CHAPTER II
Metaphysical Basis of Jaina Ethics
DEPENDENCE OF ETHICS ON METAPHYSICS: According to Jainism,
ontological discussions necessarily determine ethical considerations. The
ethical inquiry derives its meaning from the metaphysical speculation. Our conduct
and behavior are conditioned by our metaphysical presuppositions. The
incentive to the progress of moral consciousness emerges from a deep and sound
metaphysical theory which requires proper application of logic to experience.
Samantabhadra argues that the conceptions of bondage and liberation, Punya and
Papa, heaven and hell, pleasure and pain and the like lose all their relevancy
and significance, if we exclusively recognise either permanence or
momentariness as constituting the nature of substance.' This statement clearly points to the
dependence of ethics on metaphysics. Again, the affirmation that the momentary
disintegration of all things renders impossible the financial transactions, the
fact of memory, and the commonplace relations of the husband and the wife, the
teacher and the taught and the like also indicates the subservience of ethical
problems to the nature of being'. In the following pages, therefore, it is
proposed to dwell, in the first place, upon the general nature of reality; and,
secondly, upon the mode
______________________
1 Brhatkathakosa, Intro. p. 12, aslo Pravacansara. Pref. pp. 12-13.
2Apta-mimamasa,40-41,Yuktyanusasana.8-15,
Ct. Syadvadamanjuri.27
3 Yuktanusasana. 16-17.
of its comprehension and
representation, as it has a close bearing on our ethical discussions. Thirdly,
the classification of substances along with a brief account of each one of them
will be dealt with; and lastly, there will be represented the diverse ways of
expressing the nature of the ethical ideal.
GENERAL NATURE OF REALITY: According to Jainism, metaphysical reality,
objectively considered, embraces within its fold contradictions, but only in an
apparent fashion; they point just
to the incompetence and inadequateness of human expression in language.' It has
been considered as existent and non-existent,2 one and many,3
permanent and changing' etc. It is this aspect of Jaina philosophy which confounds
those philosophers who are habituated to think in an abstract way and apart
from experience. Owing to the
predilections fostered by a priori logic, they represent the Jaina view of
reality as incongruent, and so end either in the formulation of the absolutist
doctrine of universal externalism or universal nihilism. Jainism takes leave of such an inveterate habit of mind and
adheres to the testimony of experience for solving metaphysical problems. Thus
the Jaina differs from all absolutists in their approach to the unfoldment of
the inner nature of reality. Jainism
weaves the fabric and structure of reality on the authority of indubitable
experience and is not swayed in the least by the fascinations of a priori
logic. Owing to this deep-rooted abhorrence of the abstract way of
philosophising, the Jaina evaluates what is given in experience, and consequently
advocates change to be as much ontologically real as permanence. Both are
separable but only in logical thought. Being implies becoming and vice versa.
Inconsistent as it may appear at the inception, there is no doubt that
experience enforces it and logic confirms it. This conception of reality
reminds us of the Greek philosopher Promenades who regarded `Being' as the sole
reality wholly excluding of all becoming, as also of Heraclitus, for whom,
permanence being an illusion, `Becoming' or perpetual change constitutes the
very life of the universe. It
also makes us reminiscent of the Buddhist philosophy of universal flux and of
the unchanging, static, permanent absolute of Vedanta. But all these point to the one sided evaluation of
experience. It may be said that
"if the Upanisadic thinkers found the immutable reality behind the world
of phenomena and plurality,
_________________________
1 Yuktanusasana, 49. 2 Aptamimamsa, 15.
3 Ibid, 34. 4 Ibid., 56.
and the
Buddha denounced everything as fleeting and sorrowful and pointed to the
futility of all speculation, Mahavira adhered to the common experience, found
no contradiction between permanence and change, and was free from all
absolutism'."
MEANING OF THE TERM 'EXPERIENCE': It will not be out of place t0
mention the comprehensive meaning of the term `experience' adopted by the Jaina
philosophers. The term `experience' has been construed in its comprehensive
denotation as including all the five types of knowledge, namely, Mati
(Sensuous), Sruta (Scriptural), Avadhi (Intuition of material objects, or
Clairvoyance), Manahparyaya (Intuition of mental modes) and Kevala (Perfect
knowledge or Omniscience). The first two come under Paroksa, since they need
external sense-organs and mind for their birth and the other three are
classified under Pratyaksa, inasmuch as they are born independently of the
sense-organs and mind. The last three types of knowledge are the privilege and
prerogative of some selected few, namely, Yogis; but Mad and Sruta are given to
all. Mati includes inference, memory, recognition etc. ; and experience
includes Pratyaksa and Paroksa types of knowledge. Thus, Sensuous and Intellectual
knowledge are as much a part of `experience' as the transcendental one.
Sensuous and intellectual experience are also real, though they do not possess
the clarity of the transcendental one. Intuitive experience does not contradict
the intellectual one, but only surpasses it in scope, extension and clarity.
There is another way of understanding
the meaning of the term, `experience'. Experience should not be understood to
mean narrow empiricism or sensationalism in the Lockian sense, nor mere
rationalism in the Descartian sense, but it should be understood in antagonism
to the Kantian sense. To make it more clear, according to Kant, "the
understanding has different forms of conceiving or relating or connecting
percepts ; they are called pure concepts or categories of the understanding,
because they are a priori and not derived from experience".' But, according
to the Jaina, the categories or the pure concepts are not only mental
phenomena, but are also trans-subjective in character. In other words, they are both subjective and objective. Again, in accordance with Kant,
"sensibility furnishes us with objects or percepts, empirical intuitions
as he sometimes calls them".' and the universal forms are
___________________________
1 Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 18.
2 History of Philosophy (Indian
edition 1949)pp. 364,365.
3 Ibid, p. 361.
contributed by thought or
the understanding. But the Jaina does not accept this view and argues that the
universal and the particular are given together in experience. In the words of
Prof. SATXAXI MOOXEXJEE, "experience
furnishes unanalysed data with the universal and the particular rolled into
one. Reflection only distinguishes the two elements, and this has been
misconstrued to be the original contribution of thought"' It is in this
extensive meaning that the term `experience' should be taken whenever used in
the later course of our discussion.
DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE: In consonance with the
perspective adopted by the Jainas in their metaphysical speculation, substance
is that which exists or that which is characterised by simultaneous
origination, destruction and persistence, or that which is the substratum of
attributes and modes'. At the outset these definitions of substance may sound
as absolutely different from one another, but it may be noted that every one of
these definitions is inclusive of the rest, since existence implies change and
permanence from the view point of experience.3 Permanence signifies
persistence of substance along with attributes, and change refers to
fluctuating modes along with the emergence of the new modes and the
disappearance of the old ones at one and the same time'. To illustrate, gold as
a substance exists with its modifications and qualities. Now after making an
ornament, gold as a substance is existent along with its attributes and what
changes is the mode. Thus
existence which is inseparably bound up with substance (gold) accompanied by
its attributes and modes necessitates the production of a new form, the
cessation of the old one, and continuation of gold as such simultaneously. In
other words, substance, as inherently and essentially associated with endless
qualities and modifications, is out and out inconceivable without at the same
time implying existence which in turn is endowed with the trio of simultaneous
origination, destruction and persistence. The denial of the different aspects
of the Jaina view of substance will lead us either to the Buddhist philosophy
of universal change which disregards the underlying permanent being, or to the
Vedantic monism which declares the accompanying change as appearance or
illusory. Thus "the Jaina
conception of reality avoids the Scy11a of
___________________________
1 Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, p.3.
2 Panca, 10 , Prava, II, 3-4, Tasu. V. 29,30,38.
3 Panca. comm. Amrta. 10.
4 Ibid.
fluxism and the Charybdis of
illusionism"'. Thus nature
of substance may now oblige us to think that things both material and mental
are everlastingly existent. Such
a view of things cannot even pretend to conceive without falling into
inconsistency the intervention of any eternal and self-subsistent maker, either
personal or impersonal, for bringing into existence the diverse things of the
world.
SUBSTANCE AND QUALITY: Substance as different from the general and specific
qualities and modifications is not worthy of being so called. Things devoid of
attributes and modifications are nothing but abstractions, and are unthinkable.
Qualities are incapable of being existent by themselves even for a moment. They
necessitate the simultaneous existence of substance, and are denied any
isolated character; and they are themselves bereft of qualities.'
