

Abstract of PDNRL No. 36

This book explores the pluralistic epistemological model of a tenth-century South Asian philosopher and emphasizes the vital role of critique for establishing pluralism on rational grounds.

The focus of the book is a text section from the Sanskrit work *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā*, in which the Jaina scholar Vidyānandin discusses tenets of the Vaiśeṣika, a brahminical philosophical tradition. Vidyānandin refutes the Vaiśeṣika tenets by way of a systematic deconstruction of a key concept in the Vaiśeṣika ontological system, namely, the concept of inherence (*samavāya*).

In the first part of the book, Vidyānandin's uncompromising criticism of the Vaiśeṣika is taken as an example for philosophical approaches to competing world views and examined in the context of the classical Jaina theory of manifoldness (*anekāntavāda*). Through the systematic differentiation of several forms of perspectivism it is shown that Vidyānandin's edifice of thought offers a narrow path between relativism and dogmatism: It represents a form of epistemic pluralism, in which the identification of erroneous epistemic alternatives plays a crucial role for the establishment of valid epistemic alternatives.

The second and third parts of the book contain a critical text and an extensively annotated translation of the text selection from the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā*. Vidyānandin's arguments are examined against the backdrop of closely related passages from other Sanskrit works of the classical and medieval periods. The methodical analysis of these passages and the determination of their place in the argumentation's structure allow for the identification of different layers of the text's composition and reveal Vidyānandin's specific contribution in a discourse that spanned centuries.

Himal Trikha is a research fellow at the Institute for the Intellectual and Cultural History of Asia of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna.

Contents of PDNRL No. 36

Himal Trikha: Perspektivismus und Kritik. Das pluralistische Erkenntnismodell der Jainas angesichts der Polemik gegen das Vaiśeṣika in Vidyānandins Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā. Vienna 2012, Hardcover, 401p. ([order online](#))

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Lucas DEN BOER

Perspectivism and Criticism in Vidyānandin's
Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā : Review article

Himal Trikha; *Perspektivismus und Kritik: Das pluralistische Erkenntnismodell der Jainas angesichts der Polemik gegen das Vaiśeṣika in Vidyānandins Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā*. Publications of the De Nobili Research Library 36. Vienna: Institut für Südasien-, Tibet- und Buddhismuskunde der Universität Wien, 2012. € 28.00, ISBN 3 900271 42 9.

Perspectivism comes with a price. If one accepts that one and the same object is revealed by various epistemic events, the disambiguation of valid and invalid perspectives becomes problematic. One could respond to this by accepting a theory of knowledge without criteria of truth but such a theory would be self-defeating and the philosopher who adheres to it cannot even refute obviously false perspectives. It is therefore a crucial challenge for the perspectivist to provide criteria of truth without leaving his perspectivist framework.

The philosophical tradition of the Jainas, which flourished between the 6th and the 17th centuries in India, propounded a form of perspectivism, named *anekāntavāda*. The author Vidyānandin (9th/10th century) was an important thinker in this tradition. He wrote a work titled *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* (hereafter SŚP), in which he investigates the truth of several philosophical systems. In line with the importance of *ahiṃsā* (non-violence) in Jaina thought, scholars have often interpreted *anekāntavāda* as intellectual *ahiṃsā*, an extremely tolerant attitude towards rival schools. In *Perspektivismus und Kritik*, Himal Trikha examines the role of *anekāntavāda* in the discursive practice of Jaina philosophy. With a thorough study of Vidyānandin's criticism of the Vaiśeṣika system in the SŚP, Trikha makes clear that Jaina philosophy is not averse to criticism of rival theories and cannot consistently

be associated with intellectual *ahimsā*. Nevertheless, Trikha claims that a rational account of perspectivism requires the exclusion of single epistemic standpoints. He therefore argues that *anekāntavāda* and fierce criticism are not mutually exclusive and shows that both elements can be found in Vidyānandin's work.

