Eight Characteristics:

Every Jiva possesses an infinite number of qualities, Flasebappi, in his Doctrine of karama in jaina philolophy mentions eight important characteristics:

1. The faculty of omniscience (kevala- jnana)

2. The faculty of absolute undifferentiated cognition (kevala-darsana)

3. Superiority over joy and grief.

4. Possession of belief I complete religious truth (samayakatva), and irreproachable moral conduct (caritra)

5. Possession of eternal life (aksayashiti)

6. Complete formlessess (amurtava)

7. Unrestricted energy (viryatva)

8. Complete equality in rank with other Jivas.

The first characteristic of the soul is supayoga. The word upayoga is difficult to define. It is the source of experience. The cognitive, cognitive and adjective aspects spring form it. It is different a of living organism. Umasavati says that upayoga is the essential characteristic of the soul. 17 Upayoga has contain prominence. Upayoga is that by which a function is serve: upayujayte anena it upayogah. It is also described as that by which a subject is grasped. 18 In the Gommatasara: jivakanda, Upayoga is described as the drie which leads to the apprehension of object.19 It is the source of the psychical aspect of experience. It gie rise to the experiecne f objects, and the experience expresses itself in form sof jnana and darsana. Upayoga is of two types: anakara, formless, ans sakara, possessed of form. Anakara anakara, formless, ans sakara, possessed of form. Anakara Upayoga is formless, indeterminate cognition. Sakara Upayoga is determinate cognition, a defined form of experience. It would not be out of place to point out that upyoga is ot the resultant of consciousness as it is sometimes maintained. This was one of the earlier attempts to translate Upayoga. Nor is it a sort of inclination arising from consciousness. It is the cognitive drive, which gives rise to experience. It is, in fact, the source of all experience, the Jaina philosophers were aware of the driving force of experience, the force by which experience, the force by which experience is possible. This may beckoned to the ‘horme’ of the modern psychologists. It may be called home in the sense that McDougall has used the term. It is a vital impulse for urge to action. Nunn has stated that home is the basis of activity the at differentiates the living animal from dead matter. It is like Schopenhauer’s will to lie’, and Bergson’s elan vital’ jnana and darasana are manifestations of upyoga.

The biological studies of the lower animals from the amoebae onwards show that all animals are centers of energy in constant dynamical relation with the world, yet confronting it in their own characteristic way. A name was needed to express this fundamental property of life, the drive or a felt tendency towards a particular end. Some psychologists called it conation or the coactive process. But this drive may not always be conscious.

There is the presence of an internal drive in such processes. “To this drive or urge, whether it occurs in the conscious life of men and the higher animals war propose to give a single name…. horme”20 This activity of the mind is a fundamental property of life. It has various other names, like ‘ the will to live’ elan vital’, the life urge and the libido. Horme under one form or another has been the fundament postulate of amarck Butler, Bergso ad Bernard Shaw. McDougall took great pains to present the hormic theory of psychology as against the mechanistic interpretation of life and mind.

The hormic force determines experience and behavior. We get conscious experience because of this drive. The conscious experience takes the form of perception and understanding. Horme operates even in the unconscious behavior of owe animals. In the plants and animals were see it operate I the preservation of organic balance. In our own physical level. We circulate our blood, wr breathe and we digest our food, and all these are the expressions of the hormic energy. It operates at all legalese both in individual and the racial sense. 21 But the Horme expressed and presented by the Jaina philosophers could not be developed and annualized in terms of the modern psychology, because their analysis of Upayoga was purely an epistemological problem tempered with metaphysical speculation. They were aware of the fact that there is a purposive force which actuates and determines experience. This is clear from the distinction between jnana and darsana as two forms of upayoga.

Citta or cetana as a characteristic of the our is important in Indian philosophy. In thr Dravyasamgradha, jiva is described as possessing cetaa from the nominal point of view. Cetana is a sort of incliatio, which arises rom upayoga. This inclination branches in two direction jnana and darsana. Darsana may be said to be undifferentiated knowledge. Janana is cognition defined the jiva has indinite jnana and darsaa but certain classes of Karman, like jananavaraiya and Darsanavaraniya tend to obscure and confuse the essential nature of the jiva. From the phenomenta point of view, darssaa ad jnana tend to manifest themselves in eight kinds of jnana and four kinds of darsana.

The possession of Upayoga raises the question whether the Jiva possesses upayoga and is yet different from it , or whether it is identical with it . the Nyaya theory does not recognise the identity of quality and its possessor . Jainism asserts that oly from the phenomenal point of view they are separable . In pancastikayasara we read “Only in common parlance do we distinguish darsana and jana. But in reality there is o separation” 22 The SOUL IS INSEPARABLE FROK Upayoga. Horme is an essential characteristic of the living organisms. It is manifested in the fundamental property experienced in the incest adjustments and adventures that make up the tissue of life and which may be called drive or felt tendency towards an end. 23 Animal life is not merely permeated by physical ad chemical processes; it is more tha that even the simplest animal is autonomous.

