THE FOURTH GANADHARA: VYAKTA

ARE THE FIVE BASIC ELEMENTS (BHUTAS) REAL?

Now the fourth scholar named Vyakata approached Shri Mahavir Bhagavan. Bhagavan himself stated Vyakta's doubt thus "On the basis of such Vedic statement as (Indian writing pg 83 angie)

meaning the world is illusory like a dream you believed that the five basic elements (bhutas) accepted by people are illusory like a dream and hence they are not real (true). On the other hand, on the basis of such Vedic statements as (Indian writing pg 83 angie) ... etc., (the earth is a deity, water is a deity etc., ) you feel that the five bhutas which are emobiments of divinity ought to be real and lasting. Hence emobiments of divinity ought to be real and lasting. Hence, you have entertained the doubt, "Are the five basic elements real or unreal"? When you have such a doubt even regarding the perceptible reality, naturally you might have a greater doubt regarding the soul, which is an imperceptible reality. In other words, you suspect if everything is (are all these things) decidedly void and non-existent?

This argument is given in support of the view that all things are unreal and illusory.

Its logic is all the substances are unreal and illusory, because-

1) Every substance is a mutually relative reality.

2) In this real relationship (the connection) of the reality with the reals is logically impossible.

3) The creation of the real also is logically impossible.

4) The causes producing it are logically impossible.

5) Its visibility also is logically impossible (one which is beyond occurrance).

Existence is relative:

The evidence of the existence or the creation of an object is a relative concept, because an object that is real is evident or accomplished either (a) by itself or (b)by the relative other object, or (c)by both, itself and the other relative objects. Now, a substance can be in the form of a cause or an effect. If it produces an effect then only it is called the cause. But first if this causative nature is established, only then this effect can be called an effect. If the cause is not on its own accord evident, then, how can the effect dependent on such a non-evident cause be an established fact? In the same manner, if the effect is not evident by itself, how can the producer dependent on it be styled as cause. In the same manner short and long, far and near, father and son etc., become an established fact only when their mutual relationship and cognition is proved. If the middle finger is proved to be long, then only the ring finger is proved to be short, or if the ring finger is first proved to be short, then only the middle finger can be established. as long. The purport is when the objects being dependent on each other are not of their own accord evident, as an established fact, then they cannot be proved to exist even in relation to other objects. Therefore, how can it be proved to exist by itself? Or by its relationship with other things? Or by both?

Is reality different from the real Or not?'

In real and existing substances like a pot, etc., there is lying reality or existence. Is this reality or existence different from the substance or not?

(a) If the existence is not different, then it is concluded that "whatever exists is a pot". In other words all things would be existing in the form of a pot. But here you cannot say, "let it be so", because the existence of the pot also is a non-pot, then only can we call it a pot. There being nothing like a non-pot, hence non-pot being unreal, the pot also is proved unreal. That means all things are unreal.

(b)If reality is different from the object, then the object itself cannot be real. It remains only unreal. In this manner so long as we cannot prove the existence of substances like a non-pot, how can we name an object 'pot'? In other words, like the 'sat' ( existence ) or real, there is nothing like 'Abhilapya' (a thing which can be expressed by words). The purport is this, the relationship between an object and its existence (reality) being logically impossible to happen, all things are null and void or unreal.

Creation is improbable

In the same manner (i) is a created thing created? or (ii)an uncreated thing is created? or (iii)are both created- uncreated?

The first one is not true, because it is a futile endeavour to create a created one; when a thing has already been created, if it is again created then it will continue to be created endlessly.

If you say that the uncreated is created, then that which has not been created is like a horse-horn e.g. unreal. It can never be created.

Even the third point is not true because the defects in each of the two appear in both. Now the question is whether there is anything like both the created--uncreated existent or not? If there is such a thing then it results in only one issue of "created only) or "uncreated only". Hence how can there be both?

If you say, that one which is in the process of being created, is created" here first of all the question arises "Is the one being produced real? Or unreal?" In this, there is a defect as in the third point since it is self- contradictory. The essence of the argument is this, 'Creation is improbable: therefore, every substance is unreal'.

Is each of causes potential?