The main question of Trikha's study is how the author of the SŚP uses the Jaina philosophical toolbox in his discussion of rival worldviews. The book consists of three parts that approach this question from a different perspective. The first part offers a historical and philosophical background of the passages from the SŚP that are translated in the third part. It introduces the key issues of Vidyānandin's criticism of the Vaiśeṣika. This section is aimed at readers with an interest in history of ideas and philosophy and abstains as far as possible from philological issues. The second part of the book contains an overview of the arguments in the mentioned passages and discusses several related questions from the perspective of history of literature and literary science. Main questions in this section concern the composition of the Vaiśeṣika chapter and the relation between text elements from the SŚP and other works. The third part forms the core element of the book. It contains the Sanskrit text of excerpts of the SŚP, provided with a lavishly annotated German translation. Vidyānandin's main target in these passages is the Vaiśeṣika notion of inherence (*samavāya*). He points out that the postulation of such a relation between substance and qualities leads to an infinite regress. Trikha's annotations in this section contain numerous passages from other classical and medieval Sanskrit texts. In addition, the book contains several useful appendices, containing glossaries, excerpts of other Sanskrit texts that are relevant for the understanding of the passages from the SŚP, and an uninterrupted version of the text that is translated in the third part.

The layout of the parts listed already reveals the multidisciplinary character of Trikha's approach. Since versatility is not an end in itself, the question rises how these perspectives contribute to the main goal of the study. Trikha explicitly mentions that his work serves two goals. The first is to contribute to the research into a part of the history of philosophy of South Asia, namely the history of Jaina philosophy. His second goal is to investigate whether the Jaina approach of rival schools can be an inspiring method for our current dealing with philosophical traditions of various geographical areas. This twofold goal is a remarkable feature of *Perspektivismus und Kritik*.

At the risk of simplifying, one can say that most studies in Indian philosophy can be classified in one of the following two categories. The first category consists of works that are dedicated to a historical understanding of Indian philosophical texts. The second category contains rational reconstructions of Indian philosophies, whereby the underlying goal is to contribute to contemporary philosophical debates. Trikha's study does not belong exclusively to one of these two categories. With his dual objective, he has committed himself to both areas.

Recent reviews by Jayandra Soni (Soni 2012) and Jeffery Long (Long 2013) have already confirmed the value of Trikha's publication with regard to his first goal. Soni has qualified Trikha's book as an 'excellent philological study' and an important contribution to the field of Jainism, in which reliable and textual studies are scarce (Soni 2012: 695-696). He also mentions that Trikha's study is one of the few sources that shed light on the link between the Jaina and Vaiśeṣika systems. In line with this review, Long qualifies *Perspektivismus und Kritik* as a 'carefully argued work' (Long 2013: 194). There is no reason to deviate from the views of these two reviewers. Trikha's philological work is characterised by thoroughness, completeness and attention to the way in which the Sanskrit text can be made intelligible to the reader. However, Long also stresses that Trikha's 'study is of tremendous value to all who would utilize *anekāntavāda* as a model of pluralism' (Long 2013: 194). This remark concerns Trikha's second goal, which will be discussed in the next paragraph.

Part IA of *Perspektivismus und Kritik* is titled 'Zum Umgang einer philosophischen Tradition mit der Pluralität konkurrierender Weltentwürfe'. The aim of this section is not only to contribute to the history of ideas or Jaina studies but also to appraise the value of Jaina perspectivism as a model for our present-day approach towards different worldviews. With this question, Trikha enters the domain of philosophy. We should therefore not only ask whether Trikha's study contributes to Jaina studies but also investigate the value of his work for the philosophically interested reader.

The part of Trikha's book that is explicitly aimed at the philosophically interested reader occupies 64 pages, which is less than a fifth of the entire publication. The section begins with an introduction of Jaina perspectivism. This part is valuable in shedding light on the meaning of *anekāntavāda* and its compatibility with the use of criteria of truth. Trikha highlights Vidyānandin's criterion of truth, according to which a doctrine can be said to be true if it is not opposed to perception and to that which is rationally

derived from perception. After this exploration of the relation between *anekāntavāda* and truth, Trikha discusses the Jaina criticism of the Vaiśeṣika school and Vidyānandin's deconstruction of the notion of inherence. A schematic analysis of this discussion is added in a separate section. The last section compares Vidyānandin's treatment of other systems with several forms of perspectivism. In this last part, Trikha makes extensive use of original diagrams. These diagrams enlighten the text, though their interpretation is not always clear at first sight. Probably with a view to this difficulty, all visual schemes and diagrams are explained in an appendix.

A strong point of the philosophical section of the book is its accessibility. The text presupposes little prior knowledge but does not lose its interest for specialised readers. All technical terms are displayed in both German and Sanskrit and the discussion is supported with many references to primary sources, under which Vidyānandin's works play a prominent role. The visual additions to the text are valuable tools to critically examine the text and the differences between slightly different perspectivist concepts. To sum up, Trikha succeeds in introducing *anekāntavāda* to the reader who is unfamiliar with Indian philosophy, clarifies the meaning of *anekāntavāda* for those who are well versed in Jaina thought, and inspires the philosophically interested reader to reconsider the plausibility of perspectivism. When this is added to the previously mentioned merit of Trikha's annotated translation, one cannot but conclude that *Perspektivismus und Kritik* is a significant contribution to the study of Indian philosophy.

