CHAPTER 12
THE
PROBLEM OF ETHICAL SUMMUM BONUM :
THE SOPHISTS:
It is said that, "The Sophists brought
philosophy down from heaven to the dwellings of men, and turned the
attention from external nature to man himself; for them the proper study
of mankind was man.",
Hitherto the chief concern of the Greek philosophers was to ascertain
the origin of the world. The Sophists not only evinced a negative
attitude towards current ontological speculation, but also protested
against the enigmatic conclusions of their predecessors, and
consequently propounded subjec�tivity in knowledge by affirming that
`Man is the measure of all things' and that truth is `relative to the
subjective make up of the individual enunciating the statement.'2
Epistemological subjectivism and relativism ended in ethical
subjectivism and relativism. The good is entirely subjec�tive and
relative to the individual who achieves it. There are as many ethical
ends as there are individuals. This reflects a state of moral anarchy.
And yet notwithstanding the subjectivists trend of Protagoras in the
field of knowledge and morals, the contribution made by him to the
entire philosophy should not be underestimated. Man as such was
considered to be of supreme importance. The realization of ethical good
was made personal, which is tantamount to saying that morality, in its
historical beginning, assumed an egoistic form. Now not egoism in
1 History of
Philosophy, p. 61.
2Ibid. p. 57.
general but only exclusive egoism is
detrimental.1 Besides, �the great value of the entire
Sophistic movement consisted in this: it awakened thought and challenged
philosophy, religion, customs morals and the institutions based on them,
to justify themselves to reason.2 Now the age in which
Mahavira was born resembled that of the Sophists in a great measure. In
contrast to Protagoras, Mahavira did not depreciate metaphysical
speculation, but denounced absolutism. He reconstructed metaphysic with
epistemological objectives as its basis, and thus became an exponent of
the multiple nature of reality, technically known as Anekantavada. This
attitude exercised its influence on ethical; inquiry too. The good is
not subjective but objective, though individuals relish it. Thus
according to Jainism, Ahimsa is the objective good, the complete
realization of which is possible in the plenitude of mystical
experience. This is the moral and the spiritual egoism, which
distinguishes itself from the narrow, and the selfish egoism of
Protagoras. The former gives an impetus to the formulation of an
ethical theory, while the latter leader, us only to chaos.
SOCRATHES: Socrates combated the intellectual
and moral chaos of the age, and protested against the subjectivity and
relativity of the Sophists who reduced all morality to a matter of
private caprice. Socrates conformed with the view of Protagboras that
the good we seek is human well being, but differed from him by saying
that it is independent of the fluctuating choice of the individuals. It
is not subjective, but objective, because it is capable of being made
intelligible by means of general conceptions, which are the products of
reason, the universal element in man. Thus according to Socrates
knowledge in the highest good and it is further identified with
goodness. The corollary of this view is that no one is voluntarily
bad. �By this �knowledge� he did not mean of course of purely
theoretical; knowledge which needed only to be leant, but an unshakable
conviction based on the deepest insight into and realization of what is
really valuable in life deepest insight into and realization of what is
really valuable in life, a conviction such as he himself possessed,3
Besides, the knowledge with which true goodness is to be identified is
knowledge of what is good the human soul.4 �The only real
harm is spiritual and produced only by one�s own wrong doing.�5
1 Short History of Ethics,
p.345 2 History of Philosophy, pp. 61-62.
3 Outlines of the History of Greek
Philosophy, p. 102.
4 Greek Philosophy, p. 176.
5 Outlines of History of Greek
Philosophy,. 102.
17Janis
would subscribe to the view of Socrates that right knowledge and true
belief arrow essential to right action, but denies that they necessarily
issue in goodness. The irrational parts of the soul, namely, passions,
cannot be lost sight of and very often these passions prevent a man from
doing that which contributes to the well-being of the soul. The
Socratic axiom of knowledge as goodness can only be justified by one who
has ascended the mystical; heights, but we have little evidence to show
that Socrates meant this. That the real good is the good of the human
soul is in conformity with the Jaina view. The highest good is
spiritual and wrong actions obstruct spiritual progress.
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS; The
many-sidedness of the Socratic ethics gave rise to diametrically opposed
schools of ethical thought, namely, those of the Cynics and the Cryonics
founded by Antisthenes and Airstrips respectively. These two founders
endeavored in their own way to represent the chief constituents of a
life of well-being. Both agreed regarding human well being as the
highest good, but the they differed enormously in point of the content
that the life of well being must include. The ideal; of life advocated
by the Cynics consists in the eradication of all desires,. In the
freedom from all wants,. And in being completely independent of all
possessions. It enjoins absolute asceticism and rigorous
self-mortification. In contrast to the above-mentioned negative content
as constituting. In contrast to the above-mentioned; negative content
as constituting the inner core of the life of well being, the Cryonics
laid stress on the positive attainment of the greatest amount of
pleasure. They no doubt extolled; bodily pleasures, but they escaped
sensuality and bestiality, inasmuch as the need of prudence in the
pursuit of pleasures was emphasized and advocated. The prudent
cultivates self-control, postpones a more urgent to a less urgent desire
in order to get more pleasure and less pain. � The Cyrenaic and Cynic
doctrines tend towards exclusive egoism, whether as a pursuit of
self-dependence or of pleasurable feeling.�1 In the view of
the Jaina, the Cynic ideal will remain unrealizable so long as the
Almanac stredfastness is not arrived at. Mere negation will lead us
nowhere. The internal; and the external Aparigraha is incapable of
being practiced without spiritual possession. Aparigraha is incapable of
being practiced without spiritual possession. The Cynic failed to
reconcile individual goodness withholds the social one. In conformity
with the views of the Jana, the of householder and that of the Mini can
properly attune the individual; with social uplift-
Short History of Ethics, p. 41.
Meat. Exclusive egoism is suicidal, but
spiritual egoism exemplified in the life of Acaryas and Arahantas is
compatible with social goodness. The Cymics could not bring forth the
concept of social Aparigraha but went to the other extreme of mere
individual; Aparigraha and thus destroyed the social foundation and
imperiled social living. The Anuvratas proscribed for the layman strike
a balance between asceticism and sensualist, and between absolute
independence and complete dependence. The life of Mahavratas, through
individualistic in trend, is not incompatible with social goodness. The
Cryonics moved in the direction of egoistic hedonism that is totally
unacceptable to the Jaina. Egoistic hedonism does not go beyond bodily
consciousness, it tends towards narrow selfishness and looks upon with
contempt the philanthropists sacrificing their lives for social; good.
