1.
Syad asti asserts the existence of the thing. The word syat is difficult to translate. It is very often said that it connotes
‘perhaps’ or probability. But it would
be more appropriate to say that it refers to the special context. Syat would then mean ‘in the context’. From the point of view of the substance,
place, time and nature, we may say that a thing is. For instance, the jar exists, as it is made of clay in a particular
place and time. Thus substance (dravya), attribute (bhaya), time (kala), and
space (ksetra)—from the context of
these relations existence and other attributes are predicated. A house exists, i.e., it is a house as
builtup and as long as it is occupied for the purpose of residence.
2.
But the affirmation of an attribute necessarily involves the negation
of its opposite; and such a negation is a logical necessity. Then we get the predication syad nasti. It means in the (other) context the thing
does not exist. The jar does not exist
if it is to mean that it is made of metal.
The house is no longer a house if it be used as a godown. The existence of the house is denied in
different contexts. Thus, if existence
and non-existence are to be understood in different relations and contexts,
there would be no opposition between them.
One in a necessary concomitant of the other. These predictions are necessary and compatible in another
sense. The affirmation of existence and
denial of non-existence are meant to rebut the possibility of unqualified and
absolute existence and non-existence.
Thus the predications are logically necessary.
The
importance of this predications lies in the irrefutable statement of the
non-existence of a thing in the other context.
‘Non-existence or non-bing is a determinate fact with a content and not
a void’.
It
would not be correct to say that one first and the second predications involve
contradiction, because i) they are mutually complementary and ii) the two
predications are not absolute assertions.
The definition itself includes the clause ‘avirodhena’.
It
is very often contended that the contradictions, absolute existence and
non-existence, are not objective facts, as no existence is known to have
absolute existence and absolute non-existence as its characteristics. The opposition is unreal and the predication
of the unreal opposition is not necessary.
But, as Prof. Mukerji points out, it cannot be denied that it is
possible to conceive the existence and non-existence of a thing though not
ontologically real. The predications
are therefore logically necessary to rebut such a conception of absolute
existence and absolute non-existence.
The Vedantist believes in the absolute existence of the one
reality. The Sunyavadin does not
believe in the existence of the absolute.
The Jainas contend that the two may be predicated in different
contexts. The first two predications
are logically valid and psychologically necessary, as they serve to exclude
absolute existence and absolute non-existence.
The mention of the word syad function as a necessary condition and work
as a corrective against the absolute way of thought. We may here refer to the logical opposition of Hegel, who said
that affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity, for
they are the aspects of the same reality.
However, the reference would be limited to the dialectical process,
because the Jaina is realist and believes in the validity of empirical
experience.
3.
The third predication is syad asti nasti: ‘It is, it is not’. This refers to different contexts
simultaneously. For instance, in a
certain sense the jar exists and in a certain other sense the jar does not
exist. The building is a house in so
far as the purpose of the construction was for residence. But it is not a house as it is actually used
as a godown. It is very often
maintained that the predication is a mere summation of the first two. But the Jainas would appeal to experience
and say that it gives a separate and necessary predication. It refers to a separate entity arising from
the two but not the summation of the two.
For instance, a garland of flowers may be said to be flowers, as it
contains flowers, and also not merely flowers at the same time, because the
flowers enter into a new relation with each other to form a whole. Similarly, in the description of the soul
and the ultimate reality contradictory predicates have been made.
4.
The fourth is a new predications.
It expresses the indescribability of a thing. It is syad abaktavyam. It is possible that the real nature of the
thing is beyond predication, or expression in the form of words. For instance, in the case of the jar, it
exists in the svadravya, svarupa, svakala
and svaksetra and no existence is
predicated in the para-dravya, para-rupa,
para-ksetra and para-kala. Yet its nature may be such that it
cannot be easily described.
It
is contended that the fourth predication is only an abbreviated form of
affirmation and negation. The third
predication shows the successive presentation, while the fourth gives the
simultaneous presentation of the two.
But, as Prof. Mukerji points out, it is still logically necessary,
because it presents the facts of experience, that existence and non-existence
are equally possible to be predicated in the same degree. Moreover, experience shows that the
inexpressible asserts that the attributes are existing together, and a new
element has arisen due to the synthesis.
For instance, intoxicating liquor may be formed due to the combination
of jaggery and ghataki flowers. But it
is not a mere combination of the elements.
It has in itself as identity of its own which cannot be described
easily. In metaphysical speculation,
the ‘unknowable’ of Herbert Spencer may be likened to predication of this
type. Prof. Bhattacharya writes, ‘The
given indefinite’ –‘the unspeakable’ or avaktavya as it has been called, as
distinct from the definite existence, presents something other than consecutive
togetherness: it implies saharpana or
co-presentation, which amounts to non-distinction or indeterminate distinction
of being and negation. The common sense
principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected
simply because it is inexpressible by a single positive concept.