An object appears to have been made up from the aggregate of substances, viz. 'Upadan Karana' and Nimitta karana (raw material and causative substances). In other words, all things seem to be made out of the aggregate of all the causative substances. But according to your theory of 'all unreal' where there is no such thing as "all", what is the meaning of the aggregate of substances? Moreover, if each of these-substances does not possess the potentiality for emergence or creation, then how can there be the potentiality of emergence or creation in the whole aggregate? In other words, in the combination of substances when each of which is devoid of the potentiality for creation, how can it be in the causative aggregate present in their combination. If there is no oil in every particle of sand, then it is not present in the mass of sand particles. If there is oil in each sesame grain then only its mass also contains it. Similarly if there is potentiality in every causative substance then each one must be capable of producing an effect. In this manner, since the mass possessing potentiality of causing creation being impossible to exist, each substance in the mass of unreal is also unreal there being the impossibility of the combination of causative substances, everything is unreal.

Visibility impossible

Is the substance visible or invisible? There is nothing like invisible in the world because it is not logically proved. Then there is no visible thing also because it is illogical in this way,

Which is seen is not the whole of the substance but it is only the upward or forward part. This part also being a combination of particles, what we see is not the totality of particles but only the upward or forward part of the particles. There also in the same manner that part is made up of smaller particles and there it will not be wholly seen but only the smallest particles. So think out further and further; only the top most atom will come in your sight, and you call the atom invisible. In this way all things are invisible, all things are non-existent, are unreal.

Now, this is answered.

The refutation of the theory (idian writing pg86 angie) `All are unreal (null and void) '.

1. First of all, if all things are only Asat and unreal, how can this doubt arise, "Are the five elements existing or not?" Because such a doubt cannot arise in the case of objects which are utterly unreal and non-existent like a horse-horn. We do not get this doubt -- "Is this a horse- horn or a donkey-horn?" Yes, a doubt arises only in the case of things which are true (Sat) or`real just as, "Is this a stump or a human being?" but not in the case of untrue (asat) or unreal substance. Why this difference? Therefore, we say that a thing regarding which a doubt arises is established as sat or real. Otherwise why is there not the contrary condition? Just as why is it that we do not doubt unreal objects, and we doubt only real objects, Why does a doubt arise only regarding 'Sat' or existent reality?

2. If all things are asat, untrue, unreal, then the doubt also is proved to be asat or untrue.

3. Doubts and illusions are the various forms of 'gyana' knowledge and they are connected with the 'gneya' i.e.knowable object. But if all things are unreal and non- existent, then there is no difference between what is knowable or what is unknowlable? If everything is unreal then these two contrary conceptions have no meaning.

Question: There is no real thing in a dream, yet we get a doubt regarding it. Do we not?

4. Answer: Even in a dream the doubt arises only regarding the previously experienced or heard things. Therefore, even in a dream the cause of a doubt is real (satya). A dream itself being a form of knowledge is dependent on some cause. If a dream is an effect, it is under the principle of cause and effect. If all things are unreal, what can we dream of and why a dream?

5. If all things are unreal and void then why do the following differences arise?

(a) One is a dream and the other is non-dream.

(b) One is a truth and the other is a lie.

(c) One is a real city and the other is an illusive city.

(d) One is primary (formal) and the other is secondary (informal).

(e) One is an effect and the other is a cause and a creator.

(f) One is sadhya, that which is to be accomplished, and other is sadhana meaning instrument.

(g) One is the speaker or the spoken subject and the other is utterance.

(h) One is plaintiff and the other is the defendant.

(i) One is a teacher and the other is a disciple.

(j) One is a receiver namely the senses, the other is the received such as sound, colour etc.

(k) One is hot and the other is cool.

(l) One is sweet and the other is bitter.

(m) The earth is always steady; the water is always fluid. Fire is always hot; the wind is always moving. Each of these possesses a particular fixed nature. Why are not they all equal in the form of a dream? Or why are they not real. Why are they not contrary to the natural course? If all things are unreal, untrue, where there is scope for their knowledge in varied forms.

Question: The knowledges relating to them are possible just like a mirage, but they are not true. The concepts that one is a dream and the other is a non-dream, are mere illusions.

Answer: This cannot be called illusion because knowledge occurs of a thing with regard to a decided particular place, time, and nature etc. in a special form. For instance here the object is silver and there the object is not silver but tin. The pot that existed yesterday is not existent today .... Such knowledge is ture.