Nevertheless, every book has its weaknesses. Trikha's book consists of many parts and subsections. Given that the different parts are aimed at readers with different interests, reading the whole document can be an arduous task, which asks for frequently flipping back and forth. For example, the first part discusses the strategy of Vidyānandin while the introduction of Vidyānandin and his work form the beginning of the second part. On the level of content, Trikha's sources are scarce when it comes to general works on perspectivism. Of his impressive bibliography, only one page is dedicated to general works. Although this is not unusual for studies in the history of Indian philosophy, it is not an obvious choice if one aims at contributing to a contemporary philosophical debate. A last point concerns the accessibility of the work. It is a commendable effort of Trikha to write for an audience that does not exclusively consists of scholars in Jaina studies or Indian philosophy. However, it is doubtful whether his book will be read by many readers who do not belong to this category. Since the main part of his book is only accessible for Sanskrit scholars, it is not obvious for a

general philosopher to take his publication in hand. Moreover, the choice for German can be seen as an unnecessary barrier which limits the size of the potential target audience.

Regarding the latter, it is relevant to remark that parts of Trikha's study have been published in English in the meantime. See: Trikha, Himal. "Competing World Views: Perspectivism and Polemics in the Satya-śāsana-parīkṣā and Other Jaina Works" (2012) and Trikha, Himal. "Composition Areas in Vidyānandin's Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā: The First Part of the uttarapakṣa in the Chapter on Vaiśeṣika" (2012).

Overall, Trikha's book is a thorough and valuable contribution to the study of Jaina philosophy. Instead of repeating existing ideas concerning *anekāntavāda*, he examines the actual attitude of Jaina philosophers and shows that their perspectivism is not just a slogan but an instrument for rational enquiry of rival philosophies. Moreover, his study bridges a gap between two fields in the study of Indian philosophy by showing that solid historical studies and contemporary philosophical relevance are not incompatible.

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RÉSUMÉ

L'étude que livre Himal Trikha du chapitre consacré au Vaiśeṣika dans la *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* est une analyse approfondie de la critique de cette école par Vidyānandin. Le livre contient une traduction annotée de SŚP I (1-4) et SŚP II (1-41) et inclut une discussion philosophique de la méthode de Vidyānandin. Cette enquête montre que *anekāntavāda* et critique ne sont pas mutuellement exclusifs et que la méthode par laquelle Vidyānandin falsifie les alternatives épistémiques constitue une description rationnelle du perspectivisme.

region in addition to the usual suspects. Most of the chapters are well-written, condensed summaries, which contain basic information about the religions' origins, beliefs, scriptural traditions, institutional and social structures, and practices. Each chapter also situates the religion under consideration as South Asian, exploring the ways in which the regional context shaped its particular expressions within the subcontinent. Additionally, one of the unique features of the volume is its description of contemporary, lived religion in South Asia and beyond. Each chapter concludes with a brief section reviewing current scholarly questions and methodologies used in studying a particular religion. Discussion questions, a list of key terms, and a short bibliography additionally provide helpful resources for students and teachers. Some of the chapters are stronger than others, and it would have been helpful to include a chapter on Zoroastrianism. Nevertheless, the book is a useful reference for undergraduate students and is also an invaluable resource for teachers with its excellent detailed information about the religions as well as current trends and problems under consideration in the scholarship about them.

Jennifer B. Saunders
Stamford, Connecticut

PERSPEKTIVISMUS UND KRITIK: DAS PLURALISTISCHE ERKENNTNISMODELL DER JAINAS ANGESICHTS DER POLEMIK GEGEN DAS VAIŠEŠIKA IN VIDYĀNANDINS SATYAŚĀSANA-PARĪKṢĀ. By Himāl Trikha. Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, 36. Wien: Sammlung de Nobili, Institut für Südasien-, Tibet- und Buddhismuskunde der Universität Wien, 2012. Pp. 401. €28.00.

