It is only an adventitious
quality of the soul. In the state of ‘deliverance’, the soul is devoid of all
qualities including consciousness. Even the materialist Carvaka view says that
consciousness is the result o’- a combination of some circumstances
and material substances. Consciousness, for them, is an epiphenomenon, just a
product of nature produced like the intoxicating property of the drug when the
material elements are transferred into the physical body. It is said to arise
in the same way as the red colour is produced by the combination of the
betel-leaf, nut and lime, or is the result of mixing white and yeIlow. But Nyaya Vaisesikas do not deny the existence
of the soul. Modern epiphenomenalism maintains that consciousness is a
by-product of the physical and chemical changes going on in the body. It is
like the residue of a chemical action. It is like the whistle of a passing
train.
During his discussion with the Third Ganadhara, Lord
Mahavira answers the objections of the latter. He says that the presumption of
Vayubhuti seems to be that consciousness is produced from the collection (samudaya) of bhutas like earth and water. It is like the intoxication found in
the combination of the ghataki flowers
and jaggery, although it is not traceable in the components separately. If the
combination (samudaya) is destroyed,
the consciousness is destroyed. But, Mahavira points out that consciousness can
never exist in the collection if it is absent in the individual constituents as
oil cannot come out of particles of sand. But cetana
is the intrinsic quality of the soul residing in a group of bhutas, (elements). If it were only the
quality of all the elements taken together, it might also exist in a dead body.
Sometimes, consciousness arises without the working of the sense organs; and
sometimes, in spite of their working, the object is not apprehended. In the Samayasdra it is said that the mere presence
of the stimuli on the external environment, and even their coming into contact
with the sense-organs, may not be effective to produce a psychic state like the
consciousness. The presence of a psychic element, like selective attention,
determines the nature of the state. Consciousness, then, has none of the
characteristics that belong to any or all of the collection of knowable
objects. The Jainas do not accept the transcendental consciousness, with no
distinction between the ego and non-ego, of the idealists. According to Sari-Kara,
intelligence and self are identical. However,
the Jainas accept with the idealists that consciousness is unique and is not a
product of a concourse of conditions. It is eternal. The Jaina view comes
nearer to the view of consciousness presented by Ramanuja. The atman is eternal, and its natural quality of
consciousness is also eternal. It is cidrupa and also caitanya gunaka. The
self is filled with consciousness and has also consciousness for its quality. Ramanuja
tries to distinguish between the Nyaya Vaisesika view and the Samkara view.
Consciousness is not a non-eternal quality of the self, for, in that ease the
self hood would be unconscious. He also wants to avoid the identity of the self
and consciousness. And the Jainas also say that the self has consciousness as
its essence. Since the time of Leibnitz, consciousness is admitted to be an
accident of the mental representation and not its necessary, essential
attribute. His contention that the inner world is richer and more concealed was
well known to writers of the Upanisads. However, that consciousness as an
aspect of the mental life is a profound truth, is slowly to be realized.
The analysis of the states of consciousness has been an
important problem for philosophers as well as the psychologists. Consciousness
has three aspects-the cognitive, the affective and the conative. They are modes
of consciousness. In perceiving, believing or otherwise apprehending that such
and such a thing exists and has characteristics, one’s attitude is cognitive.
In the affective attitude one is either pleased or displeased about it. But one
is also active about it; tries to know more about it; tries to alter it in some
respect. This attitude is conative. But Stout says that though these three
modes of consciousness are abstractly and analytically distinct phases in a
concrete psychosis, they are not separable. They do not occur in isolation from
each other. Mind is an organic unity and its activities have the closest degree
of organic interaction. However, in every psychosis one of the aspects may be
predominant. In the pleasure of pursuit, feeling presupposes conation.
Sometimes, feeling is dependent on certain conative attitudes involved ill. the
perceptual process, Similar reciprocity is found in conation and cognition.
Indian thinkers were aware of the distinction of states in
consciousness. The Jainas recognize three forms of consciousness. They make a
distinction between consciousness as knowing, as feeling and as ex periencing
the fruits of karma (karma phala cetana), and willing. Conation and feeling are
closely allied. As a rule we have first feeling, next conation and then
knowledge. McDougall has emphasized that feeling is the core of all instinctive
activity. in fact, in all experience there is a core of feeling, while the
cognitive and conative aspects are varying factors. In the Aitareya Upanisad there is mention of
different modes of experience. Sensation, perception and ideation are different
modes of intellection. It recognizes feeling and volition as the other two
forms of experience. The seers of Upanisads give
a classification of seven mental functions. At the basis is intellection. The Chandogyoparrisad emphasizes the primacy of
the will. The Buddhists also recognized such a distinction. We have perception
and conception, feeling and affection, and conation or will. In the Buddhist
theory, will is the most dominant aspect of conscious experience, the basal
element of human life. Radhakrishnan in his Indian
Philosophy suggests that vijnana,
vedana and samskara roughly
correspond to knowledge, feeling and will. Chillers in his dictionary brings
the concept of conation under samskara. Mrs.
Rhys Davids believes that, although there is no clear distinction between
conation in the psychological sense and will in the ethical sense, still in the
Pithakas there is consistent
discrimination between psychological importance and ethical implication.s
Professor Stout has given up old tripartite classification of mental states and
reverts to the ancient bipartite analysis of mind bringing the affective and
conative elements together under the name of interest. Radhakrishnan says that,
if we discard the separation of cognition and make it the theoretical aspect of
conation, we get to the Buddhist emphasis on conation as the central fact of
mental life.