6. Is the illusion real or unreal? If the illusion is real then to that extent the real being proved existing in the world, the theory that "all things are unreal" is repudiated. If the illusion itself is unreal, it means that the theory "every knowledge is a dream and that all things are unreal," is false. Consequently the object of knowledge is proved true and real. The knowledge that finds illusion to be unreal is itself real or sat. Thus regarding the question "whether all voidness is real or unreal" here also the same difficulty arises.

7. All voidness has to be proved by means of 'Pramana'-- evidence. If the evidence itself applied to this theory of voidness is real, then the theory of (All Voidness' becomes false to that extent. If the evidence is unreal, then all voidness cannot be proved as true by such unreal evidence.

Now let us review the first five view-points of the initial or the precedent thesis:

1) If you believe that 'the proof or the evidence of the existence of an object is relative (dependent); and then you say that 'there can l e no evidence for the existence of the object', this will be a contradiction. If you say "As per the opinion of only others this is relative", then you have thus accepted 'others', and the 'opinion of others', and they will be proved real and true, not void.

2) "The middle finger is long, the first one is short". In this manner, you first entertain the concepts of actual 'longness' and shortness', and then you say "the long and the short objects because of their mutual relativity are unreal", that is inconsistent.

3) Originally in every object, existence is not merely relative, because existence is in the form of 'Arthakriyakaritva'.

'Arthakriya' means the action of a substance being created. In other words it means the creation of an effect. Its 'karitva' means its causness, the causative power of a substance. In other words, the power of producing an effect. If long and short as well as similar objects produce effect in the shape of knowledge, they are real, because of their productive power. If they are absolutely unreal, they cannot bring about their knowledge and their cognizable effects.

4) The short finger is called the first finger in comparison with the middle finger, but not in comparison with a sky- flower that is void. Similarly, the first finger is short in comparison with the long finger but not in comparison with a sky-flower, a non-existent object. Similarly, in respect of the middle long finger, the first finger is short, but sky- flower is not called short. From this it is evident that the first finger and the middle finger are real.

5) Since in an object there are countless attributes, dharmas, natures, qualities, likewise in it there are also relative dharmas like shortness, longness etc., which are real, which are evident and which manifest themselves only when there are helping objects to manifest them. If shortness is not real and if this concept is based merely on relativity then why is there not in the middle long finger, shortness of its own and why is it not known to be so? Hence we shall have to say that in it there is no shortness in respect to its own self, and if that is so, how did we get that concept? In other words shortness is a real entity there, but it is manifested only by comparison with a longer object only (on relativity with another longer object) but not with its own self.

6) If you say that the concepts of shortness and longness arise in respect of each other the question arises--"Do the concepts of both arise simultaneously or gradually"? If you say that they arise simultaneously then the mutual dependence or relativity is lost! 'Dependence or relativity' means the thing on which it depends or the thing with which it is related. It must appear previously in a concept. Here since the point is in regard to the concepts arising at the same time, where is the question of dependance of relativity? If you say that both concepts emerge gradually, it means that either of these arising concepts of 'shortness' or 'longness' will be considered as arising without dependence. From this it means that the concepts of shortness or longness are self-arising but not arising dependently. Even our experience is such that on the accumulation of all causes like sense-contact etc., the knowledge of objects like a pot etc., arise independently, and this knowledge has arisen without any dependence on other objects, and this is an established fact according to our experience. A child just at the time of its birth would acquire the first knowledge only thus without dependence. Therefore this theory that the realisation or knowledge is always relatively dependent is wrong. Otherwise if two things are not short and long and if they are equal how can there be the mutual expectation between such things just as there can be no mutual dependence between the two eyes.

7) Therefore say that in a substance there are two sorts of forms viz.,

Independent form, and dependent form. The existence, individuality, the realness, colour, taste etc., are independent forms, 'indepedent' in this sense that they are existing and knowable (cognizable) of their own accord, but not dependent upon others. Thus such independent forms of substance are self existing and self cognizable - comprehensive of their own accord. In other words to know these we have not to depend upon any relative. They are known themselves meaning without any relation to others. As for example, we know that the finger exists- it is real. In it there are various forms like existence, realness, pink colour, red colour, etc. We know each of these without depending upon any relative. We don't ask here 'The finger has existence and realness in what respect in whose relation?' No, nothing of the sort; existence means existence, redness means redness. The finger is existent of its own accord, the finger is reddish of its own accord. But if the curiosity arises to know is the finger short or long, then the question arises 'You are asking short or long in what respect, in whose relation?'