In this carefully argued work, Trikha makes a major contribution to the study of Jain philosophy: specifically, *anekāntavāda*, the Jain doctrine of the complexity of existence. The author focuses upon the *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā* (*Examination of the True Teaching*), a text by the ninth-century CE Jain philosopher, Vidyānanda. In this text, Vidyānanda engages in a powerful critique of one of the central teachings of the rival Brahmanical Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy: namely, the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of *samavāya*, or inherence. The Vaiśeṣikas postulate *samavāya* to explain the relationship between a substance (*dravya*) and a quality (*guṇa*). Vidyānanda, as Trikha shows, deconstructs this concept using a *reductio ad absurdum* argument, according to which infinite inferences would need to be postulated in order to explain the relationship between not only the substance and its quality, but between the substance and the first inherence, the quality and the first inherence, and so on. The alternative account of the substance–quality relation proposed by Vidyānanda is that on which *anekāntavāda* is based: that a substance is simply the locus of potentially infinite qualities, conceived as positive and negative relations to possibilities. The importance of Trikha's work is that it establishes that Jain perspectivism is not a form of relativ-

ism, but a kind of middle path between relativism and absolutism: affirming multiplicity, but on the basis of a definite conception of reality and knowledge. This study is of tremendous value to all who would utilize *anekāntavāda* as a model for pluralism, and has the added virtue of including a translation of a substantial portion of Vidyānanda's original text.

Jeffery D. Long
Elizabethtown College

East Asia

JAPANESE RELIGIONS ON THE INTERNET: INNOVATION, REPRESENTATION, AND AUTHORITY. Edited by Erica Baffelli, Ian Reader, and Birgit Staemmler. New York: Routledge, 2011. Pp. xvi + 228. \$133.00.

The academic study of religion on the Internet has blossomed in recent years with a number of important works now in print: L. Dawson and D. Cowan's *Religion Online* (2004); M. Warburg and Hojsgaard's *Religion and Cyberspace* (2005); and, most recently, H. Campbell's *When Religion Meets New Media* (2010) and *Digital Religion* (2012); R. Wagner's *Godwired: Religion, Ritual, and Virtual Reality* (2011); and P. Cheong's *Digital Religion, Social Media and Culture* (2012). This book breaks new ground by studying how the Internet is not a "monolithic entity," but is multiple with different localized language-based internets, of which Japan's is an important example. Part 1, "Religion and the Internet in Japan: Overview and Concepts," has two superb essays by the editors providing the context for Part 2, "Case Studies," a set of informative essays on how the new media technologies have a significant impact on Japanese traditional Buddhism, Shinto shrines, pilgrimage, new religions, Japanese shamanism, and Soka Gakkai. The book's primary contention is that the Japanese version of religion online tends to be "not so much innovative as derivative, and largely an extension of existing offline sources." Theoretically, the book also contributes to a deeper discussion of the Internet's impact on religious authority, which, as the editors correctly observe, has been inadequately treated in earlier studies that are also limited by their examples, which come solely from Western religions. This book is essential reading not only for students of Japanese religion, but also for those interested in exploring the global religious implications of Internet.

Mark MacWilliams
St. Lawrence University

CHINA'S HOLY MOUNTAIN: AN ILLUSTRATED JOURNEY INTO THE HEART OF BUDDHISM. By Christoph Baumer. London: I. B. Tauris, 2011. Pp. xi + 370. £25.00.

Baumer is an explorer of Central and East Asia, and in this book, he takes us on a sweeping tour of Mount Wutai, the Chinese home of the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī and an important pilgrimage site for Central and East Asian Buddhists.

Perspektivismus und Kritik: Das pluralistische Erkenntnismodell der Jainas angesichts der Polemik gegen das Vaiśeṣika in Vidyānandin's Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā. By HIMAL TRIKHA. Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, vol. 36. Vienna: INSTITUT FÜR SÜDASIEN-, TIBET- UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE DER UNIVERSITÄT WIEN, 2012. Pp. 401. €28.

In my review of another book on Jaina philosophy in 2008 I noted, “Not only are reliable and textual studies in the field of Jainism few and far between, but also, even less attention has been paid to texts dealing with philosophy. Consequently, Jaina studies have lagged behind in comparison to studies in Buddhism and Hinduism. Piotr Balcerowicz’s study on the *Nyāyāvatāra*, therefore, is a most welcome publication in the slow but ongoing attempt at broadening the scope of work in Jainism” (*Orientalische Literaturzeitung* 103 [2008]: 411). In the inside flap of a recent publication Hegewald says, “Jaina studies are expanding and increasingly gaining in international recognition” (*The Jaina Heritage: Distinction, Decline and Resilience*, ed. Julia A. B. Hegewald [New Delhi: Saṃskṛiti, 2011]). Slowly but surely, more and more attention is being given to Jaina studies, and, particularly in the field of Jaina philosophy, the work being reviewed here is a further welcome publication helping to close the yawning gap between studies in Jaina philosophy and those in Buddhism and Hinduism.