"Crude hedonism contains within itself the germ of pessimism: The
attainment of a preponderance of pleasure over pain seems impossible,
and the exclusive pursuit of pleasure leads over pain seems impossible,
and the exclusive pursuit of pleasures leads to boredom and
frustration.�1 The most common argument that may be advanced
against egoistic hedonism is that we desire objects and not pleasure;
pleasurable state is simply an accompaniment. That is why Jainism has
laid stress on the pursuance of noble ends so that lasting pleasures may
displace transitory ones.
PLATO AND ARISTOTLE: As advocated
by Plato, the transcendental world of ideas constitutes reality, and
reason is the most characteristic aspect of the soul. The empirical
objects of the world are but fleeting shadows of the objects, the body
and the senses are foreign to the soul�s innate nature. The true life
of the individual, therefore, consists in the freedom of the soul from
the body and in contemplating the world of ideas. The veritable end of
life finds expression in bringing into clear consciousness the latent
memories of the past when the soul possessed the knowledge of the
ideas. �The true art of living is really an �art of dying� as far as
possible to mere sense, in order more fully to exist in intimate union
with absolute goodness and beauty.�2 �This ascetic tendency
of the Platonic philosophy culminates in mysticism.�3 We are
confronted with another view of the ethical ideal which emerged on
account of the ascription of some value to the would of sense by virtue
of the fact that the objects of the world
1 History of Philosophy, p. 72. 2
Outlines of the History of Ethics, p. 41.
3 History of Philosophy, p.91.
participate in ideas. The imprisonment of
soul; into body meant the mingling of the rational part with the
irrational; part known as the spirited part and the appetites. In view
of this, the ethical idea consists in the achievement of the harmony
among the various parts of the soul. The irrational parts are not wiped
off but subordinated under reason. This is what goes to form justice.
�Such a man would not repudiate a deposit, commit sacrilege or theft, be
false to friends, a traitor to his country or commit similar misdeeds.�1
Happiness results from such a life. By virtue of this trend Plato
escapes narrow asceticism and makes room for social goodness. In view
however of the fact that Aristotle rejected the transcendentalism of
Plato and expounded the immanence of forms into things, the ethical
Summum Bonum according to him, consists in the realization of the form
as inherent in man, namely, a rational; life. It is the life of
�theoria� which means a life spent in the unimpeded apprehension and
discovery of the truth.2 The irrational parts which are
organically related to the soul need be harnessed to the service of
reason. For when properly controlled by reason they may be directed
towards the social well being. Thus individual good and social well
being are not incompatible. The ethical speculation of the Jaina and
that of Plato and Aristotle resemble each other to a great extent. The
life of reason can be compared with the life of Suddhopayoga as
explained by Jainism, with this difference that the irrational parts
which are retained in some form or the other by Aristotle, must be
removed in view of the Jaina. The difficulty is due to the fact that
Aristotle could not reconcile the life of pure reason with that of
social well-being. In view of Jainism the greatest mystics are as well
the greatest social reformers. Though asceticism which flows from the
observance of Mahavratas is the ideal of life, though it can only be
attained by a selected few, the concept of Anuvratas is capable enough
to bring harmony; between the rational and irrational parts of the
soul. Platonic asceticism is inconsistent with social goodness; hence
it is insalubrious, but the Jaina asceticism embraces social goodness
within its fold along with individual goodness. The Jaina concept of
Anuvrats is a mean between asceticism and sensualist. It completely;
makes possible the achievement of social goodness but it imperfectly
brings about individual goodness, since the irrational parts cannot be
completely subdued in the life of Anuvratas. Their extrication is
essential for complete individual goodness.
1 History of Philosophy, p.90. 2
Short History of Ethics, p. 80.
Short History of Ethics, p. 80.
UTILITARANISM: The chief exponents of this
School are Bentham. J.
S. Mill, and Henry Sidgwick. According to
them the Summum Bonum or the ultimate ethical standard consists in the
�greatest happiness of the greatest number.� These three thinkers claim
to have made a transition from mere egoism to universals. Their claim
is warrantable to a great extent, but they could not universalism.
Their claim is warrantable to a great extent, but they could not deliver
themselves from the snares of egoism. Besides, they exhibited
divergence on the grounds of transition from egoism to Altruism.
Bantam�s utilitarianism derives its validity from purely egoistic
considerations and evinces strong leanings towards sensualist by
formulating quantity as the measure of the value of pleasures. For
him, �Push-pin is as good as poetry.� The following quotation. Shows
his egoistic trend: �Dream not that men will move their finger to serve
you, unless their own advantage in so doing be obvious to them. Men
never did so and never and will, while human nature is made of the
present materials. But they will desire to serve, when by so doing they
can serve themselves, and the occasions on which they can serve
themselves by serve themselves, and the occasions on which they can
serve themselves by serving you are multitudinous.�1 Thus we
may call his utilitarianism. The Jaina would think that this should not
be overemphasized. On many occasions in life one can serve others at
the cost of conspicuous losses. Besides, a psychological fact should
not be elevated to the rank of ethical; design. Jaina ethics gives
approbation only to those altruistic actions which are performed without
;any Nidana (future mundane expectation). Actions constituting other
man�s goodness need not be done with any hope of return or personal
benefit. Again, all pleasures cannot be on par. The life of sensualist
cannot find favor with Jainism. The pleasures of the senses are of the
worst sort and should be gradually overcome by self-control. Bentham�s
view seems to denounce the value of self-control. The pleasure of
drinking cannot be abandoned by Bentham. Mill�s utilitarianism is
called �Sympathetic utilitarianism�, since, according to him, man is
induced to altruistic conduct by internal felling of the happiness of
mankind, by the consciousness possessed by every one that he is an
integral part of society. By regarding that pleasures are intrinsically
heterogeneous, Mill abandons hedonism. The distinction between higher
and lower pleasures may be brought by the �native sense of dignity�
which a man possesses. Jainism
Deontology, II. P. 133.
agrees with Mill as regards the
heterogeneity of pleasures, but introduces the principle of internal and
external Ahimsa for differentiating different pleasure. This principle
is far more comprehensive than that of �native sense of dignity.� The
man who performs a good act out of social feeling shall not be able to
do it at the risk of his own pleasure. The principle of Ahimsa which is
more in tune with the man�s inner nature pre-eminently possesses
altruistic note, and is in conformity with self-sacrifice for the good
of others. Sidgwick�s utilitarianism is called �Intentional
utilitarianism�, inasmuch as his theory is based on certain principles
known intuitively by practical reason. The pleasures of others are to
be regarded as of equal weight with our own. Sidgwick could not
reconcile national self-love with benevolence, and he is confronted with
a difficulty known as dualism of the Practical Reason. Above all, we
may say that the ethical idea, �greatest happiness of the greatest
number�, will be modified by Jainism as the greatest happiness of all.
Jainism speaks with the vulgar in pronouncing the highest good in terms
of happiness or pleasure, but in fact the highest good is the
realization of Ahimsa or self, and happiness is a compliment. Thus
Jainism thinks with the learned. Utilitarian writers on the other hand
think with the vulgar exclusively, and emphasize felling as against the
cognitive and cognitive aspects of life. Mere feeling is an
abstraction. �Feeling is a quality of a mental state which cannot exist
apart from other elements any more than color or shape can exist without
matter.�1 �Our ends are our happiness, not merely means to
happiness.�2
KANT: The highest good, according
to Kant, consists in the performance of actions out of respect for the
moral law which commands categorically or unconditionally, and
irrespective of circumstances, consequences and inclinations. �There is
nothing in the world or even out of if� says he, �that can be called
good without qualification except a good will.� The good will is a
rational will willing in obedience to moral imperative which is the
expression of man�s real self, of the very principle of his being.�3
The categorical imperative inherent in reason itself lays down �Act only
on the maxim which thou can�t at the same time will to become a
universal law,� and entails a society of rational beings, a kingdom of
ends. There is no queer of Jainism with Kantian formulations.
1 Short History of Ethics, p.251.
2 Fundamentals of Ethics, p.90. 3 History of Philosophy, p.
443.
So far as the highest good is concerned,
inasmuch as the perfected mystic or a Tirthankara presents himself to be
a member of the kingdom of ends. His actions are not limited by
circumstances, consequences, ends, and selfish and sympathetic
feelings. He is, according to Jainism, the only being acting in
accordance with the commands of his inner being. The conviction of the
Jaina is that the actions of such a being will always result in
happiness. The mistake of Kant according to the Jaina is that he
confounds supermoralism with moralist and, that from his a priori
philosophy, he deduces a principle which cannot be applied to special
circumstances and to positive rules, for instance, continence, charity
to the poor etc. The principle according to Jainism should be at once
universal and particular, i.e., universal in nature and particular in
practice. The principle of Ahimsa, e.g., in its comprehensive meaning
satisfies the universal demands of reason and the particular demands of
society. Ahimsa with the Jaina doctrine of Nayavada can very well serve
as the supreme principle of morality. Hence there is nothing is the
would or even out of it that can be called good without qualification
except a good will willing the principle of Ahimsa of all beings. It is
a form and can be validly applied to all the particular cases. Besides,
the absence of auspicious and inauspicious Bhavas has relevancy in the
life of supermoralism, but the life of morality presupposes will
combined with auspicious Bhavas. Along with the inauspicious Bhavas or
intense passions, Kant overthrew auspicious Bhavas as will without
thinking about the loss to moral life. The transcendental will is
capable of dispensing with all types of Bhavas, but the empirical will,
particularly moral will can not be against auspicious Bhavas; of
sympathy, compassion and the like.
VIRTURES: SOPHISTS, SOCRATES,
PLATO AND ARISTOTLE: The Sophists identified virtue with self-interest.
The Socratic view finds expression in the formula: �Knowledge is
virtue.� �Knowledge is both the necessary and the sufficient condition
of virtue: without knowledge virtue is impossible and its possession
ensures virtuous action.�1 This conception led Socrates to
regard that virtue is teachable and that it is one. The different
virtues like temperance, benevolence emanates from the supreme virtue,
namely, wisdom. The systematic approach to, and the exposition of
virtues may be ascribed to Plato and Aristotle. Their theory of virtues
of based on their psychology of soul. In the Platonic system, the
1 History of Philosophy, p. 70.
Soul occupies a position between the two
worlds, namely, would of ideas and would of becoming. Consequently it
must possess the traits of both the worlds, rational and irrational, the
latter comprises within its fold spirited and appetite parts. Desire
for pleasure, desire for wealth, desire for food, shelter and other
bodily satisfactions are included in the appositive part,1
while the spirited part includes anger, love of honor, shame, arsine to
disgrace,2 and gentleness, humility and reverence are the
traits of rational part. �The moral rank of these two elements is very
different; the spirited element is the natural ally of reason in the
conflicts of the soul;, and under due training is capable of manifesting
a special excellence of its own; the appositive element is naturally
baser and capable of no virtue except submission to reason.�3
This triple division of soul led Plato to recognize four cardinal
virtues. The virtue of reason is wisdom, of the spirited part, courage,
of the appositive part, temperance, and the fourths virtue is called
justice which is the presence of all these virtues ;in the soul and
consists in the free harmonious exercise of intellect, emotion and
desire under the guidance of reasion.4 Thus justice is the
highest virtue. Aristotle regarded man as an epitome of the different
levels in the development of living beings. Thus man possesses three
different souls, a vegetative, an animal and a rational soul.
Corresponding to the national and irrational (passions and appetites)
parts of the soul, there are two kinds of virtues, namely the
intellectual (diabetic) and the moral. The diabetic virtues represent
the life of pure reason. Moral virtues spring from the subordination of
irrational elements to reason. They are not naturally implanted in man
but denote a developed and settled habit formed by taking recourse to
the mean between two extremes and thus avoid the vicious excess and
defect. The middle path or the happy mean is not given by mechanical or
a priori rule as in Arithmetic, it is known by the reasoning and
judgement of man of practical wisdom, �Moral virtues are not ends in
themselves.�5 Aristotle illustrates the doctrine of means by
giving certain examples. Courage, for example, is a mean between
rashness and cowardice, temperance between licentiousness and apathy;
generosity between extravagance and miserliness. He does not apply this
theory to certain vices like adultery, murder, theft,
1 History of Philosophy, p.70.
2 Ibid.p.86. 3 Outlines of the History of Ethics, p.44.
4 Short History of Ethics, p. 47 5 Ibid. p,80.
Etc, inasmuch as, according to him, these
are bad in themselves. Jainism also forms its theory of ethics on the
ground of its psychological analysis of the soul. The intrinsic
excellence of the self is obstructed by the passions in their most
comprehensive extent including virtues and vices. Intense passion is
vice and mild passion is virtue. Aristotle�s mean from the Jaina point
of view may be recognized as the expression of mild Poisson. Jainism
analyses passions more deeply and recognizes six degrees of passions,
bringing the first three under vices and the last three under virtues!
Spiritually speaking virtues and vices differ in degree and not in
kind. But this difference should not be regarded as insignificant. The
movement towards virtuous living is a movement towards a life of reason
in Aristotelian sense and a life of supermodel is in the Jainistic
sense. By leading the life of supermoralisms the virtuous life is not
annihilated, but it reconciles the life of the spirit with the life of
virtues, as also the individual consummation with the social goodness.
The divine man is the measure of virtuous living. Thus the guidance of
Arahantas, Acrayas, Upadhyay; as and Sadhaus will determine those acts
which are virtuous, the expression of mild passions. Aristotle stops at
the verdict of wise man, but Jainism gives a practical criterion of
internal and external Ahimsa for judging the rightness of actions. The
conviction of the Jaina is that the Platonic virtues like courage,
temperance, householder can only partially observe these virtues. In
other words, though the Anuvratas are potent enough to evolve perfect
social order, they are incapable of bringing about individual salvation
or his culminate progress. In view of the Jaina, Aristotle�s life of
Theoria, the Platonic contemplation of Ideas cannot be translated into
action without the life of Mahavratas. Absolute social and individual
goodness emanates from the observance of Mahavratas, but it can be
achieved only by a few.
CLASSFICATION OF VIRTUES:
The cardinal virtues, according to Jainism may be enumerated as follows:
1) Spiritual conversion, 2) Spiritual study, 3) Ahimsa, 4) Satya, 5)
Asteya, 6) Brahmacarya, 7) Aparigraha, 8) Meditation and 9) Devotion.
We now propose to give a detailed classification of virtues after
following the scheme, which Professor RANADE has adopted in his �Pathway
to God in Hindi literature,�2
1 These are called Lesyas. We
have already dealt with these earlier.
2 Pathway to God in Hindi literature, p. 88.
Namely, the Scheme of classifying Virtues
into the Individual, the social and the Spiritual.
INDIVIDUAL VIRTUES: 1. Self-control
(Saraga-Samyama)1; 2. Greedlessness (sauna)2; 3.
Humility (Mardava) 3; 4. Straightforwardness (Arjava)4;
5. Truthfulness (Satya)5; 6. Non-stealing (Asteya)6;
7. Continence (Brahmacaraya)7; 8. Doubtlessness (Nihsanka)8;
9. Desirelessness (Nihkanksa): ; 10. Non-stupidity (Amudhata)10;
11. Abandonment of Frivolous actions (Anarthadandayaga)11;
and 12, Avoidance of eight kinds of pride.12
SOCIAL VIRTUES: 1. Universal
compassion and friendship (Bhutan Anukampa13 and Mairti); 2.
Charity (Dana) 14; 3. Non-hatred towards the diseased
(Nirvicikitsa)15; 4. Commendation of the meritorious
(Pramoda)16; and 5. Active compassion for the distressed
(Karuana)17 or helping those who are miserable, thirsty and
hungry,18 6. Indifference towards the arrogant (Madhyastha)
19; 7. Non-acquisition (Aparigraha)20; 8. Non-injury
(Ahimsa) 21; 9. Forgiveness (Ksama) 22; and 10.
Propagation of moral and Spiritual values through23 adequate
means (Prabhavana).
SPIRITUAL VIRTUES: 1. Penance
(Bodily Tapss) 24; 2. Endurance of Parisahas or suffering (Parisahajaya)
25; 3. Spiritual study (Svadyaya) 26; 4. Meditation (Dhyana)
27; 5. Devotion to Deva, Sastra and Guru28; 6.
Avoidance of seven Kinds of fear29; 7. Pessimism (Vairagya)
30; 8. Service of Saints (Vaiyavrttya) 31; 9. Spiritual
conversion (Samyagdarsana) 32; 10. Unattachment to body (Akincana)
33; 11. Self-condemnation (Prayascitta) 34; 12.
Affection towards spiritual brethren (Vatsalya) 35; 13.
Conquest of sleep, posture, and the desire for food36; 14.
Purity of food37; 15. Spiritual welcome to death (Sallekhana)
38; 16. Re-establishment of the aspirants on the right path39;
(Sthitikarana).
1 Sarvartha, VI.12. 2
Ibid.IX-6. 3. Ibid, 4, Ibid..
5 Ibid. 6
Ibid.VII.1. 7 Ibid. 8 Bhava. Pa. 7. 9
Ibid. 10.Ibid. 11 Sarvartha.
VII.21
12 Mula.53 13 Sarvartha.
VI. 12; VII. 11. 14 Ibid.
15 Bhava.Pa.7. 16
Sarvartha.VII.11 17 Ibid
18 Panca.137 19
Sarvartha.VII.11 20Sarvartha VII.1
21Ibid. 22
Sarvartha.IX.6.
23 Bhava. P5. 7. 24 Sarvartha
IX.19 25 Saravartha, IX,9
26 Ibid.20 27.
Ibid. 28 Sarvartha. VI.24
29 Mula.53. 30
Sarvartha.VII, 12. IX-7 31 Ibid IX 20.
32 Ibid, IX-24. 33 Ibid.
IX-6 34 Ibid. IX-20
35 Bhava. Pa. 7.
36.Mo.Pa.63 37 Mula.421.
38 Sarvartha. VII 22 39 Bhava. Pa. 7.
CHAPTER IX
Jaina Ethics and the Present-day Problems
At the outset we have to
acknowledge that the man of today is living in a world which is much
more complex than that of an ancient or mediaeval man. Interdependence
among nations has increased; and this has brought an ever widening and
deepening impact on the economic, intellectual and social conditions of
our existence. The scientific advancement has made countries one
another�s neighbors. Divergent races, divergent cultures, and divergent
out-looks have come in close relations. In the present chapter we shall
endeavor to put forth a view of state and society emanating from the
ethical; considerations of the Jaina and shall strive to solve the
problems of the social, national and international importance which
encounter the present man.
INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY: It is
generally alleged that Jaina ethics aims merely at self-purification and
self-evolution. Professor MAITRA remarks,� The Jaina list does not
include the other-regarding virtues of Benevolence, succour, and social
service. This shows that the Jaina virtues aim more at self-culture
than at social service. �1 But in the light of our previous
classification and enumeration of virtues the above statement is
untenable; and we can say that Jaina ethics has both the eyes of the
individual as well as the social betterment. It envisages individual as
a social being, inasmuch as the individual�s dependence upon society for
his intellectual, moral and material gains is incontrovertible and
cannot be gainsaid. Even an ascetic is incapable of transgressing this
basic assumption of social dependence, although the concept of
dependence in case of an ascetic undergoes radical change. True
asceticism is not an act of ingratitude but an act of highest gratitude,
returning golden coins for silver pieces to society. The ascetic by
virtue of his practices accumulates Punya which in some form or the
other is a social debt. This social debt is responsible for his
repeated births till its full payment. This proves his dignified
dependence upon society. The Tirthakara or the divine man who has
transcended social dependence also pays the social debt in the form of
preaching and spiritual guidance to the suffering humanity and in such a
fashion as will not produce
1 The Ethics of the Hindus, p.
203.
fresh Karmas necessitating future birth.
This sort of payment of social debt is unique, without any parallel.
Thus we see that social dependence gradually decreases and ends in
absolute independence. It is only at this stage that we are capable of
saying that individuality or the individual stands completely aloof from
the social debt. As a consequence of this fact, Jainism alleges that
the individual is not like an organ absolutely dependent for its
sustenance on social organism. Social dependence cannot rob the
individual of his freedom to achieve his spiritual individuality. An
individual is not a mere cog in the social machine. Jainism no doubt
declines to accept the unrestricted individualism that ignores social
obligation. Thus the true view recognises that the individual and
society influence each other. The individual moulds and in mounded by
society.
CONCEPT AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
STATE: The strict observance of the Anuverate sand the Silvratgas by
the human beings at large will result in the evolution of stateless
society. The political power will be needless on account of the
emergence of such individuals as have a self regulated life. The
householder�s vows of Aparigraha, Satya, Asteya; and Digvrata, Desavrata,
Bhopgopabhoga-parimanavrata are pregnant with the capability of
unrevealing all the economic problems; the house-holder�s vows of
Brahmacarya, Samayika and Prosadhopavasa are sufficient for educating
the individual in the art of self-control on its positive side, and
Anarthadandtyaga-vrata, on its negative side; the spirit of social
service is capable of being nourished by the vow of Vaiyavrtya; and
lastly, the householder�s vow of Ahimsa will serve as the guiding and
pervasive principle throughout. The State as the outward garb of
society must needs be abandoned and renounced when the society as a
whole moulds its life in consonance with the prescription of vows. The
existence of an enlightened social order can dispense with the state
altogether. But this is an ideal condition and we feel that it cannot
be materialized. Probably there will come no time when all the
individuals will be self-regulating. Hence state in some form or the
other will exist.
Thus Human imperfection will
necessitate the continuation of state control and authority. The state
is no doubt an evil but a necessary evil. It should contrive to manage
its affairs in a way which will assist the development of perfect social
order. Its national and international activities should be guided by
the principle of non-violence and Anekanta. In order that the state may
function properly without encroaching upon the inherent spiritual nature
of man it must identify itself with Samyagdarsana, Samyagjnana,
Samyakcaritra. The Policy of the State must exhibit unflinbing faith in
, and tenacious adherence to the principle of non-violence. This will
crown the state with Samyagdarsana which will ipso facto bring
enlightenment to it, and the result will be the emergence of Samyagjnana.
In other words, the adoption and the assimilation of Anekanta is
Samyagjnana. The resolute and astute application of the policy of
non-violence and Anekanta in the national and international spheres for
solving all sorts of problems will credit the state with Samyakcaritra.
The passions of fear, hatred towards any class of man and towards any
other state, the passion of deception, greed to expand its territory and
to usurp other-state�s wealth and freedom, the passions of pride of
wealth, power, achievement and heritage-all these should be banished
from the state, because they arrow corruptive of the veritable spirit of
progress. On the positive side, the state should pursue the discipline
which flows from Samyagdarsana, Samyagjnana and Samyakcaritra. The
eight virtues emanate from Samyadarsana, the one from samyagjana, and
the five from Samyakcaritra. We shall dwell upon them one by one along
with their implications.
VIRTUES OF THE STATE : As regards
the virtues issuing from Samyagdarsana, first, the state not only one,
but all states should not have any iota of doubt in the efficacy of
non-violence for solving and problems which arise in the national and
international fields. Fewer which obstructs the germination of the
living faith in, and rational adherence to, the principle of Ahimsa must
be brushed aside. It will not be amiss to point out here that
non-violence should not be counted as a virtue of necessity and a cloak
of cowardice. To use it as weapon of expediency is to defile the
Nihsankita virtue of the state. Consequently, an unshakable conviction
in regarding it as a life-principle will infuse the state with a type of
immutability even in testing situations. Secondly,. The state in no
circumstance should exhibit tendency to dominate other countries not
with standing its multifarious achievements. Even help should not end
In domination. This is Nihkkanksita virtue of the State. Thirdly, the
virtue of Nirvicikitsa which is required to be associated with the state
prescribes not to condemn the poor. Fourthly, the virtue styled
Amudhadrasti obliges the state to refuse to join any military pace on
account of its being overwhelmed by fear, inferiority and greed for
profit. Fifthly, when the state engages itself in enhancing it's
productive capacity along with proper distribution, it may be said to
have possessed Upabrmhana characteristic. Sixthly, when other states ,
being oppressed by the passion of fear, greed and the like seem to go
astray from the path of righteousness and peace, to try for their
re-establishment by reminding them of their humanitarian purpose may; be
called Sthitikarana virtue. Seventhly, to have affection for all the
members of the state irrespective of caste, colour, creed and sex is to
adhere to the prescription of the virtue known as Vatsalya. Eighthly,
it is imperative for the state to strive toss educate its members in a
way; which may bring a bout the progress of the State. It is required
as well to attain its ends by non-violent means, so that other states
may be influenced by its policy. This will bring about the
dissemination and propagation of its principles and policies among other
states. This is known an Prabhavana virtue of the state.
The virtue which springs from
Samyagjanana is Anekanta, which aims at comprehending the multiple
approaches and diverse outlooks with a view to reconciling their
claims. When the state imbibes the spirit of Anekanta, it is sure toss
become tolerant in spirit, and to attend to its various aspects. The
principle of Anekanta strives to cut the roots of onesidedsness in
theory and practice. On account of the absolutistic approach the state
is obliged to take a negative attitude towards other states which follow
a different pattern of living. But Anekanta broadens the outlook and
curbs down the absoluteness of one view. Consequently it helps in
fostering international feelings, and in presenting humanitarian
solutions of the various problems arising from the lack of sympathetic
understanding of other-state views and considerations. It will not be
insignificant to point out here that a war is the outcome of one-sided
clinging, while peace results from the many-sided outlook. The latter
should not make the state irresolute; on the contrary it should give
credence to a synthetic approach, and properly attune the demands of
different perspectives.
Lastly, Samyakcaritra credits the
state with five other virtues known an non-violence, truthfulness,
non-stealing, continence and non-acquisition. We shall now deal with
them one by one. First, consummation of non-violence in a state as in
the case of a householder is a contradiction in terms. So long as the
state exists violence in some form or the other is inevitable. Joust as
a householder is incapable of eschewing Himsa to an ascetic level, so
also the state cannot dissociate itself from violence to an absolute
degree, inasmuch as anti-state and anti-social tendencies may continue,
and order to resist the disturbances, the presence of extraneous control
is indispensable. Violence will not be intentional but it will be a
defensive weapon. Notwithstanding the compelled use of force, it is an
imperative function of the state to create an atmosphere of
nonviolence. We may mention here that the application ;of this virtue
should not be merely confined to human beings, but the sub-human
existence is also required to be brought under its purview.
Consequently, hunting and slaughtering of animals for any purpose
whatsoever should be announced as unlawful. It is against the spirit
of non-violence, and sounds as inhuman. Besides, the use of
intoxicants, specially wine, should be banned, and a social
consciousness is to be developed against the use of these derogatory
things. The deeper significance of non-violence consists in the
elimination of war, which has harassed mankind since the dawn of
civilization. War need not be considered a necessity just as Nietzsche,
Mussolim and others had thought. Nietzsche says: �For nations that are
growing week and contemptible, war may; be prescribed as remedy, if
indeed they really want to go on living.� He declares: �Man shall be
trained for war and woman for the recreation of the warrior, all else is
folly1.� �We alone, �Mussolini affirms �brings up to the
highest tension all human energy, and puts the stamp of nobility upon
the people who have the courage to meet it2.� The two world
wars have causes huge devastation's and are sufficient evidences to
prove that the international problems are incapable of being solved by
the institution of war. The establishment of intonation orginisation
and the tendency towards disarmament are the symptoms of the inefficacy
of force, war and violence to act as arbiters among international
disputes. The easing of tensions and cessation's of conflicts among
states, the maintenance of universal peace, and the promotion of human
welfare can only be effected by suffusing world�s atmosphere whitish the
spirit of nonviolence. �Thus the principle of non-violence really
implies that life should be elevated altogether from the plane of force
to that of reason, persuasion, accommodation, tolerance, and mutual
service3.� Secondly, the inter-relations among states should
be nourished upon truthfulness. Fraud or deception defiles the spirit
of co-existence. The use of slander-
1 Religion and Society, p.
199. 2 Ibid. p. 200.
3 World problems and Jaina ethics, p. 9.
ing and ridiculous speech, and of words
which arouse uneasiness, engender fear, excite repugnance and hostility,
inflame dolour and intoxicate brawl, should be banished from the conduct
of the state. Thirdly, the respect shown by the state for the rights of
others constitutes its nonstealing. Colonisation is stealing; hence it
should be condemned as unwholesome. Aggression and domination are
robbery. Hence they must stop. Fourthly, Brahmacary or continence
implies that the state should not dissipate its energies for military
organisations and in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons. The wealth
and labor of the state should be directed for the upliftment of mankind
at large. Fifthly, the virtue of Aparigraha declines to hanker after
other State�s wealth and territory. The surplus production should be
left for the use of other states without any ill-motive. Imperialistic
tendencies should be regarded as baneful by the state. The virtue of
Aparigraha is a mean between capitalism and communism.
The above treatment of the virtues
as applied to the state will oblige up to admit that the state is
required for the development of human personality. The individual
contributes its share to the state and the latter in turn reciprocates
with manifold energy and strength, and affords opportunities for the
material and spiritual development of man. Just as material
backwardness hampers the progress of the individual, so also the state
becomes impotent without material possessions. But the reins of the
horses of materialism should be in the hands of spiritualism. The above
mentioned virtues suffice to evolve a balanced outlook in the state.
The virtues of non-violence and Aparigraha are capable of establishing
universal peace. Non-violence cannot be materialised in the life of the
state without extirpating the passion of greed. The root cause of
violence is material goods. If the importance of the virtue of
Aparigraha is understood at the international level, the attitude of
non-violence will synchronies.
After dwelling upon the Jaina
conniption of the individual and society, the possibility of stateless
society, and the virtues of the state which are capable of affording
solution to the problems of national and international importance, we
now propose to deal with the attitude of Jainism towards casteism.
Jainism looks at casteism with an eye of contempt. The superiority of
one caste over the other is foreign to Jaina ethics. Casteism is an
evil and is based on the passions of hatred and pride. These two are
intense passions, hence they bring about sin to their victims. We find
references in the Jaina scriptures which go to propre that merit and not
mere birth should be regarded as the real judge of castes. The caste
has nothing to do with the realisation of spirit. The Uttradhyayana
says that Harikesa who was born in a family of untouchables attained
saintly character owing to the performance of austerities. Good conduct
and not caste is the object of reverence. Casteism is grounded in
falsity and is purely imaginary. Acarya Amitagati expresses that mere
caste is incapable of leading us to any meritorious attainment. Merit
accrues from the pursuance of the virtues of truth, purity, austerity,
Sila, meditation and spiritual study. Differences in conduct have
resulted in the distinctions of caste. There is only one caste, namely,
manhood. Merit is the basis of caste and the pride of caste destroys
right living. If the modern democratic set up is to be made successful,
casteism must go. Casteism and democracy are a contradiction in terms.
CHAPTER X
A Resume
The commencement of Jaina
philosophy, and consequently of Jaina ethical speculation, in the
present state of our knowledge can be historically traced to the divine
personality of Paravanatha, although the Jaina tradition corroborated by
the Vedic tradition of the Yajurveda and the Bhagavata ascribes its
origin to Rsabha, the first among the twenty-four Tirthakaras. Mahavira
who succeeded Parsvanatha reinterpreted the religion of his precursor
and acted more as a reformer of religion already in existence than the
founder of a new faith. Though Mahavira had a magnetic personality, yet
he had to encounter schism in his own life time. Some archaisms
originated after his Nirvana. But most of the schisms ultimately agreed
with their original source. Only Digambara-Svetambara schism resulted
in a sharp division of the church, each sect claiming greater
authenticity than the other. The Yapaniyas may be regarded as the
reconcilers of these two major sects. The origin of Jaina monarchism,
and therefore of Jaina ethics, should not be attributed to the
Brahmanical idea of sammyasa. It grew up among the imperfectly
Aryanised communities of the east. It is Magadhan in origin.
Jaina ethics is grounded in Jaina
metaphysics. The recognition of the nature of realties either as mere
permanence or as mere change has been regarded by Jainism as subversive
of ethical speculation, and a based on a prioristc and absolutistic
tendency of thought. In consonance with the speculation of the Jaina,
permanence is as much onto logically real as change on the verdict of
�experience�. This metaphysical perspective reconciles the threefold
definitions of substance as that which exists, or that which is
characterised by simultaneous origination, destruction and continuance,
or that which is the substratum of attributes and modes. In other
words, substance as inherently and essentially associated with endless
qualities and modifications, is out and out inconceivable without at the
same time implying existence which in turn in is endowed with the trio
of simultaneous origination, destruction and continuance. Every quality
transmutes its state every moment, though the quality as such is never
abrogated. Substance along with localities possesses mode of
existence. Mutability and mode of existence constitute the meaning of
Paryaya. Existence is an all-embracing characteristic. The relation
between substance and quality, between substance and modification, and
between substance and existence is one of identity-indifference.
Pramana and Naya are the sources
of cognising the Anekantatmaka reality. The former grasps the reality
in its wholeness, while the latter takes into consideration only a
fragment of the totality, and keeps in view the proper regard for the
other aspects. In order that the Anekantic reality may be rendered fit
for communication without any distortion, Jainism invented the doctrine,
of Syadvada which instructs to affix the word sight as a prefix to every
predicate in order to allow room for the predication of other attributes
inherent in the object. The word sysat should not be calculated to
evince the skeptical outlook of the Jaina but to serve as a beacon light
to enlighten the other persisting attributes which have not been
expressed by the proposition in question.
Jainism traces the whole universe
of being to two everlasting, uncreated, co-existing but independent
categories of Jiva and Ajiva. The latter if further classified into
Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kala. Hence reality is dualistic
as well as pluralistic. Plurality though, an ontological fact entails
unity also, considered especially from the synthetic objective point of
view of one existence. The six substances never part with their
original eternal nature. Pudgala from the atomic to the Skandha state
possesses the sense qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour. Though
an atom is devoid of sound, yet the combination of atoms can produce
sound when's they come in contact with other aggregates of atoms. Thus
sound is material. The distinguishing feature op Akasa is to provide
accommodation to all the Dravyas. Dharma and Adharma are the
indifferent conditions of movement and rest respectively. These two
principles of Dharma and Adharma are also responsible for the
demarcation of Lokakasa and Alokakasa. Kala expresses the condition of
change in substances. The self which possesses consciousness as its
essence has been regarded as having supreme significance among the
substances and as having the highest value among the Tattvas. The
empirical selves which vary from the one sensed to the five sensed are
bound by Karnas from an indefinite past. They re conceived to be the
enjoyers of self-performed good and bad actions, and to the knowers and
seers. They extend up to the limit of bodily dimensions, possess the
narrowing and dilating characteristics, are associated with the triple
nature of origination, destruction and continuance and own the specific
characteristic of consciousness. The transcendental self is free from
all Karmas and manifests infinite knowledge, bliss and the like.
We encounter various expressions
of the ethical idea. They converge and culminate in identical
implication. The ethical Summum Bonum may be regarded as the
deliverance of self, the attainment of Paramatman state, the achievement
of Sva-samaya or Svayambhu state of existence, the realisation of self�s
Svarupasatta, the achievement of know ledge consciousness, the
realisation of Ahimsa, the accomplishment of pure Bhavas transcending
auspicious and inauspicious Bhavas, the realisation of self�s true
agency and enjoyability and the attainment of super empirical death.
These culminate in the one objective of the fullest realisation of the
cognitive, cognitive and affective potencies of self.
The question how the self got into
defilement and corruption is avoided by the Jaina by affirming and
admitting it to be a beginningless proess. The principle of Mithyatva
which vitiates our outlook, know ledge and conduct offers a great
resistance to the realisation of the sublime end. Consequently
Samyagdarasana is to be attained which in turn will make knowledge and
conduct conducive to liberation. Unflinching faith in the pristine
purity of the self constitutes Niscaya Samyagdrasana, while the belief
in seven Tattvas is styled Vyavahara Samyagdarsana. Without
Samyagdarsana conduct is incapable of surpassing the provinces of
morality, and spiritualism gets shrouded in mystery. The emphasis on
Samyagdarsana or spiritual conversion proves that the Jaina ethics is
grounded in spiritualism.
With the light of right knowledge
which enables the aspirant to look into his infirmities, the pursuit of
right conduct sweeps away the obstructing elements which thwart the
manifestation of uninterrupted happiness, infinite knowledge etc. In
addition to right belief and right knowledge emancipation presupposes
right conduct as well. He who observes partial conduct being not able
to renounce the commitment of sins to the full claims the title of
�layman�. The minimum of conduct for the householder consists in the
observance of five Anyratas, and in the abandonment of meat, wine and
honey. The Salivates educate the individual for the exalted life of
renunciation. The Pratimas are the systematic stages of advancement
towards the life of asceticism. The exposition of the householder�s
ethical discipline on the basis of Paksa, Carya and Sadhana is the
all-inclusive way of describing the conduct of the householder. If one
is encountered with the causes which terminate the present life,. One
should resort to the performance of Sallekhana which is not other than
the spiritual welcome to death. This is not yielding to death but a
way of meeting the challenge of death undauntedly and adequately. Hence
it should be distinguished from suicide.
The life of complete renunciation
makes possible the extirpation of inauspicious Bhava which remains
unrealised in the householder�s life of partial renunciation. The life
of asceticism is not to recoil from the world of action but from the
world of Himsa. The ascension towards a higher and nobler path results
on account of being motivated by certain incentives to spiritual lie
traditionally known as twelve Anupreksas. If they posses the potency of
pushing ahead the layman into the realm of complete renunciation, they
profess to serve as the guides for the monk who is pursuing the path of
complete renunciation. The aspirant being actuated by these incentives
comes to have a negative attitude towards worldly actions and
acquisitions, and an enlightened positive, tenacious and resolute
attitude towards the life of the spirit. After adopting the internal
and external emblems at the sacred hands of an excellent Guru and after
paying obeisance to him and after going through the course of discipline
which is prescribed, he wins the credit of bring styled Sramana.
The Saint adheres to the
observance of five great vows (Ahimsa, Satya, Asteya, Aparigraha, and
Brahmacarya), of five-fold Semites (Irya, Bhasa, Esana, Adana-Niksepana,
and Utsarga), of three guptis (Manas, Vacana and Kaya); of six-fold
essentials (Samayika, Stuti, Vandana, Paratimkramana, Pratyakhyana, and
Kayotsarga). Besides, he controls the five senses, and pulls out the
hair, takes only one meal a day, does not take bath, and does not
cleanse his teeth. So much is common between a Svetambara and a
Digambara saint. Nudity, to sleep on the ground, to take meals in a
standing posture in the palm of one�s own hand-all these are peculiar to
Digambara monks.