The primary modes of predication are three: syad asti, syad nasti and syad avaktavyam. The other four are obtained by combining the
three.
The third predicate asti
nasti offers successive presentation.
In the fourth predication ‘inexpressible’ (avaktavyam) we get the expression of simultaneous predication. Dr. Padmarajiah discusses the four stages
through which the concept or ‘inexpressible’ has developed : i) The naïve negative attitude in the Rgveda as expressed in the song of
creation (BOOK V, 129) ii) A positive attitude as expressed in ‘sadasadvarenyam’ in the Mundaka Upanisad. It conceives with being and non-being as inherent in reality,
owing to the positive character, this tendency has been discussed as the ubhaya phase of the concept. iii) The third phase is the logically
sophisticated phase of the ‘negative tendency’ as shown in the expression like sa esa neti neti (Br. Up. 5-15). In this phase here is the clear awareness of
the inexpressible nature of the ultimate as efforts to express the reality
would be beset with contradictions. The
Vedanta conception of anirvacaniya, the
Buddha’s avyakrta and Nagarjuna’s
conception of the ultimate as being catuskoti-vinirmukta
came under this stage. iv) The last
phase in ‘the dialectical evolution’ of the idea of the inexpressible is
expressed in the avaktavya of the
Syadvada. It is a relativistic (sapeksa) view and not the absolute view
as presented in anirvacaniya. The Jaina states that sat and asat, in these
combinations, are inevitable and distinctive feature of our objective
experience. Again the avaktavya may show the inability to embody,
within one symbol, the two fundamental aspects of reality with equal
prominence. But this limitation is
itself a necessary step in the dialectual movement of Syadvada.
K. C. Bhattacharya states ‘….If the inexpressible is
objective as given, it cannot be said to be not a particular position nor to be
non-existent. At the same time it is
not the definite distinction of position and existence. It is a category by itself.
5.
The fifth predication is formulated as syad asti avaktavyam. From
the point of view of its own contexts (dravya,
rupa, kala and ksetra) a thing is
and indescribable. It asserts the
co-presence of the two attributes, existence and inexpressibility. Both are real and necessary attributes. Existence relates to an object in the context
of substance in respect of its internal determinations. Inexpressibility is an attribute which
relates substance, in relation of identity and distinction, to its changing
modes.
6.
The sixth proposition expresses the negative aspect together with
inexpressibility. It is syad nasti avaktavyam. In the context, it is not and is
indescribable. In relation to the para-dravya, para-rupa, para-ksetra and para-kala it is not :- it is
indescribable.
7.
The seventh proposition asserts existence, non-existence and inexpressibility. It reads : syad asti nasti avaktavyam.
In the contexts, it is, is not and is inexpressible. With reference to the sva-rupa, sva-dravya, sva-ksetra and sva-kala it exists, and with reference to the para-dravya, para-rupa, para-ksetra, para-kala non-existence can be
predicated. Yet, in its real nature it
may be such that it cannot be easily described. As Prof. Mukerji says, this predication gives a fuller and a more
comprehensive picture of the thing than the earlier ones. The predicated attribute is a synthesis of the three attributes; still, it is not a
mere summation of the attributes. It
brings out the inexpressibility of a thing as well as what it is and what it is
not.
Affirmation
and negation inexpressibility are the three fundamental predications. This implies that all negation has a
positive basis. Even imaginary concepts
like the sky-flower possess a positive basis in the two reals, the sky and
flower, although the combination is unreal.
All things which are objects of thought are in one sense, and are not in
another sense.
I.
The doctrine of Syadvada has been criticised in various ways :-
1. it is said
that the theory of sevenfold predication can only be the cause of doubt and not
of certainty, the assertion of contradictory predicates implies that the
present predication is in doubt.
Belvalkar says that Syadvada is sceptical and non-committal in its
attitude. With this agnostic and negative attitude one cannot have any dogma;
and samkaracarya lays his finger accurately on the weakest point in the system
when he says- “As thus the means of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act
of knowledge, are all alike, indefinite, how can the Tirthamkara (Jina) teach
with any claim to authority and how can his followers act on a doctrine the
matter of which is altogether indeterminate. Prof. Hiriyanna makes Syadvada a
variety of skepticism. If all our Knowledge concerning reality is relative,
they say (the old Indian critics like samkara, Ramanuja etc.), the Jaina view
must also be relative. To deny this conclusion would be to admit, at least, one
absolute truth; and to admit it would leave the doctrine with no settled view
of reality, and thus turn it into a variety of scepticism.
But it may be pointed out that the conditions of doubt are
not present in this assertion. For instance, a man sees a tree in the dusk and
doubts whether it is a man or a branchless tree. This is due to the lack of
determination between the specific features of the object as the perception is
faulty. But in the case of the sevenfold presentation the attributes of
existence and non-existence are each defined by their specific determinations.