"Qualities do not fly loose as abstract entities, and substance does not
exist as an undetermined somewhat, a mere `that' to which they are afterwards
attached. The idea of substance is the idea of qualities as unified and
systematised"'. As regards the relation between them, we may say that they
are non-separate and non-identical. Non-separateness results owing to their
subsistence in the same spatial existences, and non-identity issues because of
the fact that one is not the other. The assertion that substance is not quality
and that quality is not substance serves only to emphasize the nonidentical
character of both substance and quality. It does not mean the absolute negation
of substance in quality and vice-versa.' Thus the relation between Dravya and
Guna (substance and quality) is one of identity-in-difference. The difference between them is only
the difference in point of nomenclature, number, characterizations, and
purpose' and not difference with reference to spatial expense. "Neither
being found without the other, they both stand in the relation of invariable
concomitance or simultaneity with one another instead of being in relation of
antecedence and consequence in time"'. In
other words, "the relation between substance and quality is one of coeval
identity, unity, inseparability, and essential simplicity, the unity of
substance and quality is not the result of union or combination'."
___________________________________
1 Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism. p. 72 2
Tasu. V. 41.
3 Idea of God.p.159. Cf. Sarvartha p. 310 4
Prava. II. 16.
5 Aptamimamsa. 72. 6 Epitome of Jainism. p.24
7 Indian Philosophy. Vol. I. p. 314.
SUBSTANCE AND MODIFICATION: Having
considered the Jaina view of qualities, we now turn to the conception of
Paryaya in Jainism. The notion of Paryaya is peculiarly Jainal. In conformity with the nature of substance as
permanence in mutability, Paryaya alludes to the variable aspect of a thing
which is due to the external and internal inducements. Every quality transmutes
its state every moment; and this mode of being is called Paryaya which is
incessantly transforming itself into the next, though the quality as such is
never abrogated. It is on this account alleged that substance is in a state of
perpetual flux. However incessant
and infinite the transformations may be, the underlying substantiality and
permanency can never part with existence. Substance and Paryaya are not to be
distinguished like two different things, for it is substance through qualities
which because of its flowing nature attains the qualification of Paryaya. Substance and modes are neither
exclusively identical nor exclusively different, but the relation is one of
identity-indifference, which is in perfect harmony with the non-absolutistic
attitude upheld by the Jaina. Thus origination and destruction are applicable
to Paryayas, and persistence to qualities along with substance. It may be pointed out here that
Paryaya also refers to the mode of the existence of substance. Therefore, mode of existence and
mutability constitute the meanings of Paryaya. As
a matter of fact, mutability is incapable of transgressing the mode of
existence and vice versa. Hence Paryaya refers to both the meanings at one and
the same time. Thus there is no substance (Dravya) without modification, and
modification is inconceivable without substance.' According to Kundakunda,
origination, destruction and continuance are in modifications and the latter
are in substance. Therefore substance is the basis of these all.
JAINA CONCEPTION OF PERSISTENCE AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
GUNA AND PARYAYA : The Jaina conception of persistence is defined as that which
accounts for recognition in the form of the proposition `This is the same".
This is consequent on the fact that the essential nature of substance or
quality, notwithstanding its mobility, is eternal and unchangeable.' Thus the
continuously flowing nature of quality does not annihilate the quality itself,
which, if admitted, would fail to account for memory and in consequence run
counter to all our daily commonplace transactions. Continuance devoid of
variability stands in direct antagonism to experience. Hence permanence is not
the denial of change, but includes it as its necessary aspect. In the same way,
qualities in the absence of modifications are incapable of being conceived. To
distinguish Guna from Paryaya, in the first place, the infinite attributes of a
simple and non-discrete substance are ever simultaneously present, but the
inexhaustible modulations do not appear simultaneously, but only in succession.
Secondly, qualities render the judgement of sameness possible, while the
judgement `This is not the same' is accountable only by making allusion to
modifications. Thirdly, Gunas as such are to be interpreted as immutable in
contrast to Paryayas which are regarded as mutable. In other words, attributes of a substance are credited with
the nature of perpetuation, while the originative and decaying designations are
accorded to Paryayas.
KINDS OF MODIFICATION: Paryayas may be classified into essential
modifications and non-essential ones.' The
former imply pure modifications of a substance and the latter are indicative
of the impure modifications of a substance. Vasunandi2 speaks of
Paryayas as Arthaparyaya and Vyaiijanaparyaya. The former refers to the
continuously flowing nature of a substance', while the latter signifies mode of
existence of a substance.' Both the implications are quite consistent with the
twofold meanings of Paryaya as already mentioned. Each of these two kinds of Paryaya may be essential and
non-essential. Thus Dharma,
Adharma, Space and time possess only essential Arthaparyaya and essential Vyanjanaparyaya,
while Jiva and Pudgala possess all the four types of Paryayas, namely,
essential Arthaparyaya and essential Vyanjanaparyaya, nonessential
Arthaparyaya and non-essential Vyanjanaparyaya. The statement of Vasunandi and
Devasena that the four substances, namely, Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kala possess
only Arthaparyaya and not Vyafijanaparyaya probably implies the presence of
essential Arthaparyaya and essential Vyanjanaparyaya and the absence of
non-essential Vyafijanaparyaya and non-essential Arthaparyaya in them.' To
illustrate the Paryayas of Jiva and Pudgala, the non-essential Vyaftjanaparyaya
of Jiva alludes to its transmigratory existence which is of four kinds: human,
hellish, celestial and sub-human. The non-essential Arthaparyaya of Jiva
refers to the impure psychical states which are continuous
________________________
1.
Alapapaddhati,
p 20.@ Niyama. 14 2 Vasunandi Srava, 2,
2.
Vasunandi
Srava, 25.
3.
Ibid. 4.
Vasunandi Srava, 25.
5. Vasunandi Srava, 27.:
Alapapaddhati, p. 27.
ly taking place in the self
in mundane form. The essential Vyanjanaparyaya
of self is manifested in the disembodied state of existence and the essential
Arthaparyaya signifies the flowing nature of pure states of self in the
transcendental form. Similarly, Pudgala possesses these four kinds of Paryaya
namely Skandha-form and the flowing nature in this form, Anu-form and the
flowing nature in this form respectively.
SUBSTANCE AND EXISTENCE: Of the infinite
characteristics pertaining to a substance, the most comprehensive is
existence. It comprises all other characteristics within its purview. Judged
from the standpoint of wholeness, substance, in a summary way, is existential
in nature.' It is thus obvious that substance is indubitable, self-evident,
therefore, existent from all eternity'. It is self-supported and complete in
itself. Besides, it transcends our imperfect knowledge. In other words, it is
unfathomable by our limited conceptions, since it has infinite characteristics 3. It is of capital importance to note
that if the nature of substance is comprehended otherwise, i.e., if existence
is not regarded as its essential characteristic, substance will be either
non-existing or isolated from existence. In the former case, the conclusion
will be the the total extinction of substance, and in the latter case, the ascription
of existence as such will be purposeless, inasmuch as substance gets capability
of possessing its essential nature independent of, and in isolation from,
existence, hence the inevitable result will the annihilation of existence.'
Apart from this, the denial of the existential nature of things would lead us
to acknowledge the emergence of things either from non-existence or from other
sources which in turn require others and so on endlessly.' Hence substance and
existence are indissoluble related like heat and fire, though they differ in
nomenclature, number, characterisation etc. In other words, they have Anyatva
(non-identity) and not Prthaktva (separateness). The former implies that
neither the nature of substance is identical with the nature of existence, nor
the nature of existence is identical with the nature of substance. And the latter means that substance
and existence are not separate in respect of Pradesa or space-points, just as
two separate things possess difference of Pradesa or space-points.' They have
not difference of Prade'sa (Prthaktva) but difference of
1.
Panchadhyayi. I. 8. ; Tasu. 29.' Prava. II. 6,
2.
Pancadhyayi. I. 8.; Prava. II. 6
3.
Pancadhyayi. I. 8.
4.
Prava.
II. 13 and Comm. Amrta.
5.
Pancadhyayi. I. 10, 11.
6.
6
Prava. II. 14 and Comm. Amrta.
characterisation. To explain the difference of characterisation'
(Anyatva), existence requires substance as its support, is devoid of other
qualities, is itself one adjective out of other infinite adjectival characterisations
of substance, is constitutive of substance, and is of the nature of
origination, destruction and continuance. On the contrary, substance is bereft
of any substratum, is accompanied by other illimitable characteristics, is a
substantive with countless adjuncts, and is the subject of origination,
destruction and continuance.' Thus if any legitimate concept is requisite to
reveal the relation between the two, it is identity-in-difference. The former
refers to Pradesas and the latter, to characterisations. The relation is unique, primary and underived.