The soul is simple ad without parts it is formless as the soul is immaterial it has no form. This quality has bee mentioned in other systems also. The Jaina thinkers were against the Buddhist idea of the soul as a cluster of khandas Buddhists do not refer to the permanent soul. It is a composite of mental states called khanadas . in modern western thought Hume says, “ when I enter most intimately into what I cal myself, I always stumble upon some perception or other of hear or cold light or shade, love or hatred , pain or pleasure. I never catch myself any time without perception, and never can observe anything but the perception,” hoffding stated that the ego has been looked for in vain as something absolutely simple. The nature of the ego is manifested in the combination of sensation, ideas and feetlilngsi, but Herbart maintains that the soul is a simple being not only without parts but also without qualitative multiplicity. Modern psychology has emphasized substantiality, simplicity persistence and consciousness as the attributes of the soul. Descartes has said, I am the thing that thinks, that is to say who doubts, who affirms. Who loves, who hates and feels.,” he designates this thing as substance.25

Hamilto advocated the four characteristics with the greatest explicitness. Other prominent names are those porter, Calkins, Angelli and Aveling.26

From the phenomenal pint of view jiva is also desceibed as possessing four pranas. They are sense (indriya), energy (bala), life (ayus ) and respiration (ana). The pancastikayasara gives the same description. The idea of prana is found in Indian and western thought. In the Old Testamet (Fenesis book I) we read , “ the lord God breathed into the nostril the breath of life and man became a lying soul”. In the primitive men life when it ceases to blow men die, I the Navaho leagued there is a description of the life force according to which we see the trace of the wind in the skin at the tips of fingers parkas refers to psycho-physical factor of the organism. The jiva assumes the bodily powers when it takes new forms in each new birth. Whatever thing manifests in the four pranas live and is Jiva 27 The four pranas are manifest in ten forms. The indriya expresses itself in five senses . bala may refer to the mind the body ad speech. Ayus and an are one each. These pranas in all their details need not be present in all organisms, because there are organisms with less than five sense organs. But there must be the four main characteristics. The most perfectly developed souls have all the ten pranas and the lowest have only four. This has a great biological and psychological significance. Comparative psychology points out that in the psycho-physical development of the various animal species at the lower leave, the chemical sense which is affected by chemical reaction is the only sense function; and it later becomes the separate sense of test and smell. Experiment investigations carried b Riley and Forel point out that the chemicalsense is used but insects like moths even for mating. Fore has given a top- chemical theory for explaining the behavior of bees. As we go higher I the scale of life, the chemical sense plays little part. In birds, sight and smell are wel developed. In mammals, we find a higher degree of qualitative discrimination of smell. As we go higher still, we get the variability of adaptation, which may be called intelligence.

In the Brahamanas and the oldest Upanisads there is a description of the psyche as consisting of five pranas. They are regarded are regarded as gactors of the physicao-psychological life. Occasionally, more than five pranas are mentioned . but still the idea of a permanent self had not shaped itself . in the third Adhyaya of the Brahadaranyakopanisad Yajavalka was asked to explained what happened to a person after the body has been dissolved and the parts of the psyche has bee remitted to the fire and wind. He avoids the discussion and suggests that Karama remains after death. 28 This was step forward towards the formation of the permanent self. Brahadaranyakopanosad also contains a discussion about the constituent parts of the soul. Eight instead of five have been suggested. Vijanana and retah are mentioned . This vijnanamayapurusa comes nearer to the conception of the soul, although personal immortality is ot emphasized in Jainism also, the idea of a permanent soul possessing pranas must have developed on the same lines.

From the phenomenal point of view, the soul is the Lord (prabhu), the doer (karata), enjoyed (bhakata) limited to his body (dehamarta), still incorporeal, ad it is ordinarily found with Karama. As a potter considers himself as a maker and enjoyer of the clay pot so from the practical pint of ciew the mundane suoul is said sto be the doer of things like constructing house and the enjoyer of sense objects.29 As the soul produces impure thought –captivities and as a consequence the material Karmas, it also enjoys thoughts with the help of the material Karmas Thus Jiva enjoys its thought –created activity. However, from the nominal point of view, Jiva is the doer of suddha bhavas or pure thought (Karmas); and from the phenomenal point of view, it is the doer of pudgaala karmas or Karmic matter. 30 The distinction between the formal cause nimiety (nimitta), and material cause upadana, has been introduced for the description of the soul the Jainas say that the soul is the efficient cause of the material Karmas . the Jiva possesses consciousness and consciousness manifest itself in the form of various mental states. These matal states are responsible for activities, which produce material Karmas. It is therefore asserted that Jiva is The pancastikayasara describes the ataman as the agent of its own bhavas but it is not the agent of pudgala Karmas .³¹ Jainism emphasizes the activity of the Jiva as against the Sakhya view of the passive udasia purusa. As a consequence. Of activity, the Jiva experiences happiness and misery. But Nemicandra says that it is only from the phenomenal point of view. From the oumenal poit of view, Jiva has consciousness and it enjoys etera bliss. In the Dravyasamgraaha we read , “ niccayanayado cedaa-bhavam khu adassa” The joys and sorrows that Jiva experiences oare th fruits of dravyakarman. But Buddhism believes that the agent never enjoys the fruits of karma James ward giving the genera characterization of the “ varied contents of empirifal self, says that the self has first of all a ) a unique interest and b) a certain inwardness, further it is c) an individual that d) persists, e) is active, ad finally it knows itseft.32