The condition of these determinations makes doubts impossible.
2. It is said
that the sevenfold predication of the Jainas is beset with contradictions.
Affirmation and denial of the attribute in the same object is not logically
possible. It would be a self- contradiction. In this context we may refer to
the criticism of samkara and Ramanuja. samkara’s criticism can be analysed into
three stages. 1) He tries to point out the intrinsic impossibility of the
prediction because of the inherent contradictions involved in it. Mutually
contradictory and conflicting attributes cannot exist together. But if we take
into consideration the different contexts referred to, we may say that the
contradictions can be easily reconciled. In Experience in we get examples of
co-existing conflicting attributes. For instance, the branches may be in motion
but the tree does not move. The same individual may be father in relation to X
and son in relation to Y. 2) He points out the futility of the doctrine because
the doctrine is indefinite. The unlimited assertion that all things are of
non-exclusive nature gives indefinite assertion like syad asti and syad nasti.
Hence a man who holds such a doctrine of indefinite context does not deserve to
be listened to any more than a drunken man or a mad man.
Recent writers on Indian philosophy have re-iterated the
entire charge made by samkara and
Ramanuja and have shown that it is a kind of eclecticism, ‘a putting together
of several partial truths’ without a proper synthesis. It is therefore
characterised as a sort of compromise philosophy. The halfhearted attempt of
Jaina enquiry as expressed in Saptabhangi stops at giving partial truth
together and does not attempt to overcome the opposition implied in them by a
proper synthesis.
But if we mean by definiteness unconditional and absolute
assertion, then the ‘indefiniteness’ of the doctrine is a logical necessity. As
a Radhakrishnan points out the criticism of the Saptabhangi doctrine as of on
practical utility is an expression of personal opinion and as such need not be
considered.
Samkara also saya that the Saptabhangi doctrine is
inconsistent with the other views of Jaina philosophy. The assertions of
existence, non-existence and indescribability are alike applicable to the
doctrine of the soul and the categories. Similarly, the final release may exist
and not exist and may be indescribable.
The dialectic of Syadvada is inconsistent with the Jaina
philosophy. It could not have sprung from the same teacher and the same
philosophical background. “AS a mere ‘anaikantika’
(sic) theory of prediction, the Syadvada must return upon itself and end in
doubting the doubter himself. Prof. Radhakrishnan after mentioning the strong
points of syadvada says “Yet in our
opinion the Jaina logic leads to a monistic idealism (by which he means ‘the
hypothesis of absolute’) and so far as the Jainas shrink from it they are untrue
to their own logic”. But in the Saptaabhiangi
tarangini we read a counter argument: If the final release and heavenly
bliss are eternal and existing, where is the chance for samsara and the attempt
to obtain moksa? If the other alternative the only truth, what is the purpose
of preaching such an ideal which impossible to attain? Radhakrishanan points
out that the Saptabhangi doctrine is not inconsistent with the other views of
the Jainas. It is logical corollary of the Anekantavada. All that the Jainas
say is that everything is of a complex nature and the real reconciles the
difference in itself. Attributes which are contradictory in the abstract
co-exist in the world of experience.
Ramanuja also pinked out that contradictory attributes such
as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing any
more than light and darkness. However, he seems to accept the distinction
between dravya and paryaya, substance and modes. He also
sees that the substance has permanence; parayaya
implied change.
But the predications give
severally partial truths. The truths presented by them are alternative truths
from different points of view; and the seven predications would present a
complete comprehensive picture of reality. It is neither skepticism not
agnosticism, for each individual truth is valid It is supplemented and
harmonised by the other predication into a signal comprehensive picture of
reality, as we get a harmony in orchestra by the combination of different
notes.
With all their criticisms,
Belvalkar makes Syadvada a most searching characteristic. Radhakrishnan
observes “ Samkara and Ramanuja critisse the Saptabhangi view on the ground of
the impossibility of contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing”.
After quoting the relevant passage from Ramanuja he proceeds to say: “The
Jainas admit that a thing cannot have self-contradictory attributes at the same
time and in the same sense. All the they say is that everything is of a complex
ature, reconciles differences in itself. Attributes which are contradictory in
abstract co-exist in life and experience. The tree is moving in that its
branches are moving and it is not moving since it is fixed to its place in the
ground”.
VI. In Western thought, at
the time of the Greeks, when there was intellectual confusion due to the
conflicting theories presented by the different philosophers, several
approaches to problems were possible. Promenades had emphasized ‘Being;
Heraclitus had talked of change; Empedocles and Anaxagoras had thought that the
reality consists of a plurality of substance. The atomizes left the infinite
atoms floating in the air. Thus there was intellectual confusion. It was
difficult to reconcile these conflicting views. Protagoras escaped the problem
and said, Homo measure. The Sophists left the wise to wrangle with them and the
quarrel of the universe let be.