PRAMANA, NAYA, AND SYADVADA: After dwelling upon the ontological
nature of reality as expounded by the Jaina philosophers, we now proceed to its
source of knowledge and expression in brief. It
may be contended that, if the Anekantic reality is indescribable altogether,
the path of liberation will be blocked, as nobody will be able to preach and
propound'. According to Jainism reality is cognised by Pramana and Naya.4
Pramana refers to the grasping of reality in its wholeness, while Naya points
to an aspect of infinitely-phased reality illumined by Pramana, thus the latter
takes into consideration only a fragment of the totality.' A thing embellishes itself with
illimitable characteristics." The emphasis on the one and the cancellation
of the other would irresistibly lead us to the biased estimation and Ekantic
view of reality, which would affect our ethical conclusions as we have
elsewhere said.' Pramana assimilates all the characteristics at once without
any contradiction and animosity between one characteristic and the other, for
instance, between one and many, existent and non-existent etc. Of the unfathomable characteristics, Naya
chooses one at one moment, but keeps in view the other characteristics also. We
may point out here that, though corresponding to the countless
characteristics, there are countless Nayas, which, if summed together, are
incapable of imparting knowledge as is given by Pramana. In other words, the
aggregation of all the Nayas for construing the notion of Pramana is
inadequate. It is, therefore, to be admitted that the acquisition of knowledge
by Pramana is an independent function
_______________________
1 Ibid. 2
Prava. Comm. Amrta. II. 14.
3 Yuktyanusasana, 43. 4 Ta. su I. 6.
5 Sarvartha. 1-6 .; Rajava.
I. 6*33. 6 Syadvadamanjari, 22.
7 Ibid. 27
of the
human mind. We can thus say that both Pramana and Naya are essential for the
proper understanding of the nature of reality. Reality being the repository of
infinite attributes, the apprehension of it from a particular angle of vision,
i.e., Naya, which is objectively given and not subjectively contemplated, does
not exhaust the whole of the multiphase reality. So, in order to avoid the
possible misunderstanding that reality is exhausted by the employment of a
particular Naya, every predication should be preceded by the word syat in order to make us aware of the possibility of other alternative
predications. Hence it is known as the doctrine of Syadvada. Syadvada is no doubt the logical
outcome of Anekantavada, the doctrine of the multiple nature of reality. It is
simply the mode of predication or communication envisaged by the Jaina to
convey the knowledge of the multiphased reality. Thus Syadvada is the mode of
expression, Anekantavada or Nayavada is the mode of cognition. Syadvada is the
expression of Anekantavada in language. We cannot do better than quote Prof.
A. N. Upadhye for exposing the relation between Syadvada and Nayavada,
"Syadvada is a corollary of Nayavada: the latter is analytical and primarily
conceptual and the former is synthetically and mainly verbal. Syadvada will
certainly look lame in the absence of Naya doctrine. Naya doctrine without
Syadvada has no practical value. Syadvada in course of the process of assertion
curbs down and harmonises the absolute views of individual Nayas.l"
Jaina philosophers unanimously hold that in order to apprehend an aspect of a
whole in its completeness or to do full justice to it, only seven (neither more
nor less) forms of judgement are requisite, hence it is known as the doctrine
of Saptabharlgi Vada.'
CLASSIFICATION OF SUBSTANCE: Jainism takes experience
as its guide and resolves the whole of the universe of being into two
everlasting, uncreated, co-existing, but independent categories of Jiva and Ajiva.
The Ajiva is further classified into Pudgala (matter), Iharma (principle of
motion), Adharma (principle of rest), lakes (space) and Kala (time). Hence
reality is dualistic as well as pluralistic. But, according to the Jaina,
plurality, considered from the synthetic and objective point of view of one
existence, entails unity also. According to Kundakunda, in spite of the unique
characteristics possessed by the different substances, existence has been
regarded as an all-comprising characteristic of reality
_______________________
1 Prava. Intro. LXXXV. 2 Saptabhangitaranginil,
p. 8.
which ends all
distinctions.' The Kdrttikeyanupreksd recognised
that all substances are one from the stand-point of substance, while they are
distinct and separate from their characteristic differences.' Samantabhadra
also endorses this view by affirming that in view of the conception of one
universal existence all are one, but from the point of view of substances
distinctions arise.' Padmaprabha Maladharideva pronounces that Mahasatta
pervades all the things in their entirety, but it is always associated with
Avantarasatta which pervades only the particular objects.' In a similar vein,
Amrtacandra speaks of the two types of Satta, namely, Svarnpasatta and
Sadrasyasatta. The latter is the same as Rimanyasatta.5 In his Sap
tabharigatararigina Vimaladasa discusses the problem of unity and
plurality of existence in detail, and concludes that both the postulation of
existential identity and the articulation of differences from the stand-point
of different substances are logically necessary and justifiable." Thus
Jainism gives credence to the recognition of existential oneness but not
exclusively, since it is always bound up with plurality. This is quite
consistent with the Anekantatmaka view of reality propounded by the Jaina
philosopher. The sole warrant for the existence of one and many, unity and
diversity, is experience which vouches for such a character of reality. Thus,
Mahasatta will be associated with its opposite, namely, Avantarasatta. It may
again be pointed out that this Mahasatta is not an independent something as may
be conceived, but is invariably accompanied by its opposite.' Kundakunda holds
the nature of existence as one, immanent in the totality of substances
constituting the universe, comprehending and summarizing the universe, having
infinite modifications, indicative of the triple characteristics of
origination, destruction, and persistence and in the last as associated with
the characteristics opposite to those mentioned above.' Hence unity, duality,
and plurality-all are inseparably and inevitably involved in the structure of
reality.
MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM AS THE TWO EXTREMES: By
recognizing both Jiva and Pudgala as substances Jainism steers clear of the two
extremes of materialism and idealism which are radically opposed to each other.
Materialism considers the universe as rooted in matter,
_______________________
1 Prava. Comm. Amrta. II-5. 2 Kartti. 236.
3 Aptamimamsa. 34. 4 Niyamja. Comm. Padmaprabha. 34.
5 Prava. Comm. Amrta. II, 3,
5. 6
Saptabhangitarangini. P. 78.
7 Panca. Comm. Amrta. 8. 8
Pancadhyayi. I. 15.
9 Panca. 8.
while idealism imagines the mind or spirit to be fundamental and
primary. The former lays stress on the recognition of the reality of matter and
considers the mind to be an incident or accompaniment; the latter affirms that
mind or spirit is to be reckoned as real and matter just an appearance. But
according to Jainism, both matter and spirit are equally true, and either is
warrantable if experience is allowed to be robbed of its significance.
GENERAL NATURE OF SUBSTANCES: Notwithstanding the mutual
interpenetrating of the six Dravyas and the accommodative nature of each, they
never part with their original nature.' This statement is indicative of the
fact that these Dravyas are incapable of transgressing their fixed number which
is six. Therefore their reeducation or multiplication is an impossibility.'
With the solitary exception of Kala Dravya, the remaining five are termed
Pancastikaya for the simple reason of possessing many Pradesas.3 The
word 'Kaya' should be understood only to connote `many' Pradesas.4
Jiva, Dharma, and Adharma own innumerable Pradesas; :1ka"sa possesses
infinite ones; Kala, one; but Pudgala possesses numerable, innumerable and
infinite Pradesas.5 All the Dravyas except Pudgala are regarded as
bereft of material qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour, and only Jiva
is said to possess consciousness. Hence Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kala, are
destitute of consciousness, and also of material qualities. Thus they should
not be misapprehended as being comprised under the category of matter, but they
come under a different category of non-sentiency-cum-non-inateriality. As for
Dharma, Adharma and Lukas, each of them is considered to be one, while Jiva
and Pudgala are infinite; and Kala is innumerable." Besides, Dharma,
Adharma, Akasa and Kala are by nature non-active, and the remaining two are
active.'
NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF PUDGALA: Having discussed the general nature of six
substances, we now proceed to deal with their specific nature. We start with
Pudgala (matter). Matter, according to Jainism, is not something formless,
indefinite, and absolutely featureless as conceived by Anaximander, nor is it
to be regarded as non-being in the Platonic
_______________________
1 Ibid. 2
Sarvartha. V. 4.
1
Panca.
Comm. Amrta. 22; Panca. 102.; Prava. II. 43. ; Niyama. 34. The space occupied
by one atom is called a Pradesa.
4 Sarvartha. V. 1. 5
Dravya. 25,; Ta.su. V. 8,9, 10..; Niyama. 35, 36.