But the process of entanglement in activity and enjoyment is beginnings. The soul gets entangled I the samsra and embodied through the operation of karmas. It assumes various forms due to the materially cause conditions (upadhi) ad ias ivolved I the cycle of birth and death. It is subjected to the forceds of Karmas which express themselves, first through the feelings and emotions and secondly in chains of very subtle kinds of matter, invisible to the eye ad the ordinary instruments of science. Who the soul in embodied it is aggected b the environment. William James distinguishes between the self as known or the me the empirical ego as it is sometimes allied , ad the self as know or the I pure ego the constituents of the me may be divided into three classes: the material me, the social me and the spiritual me. The body is innermost part of the material me. The come the clothes our home and property. they become parts of our empirical ego with different degrees of intimacy. A man’s social me is the recognition that he gets from his fellowmen. A man has a many selves as there are individuals and groups who recognize him. The spiritual me also belongs to the empirical me. It consists of the “entire collection of consciousness, my psyche faculties and disposition taken concretely” but the pure self the self as the kower , is very different from the empirical self, it is the thinker that which thinks this is permanent what th philosophers call the soul or the transcendent ego.33 James ward also makes a distinction between the self known or the empirical ego, and the pure self For him, the empirical ego is extremely complex it is the presented self. The earliest element is presented self, the bodily or the somatic consciousness, but they never have the same inwardness as “the sense of embodiment” we also find a certain measure o f individual permanence and inwardness that belongs to the self. We may call this ‘the sensitive and the appetite self.’ With the development of ideation there saris what we call the inner zone, having still greater unity and permanence. This is the imaging and desiring self. At the level of intellection we come to the concept that every intelligent person is a person having character and history ad his aim in life through social interaction. This gies conscience a social product as Adam smith has said. At this stage a contrast between the thinker and the object of thought is clearly formed. This is the thinking and willing self. At this stage een the inner ideation and desire become outer no longer strictly self. The duality of subject and object is three last order of knowledge and is the indispensable condition of all actual experience. It is the subject of experience that we call pure ego or self.34

The Jaina thinkers made a distinction between the states of the soul as bahiratman, antaratman and paramaatuman. Bahiratman consists in the identification of the self with body and eternal Belgians it is the bodily self I this wr say, “I am the body, I am lean etc” this identification is due to ignorance. The same soul is in the karmavastha and is characterized by suddha caitanya and bliss. It is free from all sense of otherwise. It has discriminative knowledge. This conscious self is ataraman in the samyagdrsti gunasthana the pure and perfect self which is free from the impurities of Karma is the paramatman. It is characterized perfect cognition and knowledge. It is freed ad is a Siddha. This paramatma is jnaamaya ad is pure consciousness it cannot be known by the sese it has o indriyas and not manas. From the oumea point of view these are the attributes of the soul.35 The Jaina approach to the problem is metaphysical it contains elements of psychological instigation; but the language is the language of metaphysics. Modern psychologists, especially the rational psychologists, stopped psychological analysis and explained the process of realizing the pure nature of the self from the empirical stage to stage of pure ego. But the transcendental self is not the subject of psycholo9gy. William James has said that states of consciousness are all that psychology needs to do her work with. Metaphysics or theology may pore the existence of the soul: but for psychology the hypothesis of such a substantial principle of unity is supersluous.”36

Jainism refers to the size of the soul. Although souls are not of any definite size, they contract and expand according to the size of the body in which they are incorporated for the time big. The soul is capable of adjusting its size to physical body, as the lamp placed in a large or small room illuminates the whole space of the room. Nemicandra describes it as the phenomenal characteristic of the soul. From the numeral point of view it is said to exist in innumerable pradesas. 37 In respect of the elasticity of the soul, Jainism differs from the other Scholl’s of Indian thought. As Jacobi says the Jains have a tenet of the soze of the soul which is not shared by other philosopher.38

Some philosophers like the Vaisesikas, Demarcates and the atomizes, thought of the soul as atomic. Some others talked of the omnipresence of the soul. Jacob says that the origin Vaisesika was not clear this point. Some Samakhya writers preferred the soul to be infinitely small while Isvara Krana and later writers characterized it as all-pervading.39 The spatial view of the habitation of the soul had occupied the minds of the Upaisadic philosophers.

Upanisadic psychology agrees with the Aristotellia I localizing the soul the soul I the heart. It was later thought that it was in the brain. Yogic ad Tatric books recognized the cerebrochemical processes , and aconciousness was traced to the brain In the Taittriyounisae (1.6.1.2.) we read that the soul in the heart moves by passage through the bones of the palate, right up to the skull, where the hari are made to part. The soul in the heart is called manomaya in the Kausitaki Upanisad the soul is described as the master of all bodilyfunctions. The sense depends on the soul as ‘relatives on the rich’ the self’s immanent in the whole body , and is hidden in it This passage leads to the view like the Jaina view , that the soul fills the body . Different other accounts are given in the Upanisads. In the brhadranyaka the self is described as small as grain of rice or barley. In the kathopainsad we find that the soul is of the size of the thumb.40 It dwells in the center of the heart. In the Candogya, it is said to be of the measure of the gpanbetween the head and the chin. William James tares the feeling of self to the cephalic movements. He says that the self of sells when carefully examined is found to nosiest mainly in the collection of these peculiar motions in the head or between the head ad the heart. 41 Descartes merits that the seat of the soul is the pineal gland Fichte holds that the soul is a space filling principle Lotus says that the soul must be located some where in the matrix of the arterial brain events. These accounts tend to make us believe that the soul is something material, which occupies space. It is sometimes pointed out that the idea of the spatial attributes of the soul constitutes a contradiction. If the soul has no form it cannot occupy space, en the infinite pradesas; and if it is immaterial it cannot have form. However, this contradiction is due to the difficulties of expressing the immaterial in thermos of the materials this has bee the perenocabulary of its own, the Freaks had the same difficulty plato had to resort to allegories and myths for expressing the immaterial. In Jainism although the description of the soul is not metaphorical, it is just an tempt to come nearest immaterialism. It may be that the difficulty is due to the complexity of substance in Jainism. Jainism gives the cross division of substances as spiritual and non-spiritual, and again as corporeal and non-corporeal substance like Dharma ad Adharama; and there is the corporeal which is called pudgaga. From the phenomenal point of view, jiva comes under the spiritual but corporeal the corporeal need not necessarily be material.

