THE PROBLEM OF ETHICAL SUMMUM
BONUM : THE SOPHISTS:
It is said that, "The Sophists brought
philosophy down from heaven to the dwellings of men, and turned the attention
from external nature to man himself; for them the proper study of mankind was
man.", Hitherto
the chief concern of the Greek philosophers was to ascertain the origin of the
world. The Sophists not only evinced a negative attitude towards current
ontological speculation, but also protested against the enigmatic conclusions
of their predecessors, and consequently propounded subjectivity in knowledge
by affirming that `Man is the measure of all things' and that truth is
`relative to the subjective make up of the individual enunciating the
statement.'2 Epistemological subjectivism and relativism ended in
ethical subjectivism and relativism. The good is entirely subjective and
relative to the individual who achieves it. There are as many ethical ends as
there are individuals. This reflects a state of moral anarchy. And yet
notwithstanding the subjectivists trend of Protagoras in the field of knowledge
and morals, the contribution made by him to the entire philosophy should not be
underestimated. Man as such was considered to be of supreme importance. The
realization of ethical good was made personal, which is tantamount to saying
that morality, in its historical beginning, assumed an egoistic form. Now not
egoism in
1 History of Philosophy, p. 61. 2Ibid. p. 57.
general but only exclusive
egoism is detrimental.1 Besides, ‘the great value of the entire
Sophistic movement consisted in this: it awakened thought and challenged
philosophy, religion, customs morals and the institutions based on them, to
justify themselves to reason.2
Now the age in which Mahavira was born resembled that of the Sophists in
a great measure. In contrast to
Protagoras, Mahavira did not depreciate metaphysical speculation, but denounced
absolutism. He reconstructed metaphysic
with epistemological objectives as its basis, and thus became an exponent of
the multiple nature of reality, technically known as Anekantavada. This attitude exercised its influence on
ethical; inquiry too. The good is not
subjective but objective, though individuals relish it. Thus according to Jainism, Ahimsa is the
objective good, the complete realization of which is possible in the plenitude
of mystical experience. This is the
moral and the spiritual egoism, which distinguishes itself from the narrow, and
the selfish egoism of Protagoras. The
former gives an impetus to the formulation of an ethical theory, while the
latter leader, us only to chaos.
SOCRATHES: Socrates combated the intellectual and moral
chaos of the age, and protested against the subjectivity and relativity of the
Sophists who reduced all morality to a matter of private caprice. Socrates conformed with the view of
Protagboras that the good we seek is human well being, but differed from him by
saying that it is independent of the fluctuating choice of the individuals. It is not subjective, but objective, because
it is capable of being made intelligible by means of general conceptions, which
are the products of reason, the universal element in man. Thus according to Socrates knowledge in the
highest good and it is further identified with goodness. The corollary of this view is that no one is
voluntarily bad. “By this ‘knowledge’
he did not mean of course of purely theoretical; knowledge which needed only to
be leant, but an unshakable conviction based on the deepest insight into and
realization of what is really valuable in life deepest insight into and
realization of what is really valuable in life, a conviction such as he himself
possessed,3 Besides, the knowledge with which true goodness is to be
identified is knowledge of what is good the human soul.4 “The only
real harm is spiritual and produced only by one’s own wrong doing.”5
________________________
1 Short History of Ethics, p.345 2 History of Philosophy,
pp. 61-62.
3 Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, p. 102.
4 Greek Philosophy, p. 176.
5 Outlines of History of Greek Philosophy,. 102.
17
Janis would subscribe to the
view of Socrates that right knowledge and true belief arrow essential to right
action, but denies that they necessarily issue in goodness. The irrational parts of the soul, namely,
passions, cannot be lost sight of and very often these passions prevent a man
from doing that which contributes to the well-being of the soul. The Socratic axiom of knowledge as goodness
can only be justified by one who has ascended the mystical; heights, but we have
little evidence to show that Socrates meant this. That the real good is the good of the human soul is in conformity
with the Jaina view. The highest good
is spiritual and wrong actions obstruct spiritual progress.
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS; The
many-sidedness of the Socratic ethics gave rise to diametrically opposed
schools of ethical thought, namely, those of the Cynics and the Cryonics
founded by Antisthenes and Airstrips respectively. These two founders endeavored in their own way to represent the chief
constituents of a life of well-being.
Both agreed regarding human well being as the highest good, but the they
differed enormously in point of the content that the life of well being must
include. The ideal; of life advocated
by the Cynics consists in the eradication of all desires,. In the freedom from
all wants,. And in being completely independent of all possessions. It enjoins absolute asceticism and rigorous
self-mortification. In contrast to the
above-mentioned negative content as constituting. In contrast to the above-mentioned; negative content as
constituting the inner core of the life of well being, the Cryonics laid stress
on the positive attainment of the greatest amount of pleasure. They no doubt extolled; bodily pleasures,
but they escaped sensuality and bestiality, inasmuch as the need of prudence in
the pursuit of pleasures was emphasized and advocated. The prudent cultivates self-control,
postpones a more urgent to a less urgent desire in order to get more pleasure
and less pain. “ The Cyrenaic and Cynic doctrines tend towards exclusive
egoism, whether as a pursuit of self-dependence or of pleasurable feeling.”1
In the view of the Jaina, the Cynic ideal will remain unrealizable so long as
the Almanac stredfastness is not arrived at.
Mere negation will lead us nowhere.
The internal; and the external Aparigraha is incapable of being
practiced without spiritual possession. Aparigraha is incapable of being
practiced without spiritual possession.
The Cynic failed to reconcile individual goodness withholds the social
one. In conformity with the views of
the Jana, the of householder and that of the Mini can properly attune the
individual; with social uplift-
____________________
Short History of Ethics, p.
41.
Meat. Exclusive egoism is suicidal, but spiritual
egoism exemplified in the life of Acaryas and Arahantas is compatible with
social goodness. The Cymics could not
bring forth the concept of social Aparigraha but went to the other extreme of
mere individual; Aparigraha and thus destroyed the social foundation and
imperiled social living. The Anuvratas
proscribed for the layman strike a balance between asceticism and sensualist,
and between absolute independence and complete dependence. The life of Mahavratas, through individualistic
in trend, is not incompatible with social goodness. The Cryonics moved in the direction of egoistic hedonism that is
totally unacceptable to the Jaina.
Egoistic hedonism does not go beyond bodily consciousness, it tends
towards narrow selfishness and looks upon with contempt the philanthropists
sacrificing their lives for social; good.