6 Gomma. Ji. 587.; Ta.su. V.
6. 7
.; Panca. 98.
sense; i.e., as "a
secondary, a dull, irrational, recalcitrant force, the unwilling slave of
mind".' Nor does it admit of its being considered to be a sensation-complex,
or a collection of ideas as signified by the subjective idealism of Barkeley.
Apart from this, it is to be distinguished from the Prakrti of Samkhya. Jainism
propounds matter in the realistic sense, and so its cognizance is based on its
characteristic sense-qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour, which are in
the relation of invariable concomitance, i.e., one quality is never found in
isolation but always, in a group of four, though in varying degrees of
intensity.' The conception of matter is so comprehensive as to comprise under
it the five substances of earth, water, air, light and Dravya-mind out of the
nine substances admitted by the Vaisesika. Hence these five substances are
easily assimilable in Pudgala,3 since they emerge out of material
atoms by varying combinations. The aforementioned four qualities of atom admit
of numerable, innumerable and infinite classifications; but the principal kinds
are regarded as twenty; namely, eight kinds of touch (soft, hard, heavy, light,
hot, cold, viscous, and rough,' five kinds of taste (bitter, pungent, sour,
sweet, and astringent);' two kinds of smell (fragrance and the reverse);' and
five kinds of colour (blue, yellow, white, black and red).' The functions of
Pudgala are: the five types of body,' the speech, the mind, the Karmic
particles, the breathing including exhaling and inhaling, pleasure and pain,
life and death, and the five senses.'
KINDS OF PUDGALA : The
principal forms in which Pudgala (matter) exists, are Anu (atom) and Skandha
(aggregate)." Binary to infinite aggregates are included in Skandha.ll
An atom consists of only one Pradesa, is the terminus of divisibility of
matter, is by itself without beginning, end or middle, is destitute of sound
and is coupled with the qualities of taste, touch, smell and colour."
Besides, it is indestructible and eternal, is responsible for the disruption of
Skandhas by virtue of its segregation from them, is also the substantial cause
of them and is the measure of time. 13 Again it is devoid of sound, but is the
cause of sound; i.e., the combination of atoms may produce sound when they
strike against other
_______________________
1 History of Philosophy (
Edition 1949) p. 59.
2 Ta.su. V. 23, ; Sarvartha.
V. 5.14.
2
Sarvartha.
V. 3.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Five
types of body are; audarkika (physical), vaikriyika (fluid), aharaka
9assimilative), taijasa (electric) and Karmana (karmic), see Ta. su. II. 36.
7
Panca.
82, ; Sarvartha. V. 19. 20.
8
Ta/
si/ V/ 25. ' Moua,a/ 20.
9
Sarvartha.
V. 26.
10
Panca.
77.
11
Panca.
80
aggregates of atoms.' It possesses any one colour, any one
taste, any one smell, but a pair of such touches as are not of contradictory
nature; namely, cold and viscous, or cold and dry, or hot and viscous, or hot
and dry.' The remaining touches, namely, soft and hard, light and heavy, are
only manifested in the Skandha state of matter, and thus are not present in its
atomic state. The qualities of viscousness (snigdhata) and dryness (ruksata) vary in degrees of intensity extending from the
lowest limit to the highest, from one point to infinity.' The variations in the
degrees of intensity may be ordinarily witnessed in the milk of she-goat, cow,
buffalo, and she-camel in point of viscousness, and in dust (parilsu),
gross-sand (kanika), and sand (.rarkara)
in respect of dryness.' Hence atoms are capable of existing
with infinite variability in these two characteristics. These are responsible
for atomic linking.' Thus, for explaining the combination of atoms this
assumption excludes God or Adrsta as recognised by the Nyaya-Vaisesika school
of thought, as also the primordial motion of atoms as advocated by Democritus.
Though, according to the Jaina, atoms are active,' activity is not the cause of
combination. It will not be amiss to say that those atoms which are at the
lowest in the scale of viscousness and dryness are not given to combination
either with one another or with other intensification's.' Besides, atoms which
have equal degrees of viscousness and dryness also refuse to combine with one
another.' But atoms which hold two degrees of viscousness and dryness in excess
are given to interlining; i. e.,
atoms with two degrees of viscousness and dryness are interlinkable with four
degrees of the same in all respects. Similarly, this law holds good for other
interlinkings.9 Besides,
atoms which possess four degrees of viscousness or dryness are capable of
transforming atoms having two degrees of viscousness or dryness into their own
nature. l° Similarly, this holds good for all those atoms which have a difference
of two degrees of viscousnss or dryness. This
theory thus avoids mere conjunction of atoms, but propounds their synthetic
identification."
We now proceed to Skandha. The
aggregates of atoms exist in six different forms; namely, 1) gross-gross 2) gross
3) gross-fine 4) finegross 5) fine and lastly 6) fine-fine." 1) The class
of matter which, when
_______________________
1 Panca. 78, 79, 81. 2. Ibid. 81., Niyama. 27. Comm. Amrta.
3
Sarvartha. V. 33. 4
Ibid. 33. 5 Gp,,a/ Ko/ 608.
6 Panca.
Comm. Amrta. 98. 7 Sarvartha. V. 34. 8 Ibid. V. 35.
9 Ibid
V. 36. 10. Ibid. V. 37. 11
Ibid. V. 37.
12
Niyama. 21 to 24/
divided, cannot restore its
original state without any extraneous help is termed gross-gross. The examples
of which are wood, stone, and the like. 2) That which can be reunited on being
divided without the intervention of a third something is called gross, for
example, water, oil, etc. 3) Shadow,
sunshine, etc. which are incapable of disintegration and grasp are subsumed
under gross-fine. 4) The objects of touch, taste, smell and hearing are called
fine-gross. 5) The Karmic matter etc. which are imperceptible by the senses
are included into the category of fine. 6) The binary aggregates and the
Skandhas smaller than the Karmic matter come under the next category of
fine-fine. As we have said, the generation of sound is effected by the striking
of Skandhas against one another. Thus Jainism takes exception to the view of
Nyaya-Vaisesika which calls sound the quality of Akasa, inasmuch as it is
capable of being sensed, which would not have been possible, had it been the
quality of Akasa.
Next comes the reality of Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kala.
None of the philosophical systems originated in the east and the west
postulated the independent existence of the principle of motion (Dharma) and
the principle of rest (Adharma). Besides, the idealistic thinkers have
unhesitatingly brushed aside the reality even of space and time, since they
find themselves in the meshes of irreconcilable contradictions. Kant regarded
them as the forms of perceptions, which are imposed by sensibility upon
things. Hence on account of the glasses of space and time attached to
sensibility, the nominal reality escapes our grip and its attainment becomes a
wild goose-chase. But the Jaina who relies upon the findings of experience
absolves us from the creations of a priori logic by positing the reality of
Dharma, Adharma, Kasai and Kala answering to the experienced motion, rest,
allowance of room, and change respectively:
We shall now throw some light on the nature of motion. All the idealists are one in rejecting
the reality of motion and in designating it as mere appearance, phenomenal, and
unworthy of being intelligibly applied to thing-in-itself. The Elliptic
philosopher Zeon was the first to raise a voice against the possibility of
motion. But Jainism recognises the reality of motion. It is defined as the
modification originating from the external and internal inducements, which make
possible the traversing from one point of space to another.' The substances
like Dharma,
_______________________
1 Sarvartha. V. 7.; Panca.
Comm. Amrta. 98.
Adharma, Akasa and Kala are
non-active and motionless in this sense, but Jiva and Pudgala are said to be
the authors of motion; that is, these two Dravyas are capable of being active
to the exclusion of others.' Activity is not a different, independent category,
but a special modification of these two substances due to the external and
internal causes.' Besides, it should be distinguished from the Arthaparyaya,
which means motionless change possessed by all the six Dravyas, as has already
been explained. The activity of Jiva is due to the external causal agency of
Karman. Thus Siddhas, who have reached liberation, are non-active on account of
the absence of Karman.3 The activity of Pudgala is due to the
external agency of Kala. It will remain perpetual, since unlike Karmic
particles Kala can never be absent at any time. Thus the Pudgala unlike the
Siddhas cannot be non-active.
AKASA: That
extent of space which is replete with matter, souls, time, principle of motion,
and principle of rest is labelled Lokakasa or world space. This distinguishes
it from Alokakasa or empty space where in none of the five substances abides.'
