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First
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SANCHETI ASOO LAL
BHANDARI MANAK MAL
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Appendix F:
Anekanta (Part I)
-Dr. Nathmal Tatia
Introductory
The concept of anekant occupies a central position in Jaina
philosophy. Although it is not possible exactly to determine the
date of its origin, there is no doubt that the ontology of early
Jainism was deeply influenced by this principle. Originally an
ethical mode of speech, being concerned with what one ought or
ought not to speak, it assumed an ontological role in the
Ardhamagadhi Agamas, through three stages of development, viz.
vibhajyavada (the method of answering a question by dividing the
issues), nayavada (the method of defining the framework of
reference), and syadvada (the prefixing of the particle syat,
meaning "in a certain reference", to a preposition,
indicative of its conditional character). The anuyogadvaras
(doors of disquisition) also played a vital role in this matter.
This ontological orientation was further strengthened by
Umasvati, Siddhasena Divakara and Mallavadin, and the concept was
converted into a full-grown dialectic by Samantabhadra with whom
the classical period of the doctrine begins. The ontological
concept now acquires a logic-in epistemological character, and
Jain philosophy is now indentified with anekantavada (the
doctrine of non-absolutism) or syadvada (the doctrine of
conditional statement) or saptabhangi (the doctrine of sevenfold
predication). Anekanta as the negation of an absolutistic
position or the rejection of a biased or truncated view of things
is found in the Buddhist, Yoga and Nyaya schools as well in
various contexts. A dispassionate assessment of the worth of a
philosophy from various viewpoints was the objective that the
propounders of anekanta set before themselves. And their efforts
in that respect were laudable in that they succeeded in
preserving some of the most valuable non-Jaina doctrines as well
as texts, selected by them for critical comments, which were
otherwise ravished from the world by the cruel hands of destiny.
The Origin
Jainism primarily is an ethical discipline, and as such all
its tenets had a beginning in someone or other of the moral
principles upheld by it. Thus the assertion or denial,
affirmation or negation of a philosophical belief was to be
carefully made in consonance with the rules prescribed for the
right way of speaking in order to avoid false statements or
unwarranted speculations having no bearing on the spiritual path
of salvation. The metaphysical speculations about the beginning
and end of the cosmos, or its eternality and non-eternality or
the existence and non-existence of the soul before and after
death, and such other issues that exercised the minds of the
thinkers of those days were not considered worth while equally by
Mahavira and Buddha. The latter's repugnance to such problems is
attested by the ten avyakrtas (indeterminables) mentioned in the
Majjhima Nikaya (II pp, 107ft, 176ft) and the former's in the
Acaranga (1.8, 1.5) and Sutrakrtanga (11.5, 1-5) where such
speculations are considered as impractical and leading to laxity
in moral conduct. While this basic attitude of the Buddha
remained unmodified throughout his teaching, Mahavira appears to
have allowed a relaxation in conformity with his realistic
outlook in the interest of a dispassionate estimation of the
worth of those speculations and the discovery of the cause of
their origin. Consequently whereas the followers of the Buddha
were interested more in the repudiation of the current antipodal
doctrines than in their proper appreciation, the followers of
Mahavira devoted their energies to a proper evaluation of these
concepts with a view to finding out a solution of those
contradictory views. This led to the origin of the Madhyama
pratipat (the middle path which eschewed both the antithetical
alternatives) of the Buddhists on the one hand, and the
philosophy of anekanta (non-absolutism which attempted at
synthesising those alternatives into a comprehensive notion) of
the Jainas on the other.
The Three Stages :
Three distinct stages of development of the doctrine of
anekanta are discernible in the early Jaina Agamas.
- Vibhajyavada:
Vibhajyavada which is perhaps the earliest phase of the
doctrine is found mentioned in the Sutrakrtanga (1.14.22)
where a monk is asked to explain things through the
principle of division of issues (vibhajjavayam ca
viyagarejja). The Bhagavati Sutra provides many an
illustration where a question is dealt with in this way.
