness in the form of sensation continue to accumulate foe aa nuber f mamets
til the threshold of awareness is reached. But once the stage of awareness I
the form of sensation is reached, it lastas only for an instant, which is an
idivisible point of time ad is infinitesimal.
Western psychologists like stout deschibe
senstion as somethig of the atue of immediately exerienced warm or cold a
specific tinge of pain touch loateed in or at the sufae of the body rather than
anything outside. Psychogists have exteded the term to cover the isua data, te
sounds ad the smes that may enter into immediate edperince Stout fruther says
that all refoition of sensation as of a ertain kind, and all apprehension of it
as countinuing to be of the same nature or as changing in nature at different
momets, inoves a reference beyond this experiecnce . For, sensations are
genuine and afactual, while menta construcrs are spruius and artifical.
Sensations are new, uncontaminted and untouched by those menta processes which
render ideas suspect. They are ot structured by percetpito dimmed and blurred
through detention, abridege dthrough for gettig or artifically aranged as a
result of fortuitous associations. From hume to Russsell modrn empriricism has
tende to regard th einchoate beginnings of knowledge in unformed sensation as
more authenti that the cognitive refineet which reent enquiry proide.82
Iha cognition of object in empirical
experience is ot complete with the mere awareness at the sensationa stage. In
fact, pure senstions are ot possible. As stout says, we have hardy any prue
sensations sensations absooutely devid of meain geither origina or aquied exept
perhaps in the case of chingdren sensations transecen the immediate experience
because they ar inseparaby conedted with though. They have a regerence to
ecteral objects. They mean somethig beyond themselves.
In the sense, our empirical experiece wil
not be complete with avagraha. Avargaha is not self subsistent. It invloves
meaning and it has reference to object. It brings in iha a fatornvolvig
meaning. The next stage in experiece’ the is iha. Inavagraha a person simpy
hears a sound. I iha he cognises the ature of the sound also.83 jinabhadra
sayas that iha is equiry for the distintie features of the objet84. Akalanaka
defines iha similarly.85 Hemacandra
defines it as strivig for the cognition of the specific deatails of the object
apprehaded by senstion .86 It woud be
apter to use ‘associative itergration’ as standig for iha Ad iha is the stage
in the formation of perceptual experience. It brings in associative iteration
of sesory eemets experenceced in the stage of senstion.
Avaya:
From the stage of associative integration iha we come to the stage of
interpretation.sensations are interpreted and a eaing assinged to the
sensations are interprted and a meaning assinged to the sensation. That would
be perception. Sensation is the first impression of something the meaing of
which is not coginsed. Pereptionis the iterpretatio of senstion is which the
meaig is known. Avaya followd in the wake of iha in this stage we rach a
determinate experiecnt. The strivig fro a cognition of the specific nature of
the object. The Avasyakaniryukti defines aaya as determinate cognition.87 Tattarthasutra
Bhasaya desricbes avaya as the stage of ascertainmet of the right exlusion
of the qrong.89 Avaya may becmpared to
the apperception involved in perceptual experience. Perception is complex
experiece. The olde psycholoists analysed perception as invoving apperception.
A pperception is assimilating new experience to old experience.
Dharana: Retaention, dharana, is the next stage in perceputal experience . the Nanadisutra defines retention as the act
of retaiging a perceptual judgement for number instasns or unnumberabe
intssants. Acording to Umasavati retention devlops throug three stages as I) the nature of the object
is finally coginise, ii) the cognition so formed is retained ad iii) the object
is recognisesd on future occasios. The Avasykanirukti
defies dharana as
retetion.90 Jiabhadra says that
retention is the absence of the lapse of perceptual cognition. Like Umasvati he
also metios three stage os retentionas I) the abseence of the oapse of
perceptual judgement, ii) the formation of the menta traces and iii) the recolection of the cognitio on the
future aoccasions. In this description the absence of the lapse, avicyuti meta trace, vasaa, and recolectio sjriti arethree
stges icluded in the condception of dharana.