The classification is as follows:-

Substance

Spriitual non-spiritual

Corporeal

corporeal noncorporeal

Jiva

Matter 1.Akasa

If this division is accepted, there need be no contradiction Again when size is attributed to the soul, it is possible that it refers to the spheres or extent of the affiance that is intended. In the pancastikayasara we read that just as a lotus hued ruby, when placed in a cup of milk imparts its luster to the milk, the soul imparts its luster to the milk, the soul imparts it slushier to the whole body 42.

Jiva is characterized by upward motion. Nemicandra described the pue soul as possessing urdhavagati. In the pancastikayasara it is said when the soul is freed from all impurities it moves upward to the end of Loka. 48 For plato the soul was above all the source of motion it is only the self that moves. In the phaedrus, Socrates says in his decoded speech, “The soul in immortal for that which is ever in motion is immortal” The self never eases to move and it is the fountain and the beginning of motion to all that moves. The movement of the soul in samsara is possible in pure space with is devoid of the medium for motion. The Jaina conception of the soul as possessing uedhavagati appears to be more an ethical expediency that a metaphysical principle or a psychological fact.

All these attributes belong to the nature of every soul and they are clearly seen if the Jivas are pure and free. However most of the Jivas are not pure and reed. They are contaminated by some foreign elements which veil their purity and perfection. The foreign elements is Karman, very fine matter, imperceptible to the senses, and which enters into the soul and causes great changes. The souls are then involved in the wheel of samsara. They become samasarins.

III The samsarijias are classified on the basis of various principles like the suites and the number of sense organs possess ed by the they are the sthavara jivas, immovable souls. This is the vegetable kingdom. Sri J.C. Bosehas pointed out that the vegetable world has capacity for experience. They are one –sense organisms. Earth water fire and plats are such jivas they possess the sense of touch. This view is peculiar to Jainism. Itrasa jivas (movig souls) have tow to five sees worms, oysters, conschs etc. possess taste ad touch. Ants bugh and lice have three senses taste touch and smell . Mosquitoes, bees and flies possess four senses taste touch, smell and sight . and birds beasts and me have all the five senses Again fie sensed organisms may possess mind. They are called samnaska. They may be bereft of mind (amanaska)

Plato talked of a determined number of souls the souls that exist must always be the same they cannot be come fewer, not yet an they become fewer, not yet can they become more numberous.44 In the timaeus he said that the number of souls is equal to the number the stars.45

In Gommatasara Jicakanada, we get a detailed classification of samasarijivas. This classification is shown in table I

TABLE No. 1

Jiva

Samsari Mukta

Sthavara (Possessing Trasa

One sense)

Possessing Possessing Possessing Possessing

Two senses Three senses four senses five senses

Badara Suksma

Paryapta Aparyapta Paryapta Aparyapta Paryapta Aprayapta Samana Amana

( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) (7) (8)

aryapta Aparyapta

(9) (10)

Paryapta Aparyapta

(5) (6) Paryapta Aparyapta

(11) (12)

Paryapta Aparapta

(13) (14)

Comparative psychology points out that there have been various stages in the development of animal life. The first simple animals, the protozoa. Of one sense. In fact, till we reach the insect species we find that the chemical sense predominates positive negative and food reactions are mainly due to the chemical sense. As we go up the animal scale we find sensory discrimination in qualitative distinctions even the othersenses get discriminated ad developed as we proceeded in the development of animal life. Similarly the distinction between the Jivas as paryapta and aparyapta has great psychological significance . Gommatasara thus illustrates the paryapta developed, “as the thing like the room jars, and clothes are full or empty so the Jivas should be understood be complete or incomplete.46 Jiva becomes parayapta with the absorption of Karmic matter for building up its body sense, respiration and manes. One sensed organisms plate with the possession of food, drink body sense and repiration. The possession of these attributes makes the first four- sensed organisms parayapta or complete For five sensed organisms all the six are necessary in the absence of these the Jivas are incomplete Comparative psychology has shown that sensory discrimination has been a gradual process. Miss washburn points out that ability to distinguish between the different sensory experiences depends on several factors, like the nature of the sense organs and the ability to make aired reaction movements .47 On the basis of these investigations, three different classes of senses, like the chemical semse hearing and sight, have been mentioned the chemical sense is manifested in the combined senses of taste and touch. As sensory discrimination becomes more complex the mental life of animal becomes more developed and pronounced.

IV. these characteristics of the soul are mentioned from the practical point of view Defilement of the soul takes place who the Karma pours into the soul this is called asrava. The soul then begins to experience mundane and emotional experiences like the passions. The karama which comes into contact is retained . the soul is eternally infected with matter every moment it is getting new matter. In the normal course of things it has no end but the deliverance of the soul from the wheel of samsara is possible by voluntary means. By the prose of samvara the soul can stop the influx of karama; by nirjara it an eliminate the Karana already glued to the soul. The al obstacles are removed and the soul becomes pure and perfect, free from the wheel of samsara. Being free , with its upward motion the Jiva attains the liberation or moksa. In the last lines of the Fommatasara: Jivakanda, it is said that the liberated sol remains pure and free.