On being asked by Gautama whether a person who says that
he has taken the vow of desisting from committing injury
to all sentient beings is a bonafide observer of the vow
or a malafide imposter, Mahavira replied that if such
person was incapable of distinguishing between the
sentient and the insentient, or between the mobile and
immobile living beings, he is the latter, but otherwise
he is a true observer of the vow (op. cit., VII. 2.27).
Similarly, on being asked by Jayanti which of the two,
viz. slumber and wakefulness, was preferable, he replied
that for the sinful, it was the former, while for the
virtuous the latter (XII2.2/53-55). These and similar
instances which are in galore in our text are obviously
case of answer by division. It should be noted here that
the alternative answers to the divided issues are
sometimes introduced in the Agama by the particle siya
(Skt, syad) meaning "in a certain reference".
The expression siyavaya in the Sutrakrtanga (1.14.19) :
na yasiyavaya viyagrejja one should not explain anything
without taking resort to siyavaya (Skt. syadvada, that is
the principle of conditional predication)' also deserves
mention. It is obviously synonymous with the expression
vibhajjavaya noted above and is the forerunner of the
syadvada of later times. This also confirms our vies of
vibhajyavada as the earliest phase of anekantavada.
- The Nayas :
The nayas (standpoints) constitute the second stage of
the evolution of the concept of anekanta. The earliest
and most important way of judging the nature of things
was to consider them under four heads viz., dravya
(substance) ksetra (space). kala (time) and bhava (mode).
Thus in the Bhagwati Sutra (II.1.45), the loka (inhabited
cosmos) is considered as finite in substance and space,
but infinite in time and modes. There were also other
heads such as guna (op.cit., II. 10.126), bhava (XIX.
9.102) and samsthana (XIV. 7.80) which were analogous to
bhava. But all these heads were not called nayas. The
expressions used in connection with the nayas were
however dravya and paryaya (equivalent of bhava). The
material atoms are thus stated to be eternal qua dravya
(davvatthayae) and non-eternal qua paryaya (pajjavehim,
XIV. 4-49-50) and the souls are characterised as eternal
qua dravya (davvatthayae) and non-eternal qua bhava
(bhavatthayae, VII. 2.58-59). Another pair of nayas, viz.
avvocchitti naya (Skt avyucchitti-naya, the standpoint of
non interception) and vocchitti-naya (Skt.
vyucchitti-naya, the standpoint of interception) are also
mentioned in the Bhagavati Sutra (VII. 3.93-94). Thus the
infernal beings are eternal from the standpoint of
non-interception (of their existence as souls), but they
are non-eternal from the standpoint of interception (of
their present state of being infernal after the expiry of
that form of existence). A third pair of nayas is also
mentioned in the same text, viz. vavahariya-naya (Skt.
vyavaharikanaya, the popular standpoint), and
necchaiva-naya (naiscayikanaya, the factual or scientifie
standpoint). Thus from the popular standpoint the drone
is black in colour, but factually or scientifically
speaking, it is possessed of all the five colours, viz.
black, blue, red, yellow and white (op. cit, XVIII.
6.108).