Thus the former is recognised as being capable of providing accommodation to
Jivas, Pudgala and to the rest of the Dravyas. That space is its own base and
support, and does not call for any other substance to accommodate it is evident
from the fact that there is no other substance of more vastness than this which
may provide room to it. And even if it is conceded, it will implicitly lead us
to the fallacy of regress
ad infinitum.' Besides, it is imperative to note that, considered
from the point of view of the thing-in-itself, all substances exist in
themselves. It is only said from the commonplace point of view that all
substances are subsisting in space.' The principles of motion and rest are
immanent in the entire physical space (Lokakasa) like the permeation of oil in
the seed.' Despite the omnipresence of Dharma and Adharma in the Lokakasa and
the existence of Jiva, Pudgala, and Kala therein, they never forfeit their
respective specific nature.'
DHARMA AND ADHARMA : Dharma and Adharma are the indifferent
conditions of movement and rest respectively. Dharmastikaya
is itself incapable of migration and of generating motion in other things, but
is
_______________________
1 Sarvartha. V. 7. ; 2. Rajava. V. 7/4, 2.
3 Panca.
Comm. Amrta. 98. ; Rajava V. 7/14 to 16.
4 Panca.
Comm. Amrta. 98 ; 5 Dravya. 20. ; Sarvatha. V. 12, Panca 90,91/
6
Rajava. V. 12/2 to 4. 7
Rajava. V. 12/5 to 6.
8
Sarvartha. V. 13. 9
Rajava. V. 16/10.
the sine qua non of the
movement of Jivas and Pudgala by its mere existence, just as water assists in
the spontaneous movement of fish by its mere presence and not as the wind which
has the capability to develop activity in certain things.' Similarly,
Adharmastikaya does not persuade Jiva and Pudgala in motion to stand still, but
becomes the passive condition when they of their own accord discontinue to
move, just as the shadow of a tree does not persuade a traveler to take rest
under it.' Thus neither Dharmastikaya originates motion, nor Adharmastikaya
stops it. Both of them are non-active conditions. Besides, these two principles
are also responsible for the demarcation' of Lokakdsa and Alokakasa, inasmuch
as they make possible the existence of Jiva and Pudgala only in Lokakasa.
Besides, the residence of the Siddhas at the summit of the world also proves
that space cannot account for motion and rest and the different principles like
Dharma and Adharma must needs be assumed.'
KALA : We have
frequently made reference to the underlying assumption of the whole Jaina
philosophy that, though reality is incessantly subject to mutation, it sustains
its identical character. Thus everyone of the substances without exception is
credited with origination, destruction and persistence. In the substances like
Dharma, Adharma, Akasa, liberated soul and an atom of matter, the qualities
are continuously changing in themselves.' The experience of change, however, in
the mundane soul and in the gross matter is omnipresent and this is of necessity
to be accounted for and should not be speculatively condemned as mere illusion. In view of this, the Jainas
realistically confer an existential status on `time', and calls it substance
to answer for the experienced change,' just as Dharma, Adharma and Akasa are
calculated to -throw light on what may be called motion, rest and the providing
of room.' Kant's statement is worthy to be noted when he affirms that it is
impossible to emancipate ourselves from the spatial and temporal ways of thinking
and speaking despite our best endeavors; but the Jaina, though honoring his thesis,
refuses to acquiesce in the fact that space and time are contributed by
sensibility, since according to him they are revealed in experience and are
objectively ontologically true. Just as
space is its own support, so real time is conceived to be assisting its own
change or modification
_______________________
1 Panca. 85,88 and Comm.
Amrta. 2. Ibid 86.
3 Panca. 87. 4 Ibid. 92, 93 and Comm. Amrta.
5 Prava.
Comm. Amrta. II. 1. 6
Niyama. 33. 7 Niyama. 30.
along
with its being the condition of change in other substances constituting the
universe. Kala may be classified into real time (Parmartha Kala) and
conditioned time (Vyavahara Kala).1 The former is the substance
proper;' and Samaya, -wall are conditioned varieties of time.' The function of
Parmartha Kala is Vartana; i.e., it passively helps the selfchanging
substances; and the functions of conditioned time are change, motion and the
feeling of one's being young and old.' As has already been pointed out, Kala
Dravya is deprived of the designation, `Kaya', inasmuch as it has only one
Pradesa in the form of Kala Anu. These Kala anus are innumerable, and exist
separately on each Pradesa of Lokakasa without being mixed with one another.'
The unit of conditioned time is called `Samaya', which may be defined as the
period required by the primary material atom to traverse with slow pace from
one Pradesa of Akasa to the immediately next." It is practically inconceivable in life. It should be borne in mind
that innumerable `Samayas' lapse in the opening of an eyelid.
GENERAL NATURE OF JIVA
(SELF): The problem of self is
the most fundamental problem in the domain of philosophy. Since the dawn of philosophical
speculation down to the present time, it has vexed, great philosophers and led
them to formulate different conceptions consistent with the metaphysical
outlook upheld by them. With Jainism though the probing into the nature of self
is not a new enterprise, the special point of the Jaina view consists in
substantiating the notion of self without blinking the loftiest mystical
heights on the one hand and without condemning the unobstructed experience as
sheer illusion on the other. The self, as an ontologically underived fact, is
one of the six substances subsisting independently of anything else. The
experience of knowing', feeling' and willing' immediately proves the existence
of self: The Karttikeyanupreksa recognise
that the self is to be regarded as possessing supreme significance among the
substances and as having the highest value among the Tattvas. It is the
repository of excellent characteristics.'-1 It is the internal
Tattva. It is to be distinguished from the other substances which are merely
external since they are without any knowledge of things to be renounced and
accepted. " Kundakunda in the Pravacanasara calls
it Muhartha (a great objectivity)." It is neither merely an immutable prin
_______________________
1 Sarvartha. V. 22. 2.
Ta.su. V. 39.
3
Niyama. 31. 4 Sarvatha. V-22.
5 Dravya
22.; Niyama. 32. 6 Prava. II. 47.
7
Acaranga. 1. 5. 5, p. 50. 8 Kartti.
183.
9 Ibid.
184. 10. Kartti.
11 Ibid. 12 Kartti. 205.
13.
Prava. II. 100.
ciple as advocated by the
Vedanta , the Samkhya-Yoga and the NayaVaiseika, nor merely a momentarily
transmutable series of psychical states as recognised by the Buddhist. But,
according to the Jaina, it is a synthesis of permanence and change.
Consciousness, according tot him, is its essential and distinguishing feature.
The Jaina, therefore, diversiform the
Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Purva-Mimamsa which regard consciousness as an
adventitious attribute, as also from the Carvaka system which envisages
consciousness as an epiphenmomenon of matter, something like the inebriating
power emerged from the mixing of certain ingredients. The systems of thought
like the Samkhya- Yoga and the Vedanta of Samkara and Tamanuja betray a fairer
resemblance to the consideration
is intrinsically associated with
the self.
In the Jaina writings we are confronted with the conception
of self as variously dealt with. We may comprise these various ways under two
objective points of view. First, there is the trancwcedetal view which
represents the nature of self in its unadulterated state of existence; and
secondly there is the empirical view which describes the nature of self in its
corrupted form. At present, we propose to discuss the nature of self from the
empirical stand-point. We postpone the
discussion from the transcendental view tot a later stage.
NATURE OF EMPOIRICAL SELEF: First, the empirical self has
been in a state of transmigration since an indeterminable past. It is on this
account contended that the self originates and decays. But this is valid only
from the Paryayaarthika point of view and not from the Dravyarthika one, which
lays down indestructibility and
unproductively of the self. 1
Secondly, as we have said, the empirical self is in possession of
non-essential Vyanjanaparyya and non-essential Arthaparyaya. It illumines the
whole body by pervading in it just as the lotus-hued ruby illumines a cup of milk.
2 Thirdly the empirical self is
considered by the Jaina as the doer of evil and good actions. Fourthly, it is
also the enjoyer. To sum up the empirical self is bound by Karmas from an
indefinite past, is the enhoyer of the self-performed good and bad actions, is
the knower and the seer, and is associated with the triple nature of
origination, destruction and continuance. Besides it possesses the narrowing
and dilating characteristics, extends up to the limit of bodily dimensions and
owns its specific characteristics of knowledge, bl9iss etc. 3 It may be otter
here that Jainism recognises the metaphysical reality of infinite selves. We
may point out in passing that the relation between the empirical self and the
transcendental one is one of identity- cum difference; i.e there is
metaphysical identity between the two states (empirical and superempieical) of
the same self, but the difference is also undeniable in respect of Upadhis
which have been persisting since an infinite past. The empirical self is
potentiality transcendental, though this nominal state of existence is not
actualised at present; hence the distinction is incontrovertible.