Pureand perfect souls live eternal bliss. But they do not lose their identity as the Vedatin sold emphasize. In the Jaina Theory of the soul eight Kahanada of the Chandogyopanisad, it is said that when a man departs his speech is mereged in mind, his mind I breath, his breath in fire, which I the highest being is sat. Now, that which is the subtle essece has its self. It is the self, “ and thou Oh secetaket, art that.” In the eleventh Khanada also, we read that when the body withers and dies ad the living self leaves it, the livig self dies not.48 Jacobi says that here we come nearer to the cocept of the soul. It differes from the Jaina concept in that the soul here does not possess a permanent personality, for in mukti the jiva is mereged I Brahama and its individuality is lost. For the Jaina, Mc Taggart’s analogy of the ‘colege of sellves’ would appear to be apter, although what type of spiritual unity there is is Moksa, Jainism cannot say. Mc Taggart seeks of the unity of the absoulte as that of a society. All the seles are percect, and “ if an oppnent should remind me” he writes, “of the notorious imperfections of all the lives of all of us, I should point out that every self is in reality eternal and that its true qualities are oly seen in so far as it considered as eternal” 49 Sub specie eternitatis it is progressing towards perfection as yet unattained. The never –ceasing struggle of the soul is an important tenet in Jainism. The universe is not, theu, an amusing pantomime of infallible maruouettes, but a fight for perfection, in which “something is eternally gained for the universe by the success” . the Jaina lutlook is melioristic.

CHAPTER IV

CRITIQUE OF KNOWLEDGE

I. The Jaina attitude is empritical and realistic. The Unpanisadic philosophers found the immutabel reality behig the world of experience. Fautama, the Buddha, denouced everything as fleeting and full of sorrow.mahaira stood on commonsese and experience and found no contradiction between permaence and found no contradiction between permanence and change. The Jaina philosophy is based on logic and experience. Moksa is the ultimate aim of life. It is realised by the three- fold path of right intuitio right kowledge ad right conduct. Right knowledge is one of the major problems of Jaina philosophy. It is necessary to understand the Jaina theory of knowedge and experience for the proper understanding of Jaina thought. The Jaina epistemology is very complex and developed gradually in reponse to the demand of time.

The problemof mid eludes the grasp of philosophers and psychologists because it can beanalyzed into both metaphysical and psychological problems. Metaphysicallyt it refers to mind as the principle of the universe stading in realation to the phenomenal world. This is the cosmic princple which is emphasized by the idealists as the primary principle. Psychologically, it is the individual mind, the individual’s system of psychic stated in realation to the worls of sense. Phgilosophers could not make a distinction between the two aspects of the problem.

The Indian thinkers were gropig to grasp the itangible,the ineffable and the immaterial.the distinction between mind and matter, the mental and the physical, was vague and unclear. In the pre-Upanisadic thought, the principle of Ttabecame the principle of order in the universe. It is the underlying dynami force at the basis of the universe.” Even the Gods cannot transgress it.” We see in the conception of Rta the development from the physichal to the dicie.2 it is by the force of Rta that human brains function.” Man kows by the divie force of the same immanent power which makes fire to burn and river to flow.3 The interpretatio of the famous Rgvedic hymn of creation. “nasad asin no sad asit tadanim” ad again of “kamas tad agre samavrtatadhi manaso retah prathamain yad asit . sato bandhumasti niravindahradi pratisya kavayo manisa”4 gives a description that for the first time there aswose kama which had the primeel germ of maas withi it. Similarly the word krtu is shown to be the antecedent of the word manas or prajna. In sat. bra 4.1.4.1. there a statemet that when a man wishes, “may I do that may I have that,” that is Krtu, when he attains it, that is Daksa. The same term later changed its meaning to manas and prajna. 5

The analysis of the Jaina theory of mind shows that there has been a conflict between the metaphysical and the psychological approaches to the problem. It is predominatly a realistic approach. The mind and its stares are analysed on the empirical level. The Jaina ideal is Moksa, freedom of the soul from the impurities of Karma. The purity and the divinty of the soul to the basic concepts of the Jaina philosophy, ad mind had to be linked with the soul ad interpreted in the metaphysical terms.

The function of mind which is an inner organ, is knowing and thinking. Sthanaga described it as samkalpa vyparavati. Anuvamisika gives the citta vijnana as equivalent of the manas: “ Citta manoveijanaam it I paryayah” The Viseasvasyakabhasya defines manas in terms of menta processes.6 It is taken in the subtanitive sense. The Nyayakosa defines manas in the sense of the inner organ which controls the mental functions.

It is difficult to define mind. If at all it is to be defined, it is always in terms of its own processes. Even the psychologists of the preset day find it difficult to give a definition of mind without reference to the menta processess. Older psychologists meant by mind something that expresses its nature, powers and functions in the modes of individual experiences and of bodil activity. Mc Dougall also says that wr are boung to postulate that “something” ; ad “I do not thing”, he writes, “that we ca find a better word to denote something than the old fashioned word mind.” 7 Mcdougall defines mind as an orgaized system pre-secintific concept. It covers the whole field of interna experiece.8

The Jainas didi not merelu postulate the existaence of mind without any evidece. They found the evidence in the experiences fo the world. They also give the empirical proof for the operation of the mind. The contact of the sense organ with the soul alone does not give cognition in the reevant experiences because there is the absence of manas something else is necessary for the coginition, and that is the mind. Agaain, the mind has the functional connotation which speaks for its nature. “just as speech signifies the function of burning and the lifht shows the light.”9

Orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy postulate the existence of mind as an interna sense organ. In the evidence of cognition the contact of the soul with the sense organs in not sufficient. We must posit the existence of manas, some additional condition, which brings them together. For instance a man may not hear a sound or see an object when the mind is pre-ocupied when the mind is elsewhere as we read in the Upanisads. There is also the positive evidence in the facts of memeory ad of experiences like pleasure and pain.10 Asmind is not tangible, the proof of mind has always to be indirect, and not direct. McDougall infers the structure of the mind from its functions. He writesthat we have to build up our description of the mind by gathering all possible facts of human experience and behabiour, and by inferring from these the nature and structure of mind. He thus makes a distinction between the facts of menta activities ad the facts of mental structure. It is comparable to the sturcture and the functions of the mechanical joy; ad one who wishes to ascertain the nature of the machinery within it, ca only watch it movemet under carious condiditons.11

Mind is characterise by mental processes ike doubtig, imagaining, dremaing and expercting. It is also characterised by pleasure and pain and desires. These are the distinguishing marks of mind.12 The Nandisutra describes mind as that which grasps everything saarvartha- grahanam manah .13 In the Tattavarthasutra, we are told that cognition of what is stated on authority, as in scripturesis is the object of mind srutam anindriyasa.14 In maitri Upanisad mind is described I its reflective aspect as source of all mentalmodifications. He sees by mind by mind he hears, and by mind too, he experiences all that we call desire, will and belilef, resolution, irresolutio. All this is but mind itself.15 In modern psychology also , wundt says that mind will be the subject “to whih we attribute all theseparate facts of internal experience.” Mind , in the popular thought, is ot simply a subject in the logial sense, but a sustance in real being, ad the various activities of the mind are its expressions or notions. But this invlves, he says, some metaphysical presuppositions. For him, mind is a logical concept of interal experience.16 The Abhidhanarajendra metions that the word manas has a functional sifnificance,because it describes the funtions of the mind like thinking, imagining ad expectiig.17 andfrom this functional significance of the mind the srutcture of the mind is unferred. The Jaina thinkers make a distinction between two phases of mind dravya manas and bhava manas (manah divividham dravya manah bhava-bhava-manas ca). In the visesavasyakabhasya, we geta descroption of the tow phases of the manas. The materia mind which may be called the menta structure, is composed of infiite, fineand coherent particle fo matter meant for function of mind- dravyatah deavyamanah. It is further described as a collection of fine particles which are meant for exciting thought processes due to the yoga arising out of the contat of the jiva with the body.18 In the Gommatasara: Jiva-kanada also there is a description of the material mind as produced in the heart from the comingof mind molecules like a full blow lotus with eight petals.19

Sucha description of mind as dravya manas and bhava manas, the srutctural and the psychical aspect, can be compared to the descriptionof mind given by some modern philosophers. C.D.Broad , in his Mindand its place in nature presents a similar view. It is a modicication of the insturmental theory according to which mind is a substance that is existentialy independet of the body. For Broad, mind is composed of twofactors neither of which is ad for itself has the property of mind, but which whe combined exhibits menta properties. The factors are the bodily and the psychic factors. It is comparable to a chemical compound ike Nacl and H20 in which the individual components lose their individual identit when composed of living body possessed of I) the nervous system and somethig else and ii) the psychic factor, which possesses some feeling like mental.20 The bodily factor is described as “the liig brain and the nervous system”. About the psychic factor, Broad seems to be vague.21 Neithermental characteristics not mental evets seem to belong to it. It is likely to be sentience only. However, the pshchic factor must be capable of persistig for a period at least after tha death of the body; and it must be capable, when separted from the body, of carryig ‘traces’ of experience which happen to the mind of which it was formerly a constituent. In other words. It must coprise the ‘mnemic mass’. Broad’s view comes nearer to the Buddhist vinana, rather to the Jaina view of bhava manas. Of all the psychic factors in the Buddhist view. Vinnaa has morepermaent nature. I the Dighanikaya it is mentioned that agter death the body is dissolved mind ceases, but vinnana, the coefficent of the desire to enjoy, clings to produce its effects in some other embryo waking wsewhere.22 with this differerene of the psychic factor the Jaina distinction between the dravya manas ad the bhava manas corresponds with Broad’s theory of the compositio of mind. In speakig of the mental structure. Mcdougall has likened it to the structure of a machine. Howeve, mcdougall also warns us that it shsould not be taken in the sense of material structure of arrangement of parts. He likens it more to the compostiton of a poem of music. “the structure of the mind is a sonceptual system that we have to build up by inference from the date of the two orders , facts of behaviour and the facts of intropection.”23 The same ca be said of the composition of the manas.