But the Jainas did not
accept such an escapist attitude. They faced facts squarely and tried to find
out what was common between the conflicting views of the philosophers. This was
the Anekanta attitude of the Jainas.
The Jainas appeal to
experience and say the a priori reasoning
independent of experience is incompetent to yield insight into the nature of
the rea. The Jainas steer clear of conflicting views of reality. They make us
aware of the fact that intellectual dogmatism is not healthy and a many-sided
approach to the problem will develop in us a sense of tolerance and respect for
others. Intellectual Animas is most necessary especially in an age when
conflicting ideologies are trying to claim the monopoly of truth for themselves
and give rise to intolerance and hatred. We live in a world of fear, distrust.
It is time we tried to understand each other in an atmosphere of give ad take.
We must find out what is common between us rather than emphasize the
differences. The Anekanta view is not skepticism because it is not founded on
doubt and distrust; it is not solipsism, because it is based on an objective
determination of things; but it presents catholic approach to the problems of
life. Bernard Russell has mentioned that truth or falsity refers to
propositions and this is based on facts: it is to be true. Similarly, a
negative proposition must have a corresponding objective fact if it is to be
true. He mentions this as ‘negative fact’. Thus we find that contradictory
predications are not merely subjective, but they have an objective basis.
Thus we find that
Anekantacada manifests itself as the most consistent form of realism in Indian
philosophy. it has allowed the principle of distinction to run its full course
until it reaches its logical terminus, the theory of manifoldness of reality
and knowledge. It postulates the multiplicity of the ultimate release
constituting the cosmos. The Anekanata view of reality permeates every aspect
of life and experience.
Whitehead’s theory of
coherence comes nearer to Anekanta attitude of the Jainas. He elucidates his
attitude to reality by presenting the complete problem of the metaphysics, of
substance and of flux as a ‘full expression of the union of two notions’.
Substance expresses permanence and flux emphasizes impermanence and change.
Reality is to be found in the synthesis of the two. He interprets the lines:
‘Abide with me;
Fast falls the eventide’
By showing that the two lines
cannot be torn apart in this way and we find that a wearing Balinese between
the two is a characteristic of the greater number of philosophers. Whitehead
shows that reality can be best understood by the integral viewpoints in which
the ultimate postulates of permanence and flux are harmoniously blended.
Heraclitus emphasized the partial truth of change and flux. Promenades
presented permanence and being as the reality. Reality is to be found in the
blinding with the two viewpoints into a comprehensive whole.
For Whitehead, coherence would mean that the fundament
ideas presuppose each other. In isolation they are meaningless. It does not
mean they are definable in terms of each other, though they are relevant to
each other. No entity’ can be conceived in complete abstraction from the system
of the universe, and that it is the business of speculative philosophy to
exhibit this truth. This character is its coherence.
He also says: ‘The systematisation of knowledge cannot be
conducted in watertight compartments. All genera truths condition each other;
and the limits of the application cannot be adequately defined apart from their
correlation by yet wider generalities.
This is the attitude of the Jainas also. The Jaina emphasis
on the material and spiritual as a synthesis of opposites leads to a concrete
universal involving unity in diversity. It is comparable to Jasper’s
unfanatical absoluteness’ Jainas in their theory of Anekanta illustrate a
‘non-attachment of partial truths; and they have made creative use of the
contradictions by removing the sting out of them, Headgear presents a similar
point of view.
In our political life, Pancasila, as our late Prime
Minister has pointed out, is the paced for the ills of our present-day life.
And Pancasila expresses the spirit of Anekanta.
I. Right understanding (Samyagcarira) constitute the triple path
towards self- realisation. There is need to a harmonious blending of the three
paths. Right understanding is the basis; it leads to right knowledge. This is
faith rooted in intuitive rasp of the truth and not related to superstitious
uncritical acceptance of truth. It is looking inward and it may be referred to
as the “menta set” in the psychological sense.
46 Acarya
Samantabhadra has mentioned 8 characteristics of Samyagdarsana:
1. Nihsankita
is the deep-rooted faith in the persons who are authorities and in the validity
of the sacred texts.
2.
Nihkaniksita spirit of non-attachment towards the fruits of Nihkanksa.
It should be purely spiritual craving.
3.
Nirvicikitsa: it to be free
from illusions and stupor.
4.
Amudhadrsti is to be grew
from the perversity of beliefs, which may be called amudhatva.
5.
Upaguhana refers to the
emphasis on the right aspect of the Samyagdrsti
in the sense that we should discourage to aim at patria and half-hearted
right- mindedness,
6.
Sthitikarana is to secure
steadfastness and to lead towards rightness of understanding. The fallen
angel’s in the path have to be restored to the path of right direction.
7.
Vatsalya emphasis’s that we should
have love and kindness towards those leading the path of righteousness without
of course showing ill- will towards the fallen. Those “who hunger and thirst
after righteousness shall be filled.” 47
8.