In Jaina circles Vidyānandin is renowned as a scholastic thinker who had a profound command of Buddhist and Hindu thought. Indeed, he could be seen as a culmination of a rich phase in Jaina thought, following predecessors such as Kundakunda, Umāsvāti, Samantabhadra, Pūjyapāda, and Akalaṅka. Vidyānandin wrote both commentaries and independent works; see a short description of his major nine works in the appendix (pp. 161–62) to my “Aspects of Jaina Epistemology with Special Reference to Vidyānandin” (in *Approaches to Jaina Studies: Philosophy, Logic Rituals and Symbols*, ed. N. K. Wagle and Olle Qvarnström. Pp. 138–68. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto, Centre for South Asian Studies, 1999).

The *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā* (SŚP) is an independent work by Vidyānandin, the original plan of which was an investigation (*parīkṣā*) of fourteen teachings (*śāsanas*) for their truth (*satya*), but the version we have goes only up to the incomplete twelfth teaching (of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā school). Trikha has done a detailed study and analysis “only” of the tenth teaching of the Vaiśeṣika school. The depth and comprehensiveness of his study is evidence of the fact that Vidyānandin’s contribution as a profound thinker has yet to be fully appreciated, because works like Trikha’s also need to be done for the other schools.

In translation, Trikha’s title would be *Perspectivism and Criticism: The Pluralistic Epistemological Model of the Jainas with Reference to the Polemics against the Vaiśeṣika School in Vidyānandin’s Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā*. Trikha divides his work into three parts, two appendices, and three indices. Part I is entitled (in my translation from the German) “The role of criticism in the pluralistic epistemological model of the Jainas” (pp. 37–104), with two subsections dealing with pluralism and the term “inherence.” The title of part II (pp. 105–57) is “Vidyānandin’s polemics in the *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā* against the Vaiśeṣika” with four subsections preparing the reader for the main part III, which contains the text with an annotated translation (pp. 159–301). Appendix I contains eight parts relevant for the study and includes text passages from other Jaina works, extracting references to the key terms “inherence” and “connection” from other works. Appendix II is very useful, for example, for a vivid depiction of the *naya* and *syād-vāda*, crucial terms in Jaina philosophy (briefly explained below). The three indices are for the text passages, Sanskrit words, and names/subjects.

Trikha’s excellent philological study is by and large his PhD dissertation, submitted to the Institute for South Asian, Tibetan, and Buddhist Studies, University of Vienna. When he was approaching the end of his dissertation work, Trikha had occasion to expand his study in two articles in English of about twenty pages each, summarizing some parts of his work. and he announced these in the book being reviewed here (p. 12 nn. 1 and 2). The titles of these essays are also revealing for the content and focus of his work: “Competing World Views: Perspectivism and Polemics in the *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā* and Other Jaina Works” (*Journal of Indian Philosophy* 40 [2012]: 25–45; published online 1 July 2011). His abstract says, “Jaina authors use a pluralistic epistemological model as a tool to claim the superiority of Jainism over the other schools of Indian thought. In this article the general tendency of the Jaina’s epistemic pluralism is discussed and it is shown how the Digambara Jaina Vidyānandin tries to establish the Jainas’ pluralism on rational grounds by identifying erroneous epistemic alternatives through methodological falsification.”

The second article in English that draws on the work being reviewed here is “Composition Areas in Vidyānandin’s *Satyāśāsanaparīkṣā*: The First Part of the *uttarapakṣa* in the Chapter on Vaiśeṣika” (in *Jaina Studies: Proceedings of the DOT 2010 Panel in Marburg, Germany*, ed. Jayandra Soni. Pp. 77–96. New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan 2012). Here Trikha has striven quite convincingly to bring out Vidyānandin’s “specific achievement” in the number of arguments he, Vidyānandin, uses “which to a large extent correspond literally to passages transmitted in other Sanskrit works of the classical and medieval period,” as stated in the abstract (p. 77). Once again, Vidyānandin’s expertise in dealing with the philosophical content of other thinkers in Indian thought is brought to light. It also indicates how a serious study of Jaina philosophy demands a good background in the other schools. Indeed, as John Cort once noted to this effect: studies in Indian philosophy that ignore Jainism are incomplete.