Thus some logiians make dharana a mere retantion of perceptual
exprriene; while some other would make it also a condition of recal of that
ecperiecce at a future time. Hemecandra reclls his iew of retntion as the
condition of real with the iew as th eabcsense of rtention of the lapse
mentioned in the Visesavasyaka Bhasya. He says that retation is the absese of the
lapse of perception but it is included in the perceputal judgement aaya . that is why it has not been
separately mentioned by him. Avaya whe it continues for some length of time may
be caed retantionas the absece of the lapse of experience. It may also be said
that absece of the papse if also a condition of reall in the sense in which he
defines Dharana Mere perception without the absence of the lapse give rise to
reclooection perceptual judements which are not attendead by reflectie meta
stage are almost on the lege of ounattended perception like the touch of gras
by a person in hurried motion, and such perceptions are not capable of giving
rise ot recolection.
Hemancandra’s descripation of Aaya and his analysisi o Dharana comes earer t
the psycholgical analysis or perceptio espealy of the structuralist school.
Perception is concrete experience in which sesations are aorganised and
iterpretred. Meaing is assined to sensations. Without the factor of eaig
interpretation of the sense impressions perception would be ipossible.
The Jainas have gie an exhaustie
descriiption of the four stages of Avagraha perceptua experiece, so far
discussed. Each of them is of six types as they arise due to the fie sense
organs ad due to mind. Again Vyanjanavagraha is of four types nly. Thus there
would be twentyeight forms of percepeutal cognition. Each of twenteight forms
agai is of twelve types aoeding tot the nature of the ojeject thery can have.
Therefore the jainas have mentioned that there are three hudred ad thirtysix
tupes of sense experience namey Matijana or Abhinibodhikannaa. This elaborate
classification has no psychologial sigifcance, this elaborate classification
has to psychologial significace, although it has logical and mathematia
interese. The Jaina logicans were fond of presenting eaborate mathimatical
calculations. This is found in their eaborate calssification of Karma as gien I
the Goata Sara: Karma Kanada.
Glasenap in his ‘Doctrine of karma in Jainism’ has given a detailed aylysisi of
this division. The same tedency must have inspired the Jiana logicaans to give
such an eleborate classification o Aagraha.
v.
Super-sense Experiece: the problem of super- sesible experiece is not
new in Iddian psychoogy. In the process of self-realization, man acquires
certain experiences and powers, which are not possible for the common man with
thre orma function of the sense organs. All systems of Indian philosophy exvept
the Carakas and Mimamsakas, accept the possibility of such experiences.
Sridhara argues that by the force of constant mediation on the self, akasa and other supersensible object, we acquire knwedge of them,
because the varying graedes of conscuousness must reach the imit beyond which
it annot go . Jayata Bhatta showed that we an dexelop different degrees of
perception eading to Yogic perception whih sees all objects past, future remote
etc. he gies instances of cats which can see in darkness and the vaultured srom
long distances. Yogis can see al objects inculdig the supersensible like dhara.92 such is the nature of divine perception aso with the difference
that the divie perception is teternal while the Yogic perception is acquired
through the practive of mediation.
Prasatapada diveds Yogic perception into
I) yukta in ecstati condition; and ii) viyukta,
of those who have falled from the ecstactic state. iN the state of ecstacy
on eca see one’s own sef, other seves, akasam
time and atoms. Those who are not in ecstacy can see the supersensible and
hidden objects through a pecuilar contact of the sef, maas sense orgas and the objects. Neo –Naiyyayikas divide yougic
perception into: I) perception of those who have attained the union with the
Supreme Being; and ii) those who acquire it with some Yougic efforts. The
former have constant perception. Arasajana as intuition of sages has also been
recogiised.