Pravavaba is to kindle the light of
right understanding by removing many misconceptions, inadequacies and
deficiencies. The hurdles in the path of right understanding are many and
varied. Some of the difficulties are psychological. Acarya Samantabhadra has
give an enlightened ad able descriptions of the psychological and sociological
impediments in the acquisition of rightness of outlook and right understanding.
II. Acafya Samantabhadra
says that right understanding and right faith would be vitiated by the two
psychological and sociological processes: 48
1. Eight types of city
(Arrogance) and 2 three types of folly. We may also class them as forms rooted
in ignorance. The first distinction refers to the 8 forms of Mada (vanity) and the second has reference to the 3 types of mudhata.
The 8 types of vanity are primarily psychological. They
vitiate the working of the mind and create perversity of out look, which
becomes an obstacle in the development of right understanding. We lose the
balance of understanding and are strayed away from the right path of grasping
the truth. We live in the world of self- verged illusions about ability and
achievements. We are lost in the jungle of subjective fantasies The 8 types of
verity are:
(i)
jnana mada: In this we live in the world
of our own creation that we are the wisest me on the earth. It is the Vanity of
knowledge. Vanity (arrogance) of knowledge is born out of the immaturity of
mind. We gloat over out own intellectual achievements and suffer from the
illusion of vanity of knowledge.
(ii)
Pujaniyata mada: In this we become blind to
our short comings and failures because some people respect us Respect and
admiration for whatever little we have achieved, sometimes takes us off the
rails of the right perspective of our personality. We gloat in our glory and we
move with half open eyes in the illusion of superiority. This is the vanity of superiority.
(iii)
Kula mada refers to the arrogance of
the status of the family and birth. A person born in a high family and endowed
richly with the emanates of life is likely to lose the balance of his mind in
the matter of estimating his personality in the right perspective. He thinks no
end of himself and he develops an attitude of conceit for his way of life and
diced for the lower round of society, He looks at the lowliest and the lose
with sneering disdain. He is far away from the path of rightness of
understanding and righteousness.
(iv)
Jatimada is the arrogance of birth in a particular
‘higher’ society and community. This also makes him lose the balance of the
perspective of life and society. It leads him towards the disdain of the lowly
in society and exploits them to his advantage.
(v)
Bala mada In this, one develops the
sense of superiority for strength and valour. He may become a tyrant and
maniac. Adolf Hitler is an example of a person who suffered from the illusion
of racial superiority and of the need for the extermination of the Jewish
people. He was so full of arrogance of power and authority, that when, once, it is reported, Lord
chamberlain asked him how he was so confident of winning the war for which he
was so greatly clambering. Adolf Hitler called a few of his guards of the
suicide squad and ordered them to jump from the 4th floor and die.
The Guards did jump and die. They had to sacrifice their lives for the sake of
glorifying the power of Adolf Hitler. This is the arrogance of strength and
power.
(vi) Rddhimada
This is the vanity of the possession of some extra-ordinary power. The
possession of miracles and supernormal powers through the tapas and yougic practices may bring some powers. But one, purshing
the path of spiritual perfection, should desist from using them. Otherwise, one
is likely to lose the balance of mind and become arrogant towards the fellow
mortals. There are numerous instances Rsis
who have fallen from the height of spirituality because of their arrogance of
the attainment of certai power, and possession of wealth.
(vii) Tapo
mada refers to the vanity of ascetic practices. One feels superior because
he unlike the lowly fellow mortals’ practises penance, that gives arrogance
of tapas,
and he strays away from the true path of perfection.
(viii) Sarira mada is the arrogance of having a beautiful body. We forget that the form
and the physical beauty ar temporary. They fade. We forget that we get old and
that in old and that in old age and in accidents. Defocoemcoes and deformities
are formed. To gorged this and to love and admire one’s beautiful body creates
an illusion of superiority and a disdain for the less fortunate fellow mortals.
The 8 types cavity vitiate the mind , make us forget the
real nature of the pursuit of truth. We do not get back the perspective of life
and personality and we ‘lose the soul’
2.
we now turn our attention towards understanding the 3 types of folly
(Mudhata). They are 49
(i)
Loka-mudhata: It refers to the
superstitious practices in social and religious matters. These practices are
based on blind irrational foundations generations. These refer to the customs
and mores which are not directly recant to the purpose of achieving the
personal social and spiritual excellence. For take the holy dips in the river
and in sea for the sake washing off our sins . If taking bath in the holy rives
were to wash away our sins, the Buddha asked, then the fish and crocodiles
living permanently in the river would have washed all their sins ans. would
have been assured of a seat in heaven. Similarly, practices like jumping from
the top of the mountain for the same reason would be blind practice. men
worship all sorts of deities made of sand and stone. Going ‘sati’ after the death
of the husband is also irrational. All these practices are rooted in ignorance
and blind superstitious beliefs regarding the good of man. They constitute the
ignorance of the populace Lokamudhata.