In the Nyayavaisesika theory
also there is a description of the manifestation of the three aspects of self as knowledge, desire and volition. We
have to know a thing before we feel the want of it. In order to satisfy the
want, we act. Thus, as Hiriyanna says, feeling mediates between cognition and
conation. Thus, the modes of consciousness have been the problem of
philosophers and psychologists. There is a general agreement regarding the
division of consciousness into three modes, although different philosophers
have emphasized different aspects in the concrete psychosis. Buddhists have
emphasized conation. In the Upanisads all
the aspects have received their due prominence. The primacy of the intellect is
emphasized in the Chartdogya and Maitreya Upanisads. In the Chandogya, again, we get a description of
the primacy of the will. But this has reference to the cosmic will rather than
to its psychological aspect. The Jainas emphasize the close relation between
conation and feeling. The Nyaya theory
describes the function of feeling as a mediating factor between cognition and
conation.
The term self-consciousness is very
ambiguous. It may me-u, consciousness of the self as an object given
in introspection. In this sense. the self, the
empirical ego, becomes both an aspect of experience and also an object of
experience. Self-consciousness may mean transcendental and. pure
self-consciousness. It is not an object of knowledge. It is the ultimate
subject presupposed in acts of knowledge. Again, consciousness may mean the
ultimate eternal consciousness, which is a metaphysical concept. It is also
used in the empirical sense as consciousness which is changing.4+) Some of the
earlier philosophers have not made a clear distinction between the metaphysical
and the psychological sense of consciousness. In the Upanisads,
atrnan is described as the basis and the ultimate presupposition
in all knowledge. It is the absolute knower: and bow can the knower itself be
known?’-’ It cannot be comprehended by intellect. It is the seer and the
l.n.ower. Yet, the atman can be known by higher
intuition. It is knowable as the pratyagatmanam, apprehended
by adhyatma yoga The
Buddhists recognize the distinction between subject and object within the
consciousness. They do not believe in the transcendental self. Their
view of consciousness is like the stream of consciousness of William James.
Yogacras believe that self is a series of cognition’s or ideas. There is no
self apart from cognition’s. They reveal neither the self nor the non-self.
Some Nyaya philosophers, especially the neo-Naiyayikas,
believed that self is an
object of internal perception, manasa pratyaksa. The Vais’esikas
also maintain that, although the self is not
an object of perception but of inference, it can be apprehended by Yogic
intuition. The Sarnkhya philosophers maintain that
consciousness is the essence of self: It is
self-luminous. Self is inferred through its
reflection in buddhi. But Ptanjali accepts the
supernormal intuition of the self through
the power of Loncemtration. The self can know itself through its reflection in
its pure sattva and also when :nixed with rajas and tannins
by supernormal, intuition (pratibha
jitana). So, the pure self can know
the empirical self, out the empirical self cannot
know the pure self. There is the contradiction involved in the self being both
subject and object and the reflection theory does not much improve the
situation. Vacaspati tries to avoid the contradiction by saying that
transcendental self is the subject, and the empirical self
the object, of self-apprehension.
According to Prabhakara, self is
necessarily known in every act of cognition. Cognition is self-luminous. It not
only manifests itself, but also supports the atman,
much as the flame and the wick. Neither the self nor the object is self-luminous. There can be
consciousness of an object without the consciousness of the self. In every act
of cognition there is a direct and immediate apprehension of the self. But the
self can never be known as object of knowledge. It is only to be known as a
subject. It is revealed by triputa samvit.
The Jainas hold with Prabhakara that cognition is always
apprehended by the self: Cognition reveals itself, the self and its object.
Every act of cognition cognizes itself, the cognizing subject and the cognized
object. But the Jaina denies that consciousness alone is self-luminous. He
regards self as non-luminous. Self is the subject of internal perception. When
I feel that I am happy I have a distinct and immediate apprehension of the
self’ as an object of internal perception, just as pleasure can be perceived
though it is without form. “Oh Gautama”, said Nlahaivira, “the self is
prcrtyakser even to you. The soul is cognizable even to you.” Again, unlike the
view of Prabhakara, the Jainas hold that it is the object of perception and, it
is manifested by external and internal perception. To the question Tow can the
subject be an object of perception?’, the Jaina replies that whatever is
experienced is an object of perception.
William James made a distinction between the empirical
self, the me, and the transcendental self; the I. The self is partly the known
and partly the knower, partly object and partly subject. The empirical ego is
the .self as known, the pure ego is the knower. “It is that which at any moment
is conscious”. Whereas the me is only one of the things which it is conscious
of. But this thinker is not a passing
state. It is something deeper and less mutable. 45 Prof. Ward holds that the pure self is always immanent in
experience, in the sense that experience without the expedient will be
unintelligible. It is also transcendental,. in the sense that it can never be
the object of our experience. The Jainas were aware that consciousness of self
is not possible by ordinary cognition. Therefore, they said, it is due to
internal perception.
Self-consciousness does not belong to the realm of pure
consciousness which is foundational and without limitation. That is the cetana
which is the essential quality of the soul. But when we descend to the
practical level, the realm of vyavahara, we find the distinction between
subject and object in consciousness. The question whether the self is perceived
by direct experience like the internal perception of the Jainas, or by the
immediate intuition, ( pratibha jiuiua) of the Vedantins, is raised as a
consequence of this distinction. In all this, the question is answered from the
empirical point of view. On this basis, we may say that there are two aspects
of consciousness: (a) pure and transcendental consciousness, and (b) empirical
consciousness. Atman pure consciousness. Jim is consciousness limited by the
organism. Atman is the subject of consciousness. It is also the object of
internal perception, but only in the sense that it is immanent in consciousness
though not clearly cognized as
object. Jim is both the
subject and the object of consciousness, because it is the cognizer as well as
the cognized.