Obviously the key to understanding Trikha’s study is the Jaina theory of manifoldness or non-one-sidedness (*anekānta-vāda*), split into the theory of standpoints (*naya-vāda*) when talking about an object, say, from the universal or particular standpoint (for the other five see p. 337) and of perspectives from which the object can be predicated, where the word *syāt/syād/syān* plays a crucial role. Indeed, this *syād-vāda*, the theory using the word *syāt*, has been seen as the hallmark of Jaina philosophy—so much so that, apart from misunderstanding the Jaina use of it, renowned thinkers in the other schools seem to throw overboard the whole of Jaina philosophy as such (see below). The significance of the word *syāt* lies in its double function in asserting that a predication is made from *one* perspective (e.g., that a particular person is a mother), and that *at the same time* there can be another perspective. From that perspective she is not a mother, but a sister, aunt, etc. (for the other five perspectives see p. 338, and pp. 41–56 on Jaina perspectivism). The person is highlighted as a mother or a sister depending on the context with a specific perspective, without the others being in any way contradictory.

In his commentary to Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahma-sūtra* (2, 2, 28–32) Śaṅkara directs his criticism at the Jainas by accusing them of ascribing to a theory of indeterminacy; that is, that the Jainas subscribe to a theory of uncertainty about the nature of reality, that they are in doubt (*samśaya*) about how to describe an object of inquiry definitively, or that they uphold a theory of scepticism or agnosticism. Dharmakīrti, too, attacks the Jainas in his *Pramāṇavārttika* (*svārthānumāna-pariccheda*, 181–84), calling them “shameless ones” for ascribing identity and difference to a single object. In taking the Jaina view to an absurd extreme, claiming that for the Jainas there would be no difference between a camel and yoghurt, Dharmakīrti asks: “and when he is told to eat yoghurt, why does not the proud fellow run to the camel?” (For more details see the chapter on “*Syādvāda* is not *Samśayavāda*” in my *Aspects of Jaina Philosophy* [Madras: Research Foundation for Jainology, 1996], 20–45.)

In his exhaustive, critical, and clear presentation of the Jaina position vis-à-vis the Vaiśeṣika school, Trikha has faithfully rendered the Jaina position in Vidyānandin's words, namely as the tradition itself regards it. The clarity in reproducing the different levels on the basis of which the Jainas uphold their theory comes out graphically in the diagrammatic illustrations that are abundant in the work in German being reviewed here; the few samples in the articles in English are based on it. It is clear that Trikha strives to make his treatment of a difficult text understandable to the reader, so that the translations, comments, and explanations become vivid through well-thought-out pictorial diagrams.

It is also significant that of the twelve teachings preserved in the SSP Trikha has chosen the Vaiśeṣika school, for which there is now a vast literature. William Halbfass points out that “Jainism has been linked with Vaiśeṣika pluralism” and goes on to say, “However, the nature of the relationship between Jainism and early Vaiśeṣika has not yet been established” (*On Being and What There Is: Classical Vaiśeṣika and the History of Indian Ontology* [New York: State Univ. of New York Press, 1992], 52). Trikha's work certainly goes a long way in not only clarifying the link but also in showing, through Vidyānandin's eyes, how the Jainas disconnect themselves from the Vaiśeṣika school on philosophical grounds.

Scholars of Indian philosophy interested in the Jaina contribution to the history of ideas in Indian thought will certainly welcome this exemplary study by Trikha for its clarity and in-depth work.

HIMAL TRIKHA

Perspektivismus und Kritik. Das pluralistische Erkenntnismodell der Jainas angesichts der Polemik gegen das Vaiśeṣika in Vidyānandin's Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā. [*Publications of the De Nobili Research Library XXXVI*]. Wien: Sammlung de Nobili, 2012. 401p. € 28.– (ISBN 3-900271-42-9).

The work under review is an annotated translation and study of two excerpts from the tenth-century Jaina philosopher Vidyānandin's Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā (SŚP). The SŚP, "The Investigation Whether Teachings are True," of which there is a single edition, edited by Gokulchandra Jain (Calcutta 1964), refutes a series of ten non-Jaina traditions: Brahmādvaita, Śabdādvaita, Vi-jñānavāda, Citrādvaita, Cārvāka, Bauddha, Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā. In the present work the author focuses on the Vaiśeṣika section, specifically, the first part of the *uttarapakṣa* that critiques the notion of inherence (*samavāya*), by translating and commenting on the relevant passage from that section together with a passage from the beginning of the work that provides the framework and motivation for the critical investigation of other theories. Although Jainism is known as the tradition that acknowledges different perspectives, that does not mean that it accepts that competing philosophical views are true. The theories under examination in the SŚP err in taking an exclusive or one-sided position, and they must be refuted in order to vindicate the one true teaching that supersedes them all, namely, the teaching of many-sidedness (*anekāntaśāsaṇa*; see text I 4, p. 170f.). And indeed – also contrary to a common misconception about Jainism – the criterion of truth to be applied in assessing other theories appeals manifestly to the principle of non-contradiction: a teaching is true if it is not contradicted by perception or other assumptions or presuppositions (*drṣṭeṣṭāvīruddha*). That is the charge to be brought against the Vaiśeṣika, in particular, that his theory of categories as "completely / in every respect different" (*sarvathābhinna*) from each other is contradicted by perception (SŚP 35,27-31).