KINDS OF EMPIRIAL SELEF, ONE SENSED EMPIRICAL SELVES: The
empirical self is recognised by the Pranas which it owns. The minimum number of Pranas possessed by the empirical
self is four (one sense, one Bala, life-limit and breathing), and the maximum
bumper is ten (five senses, three Balas, and breathing) 1 However encumbered with the cruel matter a
self may be, it cannot obstruct the manifestation of consciousness to the full,
just as even the most dense cloud cannot interrupt the light of the sun to its
farthest extreme. The lowest in the grade of existence are the one-senesced
Jivas. They possess four Pranas To make it clear, of the five senses, namely,
the sense of touch, taste smell, colour and sound the one- senses Jivas possess
obey the sense of touch; and of the three Balas, namely, the Bale of mind, body
and speech, they have Olay the Bala of body, and besides they hold life-fold
classification; 2 namely, the
earth-bodied water-bodied fire-bodied, airbodied and lastly, vegetable bodied
souls. The recognition of these one- sensed souls is fraught with great
difficulty, since the four Pranas are to explicitly manifested, just as the
Pranas of a man in the state of nimbuses, or just as the Pranas of a growing
soul in the egg of a bird or in the embryonic state cannot be recognised owing
to the lack of their explicit manifestation. 3
TWO –SENSED TO FIVE-SENSED
EMPIRCAL SOULS : Having pointed out the various forms of existence of
the one-sensed Jivas and the number of Pranas upheld by them, we now proceeded
to the higher grades of existence. The two-sensed Jivas possess six Proceed to
the higher grades of existence. The two sensed Jivas possess siv Pranas, i.e.
in addition to the four Pranas of oe-sensed souls, they have two Organs more;
namely, the sense of taste, and the Bala of speech: the three sensed souls have
the sense of smell additionally: the four-sensed souls have the sense of colour
besides the above; and lastly, the five sensed souls which are mindless are
endowed with the sense of hearing in addition; and those with mind possess all
the ten Pranas. 1 Thus the nimbers of
Pranas possessed by one-sensed to five-sensed souls are four, six seven eight
nine and ten respectively. The illustrations of the two-sensed souls are
sea-snail, cowrie –shell –fish, conch-shell fish, earth- worm etc; of the three
–sensed souls are louse, bug ant, 3
etc. of the four- senesced sound are gadfly, mosquito fly, bee, beetle
dragon fly and butter fly; 4 of the five –sensed souls with ten Pranas are
clestatil, hellish and human beings and some subhuman souls 5 and of the five-senseds souls with nine
Pranas are old sensed ones are designated as non-rational or mindless
(Asamijani) whereas the five-sensed sub –human beings may be rational or
non-rational, but the celestial, hellish and human beings are necessarily
rational. 7 The rational souls may be
recognised by the capability of beings preached, of receiving instruction, and
of voluntary action. 8
Having dealt with the nature and kinds of the empirical
self, we now proceeds to discuss the nature of the ethical ideal, the Summum
Bonum of human life. This will also make clear the nature of the transcendental
self. Just as the validity of the existence of self is incapable of being
impugned, so the existence of the highest good is unquestionable The empirical
souls from the one-sensed to the four- sensed, as also some substrate of
existence. They are not endowed with that type state of existence. They are not
endowed with that type of understanding which may assist them in absolving
themselves from the thralldom of Karman. Such being the overwhelming effect of
Karman, their progress to the higher grades of existence is decided by 'time'
But the human souls, being possessed of mind, can ponder over the objective to
be aimed at for their beefcake and can achieve the highest good the possibility
of the relisation of supermen good is the possibility of a free, sacred,
immortal, human life which ends the transmigratory existence and its attendant
evils. The Tirthamakaras are the concrete examples of such achievement.
_______________________
1 Sarvartha. II-14 2.
Panca. 114. 3. Ibid. 115
4. ibid.
116. . Panca. 17 and Comm. Amta.
6. Ibid.
(In all thee eferences from 2 to 6 vide Chakravarti's translation of
Pancastikaa.) 7 Panca. Comm. Amrta. 117 8 Gomma. ji. 660.
In the ethico-religio-philosohical- works of the Jainas the
highest good is diversely formulated. Fed up with the kaleidoscopic
transformations of the world, the Jaina acaryas have dived deep into the inert
hidden regions of the spirit, and have expressed the highest good in different
ways. But it may be noted here that all the formulations of the highest good
convey identical meeting.
LIBERATION SYNCHROOUS WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF KARMAS AS THE
ETHICAL IDEAL : First, the deliverance
of self is deemed to be the highest good. Every Houma being ought to trended
strenuous efforts to seek his own salvation from the miseries of the world. All
the systems of Indian philosophy with the solitary exception of Carvaka
acquiesce in recognising liberation as the ethical ideal, though they differ in
the nature of ralisation. From the view point of the Jaina, it is not the
identification of self with the Brahman, as contemplated by the Vedantin, but
it is the attainment of Siddhahood wherein self- individuation is sustained.
The Isutrakaranaga Items us that liberation is the best thing, just as the moon
is the best among the stars 1 The Acaranaga pronounces that liberation is a
thieved by a ma who does not feel disinterested in Self-denial 2 just as fire immediately burns the dry
sticks, so the self established in itself forthwith annuls the filth of Karmas.
3 in the sate of final liberation the
empirical self is metamorphosed into transcendental, permanent existence.
4 again, having totally annihilated the
eight types of Karaman, and having experienced the supersensuous bliss that passes
understanding, the empirical self becomes completely bereft of any collyriumi
that may again cause bondage, and as such abides at the summit of the world
without having abandoned anything to be
accomplished. 5
PARAMANTMAN AS THE SUMMUM Bonum : Secondly, the ideal is
also described as the attaint of Paramatman after one's passing through the
state of Antaratman and renouncing the state of Bahiratman. 6 These three states of the same self may very
well be compared with the three types of attitudes as recognised by Dr.
CAIRD: " Man looks outward before
he looks inward and he looks a inward before he looks a upward" 7
_______________________
1 Skrya Kr. I. 11, 22. 2. Acara. 1, 2, 2, p. 17.
3 Acara,
1, 4, 3, p. 39. 4 Gomma. Ji.
68.
5 Ibid. 6
Mo. Pa. 7.
7
Evolution of Religion, II. 2. ( vide, Constructive survey of Upanisadic
philosophy, p. 247.)
The Bahiratman sees outward;
when it becomes Antaraman, it sees inward; and when it becomes Paramantaman, it
is said to see upward. Thus the ralisation of the Paramantma amounts to the
relisation of the highest good. Kundakunda, Yogindu and Pujyapadas the great
proponents of the Jaina thought, converge on this point. They frequently speak
of the realisation of Paramatman as the highest good. Here a word of caution is
necessary the words Paramatman and Brahaman are synonymously used in the Jaina
philosophical texts, but they should not be confused with the Upanisadic
Brahman which is the cosmic principle. The Jaina gives credence to the
existence of infinite Bhrahamans i.e. Oaranmatamans which are the consummately
stages of spiritual evoaccording tot Janis, are identical, inasmuch as they are
the two stages of the same entity. Thus every soul is potentially divine, and
the manifestation of divinity is called Paramatmanhood. If this connotation
implicit in the Jaina view of Paramantma is not conceded, that would constitute
a virtual abandonment of the ontological pluralism of selves which it
champions. Though Brahaman of the Upanisasds and Brahaman of the Jainas exhibit
many resemblance's, yet they differ enormously In laying stress on this
conception of Paramatman as the Summum Bouum, the goal of all human pursuance,
we are committed tot the view that the religious ideal and the ethical ideal
coalesce. The spiritual values and the ethical values are identical.