Now we come to the idea of the unconscious. The idea of the
unconscious has become very important in modern psychology and has been
popularized by the Freudians. In fact, it has developed in its two aspects-the
metaphysical and the psychological. Plato, in his Charmides, states in the wake
of a Socratic dictum, that knowledge of the self consists in what one knows and
what one does not know. Psychologically, the idea of the unconscious has
developed along with that of the conscious. Montague speaks of desires and
thoughts as being imperceptible. Leibnitz speaks of unconscious mental states.
Kant mentioned the ‘dark’ percepts of which we are not aware. Hamilton analysed
the unconscious into three degrees of latency. In recent times, psycho-analysis
has given a systematic theory of the unconscious. Freud arrived at the theory
of the unconscious by his study of hysterical patients and analysis of dreams.
Mental life for him has two parts, the conscious, which is the organ of
perception, and the unconscious. The unconscious is ordinarily inaccessible. It
is that which is not conscious. It is the depth which contains all the
dynamically repressed wishes, mainly sexual in nature. Freud analyses the
causation of neurosis and interprets dreams with the help of the unconscious.
Even normal forgetting is explained on these lines. Harman’s unconscious is a
metaphysical principle. It is the absolute principle, the force which is
operative in the inorganic, the organic and the mental alike. It is the unity
of idea and will. It exists independently of space, time and existence.
The Jaina thinkers were aware of the unconscious, although
a clear scientific formulation was not possible for them in those times owing
to lack of experimental investigations. Nandisutra gives a picture of the
unconscious in the mallaka drstanta, (example of the earthen pot). A man takes
an earthen pot from the potter and pours a drop of water into it. The water is
absorbed. Then he goes on pouring drop after drop continuously. After some
time, when many drops have been absorbed, a stage will come when the water
begins to be visible. This example gives a clear picture of the vast depth of
the unconscious which absorbs all our wishes and ideas, although the example
was meant to explain the process of avagraha.
Buddhist psychology recognizes the unconscious life. It is called vidhimutta, while vidhicitta is the waking consciousness. The two are divided by a
threshold of consciousness, manodvara. Similarly,
bhavanga subjectively viewed is
subconscious existence, though objectively it is sometimes taken to mean nirvana. Mrs. Rhys Davids says that the consciousness is only an
intermittent series of psychic throbs associated with a living organism beating
out their coming-to-know through one brief span of life. Similarly,
the idea of the unconscious is implicit in the conception of the four states of
consciousness in the various schools of Indian thought. In the Mancfukyopattisad we get a description of
waking, dreaming, dreamless sleep, and the highest stage, turlya. In the dreaming and dreamless states
of sleep there is the implicit awareness of the self. All the orthodox systems
of Indian thought accept this distinction of the levels of consciousness. This
implies the presence of the unconscious state of which we are not at the moment
aware.
In modern psychology, the idea of the unconscious underwent
modifications at the hands of Jung. Jung used the word unconscious in a wider
sense. He made a distinction between the personal unconscious and the
collective unconscious. The personal unconscious contains repressed wishes,
forgotten memories and all that is learned unconsciously. Deeper than the
personal unconscious is the collective or racial unconscious, the common
groundwork of humanity out of which each individual develops his personal and
unconscious life. The collective unconscious is inherited in the structure of
the organism including the brain structure which predisposes the individual to
think and act as the human race has thought and acted through countless
generations. The collective unconscious includes the instincts and also the
archetypes. Archetypes are the primordial ways of thinking submerged in the
waking life. An archetype becomes an idea when it is made conscious. The new
discoveries in science and the creative work of scientists arise out of this
treasure-house of primordial images. ‘J There is nothing to prevent us from
thinking that certain archetypes exist even in animals. They are grounded in
the peculiarities of the living organism itself; therefore, they are direct
expressions of life whose nature cannot be further explained.
The doctrine of karma presented
by Indian thinkers and systematically worked out by the Jainas may be aptly
compared to the collective or racial unconscious of Jung, more specially of the
archetypes of the collective unconscious, although the karma theory has a metaphysical flavour. The Jainas have given a
more elaborate and scientific theory of kartria.
The law of karma is the
ultimate determinant of various courses of life bath physical and mental. In
fact, our physical stature and our birth in particular social surroundings is
the result of the karma we have
accumulated. The kannic matter goes on
accumulating with the deeds we do. The innate faculty of the soul is obscured
by the particles of karma as the
luminous light of the sun is obscured by the veil of clouds or by fog. This
obscuration is beginningless although it has an end. The karma that binds us is both physical and
psychical in nature. The physical karma is
material in nature, while the psychical karma
comprises those psychic effects and states which are produced in the
soul owing to the influx of the physical
karma. Karmic atoms are classified into eight types. Ji7anavarniya
karma obscures true cognitive faculties. Darsana rvarwiya karma obscures the intuitive faculty. Monaniya karma deludes us. Similarly,
specific types of karma determine our
age, our physique, the states, and even the power and activity of life. The
force of karma works implicitly and
makes us what we are in both body and mind. Thus, it was suggested, the
operation of karma can be compared to
the operation of the collective or racial unconscious. The collective
unconscious stands for the objective psyche. In his more recent essays, Jung
writes: “The contents of archetypal character are manifestations of a process
in the collective unconscious. Hence, they do not refer to anything that is or
has been conscious, but to something essentially unconscious”. Elsewhere,
Jung writes that the personal layer ends at the earliest memories of infancy,
but the collective layer comprises the pre-infantile period that is the residue
of ancestral life. It contains the archetypes of very ancient images. He says
that it is possible to find the karmic factor
in the archetypes of the unconscious. “The karma
aspect is essential to the deeper understanding of the nature of an
archetype”. It is sometimes
suggested that the comparison between the operation of karma and that of the collective unconscious is inadequate. There
is no question of common inheritance except in the physical make up. Each
individual has his peculiar karma prakrti, which
cannot be derived from common inheritance. It may, however, be pointed out that
the archetypes do refer to the common heritage that each individual shares with
his community.