Vijanabhiksu states that the Yogis can
come into contace with distant objects by virtue of power acquired through
mediatton. This peculiar power of the mid cnsists in its al perasiveness.
Through such powers under the unfluence perception. Arsajnana as intuition of
sages has also been recognised.
In the patanjala Yoga, mind is described
as a coutunuous stream of functions flowing into fie statges: I)ksipta, ii) mudha, iii)biksipta, occasionally steady Iv) ekagra oncentrated and v) nirudha, withdraw. In the fourth and
the fifth stages mid is withdraw from the objects and concetrated of one of the
objects. I the fourth the mind gets the consciuos ecstacey (samprajanta –samadhi) and in the last
there is the supra-conscious state of ecstay(asaprajata-samadhi). The concentration perceeds from the gross
objects to the subter . in the different staged os samprajnata samadhi, the Yogi acquires miracuoous powers. The
Vedaitins geerall y recognises two kinds of samadhi:
samarajaata and asampraajnaata while different distinctions have been made
by the Yoga psycholofists.
Among the Buddhists Anuruddha divides
consciousness into two legels: I) subliminal consciousness and ii) supreliminal
consciousness, which is supernormal cosciousness. The yougi has t pass through
three stages in the supraliminal cosciousness, which is supernormal
consciousness. The Yogi has to pass through three stages in the supraliinal
cosciousness: I) rupacitta, where he sees visible and matieial forms. Cairoyance may
be included in this form of experience. Ii)arutpacitta.
In this stage the Yogi sees things
which are inisible and formless, iii) in the final stage of lokottaracita he reches the stage of
transecendentaal consiciousness which is aboe the three worlds. This may be
compared to omniscience, the bodhi. A
monk has to go through the severe physical and menta discipline oin order to to
pass through the different leels of consceousnesss. Concetration of mind has to
oproceed through that of grooss objects to highest level of conentration of the
four noble truths in graded way.
According to the Jainas there are two
leels of experience: pratyaksa which
is pure experience of the soul without the help of the sense organs. Then, on
the lower oevel, we have the empriical experience, which is possible through
the sense organs. It is not relly direct experience of the soul. It is paroksa indirect experience, as the
sense organs are impediments in the diect edperience of the pure soul. It is
also called samvyaahara pratyakasa, empirial
experience. When the eil of karma is remoed the soul in its pure form gets
diecet experience without the helpof sense-organs. These experiences are
supersensuous experiences. They hae been cassified into : I) avadhi which is anaogous to chairvoyance
ii) manahaparayaya telephy, and iii) kevala, omniscience.
Avadhi: Avadhi is a for of supersensible
perception. In this, we apprehend objects whih are beyondthe reach of the sense
organs. However, we perceive thigs in Aadhi which have form and shape. Things
without form like the soul ad dharma can
not be perceived by Avadhi. This can be compared with clairvoyace. Due to the
varying degrees of the destruction and subsidence of the karmic veil the
indivisdual can pecerive supersensible objets in different degrees. The highest
type of Avadhi can perceie all objects having form. The Jianas interpret the
capacity of perception in Avadhi in terms of space and time. They have
developed a technique of athematial calculation of the sutleties of time and
space. Regarding space Avadhi can extend oer a space offupied by innumerable pradesas of the size of the universe.
With reference to time it can pereive through innumerable points of time both
past and future. Avadhi can perceive al the modes of the things according to
the degree of untensity of peception. The lowest type of Avadhi can perceive an
object occupying a ery smal fraction of space ike the angula or finger breadth. Regarding the capacity in terms of time,
the lowest type of Aadhi can last for only a short time like a ssecond. It
cannot exptend byyond a second. Similarly it cannot know all the modes of the
objects. It a only cognise a part of the modes.93 thus Aavadhi which may be compared to clairoyance, differs with
different indiiduals accoridng to the capacity of the persons perceining. The
apacity is in turn, deteminted by the relatie merits acquired by the persons.