The passages of the SŚP under examination are treated according to a very rigorous philological–historical methodology. An extensive introduction (Part I) provides a great deal of helpful background: Section IA3 (p. 41-54) situates the SŚP in relation to the common Jaina philosophical project of the *anekāntavāda* – this is one of the clearest accounts of "Jaina perspectivalism" the reviewer has ever read. IA4 (p. 54-60) summarizes the main points of the Jaina debate with the Vaiśeṣika. IA5 (p. 60-67) gives an overview of the argument Vidyānandin (V.) specifically develops in the first part of his *uttarapakṣa* against the Vaiśeṣika concept of inherence, to which the Vaiśeṣika appeals in attempting to explain why a whole may not be perceived as different from its parts. IA6 (p. 67-88) compares the method of treating competing world views followed by V. with other "pluralistic epistemological models," in the process clarifying in what sense the *anekāntavāda* can be said to be a kind of "inclusivism," while IA7 (p. 88-91), at least implicitly, defends it fairly persuasively. Section B of the introduction (p. 93-104) further explains, independently of textual references, the problems entailed by the concept of inherence, using diagrams.

After these illuminating preliminaries the author proceeds to the text of the SŚP itself (Parts II and III). He devotes sections of Part II to: (1 [p. 107-118]) a brief description of the published edition of the SŚP (the author has not undertaken a critical edition) and a discussion of the probable dates of V. and his relation to other Digambara figures, (2 [p. 119-1 '5]) a very clear outline

of the contents of the translated excerpts, (3 [p. 127-140]) an explanation of the criteria used for identifying and categorizing parallel passages, and (4 [p. 141-157]) the application of these criteria in determining the sources of the SŚP and, on that basis, giving a detailed picture of its structure and composition (see below). Finally, in Part III, which comprises p. 159-301 of the work, the translation of the excerpts accompanied by a philological-historical commentary is presented. The excerpts are broken by the author into segments ("Textabschnitte," which differ from the paragraphs of Jain's edition) representing steps of V.'s arguments. The text of each segment is given in transcription with parallel passages marked by superscript letters (which are then, below the text, identified as direct or indirect citations, references, etc., along with the corresponding works), variant readings marked by superscribed Roman numerals, and longer passages, marked by superscript Greek letters, that extend across the segments and appear to be indebted to other sources. (This system takes some time to learn, but it is brilliantly conceived and flawlessly executed.) Two appendices include: (1 [p. 305-324]) translations or summaries of passages from four other Jaina works that concern themes relating to the SŚP discussion of Vaiśeṣika, including a passage from V.'s own *Yuktyanuśāsanatīkā* that bears some parallels to the SŚP critique of inherence; (2 [p. 325-333]) indices of parallel passages, ordered according to varying degrees of coincidence, as well as unidentified references; (3 [p. 337-350]) schematic presentations of the Jaina *naya*- and *syādvādas*, using the author's own system of geometric symbols (which the reviewer, unfortunately, did not find very helpful); and (4 [p. 351-375]) the excerpts printed in Devanāgarī, with the segments into which they are divided in Part III clearly marked, together with a running translation without annotations and with minimal use of brackets. This part of Appendix II will be extremely useful to non-specialists who want to access the content of the text without the "distraction" of philological analyses, but who may still refer back to the detailed discussions of the segments in Part III if they wish.