However, Jung developed the concept of the collective
unconscious on the psychological plane with reference to the psycho-analytical
study of the interpretation of dreams and fantasy. From this side, the archteypes are fundamental patterns of symbol
formation. Had he developed the archetypes of the collective unconscious, he
would have reached the doctrine of karma,
the store-house of the physical and
psychical effects of the past. He Would have realized that the force of the
unconscious is the force of karma which determines the future course of life.
The metaphysical state of the
unconscious has been an equally important problem for the philosophers. In the
development of Indian thought three distinct views can be stated: (i) there is
no entity such as consciousness. The unconscious alone exists. This is the view
presented by the materialists. This view is associated with the Carvaka view.
(ii) Consciousness alone exists. There is nothing like the unconscious. This
view is expressed by the monistic idealists of the Vedanta. The Vedantist
believes that there is nothing but consciousness, or the cit, which
wrongly superimposes unconsciousness upon itself by making an object of itself
The unconscious is created by the process of self-objectification. The
appearance of the pure consciousness is due to its reflection in its limiting
adjuncts. The pure cit wrongly identifies itself with the varying forms of the
limiting adjuncts, as the moon in the water appears shaking because of the
water shaking.
Similarly, the all-pervading cit may be
limited by manas, buddhi and ahamkara,
as the akasa which,
though unbounded, is spoken of as bound according as it takes the form of a jug
or a cloud. The unconscious is only the self-limitation of the limitless.
Again, some Vedantists maintain that the unconscious is due to the limitation
of consciousness through the nescience of avidya, and
discriminative knowledge removes this veil of the unconscious, as the son of
Kunti was known as the son of Radha and was believed to belong to a low caste
because he was brought up in such a family.s
However, the Vedantin accepts that from the practical point of view, things
exist outside our consciousness and there exists a realm of unconscious in our
midst. But it is due to the fact that our consciousness has not yet attained
its highest stage of possibility. But when the range of consciousness is so
widened as to include the realm of the subconscious and the unconscious, then
it becomes identical with the universal consciousness in which there is nothing
except itself. Thus the unconscious is only the receding and vanishing point of
consciousness which alone exists as a permanent reality. This is the picture of
the monists.
The duelists maintain that
consciousness and the unconscious exist side by side and independently. This is
the view of the Sarhkhya and the Yoga philosophy.
Purusa is conscious and prakrti is
unconscious. They meet to create experience. The purusa is
reflected in the buddhi which is unconscious,
just as a face is reflected in a mirror. Vijnanabhiksu maintains that the
reflection is mutual, because the buddhi is
reflected back in the purusa. The unconscious buddhi seems to
be conscious owing to its proximity to the conscious purusa. But the Jaina
philosophers have shove some of the defects of this theory. Acarya Hemacandra
has said of the Sarnkhya Yoga doctrine that in it consciousness does not know
objects, the buddhi is unconscious and what else
would be more self contradictory than this ? Vidyanandi says that, the purusa
being of the nature of non knowledge, how could Kapila be the instructor of
truth even like one in deep sleep? The prakrti is also unconscious and like a
jar it cannot fulfill the function of instruction. The Jaina admits with the
Vedantin the possibility of pure consciousness at least in the final state of
emancipation. because consciousness is the very essence of the soul. Even in
the stage of bondage there is not a single moment in which the self ceases
to be conscious. Bondage is the limitation of consciousness by means of the
veil of karma and what comes through the channel of the senses. Karma is the
unconscious principle which veils right knowledge and right intuition.
Ignorance and delusion are not, then, innate but are produced through the
influx of karma. The senses are rather handicaps than instruments of knowledge.
In omniscience, the self and its consciousness are released from its barriers
and the self attains omniscience. However,
the Jainas do not believe that the limitation to consciousness is illusory. It
is a fact in the empirical world.
In Western thought, Hartmann gave
importance to the unconscious. He said that the human mind is determined by the
‘unconscious in love’, ‘unconscious in feeling’ and the ‘unconscious in
character and morality’. For him, the unconscious is the absolute principle
active in all things, the force which is operative in the inorganic, organic
and mental alike yet not revealed in consciousness. It is the unity of
unconscious representations and will, the idea and the will. The unconscious
exists independently of space, time and individual existence, timeless before
the being of the world. For us, it is the unconscious in itself; it is the
superconscious.
Note on
Pasyatta
The ancient Jaina literature describes
upayoga and along with it, also mentions pasyatta. Prajnapanasutra recognizes a
peculiar mental force called pasatraya, which is rendered as pasattya in
Sanskrit. There is a description which states that both upayoga and pcrsarraya
can be sakara and anakara. It means that jrancl and
darsana belong to both pasyatta and upayoga. Pasyatta originally corresponded
to drs and now connotes prolonged vision’ with reference to determinate
knowledge; and clear vision with reference to intuition.