(ii) Devamudhata 50 refers top
the worship of the fierce and benevolent deities from whom we expect
protection, punishment or rewards. We worship the deities for the sake of
propitiating them so that the fierce deities may not harm us and benevolent may
reward us with prosperity. We forget the fact that the god is a spiritual
force. He neither rewards punishes. If he or she were to indulge in such tasks
of rewarding and punishment, they would be steeped in the baser impulses and
emotions of the animal world. Such gods are no gods. We should free ourselves
from such superstitious practices. They are rooted in the practices of the
primitive ma handed down to us for centuries on end. This is an anthropological
problem for study.
(ii)
Gurumudhata
50 is the following a guru (
teacher or preceptor) who does not
possess the requisite excellence of a guru. A true teacher is one who has
mental, moral and spiritual excellence. He must have knowledge and wisdom. He
is selfless and compassionate. He is a seeker after truth. But very often we
run after persons who do not possess these qualities and who are not fit to be
called guru. They indulge in all
sorts of unseemly activities. To follow such gurus constitutes Gurumudhata.
This type of analysis of the folly has great social significance. In our
age, we find we run agter those mediocre men who profess to have knowledge and
power and who dote on authorities. In our academic institutions like colleges
and the Universities, we rarely find real scholars who are devoted to their
studies, pursuit of knowledge and teaching. They are more interested in their
personal benefit and they run after administrative and political power. They
indulge in unacademic and unseemly activities. They are the teacher
politicians. Such men should be avoided and be kept away from the young
impressive minds. However, it is not to be said that this type of intellectual
and social climate is to be found in our time only. Socrates railed against the
sophists and the academic and political brigands. He crusaded against
hypocrisy. And he had to drink hemelok.
III.
We are, here, reminded of similar attempts made by
eminent philosophers in the Middle Ages and in the modern period in the west to
clear the cobwebs of thought for the sake of establishing the truth. Socrates
aimed at defining terms. Some the logins in the middle ages sought to give the
guidelines for thought. But we should note that til the beginning of the era,
philosophy was tied down to the apron stings of Aristotle’s philosophy. One who
deviated was condemned. There is a story of a serious attempt made by eminent
philosophers to find out the number of teeth a horse has. They refereed to the
Classical texts and the books of Aristotle. But when a young scientist, imbued
with the modern sprit of investigation, humbly suggested that a horse be
brought to the Conference hall to count the teeth instead of pouring in the
ancient classical texts, the elderly scholars looked at him with surprise and
derision, because “Aristotle never did that”.
It was
against this type of stagnation of knowledge and academic slavery that Francis
Bacon protested. He said that if we have to pursue truth, we have per force to
be free from the follies arising out of the fallacies I thought and due to the
purely deductive approach towards the seeking of truth. Truth needs to be
sought in the world outside and not merely I the deduction of conclusions from
the premises in the Aristotelian syllogisms. Francis Baconstartead the movement
of induction in the scientific investigation as a methodology of investigation.
Francis Bacon wanted to remove the
cobwebs of thought in order to get the correct picture of reality. Bacaon put
more life into logic. Making induction an epic adventure and a conquest.
Philosophy needed a new method. In order to seek the truth in the real sense of
the term, Bacon urged us to free ourselves from the traditional stagnation’s
and the fallacies of thought. “Expurgation of thought is the step” we must
become, as little children, innocent of ‘isms’ and abstractions, washed clear
of prejudices and preconceptions. We must destroy the Idols of the mind. Idol is a picture taken for a reality, a thought
mistaken for a thing. Becon mentions 4 Idols of the mind we should scrupulously
avoid in seeking truth.
The 4 Idols of the mind are:
(i)
Idols of the tribe,
(ii)
Idols of the Cave,
(iii)
Idols of the market place and
(iv)
Idols of the Theatre.
(i)
The idols of the tribe constitute the fallacious nature
to humanity in general. “For man’s sense is falsely asserted to be standard of
thing- Our thoughts are pictures rather of ourselves than of their objects. For
instance human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes a
greater degree of order in the Universe than it really finds. Hence, the
fiction that the celestial bodies move in perfect circle .52 “ All superstition
is much the same, whether it be that of Astrology, dreams , omens, retributive
judgement or the like, in all of which the deluded believers observe events
which are fulfilled, but neglect and pass over their failure, though it be much
more common” 53
(ii)
The Idols of the
cave are errors peculiar to the individual man. “ For every one. . has a
cave or den of his own, which refracts or discolors the light of nature”
54 The
judgements are vitiated by individual moods and the personal factor in
the constitution of the mind. Some minds are synthetic, and some analytic. Some
show unbounded enthusiasm for antiquity, some others eagerly embrace novelty.