"Crude hedonism contains within itself the germ of pessimism: The
attainment of a preponderance of pleasure over pain seems impossible, and the
exclusive pursuit of pleasure leads over pain seems impossible, and the
exclusive pursuit of pleasures leads to boredom and frustration.”1
The most common argument that may be advanced against egoistic hedonism is that
we desire objects and not pleasure; pleasurable state is simply an
accompaniment. That is why Jainism has
laid stress on the pursuance of noble ends so that lasting pleasures may
displace transitory ones.
PLATO AND ARISTOTLE: As advocated by Plato, the
transcendental world of ideas constitutes reality, and reason is the most
characteristic aspect of the soul. The
empirical objects of the world are but fleeting shadows of the objects, the
body and the senses are foreign to the soul’s innate nature. The true life of the individual, therefore,
consists in the freedom of the soul from the body and in contemplating the
world of ideas. The veritable end of
life finds expression in bringing into clear consciousness the latent memories
of the past when the soul possessed the knowledge of the ideas. “The true art of living is really an “art of
dying” as far as possible to mere sense, in order more fully to exist in
intimate union with absolute goodness and beauty.”2 “This ascetic
tendency of the Platonic philosophy culminates in mysticism.”3 We
are confronted with another view of the ethical ideal which emerged on account
of the ascription of some value to the would of sense by virtue of the fact
that the objects of the world
______________________
1 History of Philosophy, p. 72. 2 Outlines of the History of Ethics, p. 41.
3 History of Philosophy,
p.91.
participate in ideas. The imprisonment of soul; into body meant
the mingling of the rational part with the irrational; part known as the
spirited part and the appetites. In view
of this, the ethical idea consists in the achievement of the harmony among the
various parts of the soul. The
irrational parts are not wiped off but subordinated under reason. This is what goes to form justice. “Such a man would not repudiate a deposit,
commit sacrilege or theft, be false to friends, a traitor to his country or
commit similar misdeeds.”1 Happiness results from such a life. By virtue of this trend Plato escapes narrow
asceticism and makes room for social goodness.
In view however of the fact that Aristotle rejected the transcendentalism
of Plato and expounded the immanence of forms into things, the ethical Summum
Bonum according to him, consists in the realization of the form as inherent in
man, namely, a rational; life. It is
the life of ‘theoria’ which means a life spent in the unimpeded apprehension
and discovery of the truth.2 The irrational parts which are
organically related to the soul need be harnessed to the service of
reason. For when properly controlled by
reason they may be directed towards the social well being. Thus individual good and social well being
are not incompatible. The ethical
speculation of the Jaina and that of Plato and Aristotle resemble each other to
a great extent. The life of reason can
be compared with the life of Suddhopayoga as explained by Jainism, with this
difference that the irrational parts which are retained in some form or the
other by Aristotle, must be removed in view of the Jaina. The difficulty is due to the fact that
Aristotle could not reconcile the life of pure reason with that of social
well-being. In view of Jainism the
greatest mystics are as well the greatest social reformers. Though asceticism which flows from the
observance of Mahavratas is the ideal of life, though it can only be attained
by a selected few, the concept of Anuvratas is capable enough to bring harmony;
between the rational and irrational parts of the soul. Platonic asceticism is inconsistent with
social goodness; hence it is insalubrious, but the Jaina asceticism embraces
social goodness within its fold along with individual goodness. The Jaina concept of Anuvrats is a mean
between asceticism and sensualist. It
completely; makes possible the achievement of social goodness but it
imperfectly brings about individual goodness, since the irrational parts cannot
be completely subdued in the life of Anuvratas. Their extrication is essential for complete individual goodness.
--------------------------------------------
1 History of Philosophy, p.90. 2 Short History of Ethics, p. 80.
Short History of Ethics, p.
80.
UTILITARANISM: The chief exponents of this School are
Bentham. J.
S. Mill, and Henry
Sidgwick. According to them the Summum
Bonum or the ultimate ethical standard consists in the “greatest happiness of
the greatest number.” These three thinkers
claim to have made a transition from mere egoism to universals. Their claim is warrantable to a great
extent, but they could not universalism.
Their claim is warrantable to a great extent, but they could not deliver
themselves from the snares of egoism.
Besides, they exhibited divergence on the grounds of transition from
egoism to Altruism. Bantam’s
utilitarianism derives its validity from purely egoistic considerations and
evinces strong leanings towards sensualist by formulating quantity as the measure
of the value of pleasures. For
him, “Push-pin is as good as
poetry.” The following quotation. Shows
his egoistic trend: “Dream not that men will move their finger to serve you,
unless their own advantage in so doing be obvious to them. Men never did so and never and will, while
human nature is made of the present materials.
But they will desire to serve, when by so doing they can serve
themselves, and the occasions on which they can serve themselves by serve
themselves, and the occasions on which they can serve themselves by serving you
are multitudinous.”1 Thus we may call his utilitarianism. The Jaina would think that this should not
be overemphasized. On many occasions in
life one can serve others at the cost of conspicuous losses. Besides, a psychological fact should not be
elevated to the rank of ethical; design.
Jaina ethics gives approbation only to those altruistic actions which
are performed without ;any Nidana (future mundane expectation). Actions constituting other man’s goodness
need not be done with any hope of return or personal benefit. Again, all pleasures cannot be on par. The life of sensualist cannot find favor
with Jainism. The pleasures of the
senses are of the worst sort and should be gradually overcome by
self-control. Bentham’s view seems to
denounce the value of self-control. The
pleasure of drinking cannot be abandoned by Bentham. Mill’s utilitarianism is called “Sympathetic utilitarianism”,
since, according to him, man is induced to altruistic conduct by internal felling
of the happiness of mankind, by the consciousness possessed by every one that
he is an integral part of society. By
regarding that pleasures are intrinsically heterogeneous, Mill abandons
hedonism. The distinction between
higher and lower pleasures may be brought by the “native sense of dignity”
which a man possesses. Jainism
---------------------------------------
Deontology, II. P. 133.
agrees with Mill as regards
the heterogeneity of pleasures, but introduces the principle of internal and
external Ahimsa for differentiating different pleasure. This principle is far more comprehensive
than that of “native sense of dignity.”
The man who performs a good act out of social feeling shall not be able
to do it at the risk of his own pleasure.
The principle of Ahimsa which is more in tune with the man’s inner
nature pre-eminently possesses altruistic note, and is in conformity with
self-sacrifice for the good of others.