Distinguishing between upayoga and pasyatta,
the commentator Malayagiri says that sakara
upayoga consists of five classes of knowledge mati,
sruta, avadhi, manah-paryaya and kevala
jnana, and also three types of wrong cognition: kumati,
kusracta and avadhi-ajnancr; while sakara
pasyatta consists of six classes because mati-jnana
and mati-ajnana, are not
included in them. Similarly, anakara Upayoga is darsana. It has four
types: caksudarsana (visual), acaks.
edarsarta (intuition which is due to the mind and other sense organs
except the eyes), avadhi darsana and kevaladarsana.
Anakara pas ether, on the other hand, consists
only of three classes, because crackups
darsana, which is devoid of clear
vision, cannot possess pasyattjj. Pas,
atta thus means prolonged vision or
clear vision. However, the clear meaning is not stated, although their
sub-divisions are mentioned. The distinction between upcryoger and
pasta and their sub-divisions cannot be dismissed as mere fancy of the ancient
philosophers. We have analysed upayoga
as horme, the psychic force in life.
Similarly, it would be possible to say that the ancient Jaina philosophers were
aware of the psychic force which holds our experience and which later becomes,
the basis for new experience. Mneme is the first general property of the mind.
It is the power of the mind by which the past is retained. Ross says that it is
the general truth of living organisms that all life processes leave behind the
modification of structure, both in the individual and the racial sense. In our
mental structure are conserved the after-effects of all our individual
experiences and probably many of the experiences of our ancestors also. The
same idea is incorporated in the theory of Anamnesis in Plato’s Dialogues Meno.
Knowledge is attained by the recollection in
one’s life of realities and truths seen and known by the soul before its
incarnation, But Mneme is not to be identified with memory, although memory is
possible through the anemic force, which is wider than memory. Memory is mneme
raising to the level of awareness. ‘When I recognize my friend in the street I
do not say that I remember his face; but again my recognition is possible in
virtue of past experience in which my friend has figured, and it is therefore a
manifestation of mneme’. It is possible that lower animals have the power of
rename. In the lower animals also it operates both in the individual and the
racial sense. Birds build their nests after the racial pattern and they cross
the sea at particular places.
From the analysis of mneme given above, it appears that
similar ideas, though in a more simple manner, must have influenced the Jaina
philosophers to point out the presence of pasyatta
as distinct from upayoga, which
is the life force for conscious experience. In the divisions of pas’ yatta given by Malayagiri, it is mentioned
that pasyatta has no mati jnana and mati ajnana as its forms. Mati-jnana
is direct sense experience which arises from the contact of the sense
organs with an object, although knowledge due to mind is also included in mati-jnana. Hence, pasyatta would not include the formation of direct sense
experience, although other forms of experience are included. Therefore, it
would not be inappropriate to say that pasyatts
is the power of the mind by which we retain our experiences and which
becomes the basis for more experiences. However, we should not forget the fact
that the ancient Jaina philosophers, as all other ancient Indian philosophers,
were not clearly aware of the psycho logical significance of the problem.
Theirs was insight and philosophic speculation.
CHAPTER
IV
THE SENSE ORGANS AND THE
SENSES
The soul gets embodied through the accumulation of karma. Then starts the wheel of samsara The embodied soul comes into contact
with the objects of the world and tries to grasp the nature of things through
the specialized sources of the body. They are the sense organs. The Jaina
thinkers, like other ancient philosophers of India, recognized two varieties of
comprehension-sensory and extra-sensory. Sensory comprehension is conditioned
by the senses and the mind, whereas extra-sensory comprehension occurs directly
in the pure consciousness. Sensory comprehension is possible through the sense
organs. The sense organs are very often considered as windows through which the
soul cognizes the external world. In Ganadharavada
we get a description of the process of cognition as coming out through
the senses, as Devadatta looks through the five windows of his palace.’ Pancastikayasara describes the function of
the sense in a similar way. The sense organs are denoted by the word indriya, and indriya refers to the instrumental nature of the source of
knowledge. There are two ways in which the word indriya can be looked at. hrdriya
is referred to as the capacity of experience: it is paramaisvarya upabhoga samartha. It is also
referred to as that through which experience is possible: idvate iti indriyam. The Jaina philosophers
called such cognition paroksa jnana (indirect
knowledge), because it comes through the sense organs, which are different from
the soul. Later, it began to be called samvyavahnrai
prat yaksa. The
Jainas considered that the indriyas are
impediments to the attainment of pure consciousness and also to the
purification of the soul. Indriyas are
the source through which karma can
flow in, and the source of empirical cognition. In the Upanisads, the nature and function of the sense organs have been
described. The Atrnan was first alone.
He knew, He was self-conscious. Then he became embodied. The sense organs
became instruments through which experience is possible. Regarding the number
of sense organs, Prajapati is said to have described sixteen parts of the body.
In the Prasna Upanisad the parts are
enumerated. The iudriyas are
considered as one. The Swetasvatara Ulanisad also
gives such a classification. The distinction between the sense organs, jiianendriyas, and motor organs, karrnendriyas, was
made later. The name of indriya for an organ of sense was first mentioned in
the Kausitaki Upanisad. In the Persona Upanishad the ten indriyas were
subordinated to the mana as the central organ. In the Maitri Upanisad, the
jiianendriyas are described as the five reins; the motor organs
(karmerldriyas), are the horses; manas is the driver; prakrti is the whip; F the
vocal organ, the prehensive organ, the locomotive organ, tile evacuative organ
and the generative organ are the five karmendriyas.
The Buddhists recognize six varieties
of consciousness, visual, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and purely mental.
Then there are six asrayas, the repositories of the functions of the senses. They
are the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactual organs, and also the
mind. The five sense organs are made up of the five elements.