Only a few can have a just perspective. Truth has no parties.55
(iii)
The Idols of the
Market place arise from the
commerce and associatio of ment
with one another. They use language as the medium , but they forget that words
are sometimes misleading, as they are imposed according to the understanding of
the crowd. We I the present day have used the word ‘socialism’ without understanding
the connotation of the word. Philosophers have used the phrases like “the
infinite” or The first mover unmoved”
but these are Fig-leaf phrases used to cover naked ignorance and perhaps
indicative of a guilty conscience in
the user. 56
(iv)
The Idls of the
Theatre have migrated into men’s
minds from the various dogmas of
philosophers and also from the wrog lowas demonstration. All the systems
of philosophy are so many stage plays representing worlds of their creation
after an unreal and scenic fashion. And in the plays of this philosophic
theatre you may observe the same thing which is found in the theatre of poets,
-- that stogies invented for the stage are more compact and elegant, and more
as we would wish them to be, than true stories out of history. The world as
Plato, ad pictures of Plato rather than the world. 57
We shall never get far along the path
of truth if these idols are still tied to us. We should free ourselves from the
subjective elements in the pursuit of truth. Truth is to any man’s monopoly. It
is universal as objective. The philosophers and the seers from times immemorial
have striven to reach the highest through the means of reason and intuition.
Reasion leads us to the understanding of empirical reality, while it is the
highest experience, which leads us to the Truth. Francis Bacon had the limited
objective of providing the methodology of scientific investigation. Acarya
Samantabhadra has taken the perspective of spiritual reality and has shown the
pitfalls in the path to self-realisation. It is the seers; the Rsis light they lead us on. Such
enlighten ones or the ‘sages are the first hand exponents of philosophy. 58
The problem of the soul has been a perennial problem in
religion and speculative philosophy. Primate man had made a distinction between
body and soul. The burial of the death with their belongings and even the
mummification of the Egyptians are based o such a distinction between body and
spirit. The philosophical concept of the soul has developed from such primitive
distinctions.
Anthropological evidence shows that the notion of soul and
spirit was first formed by primitive man as an explanation of certain features
of his experience like dream and sleep. For him soul is an ethereal image of
the body. It is ethereal, tenuous or filmy; ad it possesses the power of
flashing quickly from one place to another. Yet it was not conceived as purely
immaterial. In Plato we find the emphatic primacy of the psyche or soul I the
dialogues from the Apology onwards to
the Lows.
In the Homeric thought
psyche appears as a shadowy double of the body. But Socrates and plato
recognised the soul as man’s real self. Socrates said that we should aim at the
perfection of our souls. Plato shows that of all the things that man has, next
to the gods, his soul is the most diva and most truly his own. Body in fact is
the shadow of the soul. Jowett says that Plato was concerned with emphasiing
the priority of soul to the body, towards the end of his ife, as he gave
importance to the idea of good in the Repulic
and of beauty in the symposium. Plato
said that the soul is immortal because its very idea ad essence is the
self-moved and self-moving, that which is the fountain and the beginning of
motion to all that moves besodes.
Plato reversed the primitive conception of the soul as a
shadowy double of the body and identified the true as the soul, but he pressers
and accentuates the origin animistic dualism. Approaching the question with the
scientific spirit, Aristotle started with the living organism and defined the
psyche as the principle of life. He distinguished the different levels of
psychical functions, from the vegetative to the ration. The soul is the actualitstion of the
potentiality of life, and therefore defined as the ‘entelechy’, as the
fulfillment of the body’. The idea of the soul is intrinsically independent of
the body implies the conception of its substantiality. Conceiving the soul as a
simple and indestructible substance its immortaitlty. So did plato emphasize
the simple ad unitary nature of the soul.
In modern psychology, the
idea of the soul is no longer important. In its place has come notion self or
‘the centers of interest’. The word soul is ambiguous. Sometimes it stands for
MD, sometimes for self and sometimes for both. The English world points to an
entity as the cause or vehicle of physical or psychical activities of the
individual person. The soul is a spiritual substance. In Indian though the word
atman has undergone various changes.
It is little used in the vedas. It primarily meant breath. In the Upaisads another word, praa, is used for breath, ad atma stands
for the innermost part of ma man was atmmavat.
For the Upanisadic seers, the soul
was a propositio for a experiences. Indian philosophies, with the exception of
Mayavada of samkara and Ksanikavada of Buddihists, fundamentally agree about
the nature of the soul as a permanent, eternal and imperishable substance. But
the primitive Aryans believed that the essence of ma is continued after death
in a shadowy existence in some subtle bodily form. This is not the soul of the
later philosophers. Jacobi cas it psyche.
This is the development of the primitive notion of life agter death
lingering in some form. It is found eve today in the practice of sraddha. The psyche is frequently spoken
of as purusa of the size of the thumb
( agustha-matra). At the time of
death it departs from the body. In the oldest Upanisads the psyche is described
as costituted by the praas, psycho-phyciscal
factors. Still, these factors were not regarded as principles of personality.