Sidgwick’s utilitarianism is called “Intentional utilitarianism”,
inasmuch as his theory is based on certain principles known intuitively by
practical reason. The pleasures of
others are to be regarded as of equal weight with our own. Sidgwick could not reconcile national
self-love with benevolence, and he is confronted with a difficulty known as
dualism of the Practical Reason. Above
all, we may say that the ethical idea, “greatest happiness of the greatest
number”, will be modified by Jainism as the greatest happiness of all. Jainism speaks with the vulgar in
pronouncing the highest good in terms of happiness or pleasure, but in fact the
highest good is the realization of Ahimsa or self, and happiness is a
compliment. Thus Jainism thinks with
the learned. Utilitarian writers on the
other hand think with the vulgar exclusively, and emphasize felling as against
the cognitive and cognitive aspects of life.
Mere feeling is an abstraction.
“Feeling is a quality of a mental state which cannot exist apart from
other elements any more than color or shape can exist without matter.”1 “Our ends are our happiness, not merely
means to happiness.”2
KANT: The highest
good, according to Kant, consists in the performance of actions out of respect
for the moral law which commands categorically or unconditionally, and
irrespective of circumstances, consequences and inclinations. “There is nothing in the world or even out
of if” says he, “that can be called good without qualification except a good
will.” The good will is a rational will
willing in obedience to moral imperative which is the expression of man’s real
self, of the very principle of his being.”3 The categorical
imperative inherent in reason itself lays down ‘Act only on the maxim which
thou can’t at the same time will to become a universal law,’ and entails a
society of rational beings, a kingdom of ends.
There is no queer of Jainism with Kantian formulations.
--------------------------
1 Short History of Ethics, p.251. 2 Fundamentals of
Ethics, p.90. 3 History of
Philosophy, p. 443.
So far as the highest good
is concerned, inasmuch as the perfected mystic or a Tirthankara presents
himself to be a member of the kingdom of ends.
His actions are not limited by circumstances, consequences, ends, and
selfish and sympathetic feelings. He
is, according to Jainism, the only being acting in accordance with the commands
of his inner being. The conviction of
the Jaina is that the actions of such a being will always result in
happiness. The mistake of Kant
according to the Jaina is that he confounds supermoralism with moralist and, that
from his a priori philosophy, he deduces a principle which cannot be applied to
special circumstances and to positive rules, for instance, continence, charity
to the poor etc. The principle
according to Jainism should be at once universal and particular, i.e.,
universal in nature and particular in practice. The principle of Ahimsa, e.g., in its comprehensive meaning
satisfies the universal demands of reason and the particular demands of
society. Ahimsa with the Jaina doctrine
of Nayavada can very well serve as the supreme principle of morality. Hence there is nothing is the would or even
out of it that can be called good without qualification except a good will
willing the principle of Ahimsa of all beings.
It is a form and can be validly applied to all the particular
cases. Besides, the absence of
auspicious and inauspicious Bhavas has relevancy in the life of supermoralism,
but the life of morality presupposes will combined with auspicious Bhavas. Along with the inauspicious Bhavas or intense passions, Kant overthrew
auspicious Bhavas as will without thinking about the loss to moral life. The transcendental will is capable of
dispensing with all types of Bhavas, but the empirical will, particularly moral
will can not be against auspicious Bhavas; of sympathy, compassion and the
like.
VIRTURES: SOPHISTS,
SOCRATES, PLATO AND ARISTOTLE: The Sophists identified virtue with
self-interest. The Socratic view finds
expression in the formula: “Knowledge
is virtue.” “Knowledge is both the
necessary and the sufficient condition of virtue: without knowledge virtue is
impossible and its possession ensures virtuous action.”1 This
conception led Socrates to regard that virtue is teachable and that it is
one. The different virtues like
temperance, benevolence emanates from the supreme virtue, namely, wisdom. The systematic approach to, and the
exposition of virtues may be ascribed to Plato and Aristotle. Their theory of virtues of based on their
psychology of soul. In the Platonic
system, the
--------------------------------------------------------
1 History of Philosophy, p. 70.
Soul occupies a position
between the two worlds, namely, would of ideas and would of becoming. Consequently it must possess the traits of
both the worlds, rational and irrational, the latter comprises within its fold
spirited and appetite parts. Desire for
pleasure, desire for wealth, desire for food, shelter and other bodily
satisfactions are included in the appositive part,1 while the spirited part includes anger, love
of honor, shame, arsine to disgrace,2
and gentleness, humility and reverence are the traits of rational part. “The moral rank of these two elements is
very different; the spirited element is the natural ally of reason in the
conflicts of the soul;, and under due training is capable of manifesting a
special excellence of its own; the appositive element is naturally baser and
capable of no virtue except submission to reason.”3 This triple
division of soul led Plato to recognize four cardinal virtues. The virtue of reason is wisdom, of the
spirited part, courage, of the appositive part, temperance, and the fourths
virtue is called justice which is the presence of all these virtues ;in the
soul and consists in the free harmonious exercise of intellect, emotion and
desire under the guidance of reasion.4 Thus justice is the highest virtue. Aristotle regarded man as an epitome of the different levels in
the development of living beings. Thus
man possesses three different souls, a vegetative, an animal and a rational
soul. Corresponding to the national and
irrational (passions and appetites) parts of the soul, there are two kinds of
virtues, namely the intellectual (diabetic) and the moral. The diabetic virtues represent the life of
pure reason. Moral virtues spring from
the subordination of irrational elements to reason. They are not naturally implanted in man but denote a developed
and settled habit formed by taking recourse to the mean between two extremes
and thus avoid the vicious excess and defect.
The middle path or the happy mean is not given by mechanical or a priori
rule as in Arithmetic, it is known by the reasoning and judgement of man of
practical wisdom, “Moral virtues are not ends in themselves.”5
Aristotle illustrates the doctrine of means by giving certain examples. Courage, for example, is a mean between
rashness and cowardice, temperance between licentiousness and apathy;
generosity between extravagance and miserliness. He does not apply this theory to certain vices like adultery,
murder, theft,
---------------------------------
1 History of Philosophy, p.70. 2 Ibid.p.86. 3 Outlines of the History of
Ethics, p.44. 4 Short History of
Ethics, p. 47 5 Ibid. p,80.
Etc, inasmuch as, according
to him, these are bad in themselves. Jainism
also forms its theory of ethics on the ground of its psychological analysis of
the soul. The intrinsic excellence of
the self is obstructed by the passions in their most comprehensive extent
including virtues and vices. Intense
passion is vice and mild passion is virtue.