But, following the tradition of the
Upcrni, sadic thought as in the Prasna and Maitri, the Sarhkhya philosophers
mentioned the organs and manas, which are instruments of the soul for
experience and activity. They have mentioned five sense organs, five motor
organs, and manas. Sometimes,
thirteen organs are mentioned, including ahamkara and buddhi. In that case,
mind, nhamkara, and buddhi are the internal organs, called antahkarana, and the
other ten are the external organs. The sense organs are not the products of
gross matter but of ahariakara. Aharhkara is psycho-physical in nature. The
functions of the sense organs are sensory in nature. They are concerned with
getting experience. They are, therefore, called jnanendriyas. The function of
the motor organs is bodily activity. They are, therefore, called karmemdriyas.
The functions of the two can be compared to the afferent and efferent nervous
systems. In the evolution. of life from aharikara, the manas, the sense organs
and the motor organs are developed out of the preponderance of sattva. The
‘Tanmatrns’ are due to tamas. Rajas is the force which gives impetus to sattva
and tamas. But Vijnanabhiksu says that mind alone is due to sattva, while the
sense organs and the motor organs have evolved out of Rajas. The internal
organs are described as the main gate-keepers, while external sense organs are
the subordinate gate-keepers.
Sarhkara accepts the view that there
are eleven organs (indriyas): five sense organs (jnanendriyas), five motor
organs (karmendriyas), and one internal organ (antahkarana). The antahkaraya
assumes different forms according to the diverse functions it takes. For
instance, the function of manas is doubt, the function of buddhi is
determination. Ahamkara is ego consciousness, and citta is concerned with
recollection. The five sense organs are made of elements like earth, water,
air, fire and akasa. The sattvic part is predominant in the jnanendriyas. The
rajas part predominates in the karmendriyas. The internal organs are made
up of the sattvic part and the five elements combined.
The Jainas have accepted the five
sense organs alone, although the mind is considered as a quasi-sense organ, a
no-indriya. The motor organs are recognized as instruments of experience and
behaviour. The Jainas argue that, if motor organs were to be recognized as
bidriyas only because they are instruments of special types of physical
function, then the number of indriyas would have to be extended indefinitely. The Jainas treat as indriyas only those
which are the conditions of specific cognition. Zimmer says that, according to
the Jainas, the life monads enjoying the highest states of being, hzaman or
divine, are possessed of five sense faculties as well as of a thinking faculty
(manas), and the span of life (ayus), physical strength (kaya bala), power of
speech(vaca bala), and the power of respiration (svasochvasa bala). In the
Samkhya Yoga and the Vedanta systems, five faculties of action (karmendriyas),
are added to the five sense faculties. The karwendriya are analogous to the
Jaina idea of bala. ‘Apparently, the Jaina categories represent a comparatively
primitive archaic analysis and description of human nature, many of the details
of which underlie and remain incorporated in the later classic Indian view’.
The Nyaya system has similar arguments
against the recognition of motor organs as indriyas. Jayanta maintains that if
the tongue, hands and feet etc., are regarded as indriyas, many other organs
should also be admitted as such. The function of swallowing food is discharged
by the throat. The breast performs the function of embracing. The shoulders
carry burden. All these should, then, be recognized as organs or indriyas., Again, the function of one sense organ cannot be
discharged by another. For instance, visual cognition is not possible without
eyes. But that is not the case with motor organs. A person grasps things with
his hands, but can also walk a little with his hands. If the different parts of
the body doing different functions are included among motor organs, the throat,
the breast and the shoulders would all be motor organs. The Jainas made the
same point. In fact, the Jainas say that all motor organs can be included in
the tactual sense organ.
Even in the West, the problem of
classification of the sense organs has been very old. It very often depends on
the view taken of the sensations originating in the skin and the internal
organs of the body. Traditionally, there are five special senses: vision,
-audition, smell, taste, and touch or feeling. Aristotle mentioned the five
senses, although he expressed some doubt about touch as a single sense. Current popular
usage is in the Aristotelian tradition. However, at different times, specially
of recent years, the list has been expanded. The ‘extra’ senses have come out
of the sense of feeling by the process of sub-division. Boring, listing the
sense qualities of feeling, includes pressure and other factors in the sense of
feeling. In the history of classification of the senses, there have
been in general three logically distinct approaches. They may be grouped
together (i) qualitatively, on the basis of observational similarity: (ii)
stimulus-wise, with respect to the object or forms of physical energy that
logically set them off; and (iii) anatomically, in accordance with the system
of sense organs. Gelded says that the anatomical basis seems to provide the best
organizational principle. For instance, we could talk of the sense of green and
the sense of grey, but since we know that the production of these qualities is
the work of a single anatomical unit, the eye, we are accustomed to group the
two classes of sense experiences together as visual.
Modern physiology maintains that all movement is due to the
activity of the muscles. Muscles are made of bundles of contractile fibers by
which movements are effected. There are three types of muscles: (i) skeletal
muscles, (ii) smooth muscles, and (iii) cardiac muscles. Cardiac muscles are
controlled by the nervous system, and are located in the heart. Skeletal
muscles have a much wider distribution. They are attached to the bones of the
skeleton, making bodily movement possible. Smooth muscles are found in many of
the internal organs, as in the stomach walls and in the iris of the eye. Reflex
and voluntary movements are possible because of muscles. In man, muscles are
controlled by the nervous system. The nervous system consists of a mechanism
for perceiving change in the environment, and another for reacting to the
environment.l Thus, all physiological functions are possible owing to the
stimulation of the afferent nervous system which reacts through efferent nerves
by using the muscles and tendons in its activity. In this sense, it could well
be said that all physical functions may arise out of the sense of touch. In
invertebrate animals like the protozoa, the chemical sense seems to be the only
sense for all experience and activity. Scientists are not agreed on the
question whether these animals show reactions owing to the chemical sense or to
the mechanical stimulation. Schaeffer thinks that it is due to mechanical
stimulation. Metalnikov believes that the discrimination is a chemical one. The
same problem continues to vex scientists in the case of animals like the
coelenterates, flat worms, annelids, molluscs even up to the insect level.