Here comes the second category of dependent form. 'Dependent' in this sense that to know shortness or longness we have to depend thus upon another relative aspect to be known. 'In whose relation this finger is asked whether to be short or long'. If the question is of the first finger, then we can say that it is short in relation with the second finger, which is long in respect of the first finger'. Thus the concept of the form of shortness in the first finger is dependent on the concept of the longness in the second finger and vice versa. Say shortness and longness to be known are mutually dependent. It means that they are not self- cognizable but are cognizable (comprehensive) only with respect to others. In other words for the knowledge of such forms like shortness and longness, we have to depend upon knowing the other relative aspect and its comparative form.

In this manner, in a substance the forms like shortness, longness etc., are dependant on their opponent relative aspect to be known, whereas the forms like existence, individuality, colour, etc., are independent forms irrespective of any relative aspect to be known.

Now, when there is no necessity for any relative aspect to be known in the case of such independent forms like existence etc., and as they are self cognizable (means known and dealt with independently) the theory that "because in this world everything being dependent is null and void" is repudiated. That means it is proved baseless. In other words the substances are real and also their forms like existence and colour etc., are real, but not void, not illusive like a dream's objects. Even the dependent forms like shortness- longness are also real; but only forms cognizability depends upon other relative aspects. In short, the theory of all void is itself void, known without any despendence but yet on account of our desire for knowing and for outward comparison for the other dependent qualities, we try to know them by means of comparison as short and long. In this manner, if an object has in itself such independent qualities as reality, colour, taste etc., then knowledge, in the absence of comparison is not void. Therefore the theory of "All being void" is baseless.

8) If the existence of anything like shortness etc., is not independent viz. not self-established then the existence of the short object also will not be independent, but dependent on others. Now don't say let it be dependent, because where there is no concept of comparison with a long finger, at least there remains the reality that 'this is a finger', and the concept and existence of longness also will be lost inasmuch as there is the absence of a comparison with a short finger. In other words, there is a total loss of all conceptual significations and all the things possessing relative qualities which you believe as void'! But that is not seen. In that time also, which is devoid of any comparison, there do exist short and long objects as they were and are seen also necessarily. From this, independent existence of real objects is proved.

9) If all are unreal, then even the relativity of shortness and longness will be proved unreal. If so, how can this distinction be made? How can the dealing of short and long will prevail and how can they be authenticated?

Question:

The nature of things is such that they are dealt with as short and long relatively in relation with others, and you can say that 'then unreality being the same, why is the long not treated or dealt with as the short'. The reason is that this is the nature of the thing. A question is improper ragarding nature.

Answer.

Very good, then, from this idea of swabhava of the thing, which means the nature of ownself not of the other, it is deduced that the thing is 'sat' namely real, by accepting separately the ownself and the other. In consequence it amounts to a refutation of sarvasunyata viz. all-voidness, absolute nihilism.

10) The process of being one thing relative to the other comprises four items:

(a) the individual person knowing this process of relativity;

(b) the action of being relative;

(c) the thing to which the object is related; and

(d) the relative object.

Now if all these are unreal, then nothing of these remain individually special, just as 'this is a person, but not an object'. If each of these possesses- the specialities of being a person, or of being an object, or of being the process of relativity etc., in other words, if the differentiated speciality is attached to each one, it means that they are real, because in 'all unreal', this differentiated speciality cannot be attached to anyone. Consequently the theory of absolute nihilism is refuted, broken to pieces so to say.

Summary:

In this world, objects are of our kinds:

1) (indian writing pg 92 angie) swatch siddha created of its own accord, without a creator, such as the special creations like clouds that arise without a creator.

2) (Indian writing pg 92 angie) --paratah siddha (created by a creator) just as the pots etc., created by a potter etc.

3) (indian writing pg 92 angie) wbhayatah siddha (created by both one's ownself and the sons etc., born by the couple and by one's own karmas.

4) (indian writing pg92 an gie) nitya siddha (ever existent), like the sky etc. This siddha (accomplished) is from the point of view of creation. From the point of view of knowledge, 'The pot' is self cognizable. It means, it is knowledge without the knowledge of any relatives. Whereas shortness and longness are evident dependently (viz. knowable only on knowing its relative concept.) This differentiation is not consistent with the nihilistic theory (sarva-sunyata) self cognizable self-comprehensive.

The Relationship between a Substance and its Existence:

1. First if you accept the existence of the pot, "The pot exists" but not as 'it does not exist', and thus after accepting the pot as existent then if you ask the question "what is the relationship between the pot and its existence", then by such question, non-existence or unreality of both is not proved; otherwise why does not such a question arise in repect of unreal "Donkey-horns"?

2. You say that a pot is unreal and non-existent. There also the similar question arises: what is the relation between the pot and non-existence?

(a) If a pot and non-existence are one and the same, in other words the non-existence is not different from the pot, then only the pot remains, only the pot is accepted, hut a separate entity like "Asatta" unrealness is not proved.

(b) If you say both of them are different, a separate entity of a thing like non-existence is not sound, hence it is baseless.

3. If you are a nihilist, when you know and speak of nihilism are your words and knowledge of speaking and knowing of your nihilism different from you? Or are they not different from you? If you say that they are not different (like the tree and the mango which are not different then you being not void, not unreal like horse-horn the existence of knowledge and utterance also is proved to be true. If you say that they are different from you, then you being different from this knowledge and utterance, you yourself are proved ignorant and dumb, and as such how can you prove about your nihilism?

4. Regarding the pot and its existence, the existence is the dharma quality-attribute or nature of the pot. The nature of the pot is not different from its container pot, and is different from clothes etc. Just as the existence of pot is a different entity, so the existences of clothes etc., are different entities. Then where is the problem of oneness of all these? Every existence of every object is different. Therefore, "Whatever exists is a pot", this rule is wrong. If it is asked "What is here? Pot or non-pot?" then you will have to say "Pot". What is a pot? It is existent. Just as what is here? Mango or something else. In answer we will have to say "Mango". What is a mango? Is it a tree or something else. Then it will be said it is a tree. So just like mangoes, separate and mutually different existence are established.

1. Of the four alternatives, regarding the utpanna (created) there is a particular decided one fact.

First of all you place four alternatives for a thing taking birth in this way; a thing takes birth in which position; the thing itself being created; uncreated; Both created-- uncreated or in the process of creation?

Now we would ask, are these four alternatives 'created' on or uncreated ones? As regards the first point of 'created one' the alternative is meaningless, because how can we ask about a created one if a created one takes birth? If you apply alternatives in the case of the 'non-created one why don't you place such alternative in respect of the non-existent ones like sky-flowers which are also uncreated?

2. In respect of objects like a pot, the question is, if the are not at all created at any time, why is it so that they are seen only after the aggregation of the causes like a potter etc., ,and not before that? In the same manner afterwards when broken by means of a stick etc., why are they not seen? If they are always uncreated like sky-flowers, the unseen should always remain unseen.

3. If the knowledge and statements of voidness are absolutely uncreated, who gave the expression to voidness?

4. The real condition is that a pot being newly created--, pot taking birth from one point of view is partially created. From another point of view it is partially uncreated. From a third, it is both partially created and partially uncreated. From the fourth point of view, it is partially in the process of being created, and takes birth. This can be clarified thus:

(a) The pot before birth is in the form of clay, and the clay is already 'utpanna' a created one. So pot also in its form can be called 'created' (Utpanna). (b)The pot before birth is not of pot-shape. So it can be called 'Uncreated' (Anutpanna) as per that shape. (c)By these two aspects of clay and shape a pot can be called 'created and uncreated' (Ubhay). (d) The pot just in the process of creation can be called being created (Utpadyamana).

In respect of these four alternatives, it can be said that the pot takes birth, already created, uncreated, created and uncreated both, and being in the process of creation.

Here the Jain theory of Anekantvad--sapekshvad, in other words the theory of relativity is to be taken into consideration. According to anekantvad, clay form and particular shape are different and not different from the pot; different in some respect and not different from another respect. Here the four alternatives are taken upon the 'not different' point., e.g. pot is clay itself, hence clay being created already, the pot also is considered as created.

The pot newly taking birth first as partially created while it is in the form of clay; and takes birth in a special form first as an uncreated one because the pot is abhinna, not different from clay and its special form (round shape). Thinking of existence it is existent first in the form of clay; it means the pot exists. So long as it has no special form, then it is not existent in that form with relationship to form and shape both 'ubhay' i.e., "created--uncreated"; and from the point of view of the present time, it is while in the process of creation created also otherwise the process would be fruitless, if considered as not created.

Whereas, the pot that has already been created, now does not exist in the four alternatives namely created, uncreated, both and in the process of being created. Because 'Sva- dravya' the self-substance has been created in the form of a pot; and 'Sva-paryaya self modifications as round, red, large, light etc., has already been created. So now what to talk of to be created. And the pardrvya (the other substance) cannot emerge here in the form of a cloth or in the form of non-self modification. In other words, it cannot assume another form; otherwise it would be in another's form. The summary is this. The question of creation regarding a pot that has already been created is useless. Similarly, it is also useless to ask if a created thing is at present uncreated? Or created-uncreated or in the process of being created. If we put the same four questions about an object in the process of being created, we would say that it is not created par-rup in the non-self form. In this manner, the sky which is always existent, will not be created in any one of the four forms. Thus the uncreated one also, the pot is always existent in the form of Svadravya (own substance). So in that form it is not to be created anew.

This is about a pot and the sky in the original svadravya form or as regards modification they cannot be created in any of the four alternative forms in their non-self modifications. Even that which has been created in its own paryaya (self-modification) cannot be created now in that 'Svaparyaya'; and can be created in an uncreated 'sva- paryaya' self-modification.

1) The productive causative aggregation can be logical and established

'Since all is void, there is nothing existent like such things as causative substances'. This statement of yours is illogical and is contradicted because at first it is clearly evident that this statement has been produced by such substances as throat, lips and the palate etc. When that is so, it is nonsense to say that there are no such things as causative aggregations.

Question: This appears to be so because of Avidya= false conception) illusion, because it has been said,

(indian writing pg 96 angie)

On account of severe sensuality, lust, dream, fear and infatuation (Indian writing pg96 angie) and illusion, people see before their eyes unreal thing and deem it sat like the thread-like illusory hair as real.

Answer: If all causative aggregations notwithstanding their being unreal, (asat) are perceived, why is it that the causative aggregations of the tortoise-hair or the donkey horn are not perceived as substances? They are not seen because they are unreal. Is that not so? Therefore, whatever causative substances we see are real.

2) The causative aggregative substances (samagri) like the

chest, the head, the throat etc., the speaker, sentences comprising sounds, and the subject expressed. Are they existent or not? If they are existent then how can you say that all is void? If they are non-existent, then who heard "Sarvamsunyam" All voidness? In the same manner, the meaning of 'mother' is one who has children; how can she be barren? The utterance is that which is said how can it be devoid of propounded subject matter?

3) Question: The speaker, the utterance etc., nothing of them is real. Therefore, the propounded matter also is not real. In this manner voidness of all cannot be propounded.

Answer: Not at all. Tell me whether the utterance of such theory is true, or false. If true, then this itself is proved real. If false, it being devoid of authenticity, the idea expressed by it namely 'sarvasunyata' is proved baseless.

4) If you say, "we have accepted this utterance of whatever kind?" Is this acceptance true or false? Moreover in the principle of sarvasunyata what are the acceptor, the acceptance and the accepted principles?

5) If all are unreal (asat), then the fixed particular dealings and denotations will be lost or proved false or they will be unauthentic, baseless, unproved and illogical. Why does oil emerge from only such causative substances as the sesame? Why not from sand? Why is not any effect produced from the sky-lotus? Why only between particular substances are seen the relationship of cause and effect but not between others? These particular occurrances are not possible to occur from void substances, but from real substances with varied particular natures. Then only they are possible to occur or be created.

6) At the same time to say that 'all are in the form of causative aggregations, all are born of causative aggregations', is also not proper. It is contradictory because the atoms are not created by anything, still they are proved by the visible gross effect. Such is the actual situation in fact. Otherwise to say that all are born out of aggregations--and afterwards to say that "the atom is not born," is just like saying "all utterance is untrue". This saying is refuted by your own statement, because the atoms consist of the aggregates. If there are no atoms at all as the basis, how could molecules etc., be created without causative aggregations? If you consider that even atoms are created, then the question arises--'from what basic substances are they created'? Creation cannot take place out of void otherwise there will be no particular condition and position there being no particularity in void.