- Saptabhangi:
As the third stage of development of the concept of
anekanta, we find a primitive saptabhangi and syadvada in
the Bhagavati Sutra XII. 10.211-226. Here the things are
judged under the categories of `self' (aya Skt. atman)
and `not-self' (no-aya Skt. noatman). An object is
characterized as `self' in some respect (siya aya),
`not-self' in some respect (siya no-aya), and
`indescribable , that is, both self and not-self' in some
respect (siya avattavvam aya ti ya no-aya tiya). These
three attributes are predicated of an object,
noncomposite or composite, respectively from the
standpoints of existent characters, non-existent
characters, and existent-cum-non-existent characters. In
the case of the objects that are noncomposite (for
instance, a monad), the attributes are only three in
number, viz. self, not-self and indescribable. Here
`indescribable' means the impossibility of the object
being spoken of or described exclusively as `self' or
`not-self', because of the same object being both (self
and non-self) at the same time. These three attributes
however, become six in the case of a dyad (a composite
body of two space-points) as follows : (1) self, (2)
not-self, (3) indescribable, (4) self and non-self (one
attribute for each space-point), (5) self and
indescribable (one attribute for each space-point). (6)
not-self and indescribable (one attribute for each
space-point). These six ways again become seven in the
case of a triad (a composite body of three space points)
in the following way : (1) to (6) as above, and (7) self,
not self and indescribable (one attribute for each of the
three space points). Here the fourth, fifth and sixth
ways have each two more subdivisions. Thus the fourth,
voz. self and not-self, has the following two additional
subdivisions-(1) self (for two space-points) and not-self
(for the remaining one space point). The fifth and sixth
ways also have similar subdivisions. The text referred to
above gives the divisions and subdivisions of the tetrad,
pentad and hexad also. The basic ways however do never
exceed the number seven as in the case of the triad,
though the number of subdivisions gradually go up on
account of the various possible combinations of the
space-points. The basic seven ways enumarated above are
the prototypes of later seven bhangas of what is called
saptabhangi (the doctrine of sevenfold predication). What
is to be carefully noticed in this connection is the fact
that according to the Bhagavati Sutra, the joint
predication of the attributes `self' and `not-self' to a
monad is not possible because the monad has only one
space-point. Such predication is only possible of a dyad
which has two space-points. Similarly, the simultaneous
predication of three attributes is only possible in the
case of triad which has three space-points. The
implication is that the joint predication of two
contradictory attributes to the same space-points is
purely a case of `indescribability' and not an
illustration of a dual predication of self and notself.
The dual predication is meaningful only if the object has
two parts in order that each individual attribute may
find its own accommodation. The later Jaina philosophers,
however, did not find any difficulty in such predication,
and they made the dual predication (`is' and `is not'
used by them in place of `self' and `not-self' )
irrespective of the noncomposite or composite character
of the object. Some of them also interchanged the
positions of the third and fourth attributes.
The anuyogadvaras and
niksepas
The early Jaina philosphers were fond of explaining things
according to predefined lists of heads. Such heads were called
anuyogadaras, doors of disquisition 20 (or 14) marganasthanas 24
(12 or 14) jivasthanas and 14 gunasthans may be quoted as
illustrations of such lists. There are, however, other lists
which had direct philosophical significance. Umasvati, in his
Tattvarthadhigamasutra, 1,7,8,16,26 has given such lists, which
can mostly be traced back to the Jain Agamas. These doors of
disquisition played an important role in the evolution of the
doctrine of anekanta. The Jaina doctrine of four niksepas is the
final outcome of the speculations concerning the doors of
disquisition. The niksepas were many, but finally they were
reduced to four nama, sthapana, dravya and bhava,
(Tattvarthandhigamasutra,1.5). The following dictum of the
Anuyogadvarasutra, 8, deserves mention. One should fully apply to
a subject whatever nikesepas are known about that subject; and to
those subjects whose niksepas are not known, one should apply the
four (viz. nama, sthapana, dravya and bhava). The Jaina thinkers
took a very wide view of the subjects they took up for discussion
and employed the niksepas as the media for the determination of
the meaning of words involved in such discussion. The doctrine of
anekanta owed much to the precise definition of the connotation
of the technical terminology employed in the evaluation of
antithetical doctrines, and the niksepas fulfilled this task as
auxiliaries to the nayas.
In non-Jaina Thought
Let us now see whether the elements of the anekanta way of
thinking are there in the non-Jaina schools of thought that
flourished in those days.
- The Vedic thought :
The sceptical outburst of the Vedic seer in Rgveda.
I. 164.4 : Who has seen that the Boneless One bears the
Bony, when he is first born, where is the breath, the
blood and soul of the earth, who would approach the wise
man to ask this (ko dadarsa prathamam, jayamanam
asthanvantam yad anastha bibharti, bhumya asur asrgatma
kvasti, ko vidvamsam upagat pratsum etal) ? poses a
problem to be solved in mystic experience, or through
anekanta or rejected as absurd and insoluble. The
scepticism of the Nasadiya hymn (op. cit., X. 129) has
also a similar tone. In the Upanisads we find rational
thinkers as well as mystics. The Uddalaka (Chandogya, VI.
2 1,2) was partly a rationalist philosopher who advanced
logical proof for the reality of Being (sat), and partly
an uncritical empiricist when he ascribes thought to that
Being to multiply and procreate and produce heat (tejas)
which produces water (ap), and water food (annam).
Yajnavalkya Brhadaranyaka, (II.4.12-14=IV.5 13-15)
asserts that the self cannot be known as it is the
subject, and whatever is known is necessarily an object.
This may be called rational mysticism. This background of
scepticism and rational mysticism was responsible for the
Jaina and Buddhist patterns of thought that emerged and
are found recorded in the Ardhamagadhi and Pali canons.
We have made a brief survey of the Jaina way of thinking
and shall now see its parallel in early Buddhism,
followed by a similar study of the Yoga and Nyaya
schools.
- The Buddhist Thought :
The Buddha calls himself a vibhajyavadin
(vibhajjavado.....aham.....naham ekamsavado-I am an
analyst or propounder of my views by division of issues,
and not one who takes a partial view of things - Majjhima
Nikaya, II, 469). When the Buddha is asked for his
opinion whether the house-holder is an observer of the
right path, he says that it is not possible to give a
categorical answer to the question inasmush as the
house-holder with wrong faith (miccha-patipanno) does not
follow the right path, while one with right faith
(samma-patipanno) definitely does so. This vibhjyavada is
not essentially different from that of the Jainas.In
the Suttanipata p. 396, we find people stuck to their
individual truths or opinions (pacceka-saccesu puthu
nivittha). The Udana, pp. 143-145, gives the parable of
the blind men and the elephant. Ten blind persons touch
various parts of the elephant and give ten conflicting
accounts based on their experience of the ten parts which
they happened to come into contact with. Each of them
took the part for the whole and as such they were all
with their perceptions vitiated and partial
(ekangadassino). The parable is suggestive of a definite
stage in the evolution of Buddha's thought, which
approached too near to the thought pattern of Mahavira to
be able to maintain its distinct individual character.
The ultimate thought pattern of the Buddha, however, is
to be judged by his attitude to the ten or fourteen
famous avyakatas (indeterminables) mentioned in Majjhima
Nikaya, II, pp. 107-113 and 176-183, and Candrakirtis'
Prasannapads, p. 446, Poussin's Edition.
- The Yoga School :
The Yogabhasya (IV. 33; for the Buddhist counterpart of
four kinds of questions, see Digha Nikaya, III, p. 179,
and Anguttara Nikaya, II, p. 84) classifies questions
under three heads : (i) there are questions which admit
of a clear definitive answer (ekanta-vacaniya), (ii)
there are questions which are answerable only by division
(vibhajya-vacaniya), and (iii) there are questions which
are unanswerable (avacaniya). The question 'shall
everybody be reborn after death', is vibhyajya-vacaniya,
that is, answerable by division. The person who has
experienced the distinction between spirit and matter
will not be born, the others however would take rebirth.
The Yoga philosopher there opens for himself the way to
the anekanta type of thinking, which, however, he does
not pursue any further. The Sankhya-Yoga doctrine of
parinama (change) again is essentially a vindication of
the concept of anekanta, barring its insistence on the
absolute pre-existence of the effect in the cause. The
Sankhya-Yoga conception of purusa as an absolutely
unchanging entity is of course an exception.