Thus, we find that in the case of the lower animals, especially the
invertebrates, the sense of touch appears to be predominant and to be the
source of all experience and activity.
The Jaina philosophers, as pointed out earlier, showed that
all motor organs can be reduced to experiences due to the sense of touch.
However, this does not mean that the ancient Jaina philosophers scientifically
annalysed the physiological processes of motor responses. Knowledge of
physiology had not developed to the stage required for such analysis. But their
insight showed them that all bodily functions including those of speech,
excretion and reproduction, are reducible to muscular movement due to the
nervous stimulation and response.
It is for this reason that the senses were regarded as
mutually identical when looked at from the standpoint of unity of substance.
They had all of them fundamental identity. All of them involved neural
responses. But this identity is not absolute. They were regarded as numerically
different from another point of view. Their specific functions were different.
This attitude is due to the catholic outlook of the Jainas, which made them
ready to accept all correct points of view, however they differed from their
own. This is due to the anekanta vada of
the Jainas. If the sense organs were identical, then the organ of touch would experience
taste and the rest also. In that case, the other organs would be superfluous.
Further, the perfection of, or partial injury to, one organ would similarly
affect the other sense organs. Similarly, if the difference between the sense
organs were absolute, they could not possibly cooperate in giving a synthetic
judgment, like ‘I see what I touch’.
For instance, we very often get an experience like, ‘I see the ice
is cold’.
But we cannot attribute to the ancient Jaina philosophers
experimental acumen in the physiological and psychological analysis of the
nature of sense organs. This analysis was more from the metaphysical point of
view. The Jainas accepted the identity and also the diversity of the sense
organs because of their logical outlook. Their non-absolutist anekanta attitude to the problems of life
gave them insight to find the truth in the different views presented. Thus, the
analysis of the sense organs presented by the Jaina philosophers was more a
result of philosophic insight that, of scientific analysis. However, it cannot
be denied that the analysis comes nearer to the description of the senses and
their distinctions given by the modern physiologists, although the Jainas were
not aware of the experimental and analytic basis required for such a
description.
The Jaina analysis of the structure
and functions of the sense organs is unique and deserves study with reference
to the problems of modern physiology. It is not possible for us to go into the
details of the analysis of the sense organs in the light of the discoveries of
modern physiology, as it would be outside the scope of the present work.
However, a brief survey of such comparative analysis is necessary.
The senses are called indriyas
because they have been produced by indra, which
means karma. They are the manifestations of
namakarma, which is the karma which determines the nature and composition of
our organism. The nama-karma determines what body we
shall get, whether a human body or the body of a lower animal. Similarly, the
physiological defects of individuals are due to this karma. The
nature and functions of the sense organs are determined by the nama karma. The
sense organs serve as organs of perception of objects for a soul which is
polluted with karma. The soul in a state of such pollution would not be able to
get the direct knowledge due to its own nature and pure consciousness, for it
is clouded by the knowledge-obscuringjnanavarayya-and
intuition-obscuring-darsanavaraniya karma. In such an embodied state of the
soul, experience and knowledge are possible only through the instrumentality of
sense organs. Therefore, sense organs are the means through which empirical
knowledge is possible.
According to the Jainas there are five
sense organs like the tactual, the gustatory, the olfactory, the visual, and
the auditory. Each of these has its own characteristic capacity of experiencing
touch, taste, smell, colour, and sound. Each of these organs is structurally of
two parts, the physical and the psychical. The physical part of the sense
orgait is called dravyendriya. The psychical part is
called bhavendriya. The physical part of the sense organs is caused by the rise
of the corresponding nama-karma. The psychical part of the
sense organs is caused by the destruction and subsidence of the
knowledge-obscuring karma, jhanavaraiziya karma. Each of
these two parts is again sub-divided in two parts as: dravyen,
driya is divided into (i) nivmtti and (ii) upalcarana.
Nivrtti is the organ itself and upakarana is the
protective physical cover like the eye-lid in the case of the eye. Each of
these two, again, is sub-divided in two parts: atitarriga and
balziraga-internal and external. The internal part (antaranga), is very often
talked of as soul its if. It is to be identified with the psychic element which
is necessary for any experience. It permeates the whole sense organ. Bahiranga
(the external sense part), is the material which is permeated by the psychic
element. In the case of upakarana, the protective cover like the eye-lid is the
bahiranga. The matter immediately
surrounding the eye may be identified with the antaranga of the physical part
of the sense organ, although it is possible to say that in all cases the antararga refers to the psychic element
present in the sense organs and necessary for sense experience. However, it
would be more appropriate to speak of the antaranga
of the material sense organ in terms of the material only; and, in that
sense, it would be apter to say that the antaranga
of the dravyendriya refers to
the matter that is inside the sense organ and is permeated by the psychic
element. For instance, we compare this to the cornea of the eye. In fact, we
may also include the vitreous humour in the eye.