Each Jiva has its own mind,aothough the general nature of mindis one: mano laksanatvena sarvamanasam ekatvat”because the essential nature of mind is the expression of metal states. In the situation, the Fods, men and Asuras have each his won mind. In the Rattavarthasutra, the classifiction of the souls, five sensed organisms with minds, is mentioned; sajininah samanakah.25 In the five- sensed organisms only some possess minds comparative psychologists like akohler and Alverdes have shown that mind in the devrloped form is possible in case of higher animals having insight. Naiyayaikas also believe that each organism possesses a mind and sensitive organs in order that it may be in a position to cognoze the objects and to experience pleasure and painin accordance with past Karman. Each self has one mind, because a singel mind of atomic magnitude cannot be shared by all. This mind in each self can funtion only inside the organism with which the self is connected.26 if the Jiva was sarvagata, there would be cognition of everything by everyone.27 Theirarguments were metaphysical and epistemologial than pschological. But modern psychoogy has analysed the same problem from te psychological pioint of view. McDougall writes,” it seems probable that mind has the same nature wherever and whenever it exists or manifests itself, whether in animals, men or superhuman beigs, whether I the new-born infant, the fool or the wise man. On the other hand, the structure of the mind seems to be peculiar to each individual;” not only is it different in the various species of animals (if they hae minds) and in man; but the structure of the mind of e man is different from that of every other man; ad in any one man at each stage of his career or life-history, it is not quite the same as at any other stage.28

The ancient Indian philosphers were faced with problems concerning the instrumenta nature of the mind. It was generally believed that like other sese organs, mind was also a sense orga, and the instrumet of the soul. In the Upanisads we fine references to the mind as one of the organs alongs with the other sense and motor organs (jnanenduiyas and Karmendriyas) 29 prasna Upanisad mentions manas as a central organ. Reference to the manas as the dirver of the ten organs I the Mairti Upanisad may also be noted. Orthodox Hindu philsophy accepts mind as the internal organ. There were some philosophers who made buddhi, ahamkara and manas together to consitute the interna organ atahkarana. But Jayanta believes that mind is an internal organ. Similarlu, vidyanandi maintains that buddhi and ahamkara cannot be regarded as sense organs. The Nyaya Vaishesikea philosophers regarded mind as the internal organ. But Gautama didi not include it in the list of sense organs. Kanada is also silent. Vitsysyan inclides manas under the senses. He calls it the inner sense by with we apprehend the inner states by the instrumet of the maas. Vatsyayaa believes that mind is as good a sense orga as the eye and the like , thought there are cetain differencaes. But the Jainas believed that the mind is a no- indriya In the sense tha tit is different from the fice sese organs. Its sense contents and functions are not entirely idetical with those of indriyas. The prefix here does not mean not but is at times renderd as isa. It is a quasi sense organ. Still they accept the instrumental fucntion of the mind. In the Gommatasara : Jivakanda we get a descriptio of mind as the no-indriya. It is through the mind that meta knowledge and mentao activity arise. But in the case of the mind there is no external manifestatio as in the case of other sense organs. The function of mind is assimilative.30 Thepramana mimamsa describes mind as the thing, which grasps everything. In the vrtti of the same it is said, the ‘mano’ nindriyam iti no indriyam iti a ucyate”. 31 In the Rattavarthasutra, the function mind, which is anindriya, is described as the sruta congnition.the second function is the mati and its modifications.32 it is caed the organ of apprehension of all objects because all sense experiences are apprehended by the mind. The Jainas accepted the insrtumental nature ( karanatva) of the mind. But it is said that the karana is of two types – bahya karana and antahakarana ad eve the dravya- manas is described as the atahkaraa, the internal organ. Being the internal organ it is different from the other sense organs.33 however such a dwescripiton of need not be interpreted in the sense that acording to the Jaina view,mind is not a sense organ; in fact it is more thatn s sense organ. It is sarvarthagrahanam, at is stated in the praanamimamsa.

ii. In the Dravyasamgradha, Nemicandra says that soul in its pure form has the quality of conciousness. Brahmadeva,in his commentary, writes that fro the ultimate points of view, Jiva is distingushed by its quality of consciousness. 34 It is most direct and nearest reality of which any one who has introspected is most immediately aware.

Consciousness has been the most important of discussion for philosophers, psychologists as wel as scientists. Attempts have been made to solve the problem from various angles. In the Aitareya Aranyaka, an effort is madae to understand th diffenent stages of the development of consciousness I the universe. In the evolution of herbs, trees and all that is animal, he atman is gradually developing. In the herbs, only sap is seen; in the animated beings, citta is sees; in man there gradual development of atman , for he is now endowed with prajna.35 similarly, I n the Chandogyopanisad, prajapati describes the progressive identification of atma with body cnscuousness. The psycho- physiologial method is adopted in the Taittiriya.36 finally , the atman as jananamaya ad aanadamya is emphasized. The Jaina cassification of the Jivas places the problem of the evolution of consciousness on the scienitfic basis. Jivas have bee classified into one, tow three, four and ifve sensed according to the number of the sense organs possessed by the Jivas possessing the five seses are divided into those havig mind and those without mind. It is now realized that the rise of consciounness is late in the evoluton of life, from physical evloution to the evloution of life mind and conscounsness.

Cetana as a sundmental quality of the soul is pure consciousness, a king of fame without smoke. This consciousness is eternal, although it gets manifested in the course of the evolitionary porcess of life in the empirica sense. This emprital cnsiousness arises from the cotact of the sense organs with the obejcts. Centana in its pure form gets emobdied with the Atama and ces into contact with empriical life with the sense organs and objects. It manifests itself in the form of jana and darsaa. Jnana and Darsaa are therefore aspetcs of cetaa ad cetana is the springboard froj which they arise. It is like the flood of light in which objects are iluminated .it is the psychic background and the psychic halo of cogition in its two aspects jnana and darsana. Cetana, thererore is the light of conscounsess that the soul possesses ad throught this lifht the cogition of objects arises.

The analysis of the states of consciousness has been an important problem for philosphers as well as the psychologists Consciounsesss has three aspects- the cognitive, the affective and the conatie. They are modes of consciousness. It perceiveing, belieceing or otherwise appreheding, that sch and a thing exists ad has characteristics’ one’s attitude is cognitive. In the aggective attitude oe is either pleased or displeased about it and tries ot alter it I some respect. This attitude is conative.37 but stout says that though these three modesof consciousness are abstracty ad analyticaly distince phases I a concretetion from each othe r. mind is an organic unity ad its activites have the ackisest degree of organic inter-action. However, in every psychosis oe of the aspects may be predominat. In the pleasure of pursuit, feetling presupposes cotaion. Sometimes feeling is dependent on certain conative attitude invloved in the perceputal process. Similar reciprocity is found in conation and cogition.

Idia thinkers wre aware of the distinction of states in consiousness. The Jainas recognize three forms of consciousness. They make a distinction between consciousees as knowig, as feetling and as experiecing the fruits of Karma (karma-phala-cetana) and willng.38 conation and feeling are closely allied. As a rule we have first feeling, next onation and then knowledge.39 mc Dougall has emphasized that feelig is the core of al istinctive activity. In fact in al experience there is a core off feeling, while the cogitive and conative aspects are varying factors. In the ajitareeya Upanisad there is metion of differet modes of experiece. Sensation, perception ad ideaation are differet modes of intellection. Perception and ideation are different modes of intelection. It recognizes feeling and volition as the other two forms of experience. The seers of Upanisads give a classification of seven meanta functuon. 40 At the basis is intellection .the chandogyopanisad emphasizes the primacy of the will. The Buddhists also recognozed such a distnction. We have perception or and ocnception, feeling and affection, and conation or wil. In the Buddhist theory, will is the most dominant aspect of conscious experience, the basa element of huma oife. Radhakrishan in his indian phiolosphy suggests the vijnana, vedana and samskara roughly correspond to knowsedge, feeling and will.41 childers in his dictionary brings the concept of conation under samaskara Mrs Rhys Davids believes that, although there is no clear distinction betwee conation in the pshchlolgialsense and will in the ethical sense, still in the pritaksas there is consistent discrimaination between psychlogial importance and ethical imploication.42 professor stout has given up old tripartite clasification of mental states and reverts to the ancient bipartite analysis of mind bringing the affective and conative elements together under the name of interest. Radhakrishanan syas that if we discard the separation of cognition and make it the theoretial aspect of contation, we get to buddihist emphasis on contaion as the central fact of mental life.

In the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory also there is a description of the mainfestiation of the three aspects of self as knowledge, desire ad vloition. We have to know a thing before we feel the wat of it. In order to satisfy the want, we act thus, as Hiriyaa says, feelig mediates between cognition and conation. Thus the modes of consciousness have been the probelem of philosophers and psychologists. There is a genera agreement regardig th ediision of consciousness into three modes, although deffeet philosophers have emhasized different aspects in the concrete psychosis. Buddhists have emphasized in the Chandorya and mariti Upanisads.43 In the Chandogya again we get a dwscription of the primacy of the will but this has reference to the cosmic will rather than to its psychological aspect. The Jainas emphasize the close ralation between conation and feeling. The Nyaya theory describes the functio of feeling as a mediating factor between cognition and conation.

III.self-cpscopismess: The teem self-consciousness is very ambiuous. It may mean conscuousness of the self, as an object igve in introspectio. In this sense, the self, the empriical ego becoes both an aspect of experience and also an object of esperience. Self-cosciousness. It is not an object of knowledge. It is the ultimate subject presupposed in acts of knowledge. Again consciousness may mean the ultimate eternal consciousness, which is a metaphysical concept. It is also used in the emprirical sense as consciouness which is changig.44some of the erlier philosphers have ot ade a cear distinction between the metaphyusical and the pschologial sense of consciousness. In the Upaisads, the atman is described as the basis and the absolute knower, ad how ca the knower itself be known.45 it cannot becompreheded by intelect. It is the seer and the knower.46 yet higher intuito. It is knowable as th epratyagatmanma, apprehended by adhyatmayoga.47 the Buddhists recogize the distinction between subject and object within the consciousness. They do not believe I the transcendenta self. Their view of consciousness is like the stream of consciousness of William James. Yogacaras believe theat self is a series of caonition or ideas. There is not self apart from cognition. They reeal neither the self ot the non-self.

Some Nyaya philosophers, specially the eo-naiyayikas belileced that the sef is an oject of interna perception manasapratyaksa. The Caishesikas also maintain that, aoshtough the self is not an object of perception but of infeence, it can be apprehended by Ypogic intuitin. The samkhya philosophers maintain that consciousness is the essence of sef. It is self-intuition. Self is inferred through its reglection in buddhi. But patanjali accepts the supernorma intuiton of the self through the power of concetration. The self can know itsef through its reflcetio it its pure sattva and alsowhe mixed with rajas and tamas by supernormal itution (pratibha-jnana). So, the pure self can know the emprical self, but the eprirical self cannot know the pure self. There is the contradiction involved in the self-being both subject and object and the reflection theorydoes not uch improe the situatuion. Cacaspati tries to avoid the cotradiction by saying that transcedental self is the subject, and the empriical self-the object, of self-apprehension.

According to prabhakara, self in necessarily known in every act of cognition. Cognition is self- liminous. it not ony manifests itself but also supports the atma much as the fame and the wick. Neither the self not the object is sef- luminous. There can be consuciousness of a object without the consiousness of the self. In every act of cognition ther eis a direct and immediate apprehension of te self. But the self can never be known as object of knowledge. It is ony to be known as a subject it is receled by triputa samvit.