The saint whose life is an example
of the dedication of his integral energies to the cessation and shedding
of Karmas regards the subjugation of twenty-two kinds of Parisahas and
the practice of twelve kinds of austerities as falling within the
compass of his obligations. The former occurs against the will of the
saint who has to endure them or rather who turns them to good account by
compelling them to become the means for spiritual conquest, while the
latter are in consonance with the aspirant�s will to spiritual triumph.
The performance of external austerities does not merely aim at the
physical renunciation but also at the overthrow of the attachment to the
body and senses. Of the six kinds of internal austerities, Dhyana is of
supreme importance. All the disciplinary practices form an essential
background for the performance of Dhyana. It is the indispensable,
integral constituent of right conduct, and is directly related to the
actualisation of the divine potentialities.
Broadly speaking, Dhyana is of two
types namely 1) Prasasta and 2) Aprasasta. The former category is
divided into two types, namely, 1) Dharmadhyna, and 2) Sukladhyana; and
the latter, also into two types namely 1) Artadhyna and 2) Raudradhyana.
The above-mentioned description refers to the former category. In other
words, in dealing with Dhyana as Tapas, we are completely concerned with
the Prasasta types of Dhyana, since they are singularly relevant to the
auspicious and transcendental living. On the contrary the Apresasta
types of Dhyana bring about worldly sufferings.
The saint who is confronted with
incurable disease, intolerable old age, formidable famine, great
weakness, of hearing and sight, infirmity of legs, violent animals in
the forests, etc. adopts Sallekhana (spiritual welcome to death). The
whole of the ethical discipline prescribed for the layman and the monk
has been deemed as a way for translating Ahimsa in practice, the actual
realisation of which can only be effected in the plenitude of mystical
experience. Thus if the fountain-head of ethics is metaphysics,
mysticism will be its culmination. The equivalent expression in Jainism
for the word �Mysticism� is �Suddhopayoga�. Mysticism consists in
realising the transcendental self through the internal self by
renouncing the external self. The journey from the internal self to the
transcendental self is traversed through the medium of moral and
intellectual preparations which purge everything obstructing the
emergence of potential divinity. Before the final accomplishment is
made, a stage of vision and fall may intervene.
In metaphysical terms we may say
that mysticism is the realisation of self�s capacity for original
origination, destruction, and continuance. It amounts to the
realisation of self�s Svarupa-satta. Mysticism and metaphysics connote
differences of approach to the problem of reality. If the qualification
of the mystic is realisation and intuition, the qualification of
metaphysician is merely intellection.
The fourteen stages of spiritual
evolution, technically known as Gunasthanas, may be subsumed under the
following heads, namely, 1) Dark period of the self prior to its
awakening (1st Dark night of the soul), 2) Awakening of the
self, 3) Purgation , 4) I11umination, 5) Dark period
post-illumination (2nd Dark night of the soul), and 6)
Transcendental life. There is also a state beyond these stages, known
as Siddha State.
1) The darkest period in the
history of the self is one when the self beset with Mithyatva. The
plight of the self in the first stage namely, Mithyatva Gunasthana
resembles that of a totally eclipsed moon or a completely clouded sky.
It is a stage of spiritual slumber and the self itself is not cognisant
of this drowsyds state of spirit. Such an ignorant man may be an astute
intellectualism, or a resolute moralist, but he will lack that mystical
quality by virtue of which he may be designated as a real saint. Thus
the spiritual conversion is to be sharply distinguished from the moral
conversion and from the intellectual accomplishments.
2) The occurrence of conversion
spiritual is consequent upon the instructions-either in the present
birth or in some previous birth-of those who have realised the divine
within themselves or are on the path of divine realisation. The
Arahanta is the supreme Guru. Acrayas, Upadhyayas, and Sadhus re on the
path of divine realisation. Only Acaryas enjoy the privilege of
initiating persons in the mystical life, hence they are the Gurus in the
technical sense. The five Labdhis are presupposed before spiritual
conversion may be deemed to occur. The self is now in the fourth
Gunasthana. The second and third stages are the stages of fall from
spiritual conversion.
3) The self has now been
metamorphosed into an awakened self. Mystical adventure will now
consist in eliminating the horrible contrast between the first
enlightenment and the final one. The aspirant will now dedicate himself
to the study of spiritual literature and to the observance of
self-denial. In short, he adheres to the purgative way which is not
merely a negatives process but comprises positive attainments also.
Scriptural study and devotion constitute the integral parts of the
mystic�s moral and spiritual discipline. The self, according to its
moral level, occupies the fifth, or the sixth or the lst part of the
seventh Gunasthana.
4) By this time, the self has developed a
deep habit of introversion, a power of spiritual attention, of
self-merging, and of gazing into the ground of the soul. Through deep
meditation the mystic advances upon the second part of seventh
Gunasthana, and the rest higher Gunasthanas upto the twelfth are purely
meditational stages or the stages of illumination and ecstasy.
5) The self which arrives at the eleventh
Gunasthana falls down either in the first stage or in the fourth one on
account of the rise of suppressed passions, and thus experiences the
Dark-night of the soul. All the mystics do not experience this
dark-night. Those mystics who ascend the ladder of annihilation escapes
this tragic period and forthwith succeed in materialising final
accomplishments in comparison to those who ascend the ladder of
subsidence. The latter type of mystics no doubt will also reach the
same heights but only when they climb up the ladder of annihilation.
Souls, though not every one, are confronted with the darkness of three
types in their life career, firstly, before conversion, secondly, after
conversion, and thirdly, after the ascension of the ladder of
subsidence.
6) Slumbering and unawakened soul after
passing through the stages of spiritual conversion, moral and
intellectual preparation now arrives at the sublime destination by means
of ascending the rungs of mediational ladder. This is transcendental
life, a supplemental state of existence. It is the final triumph of the
spirit, the flower of mysticism. The soul is now �Arahanta� and is
staying in the thirteenth and fourteenth Gunasthanas.
The fourteenth Gunasthana is
immediately followed by disembodied liberation, which is a state of self
beyond Gunasthanas. This state of self is the termination of mystic�s
journey.
The Vedic, the Jaina and the
Buddhist speculations concur remarkably with one another on the
psychological, ethical and religious planes of existence. The cardinal
virtues according to Jainism are: 1) Spiritual conversion, 2)
Spiritual study, 3) Ahimsa, 4) Satya, 5) Asteya, 6) Brahmacarya,
7) Aarigraha, 8) Meditation, and 9) Devotion. Jaina Ethics is
capable of bringing about the individual, the social, the national and
the international progress.