The bhavendriya, the
psychic part of the sense organ, is also divided into two parts: (i) labdhi, and (ii) upayoga. Labdhi is the manifestation of the specific sense
experience due to the destruction and subsidence of the knowledge-obscuring karma. In fact, it may be said to refer to
the removal of the psychic impediments which have to be eliminated if sense
experience is to be possible. These impediments are not physical. like
insufficiency of light in the case of vision, but psychic, in the case of the
sense experience itself. (Upayoga is
the psychic force determining the specific sense experience coming out of the
contact of the specific sense organ with the object of stimulation. It is the
force of horme operating in all psychic life and especially operating in a
specific way in the determination of the sense experience. The word horme has
been used earlier as the psychic force which determines our experience and
behaviour. This force operates in a specific sense experience, like sight,
hearing, smell, taste and touch. Although upayoga
is the common force necessary for all these experiences, it gives rise
to different experiences in the different senses, because it gets specific
expressions from the physiological and psychic conditions differently
presented. A general table of the distinction of the structure of the sense
organs is given in table . It is based on the analysis of the structure of the
sense organs as given by the Jainas. The details of the structure are worked
out on the basis of the description given by Umasvati in Tattvarthasutra Chapter II.
Thus, the Jainas make a distinction between the physical
structure and the psychic element involved in the sense organs. The physical
part is the organ itself, It is the physiological instrument through which the
individual receives the sense impressions. The outer part of the structure is
the protective organ. It also facilitates the reception of the external
stimulation. The internal part of the structure refers to the sensory nerves
and the humours as in the case of the eye.
It is the antaranga. Nivrtti
is the internal physiological composition of the
sense organ. Upayoga is the hormic force which is responsible for the sense
experience. Labdhi is the
manifestation of the horme in order to produce a specific sense experience
under suitable psychic and physiological conditions.
The Jainas have given a detailed analysis of the structure
of the different sense organs. For instance, the internal part of the sense of
hearing is like the kadarnba flower or
like a ball of flesh, mamsa gola-kara. The internal eye is of the size of a
grain of corn, dhanya masurakara. The
sense organ of smell is like a flower, mukta kusuma candra. The organ of taste is like the edge of a knife. The sense
of touch is of various forms. Similar descriptions can be given regarding the upakarana or protective cover of the organ.
For instance, the external part of the organ of taste consists of a collection
of clear particles of matter, svecchatara pudgala
samuha.
The spread-outness of the sense organs is another problem
mentioned by the Jainas. The eye is the smallest. The organ of hearing is also
small, but it is bigger than the eye. Sometimes it expands when it hears loud
sounds. The organ of smell occupies the largest space. However, it is limited
in extent. If it were unlimited in extent, experience of smell would be
possible even when the object
touches any part of the
body. But this is not the fact. The organ of taste has greater extent, although
it is still limited, angula mita. However, the sense organ of touch is
unlimited in extent. It pervades the whole body. It is sarira vyapaka. Thus the
sense of touch is considered by the Jainas as primary in one more sense. It is
possible in any part of the body.
Modern psychologists point out that the sense organ of
touch is really unlimited in extent, because it gives rise to various sense
experiences like pressure, temperature and organic pain. In fact, even the
internal parts of the organism give us experiences which are reducible to the
experience due to tactile stimulation. Organic pains like stomach-ache are, in
fact, species of the experience of touch. In this sense, all sense experiences
can be reduced to the tactile sense experience. The Jainas can be said to be
justified in giving primacy to the sense of touch.
The Jaina description of the different parts of the organs
may well be compared to the description of the sense organs given by modern
physiologists, although the latter have given an accurate and detailed analysis
of the structure of sense organs based on experimental investigations. We may,
however, note that experimental investigation was
[Please this table see file
name ‘wide table page no. 13,57,73’]
not possible in those days.
Modern physiologists say that the vision is far more complex than any other
sense organ.. We may take the example of the anatomy of the human eye for
comparison. Fig. shows the comparative
picture of the anatomy of the human eye according to the modern physiological
and the Jaina view. The outer layer
[Eye
Photo]
DRAVYENDRIYA
BAHIRANGA ANTARANGA
Upakarana
includes
protective cover. Includes
aqueous humour and
Includes eyelids and
sclerotic coat. choroid coat.
Nivrtti
of Dravyerzdriya is compared to the matter that surrounds the internal part. Iris may be
included in this.
Shows the physiological internal
composition of the sense organ. It includes retina, vitreous humour and lens.
of the material sense organ of
the eye consists of a tough resistant material which is termed sclera. This
material gives substance to the eye-ball. The most forward part of the sclera is transparent. It is called
cornea. It is a tough resistant material which permits the passage of light
rays and protects the eye. The eye-lids and the sclera may together be compared to the outer protective cover
of the structure of the dravyendriya.
It is the upakarana of
the eye. In fact, eyelids are the outer part and the cornea is the inner part.
On the inside of the back is the retina which is most important. It is a system
of highly specialized nerve cells. The cells are receptors sensitive to light.
The
image is
focussed upon. this layer. The retina consists of two types of nerve cells,
rods and cones. Then we have the lens, which is transparent, consisting of a
semi-solid substance enveloped by a thin capsule. .Just in front of the leans
is the thin muscular layer of the iris. It has an opening at the center through
which the light rays may pass. This circular aperture is the pupil of the eye.
The lens, the iris and the pupil can be compared to the nivrtti,
specially to the external part of the nivrtti.
The retina and the vitreous humour may be compared to the
internal part of the nivrtti. Similarly, the aqueous humour
between the cornea and the lens may also be included in this.
The physiologists do not account for the psychic part of the sense organ which has been called bhavendriya. It refers to the psychic factors which are necessary conditions for the sense organs giving the sense experience. The basic psychological factor required for the sense experience of the specific sense organ is the psychic force, the horn, which has been called the upayoga. This force is operating in all experience and behaviour and is responsible for the specific sense experience.