Modern psychical research has carried
perception beyond opaque wall. Precogiiton and fore – knowledge have been of
great interest ot para- psychlogy.94
even kant was greatly interested in ostensible clairoyanc eby Swedenborg
with regerence to queen Loisa I 1761 and the clairoyant cognition of the
Stockholm fire.95 in indian society we
get many instaces of such forms of perception ad dreams. A scientific sutdy of
such fors of perception is necessary.
The Jainas do not make Aadhi a form of
superormal peception , because beings living in hell, and even the lower
animals, are apable of possessing Avadhi. Heavelry beigs and being in hell
possess Aadhi naturally from bithh. They are endowed with it from birht. It is bhava pratyaya I them in the case of
huma n beings as wel as the fivesensed lower organisms Avadhi is possible due
to the desturction and subsidece of the releant vei of karma.96 it is acquired by erit. It is called gunapratyaya.97 The viseasavayaka Bhasya gives
a detailead desceiption of Avadhi from the fouteeen poiints of view and it
svarieties with redrence to temporal and spatial extension.98 the pancasitkayasare
devides Avadhi into three types with reference to spatia extension: desavadhi, paramavadhi and sarvavadhi. The
Nandi-sutra gives six variteis of Avadhi that ar possible I
the case of homeless asceits. It mentions sub- diisions of these.99
The psychic phenomeana cal ‘Frenceh
sensitiveness or sometimes caled as ‘psychometry mind and the sense organs play
their parts. C.D. Broad accepts that cairvoyance is non- sensuous perception.
Clarivoyant experiences are facts. Eminent philosophers like Sidgwick, price
and broad have acepted that there are ases of such experiences.
Manahaparyaya: Next for of sepernorama
pereption, which is manahparyaya. It
is the direct experience of the modes of mid substance working in other
indiidual mind.The Aasyaka iryukti gives
a brief description f the nature of Manahaparyaya knowledge. Manahparyay
cognises the object sof though by the minds of other people.100 the visesavasyaka
Bhasya stated that a person possessing Maahparyaya directly cogises the
meta states of others witout the insturentaity of the sense organs and the
mind.101
In western thought such a form of
cognition was called ‘thought trasferences’ Myers coined the prhase ‘Telepathy’
for desceibing such experiene. Tyrrel gies many instances of Telepathi
cognition. He also mentaions instanes of cooenctive teepathy which he calls
coooectie telepathic calculations.102
in the pubication called’apparitions’ published by te society for
psychincal Reseach many interesting exampled os teepathi coition have been
mentioned.
Manahaparyaya. Telepathic experience, is
not easy to get and is not comon for all. Acertaing physical and mental
discipline is the condition ofr getting such capacity of intuiton.in the Avasyaka Niruyukti we are tlod tha
Manahaparayaya is possible only for humanbeings of character, especialy for
homeless ascetics. Human beings acqueire this capacity due to erit and by the
practie of mental and moral discipline.103
the nandisutra gie detaile
describption of the conditions of the possility of Manahaparyaya in the case of
human beigs.104 The conditons for the
possession of Manahaparyaya are I)the huma beings in the Karma-bhumi must have
fully developed sense ograns and a fuly debeloped peesonality i.e they must be
Iparyapta iii) they must possess right attitude, saayg drist. As a cnsequence they must be free from passion. Iii)
they must be self controlled and they must be possessed of raddhi, extra
ordiary powers the discipline and occout powers attainable by the yogis
entioned in the patajala yoga is analogous to sucha descripio of the
qualifications f the human beings possessing Manahparyaya siddhasens Divakara
says that lower organisms possessing two or more sense organs are also found to
possess Manahaprayaya. But the traditional Jaina view does not acetp the
posibility of Maahaparyaya in the case of lower animals. Thine says that it is
possibelt to find istances of the possibility of such perceptions in the case
of olwer anials especially the higher ertebrates. Several experments hae
carried in this conections and serval experiment have been carried in this connection