NISCAYA NAYA AS THE ETHIAL IDEAL: TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE
TRANSCENDS THE CONCEPTUAL POINTS OF VIEW WHERTHER NISAYA OR VYAVAHARA: Thirdly, we encounter a different mode of
exmpressig the ethical ideal. The Jails in order to expound this speak in the
language of Nyayas. Kundakunda, the outstanding ethic-religious philosopher of
the first century A.D. is conspicuous for using Niscaya Naya (Transcendental
view) and Vyavahara Naya (Empirical view) as the language of spiritualism to
make out the ethical ideal. The Niscyaya Naya which grapes the soul in its
undefiled state of existence may very well sere as the ethic ideal to achieved
in contradistinction to the Vyavahara Naya which describes the self as bound,
impure and the like. No doubt, we are in the corrupt form of existence from begin ingress past, but the Niscaya Nyaya
reminds us of our spiritual magnificence and glory. It prompts the sullied self
to behold its spiritual heritage. It endeavors to infuse and instill into our
minds the impressiveness of Suddha
Bhavas after abundantly showing us the empirical and evanescent character of
Subha and Asubha Buhavas that bid the soul to mundane existence. It does not
assert that the soul is at present perfect but simply affirms that the self
ought to attain the height illumined buy it has the force of 'ought' and not of
'is' but this force is vaikd for empirical selves. In the opening chapter of
the Samayasara Kundakaunda summarises the implication of the aforementioned
rowed Nayas by saying the every self has heard about, obscured and experienced
the worldly enjoyments and consequential bondage, but the nature of the highest
self has never been conprehended.1 Hence
the former is Vyavaharanaya, while the latter is a allied Niscayanaya, which
points to the potentiality of the empirical self to become pure and enjoy its
unalloyed status. It is therefore averred that when the self has elevated
itself to the domai of spiritual em-erence, the vyabahara Baya becomes false
and the Niscaya Naya is seen to be genuine. In other words, we achieve the
right to renounce the Vyahaara Naya only when we have accomplished the loftiest
height of mystical experience. If we regard the yaahara Naya as untruthful at a
low stage, Punya, Papa, bondage, and the necessity to do strenuous effort to
achieve liberation would be of o avail. It may be noted here that the falsity
of the Vyaahara Baaya aggects neither the existence of external objects nor the
omniscience of the trancscedndental self which reflects the differences of the
world as they are. In explaining the nature of the ethical ideal in terms of
Byay Kundakunda advances a step further, and affirms that the transcendental
experience surpasses all the conceptual points of view whether Niscaya or
Vyavahara .2 The former represents the
self as unbound and untouched by Karma's, while to latter, as bound and touched
by the, but he who transcends these herbal points of view is allied Samayasara,3 the goal to be achieved. The self becomes
pure consciousness, bliss and knowledge.
It may be toed here that like the Paramaratha and Vyavahara
Nayas enunciated by Kundakunda, Samukaraaraya, the great eminent of the Advaita
doctrine, makes use of the Paramarathika and Vyaaharika view-points as the
corner stones of his philosophy. But the two differwidely. The paramarthika
view as advocated by Samkara negates the Paramarthika existence of other
material and non-material objects of the world which in the view of the Jaina,
here their own independent
_______________________
1Samaya. 4. 2. Samaa. 144.
3 Ibid.
141, 142.
existence. The Vyayahara Naya of the Jainas simply points
to our slumbering state in the domai of
spiritualism, and does not in the least touch the existential aspects of
things. The Nisaya or Paramartha Naya simply seven to awaken the slumbering
soul to attain its spiritual heritage. It does not pretend annul the external
things by merespirital outlook.
SVASMAYA AS THE TRANSCENDENT OBJECTIE: Fourthly, there is witnessed a different
expression of the Summon Bonum. 'Svasmaya' is the sublime ideal to be aimed at
it is the transcendent objective to be achieved. That self which is absorbed in
the mundane modifications referring tot he four indo of transmigratory
existence, and which does not believe that the substance is established is'
Svasamaya' 1 The interminable stay of
the self in Darsana (intuition) Jnana (Knowledge), and Caritra (Conduct also
explains the implication of the term Svasamaya, which may be discriminated from
Para-samaya wherein the self identifies itself with the body and the foreign
psychical states of attachment and aversion and the like 2 in other words,
Sa-samaya is the non-conceptual state of existence, the state in which all
differenctiatons caused by the infinite characteristics disappear. It is the
Advaita state of existence The Tattvanusamana
elucidated Advaita by pointing out that the recognition of the soul as
associated with something other is duality; while non-duality is relised by
those who see their own self quite unattached to anything whatsoever 3 But this Adaita of Jainism should be
trenchantly distinguished from the Advaita of Vedanta, wherein everything
disappears except the Brahaman. The contention of the Jaina is that the
existence of other substances is incapable of counter acting the mystic
experience of the self; only the self must not experience conceptual duality or
the plurality of finite characteristics inherent in it. The self submerges in
itself after transcending all conceptual differcnceds of infinite attributes in
the domain of spirit it is experiential, intuit, mystical state; and so escapes
and eludes our conceptual discussions. Thus Joins has arrived at the conception
of Advaita, though to of the Vedantic type, by proceeding from a different side
and ackowledgeigng a different conception of reality.
SUDDHA UPAYOGA AS THE GOAL: Fifthly, the attainment of Suddhopayoga is the goal of human
pursuance. Therein the self synchronically
_______________________
1 Prava. II 2, 6. 2.
Samaya. 2. 3Tattvanusasana, 177.
realises omniscience and
happiness which are its cognate and adjective potencies receptively. We have
seen that consciousness is the discriminative characteristic of the soul. It
manifests itself in Upayoga, which flows from consciousness as the conclusion
from premises. The Upayoga is of three kinds, namely Subha () auspicious ,
Asubha (inauspicious ) and Suddha ( pure) the self is said to possess
auspicious Upayoga when it is absorbed in the performance of meritorious deeds
of moral and spiritual nature. Hence the self acquires celestial births which
it may be noted, are also a part and parcel of worldly career. Besides, when
the self entangles it self in demertorous actions of violence, sensual
pleasure, and the like, it is said to possess inauspicious Upayoga Ghence the
self is led to the sub-human and hellish births. Both these auspicious and
inauspicious Upaygas will again continue to activate the self in the
never-ending wheel of misery Consequently, the assignment of the two Upayogas
can nerve function as the Summum Bonum of human life. The Jaina, there fore
makes an explicit pronouncement that so long as the self is a mated with these
two types of Upayoga, it will been unfruitful dissipating its energies in pursuit
of an mirages; and so the highest good will ever remain shrouded in mystery.
But as soon as the self partsa company with these auspicious and inauspicious
Upayogas, it joins hands with suddha upayoga. In other words, the experience of
Suddha Upayoga automatically lobelias the Asuddha Udayoga (Subha ad Asubha ) to
disappear, with the consequence that the transmigratory character of self
evaporated in totality. Spiritually considering, we may say that both the
impure Upayogas in the form of virtue
and vice prevet the soul from attaining the loftiest mystic heights, hence they
should be equally condemned as unwholesome for the healthiest development of
the spirit. But if the empirical self finds that it is difficult to rise to
mystical heights, it should perform auspicious activities so as to achieve at
least heavenly happiness but with the car knowledge that these performances
however intensely and carelessly conducted will in no way enable it to relish
the pure Upayoga. The inauspicious activities should by al means be disported,
inasmuch as they will bring about thousands of hurt rending miseries. The pure
consciousness which relinquishes the impure Upayogs associated with the
empirical consciousness realises omniscience and such happens as is transcendental
born of the self, supersensuous ,incomparable, infinite and indestructible 1.
This Transcendent self as the transcendental ideal may also be designated as
'Svayambhu' 2 To make it clear, it is a
state of self-sufficiency which requires no other foreign assistance to sustain
itself. It is itself the subject, the object, the means for its achievement, it
achieves for itself, destroys the extraneous elements and is the support of its
infinite potencies. Hence the self manifests it original nature by transforming
itself manifests it original nature by transforming sitself into six cases; it
is at once the ammonite, the accusative, the instrumental , the dative, the
ablative and the locative case respectively 3 The whole of our discussion may
be summarised by saying that the ideal consists in the full manifestation of
cognitive, affective and contain potencies inherent in the full manifestation
of the cognitive, affective and contain potencies inherent in the soul we he of
soar dwelt upon the former two, and now we shall turn to the last in brief.
AGENCY OF PURE BHAVAS AS THE IDEAL: Sixthly, the ideal may
be expressed in terms of activity. Kundakunda, the prominent exponent of Jina
spiritualism has bequeathed to us the philosophy of doer and the deed. He proclaims
that in whatever deeds the self may get itself engaged in the world, they are
not the representatives of the self in its pure, undefiled and transcendent
nature. The self in its real nature is Even the empirical self is not the doer
of material Karams; it is simply the doer of impure dispositions(Asuddha
Bhavas), by which the material particles transform themselves into various
Karmas. No substance is capable of dog a things foreign to its nature. And
since these impure dispositions do not pertain t the self in its original
natural and are the results of Karmic association, the transcendent sled is
denied the agency even of these empire dispositions. The denial of authorship
material Karma's, nay, eve of asupisious and auspicious psychical states points
to the supermundane, uncontaminated stetted of the self. There is o denying the
fact that the empirical self has been the doer of impure dispositions since an
indeterminable past; so it is the author of these dispositions. If this is to
granted, it will make the position of the Samkhya which imputes al actions to
the material Buddhi, and regards the principle consciousness as immutable. When
the Jaina says that the empririal self is not the agent of impure dispositions,
he simply persuades the _______________________
1 Prava. I. 19, 13.; Siddha
Bhakti. 7. 2. Pragva. I. 16.