7) The hind side of a thing being not visible is void and is non-existent.

1) "The hind side of a thing cannot be seen hence it is not existing. When there does not exist the hind side, there is nothing like the front side. So the front side is also not existent". What kind of inference is this? On the contrary on the vision of the fore side of it, the hind side is proved.

Because there is a hind side, then only a certain part called fore side is there. If there is no hind side, what is the meaning of the fore side?

Therefore, when on the basis of the existence of the fore side by the inference the existence of the hind side is logically established, then by refuting it your proposition of the frontside goes contradictory to your own statement. When you deny the hind side, your statement--that there is a fore side--is refuted. The hind-side goes parallel with the front side. To refute the hind side, would mean to refute the front side and hence the statement of front side is self contradictory.

2) You said that "because only the front side of the object is visible, the object is not existent". In this statement, the words, "visible" and "not existent" are contradictory. If you say that it is visible out of illusion, then the question is why is it that front side of the sky-flower is not visible?

3) If there is 'Sarwam sunyam' (total voidness) then how can there be differences like modern and old, near and distant, front and back? If you say that-the front, back and distant are denoted according to the opponent's opinion--then the question arises: is there a difference between "Own" opinion and "opponent's" opinion? Is there anything like real opinion and void opinion? In the same manner if you accept (treat) this difference as real, it means the repudiation of 'the theory of total voidness. If it is not accepted and if still the dealing, the denotation continues why do not such dealing and denotation prevail in respect of 'sky-flowers' also?

4) If all things are unreal, why like the back side of a thing the front side also is not invisible? Why are not all sides invisible? Or why are not all sides visible or, why is it that the front is seen but not the back?

5) In the things like sfatik etc., through the transparent items the hind side also is visible. Since this much is proved, consequently all did not remain void, hence your theory "all is void" is not correct. It you say that even this is unreal, then for proving the theory of 'sarva sunyava all voidness you have forwarded as its reason back portion is invisible, but this reason is wrong. The reason to be forwarded should be "all is invisible" but that is a contradiction. Otherwise you could have said because the totality is invisible, so the totality is unreal." Having trust on this "all unreal", if you walk on closing your eyes, it is possible that you might proceed towards a wall or a well and there you might fall into the well or dash against the wall.

6) "The hind side being invisible is not existent". If you say so, at least you accept that the front is visible. Therefore at least the existence of the senses (as the means of perceiving) and the objects of the senses is proved. If even these are unreal then the distinction between perceptible things and imperceptible things cannot be logically established.

7) Even invisible things are existing and are not unreal. Even the doubt regarding unreal things "Are all unreal or real?" itself is an existing real thing. If this doubt also is unreal, what about the object of the doubt namely what about sarwasunyatva? If you say even doubt is unreal, it means there is no doubt regarding the five elements. If that is so, the five elements are proved to be real and existent. Now you see that though the back portion is invisible, its existence is proved by inference. In this world, the existence of many things is proved by inference.

The Illustration of Invisible things proved to be Existent by means of Inference

The wind is cognizable (is understandable) through touch, sound, calmness, shaking etc., and as the possessor of the qualities like coolness, movement etc. When we are touched by the cool breezes of wind, we say, "the cool wind is blowing". The sound is visible in the direction of the wind but not in the opposite direction. From this, it is by inference established that the wind that is the resort of the sound is blowing in that direction.

The sky is an established fact as the basis for the earth and water. The earth has a basis because it has a form. Just as earth is the base for water, the sky is the basis for the earth. The five basic elements are proved by the bodies of the souls and their utility.

The five basic elements are evident as the support of soul's body and their utility.

Vanaspatikaya (Vegetative Body):

Like the body of a human being even the vanaspati kaya has birth, old age, life, death and growth. Even after it is cut, it has similar physical creation of sprouting, cherishing desires, treatment etc., hence it is proved to be a living thing. The existence of a soul in vanaspati kaya is proved thus:

1) Touch me not sensitive Proved by its contraction

plant--Bashful at touch

2) Wood apple--a creeping proved by its dependence for

plant its safety on a hedge or a wall.