II. The idea of the soul has occupied an important position in
Jaina philosophy. Jainism aims at the liberation of the soul from the cycle of
birth and death. The saving of the soul is the Christia ideal. In the Apology, plato makes socrates say that
his mission was to get men to care for their souls and to make them as good as
they can be.
Jainism is dualistic. There is a dichotomous decision of
categories. All things are divided into living and non-living, souls and
non-souls. In the first verse of the Dracyasamgraha,
we read,” the ancient amonf: the great Jainas have described the dracyas as jiva and ajiva Jiva is a category, and jiva
personalised becomes atman. Jainism believes in the plurality of souls.
Souls are substances distinct from matter. Souls influence one another. But
they are quite distance from one another and not connected in any higher unity.
They may be called spiritual monads. Jainism emphasizes the diversity of souls.
Amongst the Muslim theologians, Nazam and his Scholl maintained that the soul
is a spiritual substance.
Janism considers the soul from two points of view: the
noumental (niscaya naya) and the
phenomenal (vyavahar)
Dravyanuyougatarkana of Bhoja describes the distinction as motioned in the viseasvasyakabhasya by saying that the
niscaya narrated the real things and the vyavahara
narrates things in a populate way. In the samayasara, kaundakundacaraya
points out that the practical standpoint I essential for the exposition of the
inner reality of thigs, as a non- Arya is never capable of understanding
without the non-Arya tongue.6
The existence of the soul is a presupposition in the Jaina
philosophy. Proofs are not necessary. If there are any existence of the soul.
“Oh Gautama, the soul is pratyakasa” said Mahavira,” for that in which your
knowledge consists is itself soul”. What is pratyaksa
need not be prove like the pleasure and pain of the body. It is prartyaksa owig to the ahampratyaksa, the realization of the I,
which is associated with the functions pertaining t all the three tenses.
William James and James word present self- consciousness in this form. Ward
talks of the internal perception’ or self – consciousness. The last order of
knowledge of the duality of subject ad object is an indispensable condition of
all acute experience. It is the subject of experience that we call the pure ego
or self.7 William James says, “for this central part of the self is felt. It is
something by which we also have direct sensible consciousness in which it is
present, as in the whole life-time of such moments.8 thus , one who ignores the
self-accidence of the soul is like one who says that sound is inaudible and the
moon is devoid of the moon. The existence of the soul can be inferred from the
behavior of others. Similarly, the soul exists because “it is my word, O
Gautama.” 9
The jiva is
described from the nominee and phenomenal points of view. From the oumenal
point of view, the soul is described in the pure form. The phenomenal describes
the empirical qualities of the soul.
From the pure point of view, it is not associated with body or any
physical or mental qualities. Mahavira points out the third Ganadhara that the
soul is different from the body it sees; just as Ddevadatta recollect san
object perceived through the five widows of the palace, which is different from
the palace and the five windows, so also a person recolecting an object
perceive through the if senses of the body is different from the sense as the
body 10
The Buddhist
impermanence of the soul is also refuted. Buddhistas had said that there was no
self except the khandas kundakundacaraya
points out that from the noumea point of view the soul and the body are not
one, also though in worldly practice the soul having a beautiful body is called
beauriful ad fair like the beautiful body of the living Arhati. 11 In the Chanadogyopanisad, in the dialogue
between yajanavakaya and Janaka, the
idea of the self is progressively brought out by showing that it is not a
physical entity nor a dream –state.
From the nominal pint of
view, the soul pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. From the real point
of view, the soul is unbound, untouched and not other than itself. The soul is
one and not composite. In the Sthananga we
get a description of the soul as one(ege
atta). The commentator describes it
as ekavidhah a tmanaah. 12 Samasara kundakaundacaraya describes the
absolute oneness of the soul “On the strength of my self- realisation”. 13
This does not contradict the plurality of souls in Jainism. It only emphasizes
the essential identity of souls. Jivas in al their individual characteristics
are essentially the same. If the souls were one, then, “O Gautama, there would
not be sukha duhkha, bhandha mosksa, etc”
Individual souls are different like the kumbhas.14
The
nature of jiva has been well
described by Nemicandra in his Dravyasamgradha.
He describes the foul both from the nominee and phenomenal points of view.
He says that jiva is characterised by upayoga, is formless and is an agent. It has the same extent as its
body. It is the enjoyer of the fruits of Karma. It exists in samasara. It is
siddha and has a characteristic of upward motion. 15 We get a similar description in
the pancastikayasara of
kundakundacaraya. Jiva is formless. It characterised by upayoga. It is attached to karama. It is the Lord, the agent and
the ejoyer of the fruits of karama. It pervades bodies large or small. It has a
tendency to go upward to the end of loka
being freed from the impurities of kiarama.16
The Tattavarthasutra describes the nature of the soul as possess ing upayoga as its essential characteristic: