As Angel said, perception is
a synthetic process, and the combination of the new and the old is an essential
part of the synthesis. This process of combining was often called, by early
psychologists, ‘apperception’. This problem will be referred to later. Structural
psychologists like Wound and Titchner analysed perception into sensations. They
said that perceptions combine and fuse together a number of sensory elements as
in the process of forming H20. It is not merely a sum of sensations.
It gives a new psychological product, a creative synthesis, like the mental
chemistry of J. S. Mill. Later, the Gestalt psychologists gave a new turn to
the psychology of perception. They hold that every perceptual experience is an
unanalysed whole; it has a quality of its own. Thus, we find that perceptual
experience is not a simple unit although it is a whole and unanalysed
experience. In the Pramanamimansa there
is a statement that different stages of perceptual experience are essentially
of the same nature. The Jaina philosophers were concerned with giving a logical
and epistemological analysis of the perceptual experience. Therefore, they were
more interested in giving the conditions and the stages of knowledge. However,
their discussion of the problem has given a psychological picture of perception
in terms of logical analysis. It is difficult to find the acumen of present-day
psychological analysis in the writings of the ancient philosophers. Moreover,
we may remember that their knowledge and equipment of psychology were very
meager. They had no experimental basis. Their analysis was more on the basis of
logic, of common sense and on insight; and yet, the stages of perception
mentioned by the Jaina philosophers very much correspond to the analysis of
perception given by the traditional psychology and the structuralist school.
Avagraha is the first stage of sense
experience. It may be said to be analogous to sensation. It is the level of
sensation in which perceptual experience can be analysed. Umasvati defines avagraha as implicit awareness of the object
of sense. He says that grahana (grasping),
alocana (holding), and avadharana (pretending), are synonyms of avagraha. It is indeterminate. The object
presented through sense stimulation is cognized in an undefined and
indeterminate way. In this stage, we are merely aware of the presence of the
object without any associations, without cognizing the specific features, and
in fact without even being aware of its association and name. In the Avasyaka-Niryukti, avagraha has been defined
as awareness of the sense data. Jinabhadra insists that avagraha is indeterminate in its character. He is not prepared to
consider that it has reference to any specific features of the object, because
even relative reference is enough to promote the experience to the stage of avaya. Then avaya becomes a higher stage, and the stage of avaya will not be necessary or possible once
the cognition of specific features is admitted in the case of avagraha. It would lead to an endless
series, because cognition of the particular is relative to the state of
knowledge, and it would increase as knowledge increases. It is not possible to
ascertain all the particulars of an object even i n a long time. It is,
therefore, more appropriate to say that avagraha
is mere awareness, mere cognition of an object without the knowledge of
the specific nature of the object nor of its name. Naudisutra does not define avagraha.
It gives the implications of the definition of avagraha as given in the Avasyaka-Niryukti
and describes it as cognition of sense-data. It gives illustrations. It
also gives avagrahanata, upadharanata,
sravanata, avalambanata and medha as
its synonyms. But some Jaina logicians, like Pujyapada Devanandi, Akalanka,
Vidyanandi and Hemacandra, have said that avagraha
is determinate cognition. Pujyapada Devanapdi says that, when the sense
organ comes in contact with an object, there is intuitive apprehension (darsana). After that, we get cognition of
the object, which is of specific nature. This is avagraha. For instance, we cognize white colour with our eyes: ‘it
is white’. In this sense, the intuitive apprehension (darsana), becomes the first stage of sense experience. It will be
indeterminate. It will be a species of jiiana.
It has already been mentioned in this connection that dar;;ana cannot be identified with the
primitive and early stages of sense experience. In that case, we could not have
the highest stage of darsana, like kevala darsana. Akalaiika defines avagraha as a determinate cognition of the
distinctive nature of the object. It comes after the intuitive apprehension
which is due to the contact of the sense organs with the object. With the
contact of the sense organs with the object, there arises ‘intuition of the
bare existence’ of the object, sanmatra
darsanarn. This intuitive apprehension develops into the determinate
cognition of the object. That is avagraha. According
to Hernacandra avugra.ha is a
determinate perception which follows the indeterminate intuition through the contact
of the sense organs with the object. Indeterminate intuitive experience is darsana. It does not grasp
the specific characteristics
of the object. This darsana transforms
itself into a determinate cognition, which is avagraha.
But this avagraha is not a
mental construction,a because it
depends on the active exercise of the sense organs like the visual, and also
because it cannot be corrected by discursive thought. Therefore, it is still
immediate and direct experience based on the contact of the sense organs with
the object. Similarly, Vidyanandi and Vadi-devasuri make avagraha determinate cognition.
However, it would
be difficult to make avagraha determinate
cognition as coming after darsana, which
is indeterminate and due to the contact of the sense organs and the object, as
these logicians have describedIn that case, as we have said earlier, darsana will become a mere species of jirana
and will be reduced to the level of mere sensation. The higher forms of darsana, like kevala darsana, would be meaningless because there would be no
higher form of darsnna. All darsana will be
reduced to the sensational level. But we find that the higher forms of darsana have been accepted. It would,
therefore, be more appropriate to treat darsana
as a separate type of experience, in the sense of intuitive experience,
and avagraha as the first stage of jizana. It is really the sensational stage,
where there is mere awareness of the existence, without the cognition of the
specific features, of the object.
Sensations, as William James said, are the first things in
consciousness. This does not mean that all our experience is only fusing and
compounding of sensations. Our experience can be analysed into sensations, and
these form the elements of our sensory experience. As Stout says, sensations
are of the nature of immediate experience, like the experience of cold and
warm, a specific tinge of pain, or a touch
located in the body or at the surface of the body. The term sensation is also
extended to cover the visual data, sound, taste, and smell which may enter into
immediate experience. Sensations vary not only with the variations in the
presented objects but also in accordance with the state of the bodily organs.
They are private and immediate experiences of the individual. Sensations are
aboriginal and without precedent; a mental first cause, uncaused by antecedent
mental events and inexplicable in strictly psychological terms. They are a
first beginning of the knowledge, and the ultimate source upon which all
empirical cognition rests. Further, sensations are simply given rather than
made. They are ‘impressions’ which the mind passively receives. They
constitute, as Lewis says, a content of experience “which we do not invent and
cannot have as we will, but merely find”. During the period of two hundred
years between the publication of Lock’s Essay and of James’s Principles, two
further characteristics, now largely of antiquarian interest, were gradually
attributed to sensation. Sensations were held to be the simple elements of
which complex ideas are formed, as well as the matter or crude stuff out of
which the associative machinery fashions the organized and meaningful world of
everyday experience.
In this sense we can say that avagraha is the stage of sensation. It is the first stage of
experience. It is the given. It does not involve the stage of darsana, which is qualitatively different from j”nana.
Avagraha is a species of jnana. Therefore, we describe avagraha as the immediate experience. It is sensation.
Stages in Avagraha
Avagraha has been
identified by us with sensation, the immediacy of experience. It is bare
awareness of the existence of the object without any determination of its
specific features. This fact becomes clear if we remember that avagraha has been further distinguished into two stages: (i)
vyanjanavagraha and arthavagraha.
Vyanjanavagraha is the earlier stage. It is a
physiological stimulus condition of the sensation, of the immediate experience.
In the Visesavasyaka Bhasya we get a
description of vyanjanavagraha. There
it is said that what reveals an object, as a lamp reveals a jar, is vyanjanavagraha.
It is only the relation of the sense organ
and the object in the form of sense stimulation such as sound. In the _Nandisutra,
we get an example of the earthen pot
and drops of water, mallaka drstanta. It
gives a description of the stage of vyanjanavagraha.
A clay pot is to be filled with water. In the beginning, when a person
pours out one drop of water, it is absorbed and there is no sign of existence
of water. He goes on pouring drops of water and at a certain stage a drop of
water will be visible. Then the water begins to accumulate. We may call this
stage when the water becomes visible the ‘threshold of saturation’. The drops
of water below the threshold are all absorbed. Similarly, a person who is
asleep receives sound stimulation successively for sometime. The sound atoms
reach the ears. Innumerable instances have to occur before the ears become full
of sound atoms. At a particular stage, the person becomes conscious of the
sound. So far he was not aware of the sound although the auditory stimulation
was pouring in. We may call this stage of first awareness the threshold of
awareness’. The sensation of sound starts the moment the threshold is crossed and
we become aware of the sound. That is the immediate experience of sound, arthavagraha. So far there was no awareness
of the sound although the conditions of stimulation for such awareness were
operating below the threshold. The stimulus was pouring in constantly although
no awareness of sound was possible up to a particular stage. Such a preparatory
stage of sensation presents physiological and stimulus conditions for the
sensational stage. It is indeterminate and undefined. In fact, it is sometimes
contended that it is not consciousness at all. Yasovijaya says that vyanjanavagraha is cognition only in name.
It is only a condition of arthavagraha, which
is cognition. However, the presence of consciousness in vyanjanavagraha may be admitted, although it is not explicit
because of its undeveloped existence.a In this, the awareness is implicit. It
may be referred to as potentiality of awareness. In this sense vyanjanavagraha is not totally unconscious,
because it is this that develops into consciousness. It is not possible for man to be clearly aware of all the
contents in his mind even when he is wide awake. Countless points of
consciousness emerge in the course of a single day. Vyai~janavagraha has been just described as implicit awareness,
the physiological and stimulus condition of awareness. It gradually develops
into awareness and gives the sensation. It is very often described as ‘contact
awareness’. However, it would not be appropriate to call this ‘awareness’
although there is the stimulation flowing in. Awareness gradually emerges
later, through the accumulation of stimulation. It is merely potentiality of
awareness, or implicit awareness. Such a stage of potential consciousness may
be compared to the unconcious experiences described by Stout. The question of
unconscious mental states relates to the possibility of there being experiences
which may be ours but of which we cannot become aware directly. There are
feelings and sensations which do not enter into the stream of our mental life
so as to be open to direct observation at the time at which they occur.
Leibnitz has also spoken of unconscious mental states, ‘petites perceptions’.
Leibnitz’s doctrine of ‘petites perceptions’ enables him to understand how
things may be in the mind in an undeveloped way even when we do not seem to be
conscious of it. He agrees with Locke that sensations come first. But the unconscious mental states and the
‘petites perceptions’ imply the presence of a certain experience of which we
are not directly aware. If we can know of them at all, as Stout says, we can
only do so in the way in which we can come to know the mental dispositions, or
as we come to know of mental states in the lower animals. In this sense,
although we have compared vyaizjanavagraha to
the unconscious mental states of Stout and Leibnitz, we cannot say that they
are identical. It is true that there is a remote likeness, but they cannot be
similar to each other, because the unconscious mental states of Stout do not
accumulate and gradually emerge into consciousness. They are there but cannot
be directly observed.
We may take the analogy of the psychological investigations
of the Western psychologists in their attempt to measure the intensity of felt
sensation. Weber carried on experiments in the direction of measuring the felt
difference in the intensity of the sensation. He found that in comparing
objects and observing the distinction between them, ‘we perceive not the
difference between the objects but the ratio of this difference to the
magnitude of the object compared’. If we are comparing by touch two weights,
the one of thirty and other of twenty-nine and a half ounces, the difference is
not more easily perceived than that between weights of thirty and twenty-nine
drachmas. Similar observations can be made about the sense of sight. The
difference in the intensity of light is discernible when the ratio of the
original stimulus to the increased stimulus is 100:101. Weber said that, in
addition, not the absolute difference between the vibration of two tones but
the relative difference compared with the number of vibrations of the tones, is
discriminated. The original stimulus, whatever its absolute intensity may be,
must be increased by a certain constant fraction of its own amount, before any
unlikeness in the sensation is discernible, before ‘the threshold of
discernment’ is passed. The constant fraction is different for different kinds
of sensation. The basis of the stimulus consists in the fact that the awareness
of sense experience is possible after ‘the threshold of awareness is reached’.
This is possible when the stimulus units are accumulated and produce the
awareness after the particular stage. Mallaka
drstanta gives a picture of such a mental process, although quantitative
measurement and the experimental basis were not possible.
Arthavagraha
As soon as a person becomes conscious, the stage of vyaiajanavagra/ia is over and it transforms
itself into arthavagraha. This may be
called the stage of sensation proper. It is awareness of the object. In the Nandisutra, there is a statement that, in
this stage, we are aware of the sound as ‘this is sound’ or ‘colour’ or
‘touch’, but not exactly cognize the nature of the sound, colour or touch. But
in the Visesavasyalcabhasya, this kind
of determinate awareness, as ‘this is sound’ is denied in the stage of
sensation. It is merely awareness of the occurrence of the cognition, because
it lasts only for one moment. It is, therefore, indeterminate and indefinite.
It does not reach the stage of cognition of specific content. In the Visesavasyakabhasya, there is a discussion
of an opinion of the Jaina thinkers who define arthsvagraha with reference to the development of personality. It
is said that the awareness of a new-born infant is confined to cognition of the
general nature only. But, as i t gradually grows, it gets sufficient experience
and acquaintance with the object, and cognizes specific features of the object
even in one instant. This view is criticized in the Visesava.syakabhasya on the ground that it will lead to an
indefinite series of cognitions and that cognition would vary with the extent
of the individual’s knowledge.
On the basis of such a distinction regarding the two stages
of avagraha, it is stated that vyanjanavagraha lasts for indefinite
moments, gradually proceeding towards the level of consciousness. The
physio logical and stimulus conditions of awareness in the form of sensation
continue to accumulate for a number of moments till the threshold of awareness
is reached. But once the stage of awareness in the form of sensation is
reached, it lasts only for an instant, which is an indivisible point of time
and is infinitesimal.
We have seen that Western psychologists, like Stout,
describe sensations as something of the nature of immediately experienced warm
or cold, a specific tinge of pain, touch located in or at the surface of the
body, rather than anything outside. Psychologists have extended the term to
cover the visual data, the sounds and the smells that may enter into immediate
experience. Stout further says that all recognition of sensation as of a
certain kind, and all apprehension of it as continuing to be of the same nature
or as changing in nature at different moments, involves a reference beyond this
experience. For, sensation is immediate experience and nothing more. At any one
moment there is no other immediate experience except just the experience itself
at the moment. Sensations are genuine and factual, while mental constructs are
spurious and artificial. Sensations are new, uncontaminated and untouched by
those mental processes which render ideas suspect. They are not structured by
perception, dimmed and blurred through detention, abridged through forgetting
or artificially arranged as a result of fortuitous associations. From Hume to
Russell, modern empiricism has tended to regard the inchoate beginnings of
knowledge in unformed sensation as more authentic than the cognitive refinement
which recent inquiry provides.
The Jainas have raised another problem regarding the
subdivision of the stages in avagraha, sensational
experience. This is based on the problem of contact of the sense organs with
the object, the prapyakaritva and aprapyakaritva. This problem has been
discussed in the last chapter. According to the Jainas, the visual sense organ
is aprapyakari, because there is no
contact of the sense organ with the object. Other sense organs are prapyakari. Vyaiijanavagraha, it is
maintained, is essentially concerned with the contact of the sense organs with
the stimulus coming from the object, gradually giving rise to awareness of the
object. In this sense, according to the Jainas, there are four types of vyaiajanavagraha there being no vyanjanavagraha for the sense of sight. The
visual sense organ is incompetent to establish direct contact with objects of
the external world through the stimulation. But, arthavagraha is awareness itself. It is of six types - due to the
five sense organs and due to the mind which is a quasi-sense organ. Thus,
according to the Jainas, the visual sensation does not require accumulation of
the sense stimulus coming from the object. It would’mean thcre is no mental
state below the ‘threshold of awareness’.
But it would be difficult to justify the view regarding the
visual sense in the light of modern science. It may be said that even in the
case of the visual sense organ, the light rays have to pass through the lens of
the eyes and reach the retina. In this sense, there is contact between the
sense organ, the eye, and its object, which is illuminated by light. This
problem has been discussed in the last chapter. It would, however, not be
inappropriate to say that, even in the case of the sense of sight, the
physiological and the stimulus conditions are required. Vyailjanavagraha is a necessary stage of arthnvagraha. All sensations emerge from the accumulation of the
stimulation up to the stage of ‘threshold of awareness’. ‘Sensation is aroused
by the messages which are transmitted through the nerves from the sense organ
to the brain; and this is the description of the nature of the sensory message
and the way in which it can be recorded and analysed’. If the message from the
sense organs is crowded closely, the sensation is intense; and if the message
is separated by long intervals, the sensation is feeble. Sensations have an
upper and a lower limit. They are ‘thresholds’. If the stimuli are not
sufficient and fall below the threshold, they do not evoke sense experience.
They are called sub-liminal stimuli. The sub-liminal stimuli may accumulate and
produce the experience. Western psychologists say that sensations have a
latency period. This is the time taken by bodily tissues, physiological
factors, before they produce their effect. For instance, it takes a certain
length of time to arouse a sense organ and to excite the nerve fibres that lead
to the brain. The brain connections, the motor nerves and also the muscles take
time.
Arthavagraha, then, is the real
sensational stage, the immediacy of experience, while vyanjanayagraha is a latency stage and the stimulus condition
which gradually gives rise to the awareness. However, arthavagraha is also indefinite and not determinate. According to
Jinabhadra the consciousness of a person just awakened from sleep and hearing
the sound does not take the form ‘this is sound’; because ‘this is sound’ is
determinate and discursive and requires more than one moment for developing.
But, the arthavagraha is awareness of
the sound, and it is instantaneous. The cognition ‘this is sound’ is possible
at a later stage, called avaya.
Iha
Cognition of
objects in empirical experience is not complete with mere awareness at the
sensational stage. In fact, pure sensations are not possible. As Stout says, we
have hardly any pure sensations, absolutely devoid of meaning, either original
or acquired, except perhaps in the case of children. Therefore, though
sensations are not selfsubsistent, they do involve mental factors. They have
derivative meaning. All recognition of a sensation as of certain kind involves
a reference beyond immediate experience. ‘Its identity in nature or difference
in nature in relation to the past or possible future experiences can only be an
object of thought transcending the immediacy of sense. Sensations transcend the
immediacy of experience also because they are inseparably connected with
thought. They have reference to external objects. They mean something beyond
themselves. For instance, a sensation of red refers to something red or to
something which appears red. Thus, absolutely pure sensation is not possible.
It is only an abstraction. It always involves some element of meaning or
association which makes the experience concrete. Sensations have always a
derivative meaning. In this sense, our empirical experience will not be
complete with avagraha. Avagraha is
not self-subsistent. It involves meaning and has reference to object. Arthavagraha, mere awareness of sensation,
lasts only for one instant, and it immediately transforms itself into more
specific cognition. It brings in iha, a factor involving meaning. The next
stage in experience, then, is iha. In avagraha, there is mere awareness of the
object. In iha, the nature of the object is cognized. In avagraha, a person simply hears a sound. In iha, he cognizes the nature of the sound
also. In Tattvarthasutra Bhasya, we
get a description of the factors of experience. Sensation cognizes only a part
of the object, while iha strives to
cognize specific features. It strives for cognition of the nature of the
object. The process of iha continues
for a certain period of time, although it never exceeds one rnuhatrta. Naudisutra gives five synonyms of
iha: abhogayata, margauatn, gavesanata and
vimarsa. Umasvati gives synonyms of ihd as uha,
tarka, vi cararra and jijnasa. Pujyapada Devanandi defines iha as striving for understanding the
specific character of the object which has been cognized by crvagraha. Jinabhadra says that it is
inquiry for the distinctive features of the object. Akala?ika defines iha similarly. Hemacandra says that iha strives for the cognition of the specific
details of the object apprehended by sensation. Vyaiajanavagraha is
the potential condition of awareness. Arthavagraha
is the dawning of awareness. Iha is
the tendency towards cognizing the specific features of the object. Ihi-t has been very often translated as
‘speculation’. But it would be more appropriate to use the phrase ‘associative
integration’. However, it would be difficult to find out an appropriate phrase
for ‘iha’, because the synonyms, like cinta and virnarsa,
mentioned in Nar.disutra and,
like pariksu and vicarana, mentioned by Umasvati lead to
attribute discursive thinking at this early stage of perceptual cognition. What
Umasvati and Nandisutra meant by using such terms with the content of
discursive thinking as synonyms of iha, it is difficult to know. We may only
say that iha is the first mental association which gives content
and coherence to the immediacy of experience in the sensational stage. Mere
awareness of the sensation is followed by the cognition of specific features of
the object. It is a striving of the mind towards coherence and integration of
the sense impressions. In this stage, we get the nature of the object, although
it is still in. the semi-conceptual stage. Thus, iha is a stage in the
formation of perceptual experience. It brings in associative integration of
sensory elements experienced in the stage of sensation. It is very often said
that perceptual experience involves factors like association and selection of
the sense data. Perception involves implicit comparison, assimilation,
discrimination and integration. It involves association. We perceive a red
rose. In this experience, we get the experience of the sensation of red. Other
characteristics are associated and integrated and then we perceive the object,
the red flower. At least, that is what the earlier psychologists, especially
the Associationists, believed. In fact, the Associationists believed that all
complex experience can be looked upon as reproduction and association of
elementary sensations.
The Jainas thought that, as iha is striving
for determinate and specific cognition, it is possible to confuse it with
doubt, (sarhsaya). But, iha is not to be confused
with doubt, although it does involve an element of striving for finding the
specific nature of the object. Jinabhadra says that the mental state which
refers to many conflicting alternatives where it is difficult to make choice,
is the state of doubt. It is a state which is really nescience, (ajnana).
But Tha is the
mental state in which there is striving for the ascertainment of truth. It
leads to the acceptance of the true and the avoidance of the untrue.’
Siddhasena Divakara also draws the same line of distinction between iha and samsaya.
For instance, on receiving a sense impression of sound,
there arises a doubt whether the sound comes from a conch or a horn. The mind
is driven to consider the specific points of agreement and difference. It is
perceived as sweet and agreeable. This quality is attributed to the sound of
the conch and not of the horn. This associative integration, and the striving
for cognition of the specific nature of the object, is iha. According
to this interpretation, it appears that doubt is the beginning of iha. It
arises just before iha takes form. In the Pramanamimamsa,
it is said that doubt crops up in the interval between
sensation (avagraha), and associative integration (iha), even
when the object is a matter of habitual perception. But the existence of the
state of doubt is not easily detected owing to the rapidity of succession of
mental events. But with the introduction of doubt as a stage in the process of perceptual
experience before Ma, the associative
integration becomes more difficult to understand from the psychological point
of view. This has been very often responsible for terming iha as speculation. However, we may say that
the doubt which intervenes between sensation and !h1i, which we have called associative integration, is more a
logical expediency than a psychological fact. The Jaina logicians are concerned
with finding a logical sequence and consistency in the problem of the theory of
the knowledge, rather than in psychological analysis. It is difficult to
maintain that iha, in the sense of
speculation, is a stage which culminates from doubt or from the comparison of
various alternative presentations. In this sense, doubt (samsaya) and speculation (iha) involve
an element of discursive thinking which is not possible at this early stage of
perceptual experience. It would be more appropriate to say that iha is the associative
factor. It integrates impressions to form a concrete psychosis. In the language
of the structural psychologists like Wouldn’t and Titchner, such a process of
association and integration is a necessary element in perceptual experience,
which is a complex experience.
Avaya
From the stage of associative integration (iha), we come to the stage of
interpretation. Sensations are interpreted and a meaning assigned to the
sensation. That would be perception. Sensation is the first impression of
something the meaning of which is not cognized. Perception is the
interpretation of the sensation, in which the meaning is known. William James
says it is ‘knowledge about’. This involves perceptual judgment. When we
perceive a red rose, our perception involves the cognition, ‘this is red rose’.
The Jainas said that this stage of perceptual judgment is avaya, although it is still in the
non-verbal stage. Avaya follows in the
wake of iha, associative integration.
In this stage, we reach a determinate experience. The striving for a cognition
of the specific nature of the object results in the definite perception of the
object. Avasyakaniryukti defines avaya as determinate cognition. In the Sarvarthasiddhi we get a description of avaya as cognition of the true nature of the
object through cognition of its particular characteristics. so Umasvati says that upagama, upanoda, apavyadha, apeta and apagata are synonyms of avaya. They mean determinate cognition. Nandisutra
gives avartanata, pratyavartanata,
buddhi, vijnana as synonyms. Tattvarthasutra
Bhasya describes avaya as the stage of ascertainment of right and
exclusion of wrong. For instance, on hearing a sound, a person determines that
this sound must be of a conch and not of a horn, since it is sweet and not
harsh. Harshness is the quality of the sound of a horn. This type of
ascertainment of the existing specific feature of the object is called avaya.
It is perceptual judgment. It is expressed in the form of a judgment, as ‘this
is a sound of a conch’, or ‘this is a red rose.’
Some Jaina logicians say that avaya has only
a negative function. In this stage of experience there is merely the exclusion
of non-existing qualities. They ascribe cognition of the existing quality to a
later stage of experience called dharana. Jinabhadra
says that such a view is not correct. He says that, whether a cognition merely
does the negative function of excluding the non-existing qualities, or also
does the determination of the existing characteristics, or whether it does
both, it is still avaya (perceptual judgment). Umasvati
seems to hold the view mentioned by Jinabhadra. Pujayapada says that crvUya cognizes
the specific features of the object. Therefore, it is determinate cognition.
Akalanka holds a similar view. Vadi-Deva describes avcrya as a
determination of specific features of the object cognized in the stage of 7115.85
Hemacandra holds a similar view. He says that avaya is the
final determination of the specific nature of the object cognized by iha.
Avaya has been described in this treatise as perceptual
judgment.
Avuyu may be compared to the
apperception involved in perceptual experience. Perception is a complex
experience. The older psychologists analysed perception as involving
apperception. Apper ception is assimilation of new experiences to old. It is
involved in all distinct perceptions, and usually in all attentive perceptions.
When we hear the footsteps of someone coming up the stairs, we are only aware
through the sense organ of hearing of a sound of a certain type. But that sound
is of a particular person who is coming up the stairs, is interpretation based
on our previous experience. We then get the experience that we hear the
footsteps of a person coming up the stairs. In this stage, what is fragmentary
in our experience is supplemented and expanded, and fitted into a system to
form a completed picture.
Dharnna (Retention)
Now we come to the stage of retention,
dharana, in perceptual experience. Nandisutra
defines retention as the act of retaining a perceptual
judgment for a number of instants or innumerable instants. It gives sthnpana
and pratistha as
synonyms of dharana.g6 Umasvati
defines
dharana as final determination of the object, retention of the cognition thus
formed, and recognition of the object on future occasions. According to
Umasvati, retention develops through three stages: (i) the nature of the object
is finally cognized; (ii) the cognition so formed is retained; and (iii) the
object is recognized on future occasions. Avasyakaniryukti
defines dharana as retention.,”,
Jinabhadra says that retention is the absence of the lapse of perceptual
cognition. Like Umasvati, he also mentions three stages: (i) the absence of the
lapse of perceptual judgment; (ii) the formation of the mental trace; and (iii)
the recollection of the cognition on future occasions. In this description, the
absence of the lapse, aviccuti, (mental
trace), vasana, and recollection (smrti), are three stages included in the
conception of dhararra. Pujyapada
Devanandi defines dharatra as the condition
of the absence of forgetting, in future, of that which has been cognized by avaya. Akalanka says that it is absence of
forgetting what has been cognized by perceptual judgment. But some logicians
like Vadideva do not accept dharana as
a condition of recall in future. Dharana is a
stage of perceptual cognition and cannot last up to the moment of recall. They
say it is only establishing perception for a certain length of time.
Thus, we find that some logicians make dharana mere retention of perceptual experience,
while some others would make it also a condition of recall of that experience
at a future time. Those who deny that it is a condition of recall say flat it
cannot be a cause of recall although it is a remote condition of recall,
because recall does require retention of an experience. Vridideva says that the
recollection of an experience is due to a special capacity of the soul, which
may be called saraskara. Hemacandra
entirely agrees with Vadideva’s interpretation, although he tries to reconcile
the two views. He says that retention is also a condition of recall. Hemacandra
says that the condition is only the causal stuff capable of effecting
recollection of past experience. It is only a mental trace, scrrizskara. It is the continued existence of
a cognition for a definite or indefinite length of time. He further says that
the mental trace, or samskara, is a
species of cognition, and not different as the Vaisesikas have stated. If it
were not cognition, it would not produce recollection, which is cognitive in
nature. Hemacandra reconciles his view of retention as the condition of recall
with the view of retention as the absence of the lapse mentioned in Yisesavasyakabhasya. He says that retention
is the absence of the lapse of perception. But it is included in the perceptual
judgment (avaya). That is why it has
not been separately mentioned by him. Avaya, when
it continues for some length of time, may be called retention in the sense of
absence of the lapse of experience. It may also be said that absence of the
lapse is also a condition of recall in the sense in which he defines dharana. Mere perception without the absence
of the lapse cannot give rise to recollection. Perceptual judgments which are
not attended by the reflective mental stage are almost on the level of
unattended perception, like a person touching grass in hurried motion. And such
perceptions are not capable of giving rise to recollection.
Hemacandra’s description of avaya and his analysis of dharana come nearer to the psychological
analysis of perception, specially of the Structuralist school. Perception is a
concrete experience in which sensations are organized and interpreted. Meaning
is assigned to sensations. Without the factor of meaning or interpretation of
the impressions, perception would be impossible. Hemacandra’s example of the
person touching grass in hurried motion shows that ‘selective interest’ is a
necessary condition of perceptual judgment. Such experiences would be on the
fringe of consciousness, and they would enter into the focus of consciousness
only if forced by factors like nearness or selective interest. Retention is an
important condition of perception. In fact, as Stout says, retentiveness is in
some form an indispensable condition of mental development. Mental development
would be impossible unless previous experience left behind its persistent
after-effects to influence the mental state in the course of subsequent
experience. These after-effects are called traces or dispositions. Hemacandra
called them samskara. They are the
latent conditions of subsequent experience. However, Hemacandra makes them
special capacities of the soul. Mental traces or dispositions brinS us to the
problem of memory.
However, the analysis of perceptual experience shows that
the concrete psychosis involves the accumulation of sense stimuli to produce a
cumulative effect. It gradually gives rise to awareness, that is, the
physiological and stimulus condition of sense awareness. That is
vyaimjanavagraha.
It gives
rise to awareness of the object. It is a sensation. It is arthavagraha. Thus, avagraha is a stage of sensation. It is a stage of immediate
experience in which we are merely aware of the object of stimulation without
knowing anything more of the object. Avagraha,
on the whole, is a stage of sensation. But, avagraha is not without the thought element. There can be no pure
sensation. Sensations always have a derivative meaning for retentiveness and
association operate from the very beginning of life. A sense impression or
image has meaning in so far as it refers to something other than itself, in so
far as it enables us to think of the object. In experiencing a sensation, an
object is brought before the mind. The sensation of yellow carries with it the
thought of something yellow. This leads us to the next stage called iha. It is
associative integration. In this stage of integrati~e experience, we do not get
the full experience of the object in the form of cognition of the determinate
nature of the object in its fullness. In this we do not form a judgment. In the
stage of avaya, we get the perceptual
judgment. In this stage, sense impressions are interpreted, and meaning is
attached to the experience. We get perceptual judgment in the form: ‘this is a
red rose’. The implicit presence of the thought element in sensation gets
expression and a concrete experience is formed. According to the Jainas, the
perceptual experience which they sometimes call avagraha in general, needs to be retained. Otherwise, it would not
be complete. Retentiveness is, in some form, an indispenesable condition of
mental development. Our subsequent experience depends on the capacity to retain
the perceptual cognition. This capacity of retention differs with different
individuals. A completed perceptual experience would be possible with all the
four stages co-operating. This is the concrete psychosis called perception. As
it was pointed out earlier, it is sometimes referred to as avagraha. Iha, avaya and dharana have already been shown to be cases
of avagraha. But such identification
of the other processes with avagraha was
not universally accepted. Jinabhadra says that they are cases of avagraha only by courtesy, repacarena.
The Jainas have given an exhaustive description of the four
stages of avagraha, perceptual experience,
so far discussed. Each of them is of six types, as they arise from the five
sense organs and the mind. Again, vya-ijunavagraha is of four types only. Thus
there would be twenty-eight forms of perceptual cognition. Each of the
twenty-eight forms, again, is of twelve types according to the nature of the
object they can have. Therefore, the Jainas have mentioned that there are
three-hundred and thirty-six types of sense experience, mati jnana or abhinibodhika-jnarra.
This elaborate classification has no psychological significance,
although it has logical and mathematical interest. The Jaina logicians were
fond of fabulous mathematical calculations. This is found in their elaborate
classification of karma as given in
the Gorrtmatasara: Karma Kanda. Glasenapp
in his Doctrine of Karma in Jainisna, has
given a detailed analysis of this division. The same tendency must have
inspired the Jaina logicians to give such an elaborate classification of avagraha.
CHAVIER VI
OTHER SOURCES OF EMPIRICAL
KNOWLEDGE
It was seen in the last chapter that the concept of dharana has occupied the attention of the
Jaina logicians and that they are not entirely agreed on its function. Dharana has been considered as a condition of recollection. The
psychological analysis of memory shows that retention is a condition of memory,
and recollection and recognition are the forms in which memory expresses
itself. We are, therefore, concerned here with analysing the concept of memory.
We shall study retention, recollection, and recognition as factors involved in
memory.
The Jaina philosophers are not agreed on the function of dharana, retention. Nandisirtra has mentioned three stages of dharana. Umasvati has also accepted the three stages. They make dharana a condition of recollection,
although some logicians, like Vadi-Deva, do not accept this. It was mentioned
in the last chapter that Hemaeandra reconciles the two views regarding the
function of retention. He makes it both a factor in perceptual cognition and a
condition of recall. This raises the problem of the analysis of memory and the
function of retention in memory.
Psychological analysis of memory is representative. It is
the process of remembering objects of past experience. Perception, on the other
hand, is a preventative experience-the interpretation of sense impressions
produced by external stimuli. Sometimes, the word memory is used as synonymous
with retentiveness in general. But Stout says that this application of the term
is inconvenient. Retention is a factor involved in memory. It is, as was
stated, a condition of memory. “Memory is ideal revival, so far as ideal
revival is merely reproductive and does not involve transformation of what is
revived in accordance with present conditions.”‘ Hume has said that, when an
impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance as an
idea; and this it may do in two different ways. In its new appearance it
retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity. This he calls memory.
Retention is a condition of memory. In retention, the past experience is
retained in the form of mental traces or mental dispositions, (sanskaras). In
physiological terms, it leaves a structural modification in the brain owing to
the plasticity of the brain. However, retention is more mental. It is a
sanskara which is more cognitive in nature, as Hemacandra stated. The brain
cannot be the repository of past experience, as Mill and William James have
said. Bain says that the faculty called memory is “almost exclusively found in
the retentive power although sometimes aided by similarity.” Thus, retention
implies the power of preserving in the form of mental dispositions, past
perception.
In this sense, the Jaina philosophers called dharana a
condition of recollection. Hemacandra mentions it as a condition of memory. In
this sense also we can interpret the description of the three stages of
retention given in the Nandi. sutra and the Tattvartha. sutra Bhasya. The three
stages describe stages in the development of memory. The first, perceptual
experience, should continue to remain in the mind in some form. Without this,
recollection would not be possible. Retention is also a condition of recall.
The absence of lapse of experience is necessary for the revival of the
experience at a later stage. In the analysis of dharana in the second stage,
the cognition formed by avaya is retained. This later leads to recognition.
Jinabhadra describes the three stages of dharana as (i) the absence of lapse of
perception, (ii) the formation of a mental trace, and (iii) the recollection of
the cognition on future occasions. Hemacandra points out that perceptual
judgment, when protracted for some time, would become retention; and that is
the absence of the lapse of perception. But the absence of the lapse of
perception is also a condition of recall, because without the absence of the
lapse there would be no mental trace and there would be no recollection.
Retention, then, is not memory itself although it is a necessary condition of
memory, because recollection would not be possible without retention. Formation
of a mental trace is an important factor in retention. We have seen that
Hemacandra showed that, in a sense, retention can be described as a mental
trace, a samskara. It is a continued existence of a cognition for a definite or
indefinite length of time. He says that the mental trace, or samskara, is
cognitive in character. It is a species of cognition. The mental trace, or
sarhskara, may be compared to the mental disposition of the modern psychologists.
Some of these give a physiological picture of the mental disposition. They say
that past experiences are retained in the form of physiological dispositions.
They are not mental traces or mental dispositions. They are only structural
modifications of the brain. They are unconscious cerebration’s. In this sense,
retention would become merely
physiological in nature. It would be merely a neural habit. But this view is
not adequate. Past experiences are retained in five form of mental
dispositions, although physiological traces may also be there. Mere
physiological disposition cannot take the place of mental disposition. Mellone
says that they exist in the form of psychological (mental) dispositions, and
not merely in the form of physiological dispositions. Stout also maintains that
past experiences are retained in the form of mental dispositions which
constitute the mental structure. We have seen that 1-Iemacandra has made the
mental trace, or sanskara, of the
nature of cognition and not different from cognition as some philosophers, like
the Vaisesikas, suppose. If it were not cognition it would not produce
recollection, which is cognitive in nature, nor would it be an attribute of the
self.
Retention, then, can be
described as the mental trace, or sanskara by
which experiences cognized in a definite form by avsya are retained in the mind and they do not lapse. Such
retention of past experiences will form a condition of the recall of the
experience on a future occasion. Hunter writes, “retaining is a necessary
condition for remembering, for without it there would be nothing to remember.
Forgetting and retaining are related, for if there is failure to retain then
there must be forgetting.”
The second factor in memory is recollection. Very often,
recollection is considered to be a condition of memory, but it would be more
appropriate to say that recollection is a form in which memory expresses
itself. There is a distinction between recall and recollection. Hunter makes
this distinction very clear. For instance, if we remember a poem learnt
earlier, it would be recall. But, sometimes, in recalling the poem we remember
our personal experiences in learning it. We also remember the page on which the
poem was printed and the room in which we learned the poem. That would be
recollection. However, such a distinction is not necessary for our discussion.
We may take the word recollection in a broad sense as including recall. We may
sometimes term it as recall. Recollection may be termed as reproduction of past
experiences. It is the ideal revival of past cognitions which have been
retained in the form of mental dispositions. It is the revival of the original
experience. It is ideal revival, as Stout says, so far as it is merely
reproductive. Retention alone is not, therefore, a sufficient condition of
memory. Experiences retained have to be recalled before they become memory.
Every psychic process leaves behind some engram complexes which are conserved
in the mental structure of the individual and bring about changes in it. The
conserved elements are not the mere mass, but are organized wholes through
cohesion, as Drever writes. Such cohesion brings about force and facilitates
recall. Perceptual experiences are retained in the form of mental dispositions.
This is also Spearman’s Law of Retention. Thus, retention is a necessary
condition of recall. However, it is not itself recall and should not be
identified with recall. We have seen that in the Pramanamimarnsa also there is
a description of retention as a condition of recall.
Hemacandra describes the process of recollection. According
to him, it is smrti. It arises from the stimulation of mental dispositions, vasana, which may be considered to be
equivalent to samskara. Perception,
once experienced continues to remain in the mind in the form of an unconscious
mental trace, or an unconscious mental disposition. This is a latent condition
of memory. But when they are stimulated, they come to the surface of
consciousness and we recall the experiences which we once cognized and which
femained so far in the form of mental traces. Therefore, Hemacandra says that
the stimulation of the mental trace gives rise to recollection. The emergence
of the latent mental trace by stimulation then, constitutes a necessary condition
of recall. Unless the stimulation is present, recall is not possible.
According to the Naiyayikas, smrti is a form of qualified
perception and has reference to the direct presentation of some object,
although it involves an element of representation. In memory, there is a
revival of past experience in the form of ideas and images, in the same order
in which they were actually experienced by us and were retained by the soul.
The emergence of the mental trace to the conscious level
is, as seen, due to its stimulation. This stimulation is determined by
different conditions. The conditions for the emergence of the mental trace to
the conscious level may be classed into two types: (i) external conditions, and
(ii) internal conditions. The external conditions refer to environmental
factors. Observation of similar objects, for instance, is an external condition
necessary to arouse the mental trace to the level of conscious state. Mohanlal
Mehta, in his Jaina Ps vchology, has
mentioned that external conditions necessary for the fact of recalling may be
classed into three types, which represent the three laws of association: the
law of contiguity, the law of similarity, and the law of contrast.” The
recollection of an object experienced in the past refers to the object as
“that”, “that jar”, “that cloth”. Perception always refers to the present
datum, while recollection has a reference to the content as it existed in the
past.