and severa instces have been quaoted.105
The Sthanana recngnise stwo arieties Manahaparyaya as rjumati and vipulmati. 106 Umasacati makes a similar distinrtions 107 he says that Rjumati is less pure and it
someties falters. Vipulamati is purer and more lasting . it lasts upto the rise
of omniscience. We also get such a desceiption I the pancastikayasara. 108
Rjumati gies a striaight and direct intuition of the thoughts of others,
while in Vipulamati the proess of knowing the ideas of others is maidfested in
an irregualr way. Puiyapada desceibes the narute of Manahaparyaya as the
intuition or oects of the ativities fo the sense ogras of speeh, body and
mind.109 He says that Vipulaati knows
lesss number of object of the than Rujuatio but whateve it knows it knows
perfectly ad bividoly vipulameti is more penetratig and it is more lucid than
Rjumati. Rjumati flaters. Onew who is at the upward stage of spiritual
development has qcquieed Vipulamati while on ewho is sure to desecent in the
spiritual developomet gets the Rjumati Manahparyaya.110
In the weat the phenoeana of extea-sensory
perceptio likeclairvoyace, telepathy, precognition and edumbship have been
accepted as fats, Een pschloligists like McDougall are inclined to believe that
extra sensory perception like clairvoyance telephathy ad or knowledge seems in
a fair way edtabliseh.111 Prof.
H.H.Prince says that evideance for clairvoyance and telepathy is ‘abundant and
good.112 Prof Rihet admits that
telepathi experiences certaialy exist.113
Dr Rhine has doe good work in
extra-sensory perception. He syas that extra-sensory pereption in the for of
clairvoyance ad telepathy is an actual and demosntrabe occurrence. It is not a
sensory phenomenon.114
Kevala: Acording to the Jainas the soul,
in its pure form is pure consicousness and knowldege. It is omnisient. But it
is obcured by the karmas as the mood or the sun is lible be obscured by the eil
of dust, for or a patch of cloud.115
when such a veil of karma is removed omniscience dawans. That is kevala jnana. That is a stage aof
perfect knowedge and a stage of kaivaya.
Omniscience intuits all substane with al
theirr modes.116 Nothing remains
unknown in omiiscience. It is knowledge of all substances and modes of the pa,
preset and the future, all in one. It is lastingand eterna. It is transcedenatl
and pure. It is the perfect manifestation of the pure and the real nature of
the soul when the obstructie ei of Karma ar removed.117
This
ominiscience is coexistet with the supreme state’of absolute clarity of life
monad’ this is precisefly the relase.118
No longer is the monad dimmed with the beclodding passion but open and
free and unilimted by the particualrising qualities that constiute
indiidualtiu’ The mment the limitation that makes particular experience
possibel if eleminated perfect itutuion of everythig is attained. The need of
the experenes in dissolove in infinite- this is the postie meaning of kaialya.119 Zimmer says that one is reminded of the rptestof the modren
French poet and philosopher Paul valery in his noe mansieru Tests. There are people’ he writes who fee that the prgans
of sense ar cutting them off from reality and essence knowledge, a cloud
obsruting the essence of being; the shing moon , like darkness or a cataract of
the eye! Take it al away so that modern theory of kmowdege from which it
arises, is remarkaby close to the old idea which jainism holds:thath of the
liiting foce of our varuous faculties of huma n understanding.
Mimamsakas are not prepared to acetpt the
possibility of the ocurrence. The Mimamsakas raised a series of logical
objections to the possibility of omminscience. Aording to the Mimamasakas
omminicience canot mean the kowedge of al the objects of the word either at the
same time or successiveely Nor can omniscience be knowledge of archetypal
formas and not of particular things. There can be no omniscience beaaus
eknowledge of the past, the prasent and
the future can neve be exhausted . moreover , if al onjet wre known in
omiscience at one moment then the next moment it would be unconscience and bank
. the ominscient , gain would be tainted by the desire and aveersions of
toehters in knowing them.
But Jainas refute the argument of the
Miamsakas regarding the problem of the occurrence of ominiscience. In the
pramana Mimamsa we get the refutatuion of the Mimasa arguments against the
ocurrence of omisicience. Similarly Mimamasakas have bee replied by
prabhacandrai n prameya-kamala-martanda. The
Jaisas sy that it is ot corect otdyny the ocurence as the Mimasakes do.
Onmisciecnce is the sogle intuition of the whole aord ecause it does not depet
upon the sense organs and the mind. The pure intuitio of the omnsicient
selfknows a the object simultaeously by a single stirke of intuition since it
trasecnds the imits of time and space. Prabhacandra syas that the Mimamsaka
obejction theat the omnsiceiet soul woukd be unconscious the next moment of the
occurrence of omniscience is not correct, becaude it is a sigel uednig
intuition For the omniscient. Cognition and the word are not destroyed the
momet the omniscience is possibel. Similarly the Jainas cnted, as agaist the
Mimamsakas, that the omiiscient soul knows the past as existingin the past and
future as existing in the future0.120
The omniscient selfis absloutely free form the bondae ofphysical
existaence as past preset and future. In fact the Mmamasakas also admit tha ti
recogition we apprehed the past as we the preset in one cognitionk and a flash
intuion called pratibha jnana in
emprirical life a apprehed future it is theresore possible for the omiscient
soul who ins etreely free from the fetters of karma to have a super-sensous
vision of the whole world past prset and future by as asigel unendig flash of
intutuon. In the pramana Mimamsa the possibility of the occurrence omniscience is
logially proved by the ecessity of the final consummation of the progressive
deelopment of knowledge.121 There are
degrees of exellece in kowledge ad the knowledge must reach it sconsummation
somehwere Tat is the stage of omiscience when the obsuring Karmas are totally
aihilated.122
The nandi
surta metions two types: I) Bhavastha omnisiecne f the liberated who
stilive I this world as for instace the omnisciecne of the Tirthamakars ii)
Omiscience of the one who is totally liberated which may be caled
Siddha.123 The Bhavastha omniscience is
again of two types as I) Sayogi and ii) Ayogi. There are sub-divisions in both
these. Similarly Siddha omniscience is of two types as I) Anantara- kevala and
ii) Paramapara-Kevala, each having it sub-divisions.124
The Jaina view of
omniscience may be coparead to the Nyaya view of the divine knowledge, and the
Yoga theory of divine perception. Divine knowledge is all-embracing intuition.
It is perceptual in character as it is direct and as it is not derived through
the instrumentality of any other cognition. The divine perception grasps the
past, the present and the future in one eternal ‘now. The soul.accordig to the
Jaina, is itself divine and perfect and there is no there is any other
transcendental being than the individual soul. Each soul is a God by itself
although it is obscured by the Karmic veil in its empirical state. The
Kaivalyastate of the individual soul may be compared to the dive omniscience.
However, the Naiyayikas and Pratanjali accept that man has sometimes the flash
of the intuition of the future, and he can attain omniscience by constant
meditation and the practice of austerities. The Jainas believe that the removal
of obscuring Karmas by meditation, threefold path and self-control, the
individual soul reaches the consummation of omniscience, the state of Kaivalya.
That is the finality and the end. But others like the Naiyayikas posit a divine
omniscience which is higher, natural and eternal.
It is not possible to
establish the possibility of omniscience on the basis of empirical methods of
investigation which psychology and empirical science follow. However, its
logical possibility cannot be denied. Progressive realization of greater and
subtler degrees of knowledge by the individual is accepted by some
psychologists especially with the introduction of psychical Research for
analysing extra-sensory perception. A consummation of this progressive
realization would logically be pure knowledge and omniscience, a single al
embracing intuition.