Aristotle’s mean from the Jaina point of view may be recognized as the
expression of mild Poisson. Jainism
analyses passions more deeply and recognizes six degrees of passions, bringing
the first three under vices and the last three under virtues! Spiritually
speaking virtues and vices differ in degree and not in kind. But this difference should not be regarded
as insignificant. The movement towards
virtuous living is a movement towards a life of reason in Aristotelian sense
and a life of supermodel is in the Jainistic sense. By leading the life of supermoralisms the virtuous life is not
annihilated, but it reconciles the life of the spirit with the life of virtues,
as also the individual consummation with the social goodness. The divine man is the measure of virtuous
living. Thus the guidance of Arahantas,
Acrayas, Upadhyay; as and Sadhaus will determine those acts which are virtuous,
the expression of mild passions.
Aristotle stops at the verdict of wise man, but Jainism gives a
practical criterion of internal and external Ahimsa for judging the rightness
of actions. The conviction of the Jaina
is that the Platonic virtues like courage, temperance, householder can only
partially observe these virtues. In
other words, though the Anuvratas are potent enough to evolve perfect social
order, they are incapable of bringing about individual salvation or his
culminate progress. In view of the
Jaina, Aristotle’s life of Theoria, the Platonic contemplation of Ideas cannot
be translated into action without the life of Mahavratas. Absolute social and individual goodness
emanates from the observance of Mahavratas, but it can be achieved only by a
few.
CLASSFICATION
OF VIRTUES: The cardinal virtues, according to Jainism may be enumerated as
follows: 1) Spiritual conversion, 2) Spiritual study, 3) Ahimsa, 4) Satya, 5)
Asteya, 6) Brahmacarya, 7) Aparigraha, 8) Meditation and 9) Devotion. We now propose to give a detailed
classification of virtues after following the scheme, which Professor RANADE
has adopted in his ‘Pathway to God in Hindi literature,’2
--------------------------------------------------------------------
1 These are called Lesyas.
We have already dealt with these earlier.
2 Pathway to God in Hindi
literature, p. 88.
Namely, the Scheme of
classifying Virtues into the Individual, the social and the Spiritual.
INDIVIDUAL VIRTUES: 1. Self-control (Saraga-Samyama)1; 2. Greedlessness (sauna)2; 3. Humility (Mardava) 3; 4.
Straightforwardness (Arjava)4;
5. Truthfulness (Satya)5;
6. Non-stealing (Asteya)6;
7. Continence (Brahmacaraya)7; 8. Doubtlessness (Nihsanka)8; 9.
Desirelessness (Nihkanksa): ; 10. Non-stupidity (Amudhata)10; 11. Abandonment of Frivolous actions
(Anarthadandayaga)11; and
12, Avoidance of eight kinds of pride.12
SOCIAL VIRTUES: 1.
Universal compassion and friendship (Bhutan Anukampa13 and
Mairti); 2. Charity (Dana) 14;
3. Non-hatred towards the diseased
(Nirvicikitsa)15; 4. Commendation of the meritorious (Pramoda)16; and 5.
Active compassion for the distressed (Karuana)17 or helping
those who are miserable, thirsty and hungry,18 6.
Indifference towards the arrogant (Madhyastha) 19; 7. Non-acquisition (Aparigraha)20;
8. Non-injury (Ahimsa) 21; 9.
Forgiveness (Ksama) 22; and 10. Propagation of moral and
Spiritual values through23 adequate means (Prabhavana).
SPIRITUAL VIRTUES: 1. Penance (Bodily Tapss) 24;
2. Endurance of Parisahas or suffering
(Parisahajaya) 25; 3.
Spiritual study (Svadyaya) 26; 4. Meditation (Dhyana) 27;
5. Devotion to Deva, Sastra and Guru28;
6. Avoidance of seven Kinds of fear29;
7. Pessimism (Vairagya) 30;
8. Service of Saints (Vaiyavrttya) 31; 9. Spiritual conversion
(Samyagdarsana) 32; 10. Unattachment to body (Akincana) 33;
11. Self-condemnation (Prayascitta)
34; 12. Affection towards spiritual brethren (Vatsalya) 35;
13. Conquest of sleep, posture, and the
desire for food36; 14.
Purity of food37; 15.
Spiritual welcome to death (Sallekhana) 38; 16.
Re-establishment of the aspirants on the right path39; (Sthitikarana).
---------------------
1 Sarvartha, VI.12. 2 Ibid.IX-6. 3. Ibid, 4, Ibid..
5 Ibid. 6 Ibid.VII.1. 7 Ibid. 8 Bhava. Pa. 7. 9 Ibid. 10.Ibid. 11
Sarvartha. VII.21
12 Mula.53 13 Sarvartha. VI. 12; VII. 11. 14 Ibid.
15 Bhava.Pa.7. 16
Sarvartha.VII.11 17 Ibid
18 Panca.137 19
Sarvartha.VII.11 20Sarvartha VII.1 21Ibid. 22
Sarvartha.IX.6.
23 Bhava. P5. 7. 24
Sarvartha IX.19 25 Saravartha, IX,9
26 Ibid.20 27. Ibid. 28
Sarvartha. VI.24
29 Mula.53. 30 Sarvartha.VII, 12. IX-7 31 Ibid IX 20.
32 Ibid, IX-24. 33
Ibid. IX-6 34 Ibid. IX-20
35 Bhava. Pa. 7. 36.Mo.Pa.63 37
Mula.421.
38 Sarvartha. VII 22 39 Bhava. Pa. 7.
CHAPTER IX
Jaina Ethics and the Present-day Problems
At the outset we have to acknowledge that the man of today
is living in a world which is much more complex than that of an ancient or
mediaeval man. Interdependence among
nations has increased; and this has brought an ever widening and deepening
impact on the economic, intellectual and social conditions of our existence. The scientific advancement has made
countries one another’s neighbors.
Divergent races, divergent cultures, and divergent out-looks have come
in close relations. In the present
chapter we shall endeavor to put forth a view of state and society emanating
from the ethical; considerations of the Jaina and shall strive to solve the
problems of the social, national and international importance which encounter
the present man.
INDIVIDUAL AND
SOCIETY: It is generally alleged that Jaina ethics aims merely at
self-purification and self-evolution.
Professor MAITRA remarks,” The Jaina list does not include the
other-regarding virtues of Benevolence, succour, and social service. This shows that the Jaina virtues aim more
at self-culture than at social service. “1 But in the light of our previous classification and enumeration
of virtues the above statement is untenable; and we can say that Jaina ethics
has both the eyes of the individual as well as the social betterment. It envisages individual as a social being,
inasmuch as the individual’s dependence upon society for his intellectual,
moral and material gains is incontrovertible and cannot be gainsaid. Even an ascetic is incapable of
transgressing this basic assumption of social dependence, although the concept
of dependence in case of an ascetic undergoes radical change. True asceticism is not an act of ingratitude
but an act of highest gratitude, returning golden coins for silver pieces to
society. The ascetic by virtue of his
practices accumulates Punya which in some form or the other is a social
debt. This social debt is responsible
for his repeated births till its full payment.
This proves his dignified dependence upon society. The Tirthakara or the divine man who has
transcended social dependence also pays the social debt in the form of
preaching and spiritual guidance to the suffering humanity and in such a
fashion as will not produce
________________
1 The Ethics of the Hindus, p. 203.
fresh Karmas necessitating
future birth. This sort of payment of
social debt is unique, without any parallel.
Thus we see that social dependence gradually decreases and ends in
absolute independence. It is only at
this stage that we are capable of saying that individuality or the individual
stands completely aloof from the social debt.
As a consequence of this fact, Jainism alleges that the individual is
not like an organ absolutely dependent for its sustenance on social
organism. Social dependence cannot rob
the individual of his freedom to achieve his spiritual individuality. An individual is not a mere cog in the
social machine. Jainism no doubt
declines to accept the unrestricted individualism that ignores social obligation. Thus the true view recognises that the
individual and society influence each other.
The individual moulds and in mounded by society.
CONCEPT AND FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE: The strict observance of the Anuverate sand
the Silvratgas by the human beings at large will result in the evolution of
stateless society. The political power
will be needless on account of the emergence of such individuals as have a self
regulated life. The householder’s vows
of Aparigraha, Satya, Asteya; and Digvrata, Desavrata,
Bhopgopabhoga-parimanavrata are pregnant with the capability of unrevealing all
the economic problems; the house-holder’s vows of Brahmacarya, Samayika and
Prosadhopavasa are sufficient for educating the individual in the art of
self-control on its positive side, and Anarthadandtyaga-vrata, on its negative
side; the spirit of social service is capable of being nourished by the vow of Vaiyavrtya; and lastly, the
householder’s vow of Ahimsa will serve as the guiding and pervasive principle
throughout. The State as the outward
garb of society must needs be abandoned and renounced when the society as a
whole moulds its life in consonance with the prescription of vows. The existence of an enlightened social order
can dispense with the state altogether.
But this is an ideal condition and we feel that it cannot be
materialized. Probably there will come
no time when all the individuals will be self-regulating. Hence state in some form or the other will
exist.
Thus Human imperfection will necessitate the continuation
of state control and authority. The
state is no doubt an evil but a necessary evil. It should contrive to manage its affairs in a way which will
assist the development of perfect social order. Its national and international activities should be guided by the
principle of non-violence and Anekanta.
In order that the state may function properly without encroaching upon
the inherent spiritual nature of man it must identify itself with
Samyagdarsana, Samyagjnana, Samyakcaritra.
The Policy of the State must exhibit unflinbing faith in , and tenacious
adherence to the principle of non-violence.
This will crown the state with Samyagdarsana which will ipso facto bring
enlightenment to it, and the result will be the emergence of Samyagjnana. In other words, the adoption and the
assimilation of Anekanta is Samyagjnana.
The resolute and astute application of the policy of non-violence and
Anekanta in the national and international spheres for solving all sorts of
problems will credit the state with Samyakcaritra. The passions of fear, hatred towards any class of man and towards
any other state, the passion of deception, greed to expand its territory and to
usurp other-state’s wealth and freedom, the passions of pride of wealth, power,
achievement and heritage-all these should be banished from the state, because
they arrow corruptive of the veritable spirit of progress. On the positive side, the state should
pursue the discipline which flows from Samyagdarsana, Samyagjnana and
Samyakcaritra. The eight virtues
emanate from Samyadarsana, the one from samyagjana, and the five from Samyakcaritra. We shall dwell upon them one by one along
with their implications.
VIRTUES OF THE STATE :
As regards the virtues issuing from Samyagdarsana, first, the state not
only one, but all states should not have any iota of doubt in the efficacy of non-violence
for solving and problems which arise in the national and international
fields. Fewer which obstructs the
germination of the living faith in, and rational adherence to, the principle of
Ahimsa must be brushed aside. It will
not be amiss to point out here that non-violence should not be counted as a
virtue of necessity and a cloak of cowardice.
To use it as weapon of expediency is to defile the Nihsankita virtue of
the state. Consequently, an unshakable
conviction in regarding it as a life-principle will infuse the state with a
type of immutability even in testing situations. Secondly,. The state in no circumstance should exhibit tendency
to dominate other countries not with standing its multifarious achievements. Even help should not end In domination. This is Nihkkanksita virtue of the
State. Thirdly, the virtue of
Nirvicikitsa which is required to be associated with the state prescribes not
to condemn the poor. Fourthly, the
virtue styled Amudhadrasti obliges the state to refuse to join any military
pace on account of its being overwhelmed by fear, inferiority and greed for
profit. Fifthly, when the state engages
itself in enhancing it's productive capacity along with proper distribution, it
may be said to have possessed Upabrmhana characteristic. Sixthly, when other states , being oppressed
by the passion of fear, greed and the like seem to go astray from the path of
righteousness and peace, to try for their re-establishment by reminding them of
their humanitarian purpose may; be called Sthitikarana virtue. Seventhly, to have affection for all the
members of the state irrespective of caste, colour, creed and sex is to adhere
to the prescription of the virtue known as Vatsalya. Eighthly, it is imperative for the state to strive toss educate
its members in a way; which may bring a
bout the progress of the State. It is
required as well to attain its ends by
non-violent means, so that other states may be influenced by its policy. This will bring about the dissemination and
propagation of its principles and policies among other states. This is known an Prabhavana virtue of the
state.
The virtue which springs from Samyagjanana is Anekanta,
which aims at comprehending the multiple approaches and diverse outlooks with a
view to reconciling their claims. When
the state imbibes the spirit of Anekanta, it is sure toss become tolerant in
spirit, and to attend to its various aspects.
The principle of Anekanta strives to cut the roots of onesidedsness in
theory and practice. On account of the
absolutistic approach the state is obliged to take a negative attitude towards
other states which follow a different pattern of living. But Anekanta broadens the outlook and curbs
down the absoluteness of one view.
Consequently it helps in fostering international feelings, and in
presenting humanitarian solutions of the various problems arising from the lack
of sympathetic understanding of other-state views and considerations. It will not be insignificant to point out
here that a war is the outcome of one-sided clinging, while peace results from
the many-sided outlook. The latter
should not make the state irresolute; on the contrary it should give credence
to a synthetic approach, and properly attune the demands of different
perspectives.
Lastly, Samyakcaritra credits the state with five other
virtues known an non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, continence and
non-acquisition. We shall now deal with
them one by one. First, consummation of
non-violence in a state as in the case of a householder is a contradiction in
terms. So long as the state exists
violence in some form or the other is inevitable. Joust as a householder is incapable of eschewing Himsa to an
ascetic level, so also the state cannot dissociate itself from violence to an
absolute degree, inasmuch as anti-state and anti-social tendencies may
continue, and order to resist the disturbances, the presence of extraneous
control is indispensable. Violence will
not be intentional but it will be a defensive weapon. Notwithstanding the compelled use of force, it is an imperative
function of the state to create an atmosphere of nonviolence. We may mention here that the application ;of
this virtue should not be merely confined to human beings, but the sub-human
existence is also required to be brought under its purview. Consequently, hunting and slaughtering of
animals for any purpose whatsoever should be announced as unlawful. It is against the spirit of non-violence, and sounds as inhuman. Besides, the use of intoxicants, specially
wine, should be banned, and a social consciousness is to be developed against
the use of these derogatory things. The
deeper significance of non-violence consists in the elimination of war, which
has harassed mankind since the dawn of civilization. War need not be considered a necessity just as Nietzsche,
Mussolim and others had thought.
Nietzsche says: “For nations
that are growing week and contemptible, war may; be prescribed as remedy, if
indeed they really want to go on living.”
He declares: “Man shall be
trained for war and woman for the recreation of the warrior, all else is folly1.” “We alone, “Mussolini affirms “brings up to
the highest tension all human energy, and puts the stamp of nobility upon the people who have the courage to meet it2.” The two world wars have causes huge devastation's and are sufficient evidences
to prove that the international problems are incapable of being solved by the
institution of war. The establishment
of intonation orginisation and the tendency towards disarmament are the
symptoms of the inefficacy of force, war and violence to act as arbiters among
international disputes. The easing of
tensions and cessation's of conflicts among states, the maintenance of
universal peace, and the promotion of human welfare can only be effected by
suffusing world’s atmosphere whitish the spirit of nonviolence. “Thus the principle of non-violence really
implies that life should be elevated altogether from the plane of force to that
of reason, persuasion, accommodation, tolerance, and mutual service3.” Secondly, the inter-relations among states
should be nourished upon truthfulness.
Fraud or deception defiles the spirit of co-existence. The use of slander-
_____________________________________________
1 Religion and Society, p. 199. 2 Ibid. p. 200.
3 World problems and Jaina
ethics, p. 9.
ing and ridiculous speech,
and of words which arouse uneasiness, engender fear, excite repugnance and
hostility, inflame dolour and intoxicate brawl, should be banished from the
conduct of the state. Thirdly, the
respect shown by the state for the rights of others constitutes its
nonstealing. Colonisation is stealing;
hence it should be condemned as unwholesome.
Aggression and domination are robbery.
Hence they must stop. Fourthly,
Brahmacary or continence implies that the state should not dissipate its
energies for military organisations and in the manufacturing of nuclear
weapons. The wealth and labor of the
state should be directed for the upliftment of mankind at large. Fifthly, the virtue of Aparigraha declines
to hanker after other State’s wealth and territory. The surplus production should be left for the use of other states
without any ill-motive. Imperialistic
tendencies should be regarded as baneful by the state. The virtue of Aparigraha is a mean between
capitalism and communism.
The above treatment of the virtues as applied to the state
will oblige up to admit that the state is required for the development of human
personality. The individual contributes
its share to the state and the latter in turn reciprocates with manifold energy
and strength, and affords opportunities for the material and spiritual
development of man. Just as material
backwardness hampers the progress of the individual, so also the state becomes
impotent without material possessions.
But the reins of the horses of materialism should be in the hands of
spiritualism. The above mentioned
virtues suffice to evolve a balanced outlook in the state. The virtues of non-violence and Aparigraha
are capable of establishing universal peace.
Non-violence cannot be materialised in the life of the state without
extirpating the passion of greed. The
root cause of violence is material goods.
If the importance of the virtue of Aparigraha is understood at the
international level, the attitude of non-violence will synchronies.
After dwelling upon the Jaina conniption of the individual
and society, the possibility of stateless society, and the virtues of the state
which are capable of affording solution to the problems of national and
international importance, we now propose to deal with the attitude of Jainism
towards casteism. Jainism looks at
casteism with an eye of contempt. The
superiority of one caste over the other is foreign to Jaina ethics. Casteism is an evil and is based on the
passions of hatred and pride. These two
are intense passions, hence they bring about sin to their victims. We find references in the Jaina scriptures which
go to propre that merit and not mere birth should be regarded as the real judge
of castes. The caste has nothing to do
with the realisation of spirit. The
Uttradhyayana says that Harikesa who was born in a family of untouchables
attained saintly character owing to the performance of austerities. Good conduct and not caste is the object of
reverence. Casteism is grounded in
falsity and is purely imaginary. Acarya
Amitagati expresses that mere caste is incapable of leading us to any
meritorious attainment. Merit accrues
from the pursuance of the virtues of truth, purity, austerity, Sila, meditation
and spiritual study. Differences in
conduct have resulted in the distinctions of caste. There is only one caste, namely, manhood. Merit is the basis of caste and the pride of
caste destroys right living. If the
modern democratic set up is to be made successful, casteism must go. Casteism and democracy are a contradiction
in terms.
CHAPTER X
A Resume
The commencement of Jaina philosophy, and consequently of
Jaina ethical speculation, in the present state of our knowledge can be
historically traced to the divine personality of Paravanatha, although the
Jaina tradition corroborated by the Vedic tradition of the Yajurveda and the
Bhagavata ascribes its origin to Rsabha, the first among the twenty-four
Tirthakaras. Mahavira who succeeded
Parsvanatha reinterpreted the religion of his precursor and acted more as a
reformer of religion already in existence than the founder of a new faith. Though Mahavira had a magnetic personality,
yet he had to encounter schism in his own life time. Some archaisms originated after his Nirvana. But most of the schisms ultimately agreed
with their original source. Only
Digambara-Svetambara schism resulted in a sharp division of the church, each
sect claiming greater authenticity than the other. The Yapaniyas may be regarded as the reconcilers of these two
major sects. The origin of Jaina
monarchism, and therefore of Jaina ethics, should not be attributed to the
Brahmanical idea of sammyasa. It grew
up among the imperfectly Aryanised communities of the east. It is Magadhan in origin.
Jaina ethics is grounded in Jaina metaphysics. The recognition of the nature of realties
either as mere permanence or as mere change has been regarded by Jainism as
subversive of ethical speculation, and a based on a prioristc and absolutistic
tendency of thought. In consonance with
the speculation of the Jaina, permanence is as much onto logically real as
change on the verdict of ‘experience’.
This metaphysical perspective reconciles the threefold definitions of substance
as that which exists, or that which is characterised by simultaneous
origination, destruction and continuance, or that which is the substratum of
attributes and modes. In other words,
substance as inherently and essentially associated with endless qualities and
modifications, is out and out inconceivable without at the same time implying
existence which in turn in is endowed with the trio of simultaneous
origination, destruction and continuance.
Every quality transmutes its state every moment, though the quality as
such is never abrogated. Substance
along with localities possesses mode of existence. Mutability and mode of existence constitute the meaning of
Paryaya. Existence is an all-embracing
characteristic. The relation between
substance and quality, between substance and modification, and between
substance and existence is one of identity-indifference.
Pramana and Naya are the sources of cognising the
Anekantatmaka reality. The former
grasps the reality in its wholeness, while the latter takes into consideration
only a fragment of the totality, and keeps in view the proper regard for the
other aspects. In order that the
Anekantic reality may be rendered fit for communication without any distortion,
Jainism invented the doctrine, of Syadvada which instructs to affix the word
sight as a prefix to every predicate in order to allow room for the predication
of other attributes inherent in the object.
The word sysat should not be calculated to evince the skeptical outlook
of the Jaina but to serve as a beacon light to enlighten the other persisting
attributes which have not been expressed by the proposition in question.
Jainism traces the whole universe of being to two
everlasting, uncreated, co-existing but independent categories of Jiva and
Ajiva. The latter if further classified
into Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and
Kala. Hence reality is dualistic
as well as pluralistic. Plurality
though, an ontological fact entails unity also, considered especially from the
synthetic objective point of view of one existence. The six substances never part with their original eternal
nature. Pudgala from the atomic to the
Skandha state possesses the sense qualities of touch, taste, smell and
colour. Though an atom is devoid of
sound, yet the combination of atoms can produce sound when's they come in
contact with other aggregates of
atoms. Thus sound is material. The distinguishing feature op Akasa is to
provide accommodation to all the
Dravyas. Dharma and Adharma are the
indifferent conditions of movement and rest respectively. These two principles of Dharma and Adharma
are also responsible for the demarcation of Lokakasa and Alokakasa. Kala expresses the condition of change in
substances. The self which possesses
consciousness as its essence has been regarded as having supreme significance
among the substances and as having the highest value among the Tattvas. The empirical selves which vary from the one sensed to the five sensed are
bound by Karnas from an indefinite past.
They re conceived to be the enjoyers of self-performed good and bad
actions, and to the knowers and seers.
They extend up to the limit of bodily dimensions, possess the narrowing
and dilating characteristics, are associated with the triple nature of
origination, destruction and continuance and own the specific characteristic of
consciousness. The transcendental self
is free from all Karmas and manifests infinite knowledge, bliss and the like.
We encounter various expressions of the ethical idea. They converge and culminate in identical
implication. The ethical Summum Bonum
may be regarded as the deliverance of self, the attainment of Paramatman state,
the achievement of Sva-samaya or Svayambhu state of existence, the realisation
of self’s Svarupasatta, the achievement of know ledge consciousness, the
realisation of Ahimsa, the accomplishment of pure Bhavas transcending
auspicious and inauspicious Bhavas, the realisation of self’s true agency and
enjoyability and the attainment of super empirical death. These culminate in the one objective of the
fullest realisation of the cognitive, cognitive and affective potencies of
self.
The question how the self got into defilement and
corruption is avoided by the Jaina by affirming and admitting it to be a
beginningless proess. The principle of
Mithyatva which vitiates our outlook, know ledge and conduct offers a great
resistance to the realisation of the sublime end. Consequently Samyagdarasana is to be attained which in turn will
make knowledge and conduct conducive to liberation. Unflinching faith in the pristine purity of the self constitutes
Niscaya Samyagdrasana, while the belief in seven Tattvas is styled Vyavahara
Samyagdarsana. Without Samyagdarsana
conduct is incapable of surpassing the provinces of morality, and spiritualism
gets shrouded in mystery. The emphasis
on Samyagdarsana or spiritual
conversion proves that the Jaina ethics is grounded in spiritualism.
With the light of right knowledge which enables the
aspirant to look into his infirmities, the pursuit of right conduct sweeps away
the obstructing elements which thwart the manifestation of uninterrupted
happiness, infinite knowledge etc. In
addition to right belief and right knowledge emancipation presupposes right conduct
as well. He who observes partial
conduct being not able to renounce the commitment of sins to the full claims
the title of ‘layman’. The minimum of
conduct for the householder consists in the observance of five Anyratas, and in
the abandonment of meat, wine and honey.
The Salivates educate the individual for the exalted life of
renunciation. The Pratimas are the
systematic stages of advancement towards the life of asceticism. The exposition of the householder’s ethical
discipline on the basis of Paksa, Carya
and Sadhana is the all-inclusive way of describing the conduct of the
householder. If one is encountered with
the causes which terminate the present life,. One should resort to the
performance of Sallekhana which is not other than the spiritual welcome to
death. This is not yielding to death but a way of meeting the challenge
of death undauntedly and adequately.
Hence it should be distinguished from suicide.
The life of complete renunciation makes possible the
extirpation of inauspicious Bhava which remains unrealised in the householder’s
life of partial renunciation. The life
of asceticism is not to recoil from the world of action but from the world of
Himsa. The ascension towards a higher
and nobler path results on account of being motivated by certain incentives to
spiritual lie traditionally known as twelve Anupreksas. If they posses the potency of pushing ahead
the layman into the realm of complete renunciation, they profess to serve as
the guides for the monk who is pursuing the path of complete renunciation. The aspirant being actuated by these
incentives comes to have a negative attitude towards worldly actions and
acquisitions, and an enlightened positive, tenacious and resolute attitude
towards the life of the spirit. After adopting
the internal and external emblems at the sacred hands of an excellent Guru and
after paying obeisance to him and after going through the course of discipline
which is prescribed, he wins the credit of bring styled Sramana.
The Saint adheres to the observance of five great vows
(Ahimsa, Satya, Asteya, Aparigraha, and Brahmacarya), of five-fold Semites
(Irya, Bhasa, Esana, Adana-Niksepana, and Utsarga), of three guptis (Manas,
Vacana and Kaya); of six-fold
essentials (Samayika, Stuti, Vandana, Paratimkramana, Pratyakhyana, and
Kayotsarga). Besides, he controls the
five senses, and pulls out the hair, takes only one meal a day, does not take
bath, and does not cleanse his teeth. So much is common between a Svetambara
and a Digambara saint. Nudity, to sleep
on the ground, to take meals in a standing posture in the palm of one’s own
hand-all these are peculiar to Digambara monks.