3) Shami, etc. proved by sleep, waking, and contraction.

4) Bakula, a perfumed plant proved by the attraction of sound

5) The Ashoka tree-- proved by the attraction of form

Jonecia Ashoka

6) Kurubaru proved by the attraction of scent

7) Virahak proved by the attration of taste

8) Champa Tilak proved by the attraction of touch

The Prithvi kayajiva is like a muscular sprout.

It is proved by the growth of the sprouts of the same species, after having been formerly cut. The dug out mountain, or mine, gets filled up in the same form after many years. How can this happen without a soul?

The apkayajiva, like a frog, coming out from dug out earth by its natural manifestation, is proved animate. It is evidently animate like a fish falling from the sky clouds etc. by their distortions.

The vayukaya jiva like bullock without other's direction, makes irregular horizontal movement, so it has soul.

The agnikaya jiva. It is evident as animate from its living on food (fuel) and increase with the availability of sufficient food and by its consequent development.

In this manner, the elements like earth etc., are different from the distortions of the sky like twilight and have form. Therefore, they are jivakayas soul's bodies. If in the world there were no souls possessing one sense, the (samsar) the world itself would have ended because from times immemorial the process of souls attaining moksa (salvation) is current. Yet there is no end to souls. If so, where were all these souls staying? Here we should believe that they all were lying in the 'ekendriya' bodies.

Where is Violence, Or Non Violence

Question: Then in this world pervaded with jivas, how can non-violence be observed?

Answer The earth etc., which are destroyed by weapons lack life; therefore in utilising them there is no violence. In the same manner, even this is proper to be known that according to the 'Nischayinay' there is no rule that "there is necessarily violence, if the jiva dies; and necessarily non-violence where the jiva does not die." Even this is not a rule that if jivas are less, there is non-voilence, and if jivas are more there is violence", because those wicked people who have the evil motive of killing a king etc., are violent though they do not kill them. Likewise a doctor though he might give pain to a patient is necessarily non- violent. The enlightened Munis who observe five 'samitis' (awareness of sinlessness) and three 'Guptis' (mental-vocal- physical auspicious activities accompanied with the restraint over inauspicious activities), know the nature of jivas. Over and above they are always cautious and careful in their concern for total non-violence to jivas, and always pursue that objective. Now even if at any time violence might have been committed by them under awareness of samitis-guptis, they are not violent. On the contrary in any activity with non-cautious mental mood. even if ajiva does not die, there is violence because of the absence of caution and awareness for protection of jivas.

Therefore in fact the inauspicious mental attitude is violence, just as Tandulia Matsyas etc., are bound by the karmas of violence only on account of thoughts of violence, even though they are not actually comitting violence. Who is this Tandulia Matsya! It is a very small fish staying in the eye brow of a big gigantic fish. It sees that "along with a big wave of water a lot of small fish enter the cave-like open mouth of that very big fish lying in sleep": and it thinks "how lucky this big fish is to have this big lot of fishes easily available directly in mouth for devouring." Afterwards on returning the water wave out, those small fishes are thrown out intact alive. Looking this the small Tandulia fish thinks, "oh! how foolish this big fish is to leave up such a big lot of fishes without eating them! If I were in its place, I would have eaten all the fishes, and I would not have left off a single of them."

These thoughts of violence will be tantamout to actual violence inasmuch as it binds the karmas of violence which send that jiva to hell!

Question: Is not violence the actual killing of the external jiva?

Answer: There is anekantvad i.e., it may or may not be violence. If the external killing of a jiva is a cause or an effect of inauspicious conscience (mentality) it is no violence. If there is no inauspicious mentality it is no violence. Just as on account of the purity of the mental mood i.e., sanctity of the heart of one who is free from moha ( insanity ).

Thus the five elements (bhutas) are real but not unreal. Out of these, first four are having conciousness and the last one Akash (Sky) does not possess conciousness.

The proposition, "the whole samsar is like a dream" is to show to the Bhavya jivas the worthlessness of money, women, sons, worldly objects etc. On hearing this they may leave off their blind avarice and affections in them and get indifferent towards them and consequently make efforts for salvation.

In this manner having been relieved of all his doubts brahmin Vyakta with his 500) disciples accepted Charitra-dharma on the spot at the hands of Bhagavan Mahavir.