Just this (incomplete) summary of the contents of the work should indicate the exhaustiveness and meticulousness with which these relatively short excerpts (only eleven pages combined in the Devanāgarī version) have been processed. Sometimes the reviewer felt a bit overwhelmed by the intricacy and extent of the philological machinery, yet he must admit that the results are extremely impressive. Every term and concept in the text is thoroughly – and convincingly – explained, so that in the end the literal meaning shines forth brilliantly. Every idea and argument addressed by V. is traced back to its antecedents in earlier philosophical literature. Indeed, the relation of the SŚP to its historical context is illuminated to a degree one would not have thought possible. The author has made every attempt to identify all passages from both Jaina and non-Jaina works that V. cites, alludes to, or may have only been influenced by, as well as citations of / references to the text by later authors (esp. Prabhācandra) and parallel passages in V.'s own works. Certainly, one of the most significant achievements of the study is the analysis of the composition of the Vaiśeṣika portion of the SŚP in IID (p. 141 ff.). Here the author offers plausible hypotheses regarding passages where V. seems to have depended on other sources, and what those may have been, and passages that seem to be his own creations. In many instances, of course, one is able to identify Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika sources, especially the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*; in others, one can discern a reliance on Samantabhadra. For one significant portion of the text, corresponding to segments II 14-29, the author speculates, on the basis of two references to Dharmakīrti and another to Prajñākara Gupta, and from a pattern of parallel passages in the works of Prabhācandra, that V. may have had before him another work "belonging to a Buddhist milieu" (p. 154) that developed some of the same arguments against *samavāya* he employs. The table on p. 157 is a thing of beauty: it assigns the segments representing the first part of the *uttarapakṣa* to different stages of its argument in a very transparent way, while also indexing them according to "Vergleichsstellen."

One cannot really do justice to a work of this complexity and richness in a short review. The reviewer hopes that he will sufficiently convey his admiration by saying simply that he believes

it is a resource, not only for V.'s thought but for Jaina metaphysics generally – for it is about much more than just these two passages of the SŚP – that scholars will consult with benefit for years to come. There is only one place where the translation did not ring true, and that is the translation of the difficult and possibly corrupt text of segment II 13. But even there the author has the integrity to note an alternative translation (p. 199), suggested by someone else, which seems, intuitively, to be the correct one.

There is only one aspect of the book with which the reviewer found himself strongly disagreeing, and that is the implication that, outside of presenting us with a possible model for mediating disputes between conflicting world-views, the SŚP offers little in the way of philosophical interest (p. 40f.): “Relevanz erhielt das Werk damit nur aus philologisch-historischer und aus philosophie-historischer Sicht: Zum einen gibt das Werk einen Einblick in den jeweiligen historischen Entwicklungsstand der behandelten philosophischen Traditionen und den Stand der Diskussion zu Teilproblemen, zum anderen repräsentiert die Art des Umgangs mit konkurrierenden Weltentwürfen, nämlich diese insgesamt für null und nichtig zu erklären, einen in der Geschichte der Philosophie häufig unternommenen Versuch, abweichender Geltungsansprüche Herr zu werden.”

In fairness, the author suggests immediately prior to this that one might “accommodate” V., whose cosmological views are completely outdated, by having a look at his philosophical arguments. It is, however, the discussion of the “Teilprobleme” in the text that, the reviewer believes, would pique the interest of any contemporary philosopher. Merely the following elegant statement of V.'s core argument against the Vaiśeṣika will make this clear (p. 61): “Die Irrealität der Annahmen des Vaiśeṣika wird dadurch zu beweisen gesucht, dass die aus der Kategorienlehre entwickelten Faktoren des Einzeldinges in der Sinneswahrnehmung nicht zur Erscheinung kämen, da das Prinzip, das ihr gemeinsames Auftreten (*vytti*) beim Einzelding und damit die Sinneswahrnehmung eines konkreten Einzeldinges angeblich ermöglicht, die Inhärenz (*samavāya*), nicht in der Weise gedacht werden kann, dass es mit den Elementen der von ihr zu stiftenden Verbindung selbst in Verbindung treten könnte, und deshalb selbst nicht auftreten (*avyttimat*), außen vor bleiben würde. Wenn aber die Inhärenz nicht schlüssig etabliert werden kann, gibt es keine Verbindung zwischen den die Welt aufbauenden Faktoren. Das Weltgebäude des Vaiśeṣika zerfällt in zueinander nicht in Beziehung stehende Bruchstücke; ohne Verbindung geht der Zusammenhalt der Dinge verloren (*sakalārthahāni*).”

A contemporary metaphysician would find this fascinating. Although the concept of inherence does not get much play in philosophical discussions these days, the more general problem of the nature of properties, and the notions of the instantiation of properties and the “compresence” of tropes, certainly do. Thanks to studies and translations such as the one under review philosophers have reliable guides to the theories and arguments of classical Indian philosophy that could potentially provide them with much food for thought.

John Taber