3 Prava.
Comm. Amrta. I-16.
empirical self to look
behind the Karmic veil. Hence here the chief point of reference is the self I
its pure nature. The Jaina reads no contradiction in affirming that the
enlightened self which has become familiar with its true nature manifests the
pure modes and thereby becomes the substantial agent of those modes, and in
affirming that the ignorant self because of its erroneous indentifiation with
the alien nature develops injure depositions, and there by it allied their
agent. 1 Just as from gold obey golden
things can be produces pure modifications and the ignorant self produces impure
ones. 2 When the ignorant self becomes
enlightened, it starts generating pure modifications without any discongruity.
Thus the self is simply the doer of its won states ad to the doer of anything
else whatsoever. The empirical self is the author of impure psychic states on
account of its association with the Karmas. But if we advance a step further
and reflect transcendentally, we arrive at the inevitable conclusion that the
pure self cannot be the author of these impure psychical states because they
are foreign to its association with the Karmas. But if we advance a steep
further and reflect transcendentally, we arrive at the inevitable conclusion
that the pure self cannot be the author of these impure psychical states
because they are foreign to tits nature. Thus the transcendental self is the
doer of transcendental Bhavas. Besides it is also their enjoyer. Consequently
it may be asserted that the manifestation of cognitive potencies is the
manifestation of the genuine nature of self, which is the same as the
realisation of the ideal.
REALISATION OF SVARUPASATTA AS THE TERMINUS OF
SELF-DEVELOPMENT: Seventhly, the
ethical ideal may also be expressed in metabphsical terms. The realisation of
the self's Svarupasatta, or the manifestation of intrinsic characteristics and
modification of the self, or the expression of the self's original origination'
destruction and continuance is the ethical ideal no doubt, the self or the
expression of the self's ogigial origination' destruction and continuance is
the ethical ideal. No doubt, the self is existent, but its existence is mundane
and corrupt from the beginning's past. The self is to acquire existence, but
what is to be acquired is simply the purity of existence. Drama, Adharma, Akasa
and Kala are the pure existents. Pudgala in the au form is pure and in the
Skandha form is impure, but the self exists in the defiled state of existence.
It is, in the empirical state, cahracterising itself with impure modification
and qualities, and consequently impure, but the self exists in the defiled sate
of existence, it is in the empirical sate, quintile impure origination,
destruction and continuance originate. Bu its won strenuous efforts
transcendental modifications and qualities , and pure origination, destruction
and continuance are to be revealed . In this
_______________________
1 Samaya. 128, 129. 2. Ibid. 130, 131
state also, self realises
its true substantiality. This again is the same as the Siddha state,
Paramatmanhood, disembodies liberation, Sa Samaya etc; hence the metaphysical
ideal, the ethical ideal and the religious idea are perfectly identical.
PANDITA-ANDITA MARANA AS THE ETHICAL SUMMUM BONUM:
Eighthly, the Jainas also proclaim the ideal in terms of death in order to
reveal the nature of the ethical Summum Bonum. According to them the goal of
the aspirant's one-pointed endeavor ought to be the attainment of the
Pandita-pandita Marana (sublime death) to the utter exclusion of Pardita
Marana, the Bala-Pandita Marana, the Bala Marana and the Bala-Bala Marna. These
five types of death 1 have been
enumerated by keeping in view the different stages. 2 of spiritual advancement.
The lowest and the most detestable kind of death (Bala-Bala Marana) occurs to
that man who leads the life of utter perversion 3 The highest sort of demise (Pandita-Pandita Marana) is
exemplified in the consummate lives of embodied omniscient beings when they
part with their body 4 Those souls
which havecrowned themselves with spiritual conversion, bt have remained
incapable of observing patria owes in their life-time succumbed to Bala
Marana.5 This is to be distinguished
from the Bala-Pandita Marana 6 which is
the destiny of those who give themselves to patria vows gate beings spiritually
obverted. The saints observing complete vows enjoy Pandita Mara.7 All these types of death except the Pandita-
Pandita Marana are pregnant with future possibility of birth; hence they may be
designated as emporia deaths. And these are required to bediatinguishe from the
death of transcendent type or the Pandit-Pandita Marana wherein the mundane
life is cast aside Thus this latter tube departure is a of the happiest kind,
and consequently it requires or paramount devotedness. This sort of soul's
release from bodily confinement appears before us as an illustration of Chula
to death Here the inevitability of death has been proerlyment with.
AHIMSA AS THE GOA: Ninthly, the ethical highest good also
finds its expression in the realisation of perfect Ahimsa. Ahimsa is so center
in Jaime that it may be incontrovertibly called the beginning
_______________________
1 Bhaga. Ara. 26.
2. We shall deal with the
stages of spiritual advancement in the sixth chapter.
3 Ibid.
30.
4 Bhaga.
Ara. 27. 5. Ibid. 30. 6 Ibid. 2078 7 Ibid. 29.
and end of Jaina religion.
The statement of Samantabhadra that Ahimsa of all living beings is equivalent
to the relisation of Parama Brahama sheds light on the paramount halter of
Ahimsa .1 The whole of the Jana Acara
is a derivation of this principle All is are the illustrations of Himsa. The Sutrakritanga exhorts us to regard Ahimsa as the quintessence of wisdom 2 Since Nirvana is not other than Ahimsa, one
should cease to injure all living beigs.3
The Aaranaga produces that one
should neither deprive any liking beings of life, nor rule over him not torment
him bore exit him 4 This is tantamount
to saying that Ahimsa is the pure and eternal Dharama 5 All living beings from
the one –sensed to the five-sensed are basically like our owe self 6 Hence it is not justifiable to injure them,
to rule over them, and to torment them 7
All this is from the Vyabahara point of view. The Niscaya view tells us
that the Atma which is Apramatta is Ahimsa the appearance of any sort of
passion of surface of self is Himsa, and the self in its pure form is Ahimsa
9 The perfect and the absolute Ahimsa
is possible oly in mystical relisation which is further identified with the
terminus of all ethic endeavors.
KNOWLEDGE-CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE END: Lastly, the attainment of
knowledge-consciousness (Jnaa Cetana) ought to be the end of aspirant's
endeavors in contrast to action-consciousness (Karma Cetana) and result
consciousness (Karamaphala Cetana) 10
The attribution of consciousness to the auspicious and inauspicious
psychical assets occasioned by Karmas is called action-consciousness; and the
confusion of consciousness with enjoyment of the duality of pleasure and pain
is termed result-of the misunderstanding regarding the inherent nature of
things. Hence they need by abjured in the interest of ascending the supraethica
plane of life. The five type of one sensed souls are the illustrations holding
result-consciousness; the two- sensed to five-sensed souls exemplify those
having predominantly action-consciousness; ans. the sold devoid of ten Pranas
experience
_______________________
1 Svayambhu. 17. 2.
Sutra. Kr. 1.1.4.10.; 1.11.10.
3 Sutra.
Kr. 1.11.11. 4. Acara. 1.4.1. p.
36. 5. Ibid.
6.
Dasavaika. X. 5. 7. Acara. 1.5.5. p. 50.
8
Haribhadra, Astaka. 7 (vide. Muni Nathamal : Ahimsa Tattva Darsana. p. 4. )
9 Puru.
44 10. Panca. 38.; Prava. II. 31. 11. Prava. II. 32.
knowledge- consciousness. 1
Thus knowledge-consciousness is the full-fledged ad legitimate
manifestation of consciousness. The Arhat or Siddha state is the state of
knowledge-consciousness, the state of omniscience and bliss. 2
PROGRAESSIVE REALISATION
OF THE END : We shall end this chapter
by saying that the ideal is realised progressively. The first step consists in
the development of the firm conviction as to the distinctness of the self and
body. In other words, the resolute belief convinces the aspirant that he is
essentially the pure self as absolutely different from the bodily or sensuous
vesture and the dual psychical states. In the second step, after the emergence
of right belief and right knowledge, he proceeds to wipe out the obstructive
elements to the full which hamper the realisation of the pure self. The third
step slows as a logical consequence of the second; namely the pure self is
realised and not only believed as different from the not- self thus, the
achievement of right, belief, right
knowledge and right conduct is same as the realisation of the Atman, 3
which is regarded summarily as the ethical Summum Bonum. The next hatter will
be devoted tot he exposition of the nature of the first step. The rest of the
steps of experience will be dealt with in the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters
respectively.