The saint whose life is an example of the dedication of his
integral energies to the cessation and shedding of Karmas regards the
subjugation of twenty-two kinds of Parisahas and the practice of twelve kinds
of austerities as falling within the compass of his obligations. The former occurs against the will of the
saint who has to endure them or rather who turns them to good account by
compelling them to become the means for spiritual conquest, while the latter
are in consonance with the aspirant’s will to spiritual triumph. The performance of external austerities does
not merely aim at the physical renunciation but also at the overthrow of the
attachment to the body and senses. Of
the six kinds of internal austerities, Dhyana is of supreme importance. All the disciplinary practices form an
essential background for the performance of Dhyana. It is the indispensable, integral constituent of right conduct,
and is directly related to the actualisation of the divine potentialities.
Broadly speaking, Dhyana is of two types namely 1) Prasasta and 2) Aprasasta. The former
category is divided into two types, namely, 1) Dharmadhyna, and 2) Sukladhyana;
and the latter, also into two types namely
1) Artadhyna and 2) Raudradhyana.
The above-mentioned description refers to the former category. In other words, in dealing with Dhyana as
Tapas, we are completely concerned with the Prasasta types of Dhyana, since
they are singularly relevant to the auspicious and transcendental living. On the contrary the Apresasta types of
Dhyana bring about worldly sufferings.
The saint who is confronted with incurable disease,
intolerable old age, formidable famine, great weakness, of hearing and sight,
infirmity of legs, violent animals in the forests, etc. adopts Sallekhana (spiritual welcome to
death). The whole of the ethical
discipline prescribed for the layman and the monk has been deemed as a way for
translating Ahimsa in practice, the actual realisation of which can only be
effected in the plenitude of mystical experience. Thus if the fountain-head of ethics is metaphysics, mysticism
will be its culmination. The equivalent
expression in Jainism for the word ‘Mysticism’ is ‘Suddhopayoga’. Mysticism consists in realising the
transcendental self through the internal self by renouncing the external
self. The journey from the internal
self to the transcendental self is traversed through the medium of moral and
intellectual preparations which purge everything obstructing the emergence of
potential divinity. Before the final
accomplishment is made, a stage of vision and fall may intervene.
In metaphysical terms we may say that mysticism is the
realisation of self’s capacity for original origination, destruction, and
continuance. It amounts to the
realisation of self’s Svarupa-satta.
Mysticism and metaphysics connote differences of approach to the problem
of reality. If the qualification of the
mystic is realisation and intuition, the qualification of metaphysician is
merely intellection.
The fourteen stages of spiritual evolution, technically
known as Gunasthanas, may be subsumed under the following heads, namely, 1)
Dark period of the self prior to its awakening (1st Dark night of
the soul), 2) Awakening of the self, 3)
Purgation , 4) I11umination, 5)
Dark period post-illumination (2nd
Dark night of the soul), and 6) Transcendental life. There is also a state beyond these stages,
known as Siddha State.
1) The darkest period in the history of the self is one
when the self beset with Mithyatva. The
plight of the self in the first stage namely, Mithyatva Gunasthana resembles
that of a totally eclipsed moon or a completely clouded sky. It is a stage of spiritual slumber and the
self itself is not cognisant of this drowsyds state of spirit. Such an ignorant man may be an astute
intellectualism, or a resolute moralist, but he will lack that mystical quality
by virtue of which he may be designated as a real saint. Thus the spiritual conversion is to be
sharply distinguished from the moral conversion and from the intellectual
accomplishments.
2) The occurrence of conversion spiritual is consequent
upon the instructions-either in the present birth or in some previous birth-of
those who have realised the divine within themselves or are on the path of
divine realisation. The Arahanta is
the supreme Guru. Acrayas, Upadhyayas,
and Sadhus re on the path of divine realisation. Only Acaryas enjoy the privilege of initiating persons in the
mystical life, hence they are the Gurus in the technical sense. The five Labdhis are presupposed before
spiritual conversion may be deemed to occur.
The self is now in the fourth Gunasthana. The second and third stages are the stages of fall from spiritual
conversion.
3) The self has now been metamorphosed into an awakened
self. Mystical adventure will now
consist in eliminating the horrible contrast between the first enlightenment
and the final one. The aspirant will
now dedicate himself to the study of spiritual literature and to the observance
of self-denial. In short, he adheres to
the purgative way which is not merely a negatives process but comprises
positive attainments also. Scriptural
study and devotion constitute the integral parts of the mystic’s moral and
spiritual discipline. The self,
according to its moral level, occupies the fifth, or the sixth or the lst part
of the seventh Gunasthana.
4) By this time, the self
has developed a deep habit of introversion, a power of spiritual attention, of
self-merging, and of gazing into the ground of the soul. Through deep
meditation the mystic advances upon the second part of seventh Gunasthana, and
the rest higher Gunasthanas upto the twelfth are purely meditational stages or
the stages of illumination and ecstasy.
5) The self which arrives at
the eleventh Gunasthana falls down either in the first stage or in the fourth
one on account of the rise of suppressed passions, and thus experiences the
Dark-night of the soul. All the mystics
do not experience this dark-night.
Those mystics who ascend the ladder of annihilation escapes this tragic
period and forthwith succeed in materialising final accomplishments in
comparison to those who ascend the
ladder of subsidence. The latter
type of mystics no doubt will also reach the same heights but only when they
climb up the ladder of annihilation.
Souls, though not every one, are confronted with the darkness of three
types in their life career, firstly, before conversion, secondly, after
conversion, and thirdly, after the ascension of the ladder of subsidence.
6) Slumbering and unawakened
soul after passing through the stages of spiritual conversion, moral and
intellectual preparation now arrives at the sublime destination by means of
ascending the rungs of mediational ladder.
This is transcendental life, a supplemental state of existence. It is the final triumph of the spirit, the
flower of mysticism. The soul is now
‘Arahanta’ and is staying in the thirteenth and fourteenth Gunasthanas.
The fourteenth Gunasthana is immediately followed by
disembodied liberation, which is a state of self beyond Gunasthanas. This state of self is the termination of
mystic’s journey.
The Vedic, the Jaina and the Buddhist speculations concur
remarkably with one another on the psychological, ethical and religious planes
of existence. The cardinal virtues
according to Jainism are: 1) Spiritual conversion, 2)
Spiritual study, 3) Ahimsa, 4)
Satya, 5) Asteya, 6)
Brahmacarya, 7) Aarigraha, 8)
Meditation, and 9) Devotion.
Jaina Ethics is capable of bringing about the individual, the social, the
national and the international progress.